THE SVĀTANTRIKA-MĀDHYAMIKA SCHOOL OF MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM

Donald Sewell Lopez, Jr.
Alexandria, Virginia

B.A., University of Virginia, 1974
M.A., University of Virginia, 1977

A Dissertation Presented to the Graduate
Faculty of the University of Virginia
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Religious Studies

University of Virginia

May, 1982

Jeffrey Hopkins 10/22/81
Harvey B. Aronson

Abstract

In the sixth century A.D., a schism developed in the Mādhyamika school of Buddhist philosophy. The documentary evidence for the split is found in three commentaries to Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakaśāstra). Buddhapālita, in his commentary, presented many of his arguments in the form of consequences (prasaṅga), logical statements put in terms of the opponent's assertions in order to reveal to the opponent the fallacy of his position. Bhāvaviveka, in his Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom" (Prajñāpradīpa), criticized Buddhapālita's use of consequences, insisting that the Mādhyamika's own position must eventually be stated in the form of an autonomous syllogism (svatantra-prayoga). Subsequently, Candrakīrti, in his Clear Words (Prasannapadā), argued that the faults ascribed by Bhāvaviveka were not entailed by Buddhapālita. Candrakīrti also stated that the use of autonomous syllogisms is unsuitable for Mādhyamikas, thereby rejecting Bhāvaviveka's position.

In the eleventh century, Tibetan shcolars used this controversy as the basis for identifying Bhāvaviveka and his followers as Svātantrikas and Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, and their followers as Prāsaṅgikas. These two schools within Mādhymaika were designated in terms of the means by which they sought to cause an opponent to understand emptiness (śūnyatā), with the Svātantrikas employing autonomous syllogisms and the Prāsaṅgikas employing consequences. Tibetan scholars retrospectively subdivided the Svātantrika school into two branches, the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika founded by Bhāvaviveka and the Yogācāra-Svātantrika founded by Śāntirakṣita.

Previous research in the West on the Svātantrika school has,

for the most part, been limited to selected studies of isolated topics within the system. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a more comprehensive and detailed overview of the Svātantrika system, dwelling at length on a number of central issues. Chapter One deals with the Mādhyamika school in general, delineating those tenets which the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas share. The second and third chapters consider the issues on which the two schools part company, such as the use of syllogisms and consequences and whether or not the selflessness of phenomena (dharma-nairātmya) is taught in the Hīnayāna sutras. Chapter Four analyzes the Svātantrika views on the nature of the ignorance which is the root cause of suffering and Chapter Five provides a detailed study of one of the reasonings which the Svātantrikas found most effective in destroying that ignroance--the reasoning of the lack of being one or many. Chapter Six deals with the two truths (satyadvaya), their divisions, and interrelationship in Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. Chapter Seven provides a summary of the assertions of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas and the Yogācāra-Svātantrikas.

The chief sources for the dissertation are the Svātantrika chapters of the two most important tenets (grub mtha') texts of the Ge-luk-pa (dGe-lugs-pa) order of Tibetan Buddhism, Jam-yang-shay-ba's ('Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, 1648-1721) Great Exposition of Tenets (Grub mtha' chen mo) and Jang-gya's (lCang-skya-rol-pa'i-rdo-rje, 1717-1786) Presentation of Tenets (Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa). In addition, the discussions of Svātantrika in the writings of Tsong-kha-pa (1357-1419) were

consulted extensively, with special attention being given to his Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bshad snying po) and Great Exposition of Special Insight (Hlag mthong chen mo). The major works of Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha, Śāntirakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Candrakīrti are also primary sources for the dissertation.

In addition to the chapters mentioned above, the dissertation includes a translation of the entire Svātantrika chapter of Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets together with an edited version of the Tibetan text. A glossary of Sanskrit and Tibetan technical terms is also provided.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Technical Note 1

Introduction 4

EXPOSITION

1 The Middle Way 34

2 Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika 61

3 The Root of Cyclic Existence 108

4 Ultimate Existence 198

5 The Reasoning Consciousness 244

6 The Two Truths 302

7 An Overview of the Svātantrika System 346

TRANSLATION OF THE SVĀTANTRIKA CHAPTER OF J̄ANG-ḠYA'S <u>PRESENTATION OF TENETS</u>

Translator's Preface 365

Part I: Mādhyamika

1 The Life and Works of Nāgārjuna 368

2 Mādhyamika Schools in India 380

3 History of Mādhyamika in Tibet 390

4 The Middle Way 413

5 Scriptural Interpretation 428

6 The Practice of the Path 443

7 Svātantrika 450

Part II: Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika

8 Refutation of Chittamātra 456

9 The Meaning of Ultimate Existence 484

10 The Refutation of Ultimate Existence 496

11 The Two Truths 503

12 Presentation of the Path 528

Part III: Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika

13 Integration of Mind-Only 535

14 The Meaning of True Existence 542

15 The Lack of Being One or Many 554

16 The Two Truths 597

17 The Paths and Fruits 602

Edited Tibetan Text of the Svātantrika Chapter of
J̄ang-ḡya's Presentation of Tenets 609

Glossary 741

Bibliography 766

Notes 810

Technical Note

The transliteration system for Tibetan words is that devised by Turrell Wylie[1]; it has been modified slightly in that the first pronounced letter in the names of persons and texts is capitalized. The transliteration of Tibetan words appears in parenthetical citations, notes, glossary, and bibliography. In order that non-Tibetan speakers might be able to pronounce Tibetan words correctly (which is impossible using a transliteration system due to the number of unpronounced letters in Tibetan), a phonetic transcription system devised by Jeffrey Hopkins is used. The Hopkins system facilitates accurate pronunciation of the central dialect and is used throughout the text wherever Tibetan names occur.

The conversion table from transliteration to "phonetics" is as follows, with the transliteration form on the left of each column and the "phonetic" form on the right. Lines above letters indicate that the tone is "high," with a sharp and short pronunciation:

ka: ḡa	kha: ka	ga: ga	nga: nga
ca: j̄a	cha: cha	ja: ja	nya: nya
ta: d̄a	tha: ta	da: da	na: na
pa: b̄a	pha: pa	ba: ba	ma: ma
tsa: d̄za	tsha: tsa	dza: dza	wa: wa
zha: sha	za: sa	'a: a	ya: ya
ra: ra	la: la	sha: s̄ha	sa: s̄a
ha: ha	a: a		

The "phonetic" system is derived by using the "phonetic" columns above and substituting k and p for g and b in the suffix position; n̄ga, n̄ya, n̄a, m̄a, and l̄a are used when these letters appear after a prefix or under a superscription, as their pronunciation becomes high at that time; dbyang is rendered as ȳang and dbang as w̄ang for the same reason. For vowels, "a" indicates the vowel sound of "opt"; "i" indicates the sound of "it" or "eat"; "u" indicates the vowel sound of "soon"; "ay" indicates the vowel sound of "bake"; "o" indicates the vowel sound of "boat"; and "ö" indicates the vowel sound of "er" minus the "r"). The hyphens between syllables are retained in the "phonetic" form so that the beginning and end of the syllables can be easily distinguished.

The names of Tibetans and Mongolians who live in or have published in the West are spelled as they spell them. Aside from these, all other Tibetan names have been rendered in the system given above in order to bring their pronunciation in accord with the actual spoken Tibetan in the central dialect; the transliterated form of each name is given in parentheses after the first occurrrence.

Sanskrit equivalents for Tibetan terms are given wherever possible; an asterisk before an entry indicates a reconstruction of the Sanskrit.

The transliteration scheme for Sanskrit is also aimed at easy pronunciation, using sh, ṣh, ch, and ṛi, rather than ś,

ṣ, c, and ṛ. With the first occurrence of each Indian title, the Sanskrit is given, if available. The full Sanskrit and Tibetan titles are found in the bibliography which is arranged alphabetically according to the English titles of sutras and according to the "phonetic" transcription of authors of Tibetan works. Throughout the text, the titles of all Sanskrit and Tibetan works have been translated into English. This does not imply that the work has been translated into English.

The Buddha achieved enlightenment at the age of thirty-five under the Bodhi tree near the town of Gaya. It is said that he remained there for seven weeks before setting out for the Deer Park in Sarnath where he first turned the wheel of doctrine. From that time until he passed away at the age of eighty, he wandered throughout northern India teaching doctrines appropriate to the interests and capacities of his listeners. Thus, unlike Jesus whose ministry lasted for three years, the Buddha taught for forty-five, leaving a large body of teachings. Shortly after his death, disagreements arose in the Buddhist community as to how the teachings were to be interpreted as a result of which the various schools of Buddhist tenets were established.

With the rise of the Mahāyāna some four hundred years after the death of the Buddha, a large corpus of literature known as the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras was introduced into the canon. These texts were not accepted as the word of Buddha by the Hīnayāna schools for the most part but were studied and explained by philosophers such as Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, giving rise to the Mahāyāna tenet system of Mādhyamika and Chittamātra.

Based on the idea that the Buddha taught different things to different people in accordance with their capacities, it is the Mahāyāna position that Buddha set forth the basic positions of all of the various tenet systems. Later these positions were expanded into fully developed philosophical systems by the

men who have become known as the founders of those systems. Thus, Buddha taught the doctrine of emptiness in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. His teachings were then elaborated on and developed into the Mādhyamika system by Nāgārjuna, who is considered its founder. The Tibetan word for "founder" in this context is _s̄hing-d̄a-s̄ol-jay_ (_shing rta srol 'byed_) which means "opener of the chariotway." It is explained that Buddha's initial teaching of the doctrines of the various schools is like someone's clearing a new path or blazing a trail. The founders of the individual schools systemized those teachings as someone would expand the path into a roadway, smooth and wide enough for a chariot to pass through.[1]

THE SVĀTANTRIKA SCHOOL

In the sixth century a fork developed in the Mādhyamika chariotway founded by Nāgārjuna, resulting in the formation of two subschools within Mādhyamika—Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. The documentary evidence for this split is found in the commentaries to Nāgārjuna's most famous work, the _Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way_ Called "Wisdom" (_Prajñānāmamūla-madhyamakakārikā_). There were eight Indian commentaries to the _Treatise on the Middle Way_, four of which are not preserved in Tibetan translation, those of Devasharma, Guṇamati, Guṇashrī, and Sthiramati. The four commentaries available from the

Tibetan are that by Buddhapālita, known simply as the *Buddhapālita Commentary*, Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* (*Prajñāpradīpa*), Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* (*Prasannapadā*), and a commentary called the *Akutobhayā*. This last work is listed as having been written by Nāgārjuna but is considered not to be because it is not quoted by any of the other commentators.[2]

In his commentary on the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, Buddhapālita presented many of his arguments in terms of consequences (*prasaṅga*), logical statements put in terms of the opponent's assertions in order to reveal to the opponent the fallacy of his position. In the *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"*, Bhāvaviveka criticized Buddhapālita's use of consequences, insisting that the Mādhyamika's own position must ultimately be stated in the form of an autonomous syllogism (*svatantra-prayoga*). Subsequently, Chandrakīrti came to Buddhapālita's defense in his *Clear Words*, arguing that the faults ascribed by Bhāvaviveka were not entailed by Buddhapālita and that the use of autonomous syllogisms is unsuitable for Mādhyamikas, thereby rejecting Bhāvaviveka's position. The philosophical implications of the use of syllogisms and consequences is analyzed in Chapter Two of this work.

Although Buddhapālita was the first to use consequences in explaining the meaning of Nāgārjuna's text, he is not considered to be the founder of the Prāsaṅgika (Consequentialist) branch of

Mādhyamika. In order to be considered the founder of a system, one must consciously prove the validity of the approach of that system and distinguish it from that of rival systems. For this reason, Chandrakīrti is held to be the founder of Prāsaṅgika school. Similarly, Bhāvaviveka is considered to be the founder of the Svātantrika (Autonomy) branch of Mādhyamika, even though he was preceded by Devasharma who presented the Svātantrika position in his commentary to the Treatise on the Middle Way.[3]

In the eighth century, the great scholar Shāntarakṣhita founded a school which supported the general Svātantrika position but disagreed with Bhāvaviveka on a number of important points. Because, Shāntarakṣhita's school incorporated certain doctrines of the Mind-Only or Yogāchāra tenet system, it is known as Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, whereas Bhāvaviveka's system is known as Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. During the reign of King Tri-sōng-day-dzen (Khri-srong-lde-btsan), Shāntarakṣhita was invited to Tibet where he was instrumental in the establishment of the first monastery in Tibet at Sam-ye (bSam-yas) and the ordination of the first Tibetan monks in 767.[4] After the death of Shāntarakṣhita, his foremost student, Kamalashīla, was invited to Tibet to defend the Mādhyamika approach to the practice of the path against the system of the Northern Ch'an monk known as Hva-shang Mahāyāna. Kamalashīla presented his position in three texts, each entitled the Stages of Meditation (Bhāvanākrama), and was declared the victor in

the controversy which has come to be known as the Council of Lhasa.[5]

As Mādhyamikas, the Svātantrikas propound a middle way free from the extremes of true existence and utter non-existence. They assert that phenomena do not truly exist or ultimately exist but that they exist conventionally, with impermanent phenomena arising in dependence on causes and conditions and capable of performing functions. The unique meaning of the middle way in the Mādhyamika school is discussed in Chapter Two.

That which distinguishes the Svātantrikas from the other branch of Mādhyamika, the Prāsaṅgikas, is their assertion that phenomena exist in and of themselves conventionally. For the Svātantrikas, if things did not exist by way of their own character (svalakṣhaṇa) conventionally, they would not exist at all; they insist on the objective autonomy of phenomena on the conventional level although they refute that phenomena exist by way of their own character ultimately. Things appear to our senses to exist from their own side and the Svātantrikas assert that such is their conventional mode of being. The Prāsaṅgikas, on the other hand, take a more radical position, holding that things do not exist by way of their own character, even conventionally, but rather that phenomena are merely designated by terminology and thought. The fundamental question dividing the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas is where to draw the line between the hypostatization of phenomena and nihilism. How

tenuous can the existence of phenomena be without their disappearing into nothingness? How subjective can the status of phenomena be and still exist?

The Svātantrikas contend that phenomena exist from their own side but that that mode of existence must be posited by the consciousness to which it appears. If phenomena lacked this objective mode of subsistence, this existence by way of their own character, functionality would be impossible and they would cease to exist. They assert that phenomena do not ultimately exist and thereby avoid the extreme of permanence. They assert that phenomena are established from their own side conventionally and thereby avoid the extreme of annihilation.

The Prāsaṅgikas say that the Svātantrikas go too far, superimposing a false nature onto phenomena. They agree with the Svātantrikas that things appear to exist inherently but, unlike the Svātantrikas, they argue that this is a false appearance. Whereas the Svātantrikas hold that the objective existence of phenomena is gained through appearing to consciousnesses, the Prāsaṅgikas contend that that objective mode of being does not exist even conventionally; phenomena are merely designated by terms and thought consciousnesses. They are able to reject the inherent existence asserted by the Svātantrikas while maintaining the viability of conventions. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the conventional nature of phenomena is more conditional, more designated, more provisional, than that propounded by the

Svātantrikas. The sources and implications of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika views are explored in Chapter Two.

It is essential to keep in mind that the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika schools are, above all, religious systems and that their assertions on the nature of phenomena therefore have religious implications in terms of the practice of the path to enlightenment, a state beyond all suffering. Here, Frederick Streng's definition of religion as "a means of ultimate transformation" is appropriate.[6] All of the refutations and proofs put forth by the Mādhyamikas have the final purpose of identifying the exact nature of the misconception which is the cause of all suffering and destroying that ignorance. The Svātantrikas hold that the conception of true existence is the final root of cyclic existence (saṃsāra) but that one may be liberated from rebirth by realizing the coarser selflessness of the person (pudgalanairātmya), without having to understand the emptiness of true existence of phenomena. Bhāvaviveka thus differentiates between the root of cyclic existence and the final root of cyclic existence, the former being the conception of a self of persons and the latter being the conception of true existence.

The Prāsaṅgikas argue that the selflessness of persons and phenomena as identified by the Svātantrikas are coarse and that understanding of them does not result in liberation. Rather, one must understand the more subtle emptiness of inherent existence of persons and phenomena which is presented only

in the Prāsaṅgika tenet system in order to destroy the ignorance which is the cause of all suffering, the ignorance which conceives of persons and phenomena to exist inherently. The meaning of self and selflessness in Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika is pursued in Chapter Three.

In order for the ignorance which is the root cause of suffering to be destroyed, it must first be identified and the object of the ignorance delineated. Bhāvaviveka and Kamalashīla go to some length to identify how phenomena are conceived to exist by ignorance. They identify the meaning of ultimate existence and true existence, the objects of negation in the Svātantrika system. The structure of their arguments with special reference to the metaphor of the magician's illusion is analyzed in Chapter Four.

For the Mādhyamikas, the mere absence of what they identify as the object of negation is the final nature of reality. For the Svātantrikas, this reality is the emptiness of true existence and must be understood by all those who seek the ultimate transformation called Buddhahood. Emptiness is the sacred, the realization of which bestows the supreme good. It can, with qualification, be compared to Otto's category of "the holy." However, for Otto, reasoning has no part in the experience of the holy, where, he says, "coercion by proof and demonstration and the mistaken application of logical and juridical processes should be excluded."[7] The non-conceptual, non-rational numinous

cannot be approached with conceptuality and reason for "mysticism has nothing to do with 'reason' and 'rationality.'"[8] In the Mādhyamika system, emptiness is a hidden phenomenon (parokṣha) which means that it cannot be realized without first relying on inference and reason. Reasoning thus becomes the fundamental conduit to the holy, the sole initial passageway to the experience of the sacred. It is not surprising, then, that the Svātantrikas lay great emphasis on the process of reasoning, proving that phenomena do not ultimately exist with great care and precision. It is their position that the rational human mind, properly directed, has the capacity to destroy all misconception, thereby making all suffering impossible. The reasonings employed by the Svātantrikas are explored in Chapter Five.

The Mādhyamikas divide all objects of knowledge into two categories, ultimate truths and conventional truths. Ultimate truths are emptiness; conventional truths are everything else that exists. Ultimate truths (paramārtha-satya) are ultimate in the sense that they are objects of the highest consciousness, the wisdom directly realizing emptiness, and truths because they exist as they appear. Conventional truths (saṃvṛiti-satya), literally "truths for a concealer" are true only for an ignorant consciousness which obscures or conceals the nature of reality. This is not to inply that the division of objects of knowledge into ultimate and conventional truths is a classification of the

objects of experience into the sacred and profane. If by the sacred one means those objects of religious practice which are worthy of respect or veneration, then many conventional truths, such as the Buddha, his doctrine, and the wisdom consciousness directly realizing emptiness are to be classed as sacred. The various divisions of the two truths and the relationship of the two truths are considered in Chapter Six.

The tenets described above are shared by both branches of the Svātantrika school, Sautrāntika-Svātantrika and Yogāchāra-Svātantrika. However, the two subschools disagree on significant issues, most of which arise out of their encounter with the doctrine of mind-only taught in the Chittamātra school. The Chittamātrins assert that objects and the consciousnesses apprehending them are the same substantial entity (dravya), in other words, they assert that external objects do not exist. The school founded by Bhāvaviveka is called Sautrāntika-Svātantrika because it asserts, like the Sautrāntika school, that the objects apprehended by sense consciousnesses are external objects which are composites of minute particles. However, unlike the Sautrāntikas, they do not assert that external objects are truly existent and ultimate truths. Bhāvaviveka emphatically rejects the Chittamātrin assertion that external objects do not exist, devoting the fifth chapter of his Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvālā) to a lengthy refutation of the system.[9] He argues that the assertion that objects are the nature of consciousness is both

logically untenable and contradicts the word of Buddha. He does not even concede the existence of statements in the canon which ostensibly support the Chittamātra position, explaining that passages such as the one in the Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Dashabhūmikasūtra) that, "These three realms are mind only," were made not to indicate that external objects do not exist but that there is no agent other than the mind.[10] The Prāsaṅgikas assert that Buddha taught the doctrine of mind-only in other passages to trainees who are temporarily unable to understand the Mādhyamika view, but Bhāvaviveka takes the more extreme position that Buddha never taught that objects are of the nature of consciousness and that all of the statements which suggest that can be explained as teaching something else.[11]

Shāntarakṣhita's Yogāchāra-Svātantrika school takes a far more accommodating view of the Chittamātrin doctrine of the non-existence of external objects. His school is so named because it asserts, like the Yogāchārins or Chittamātrins, that the objects of the senses are of the nature of consciousness. However, unlike the Chittamātrins, they do not assert that consciousnesses truly exist. Shāntarakṣhita thus integrates the teaching of mind-only into the Mādhyamika system, creating a synthesis of the two main streams of Mahāyāna philosophy. The resulting Yogāchāra-Svātantrika school represents the final major development of Buddhist philosophy in India. He says in his Ornament for the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṃkāra):

> The non-existence of external objects should
> be known
> Through relying on mind-only.
> [Then] relying on this [Mādhyamika] mode, it
> should be known
> That this [mind] too is completely selfless.[12]

Shāntarakṣhita sees penetration of reality as a process which must proceed in definite stages. One first realizes that the person lacks substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency, that is, one understands the selflessness of the person as taught by the Hīnayāna tenet systems. One then turns one's attention to the objects of sense experience and comes to realize that these objects which appear to be distant and cut off from the consciousnesses apprehending them are in fact of the nature of consciousness, like objects in a dream. It is at this point that one analyzes the mode of being of the consciousness of which sense objects are the same nature, employing Mādhyamika reasoning to discover that consciousness does not ultimately exist.[13]

Although Shāntarakṣhita is considered the founder of Yogāchāra-Svātantrika because he wrote texts delineating it as a system, the view of the school seems to have existed at the time of Bhāvaviveka, who criticizes it saying that accepting the Chittamātra view and then rejecting the true existence of

the mind with Mādhyamika reasoning is like a fool's intentionally wallowing in mud to get dirty so that he can then wash himself and become clean; it would have been better never to have gotten dirty in the first place.[14]

THE LITERATURE

The Svātantrika school has received very little attention from Western Buddhologists. Writing in 1962, Edward Conze noted that, "We still have no clear idea of Bhāvaviveka's Svātantrika system. . . . Likewise we continue to be puzzled by the teachings and affiliations of the Yogāchāra-Mādhyamikas."[15] Perhaps the most easily identifiable reason for the neglect of Svātantrika is the fact that the greater portion of their works were not preserved in Sanskrit. The primary texts delineating the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika system are Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way (Madhyamakahṛidaya) and its autocommentary, the Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvālā). These texts not only provide a detailed presentation of Bhāvaviveka's own system but also include expositions and critiques of the major Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical schools of India in Bhāvaviveka's day. It is as an encyclopedia of others' systems rather than as an articulation of Bhāvaviveka's Sautrāntika-Svātantrika school that the Essence of the Middle Way and the Blaze of Reasoning have been valued by modern scholars. Bhāvaviveka's terse

commentary to Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way and the voluminous subcommentary by Avalokitavrata are also important sources for the understanding of Svātantrika, especially when studied with the Prāsaṅgika commentaries of Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti. The other Sautrāntika-Svātantrika text of central importance is Jñānagarbha's Differentiation of the Two Truths (Satyadvayavibhaṅga), renowned as one of the three texts illuminating Svātantrika. With the exception of a portion of the Essence of the Middle Way, all of these texts have been lost in the original Sanskrit, and only one chapter of Bhāvaviveka's commentary to the Treatise on the Middle Way and fractions of four chapters of the Essence of the Middle Way and Blaze of Reasoning have been rendered into a Western language from the Tibetan translations.

The Yogāchāra-Svātantrika system is delineated in Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṃkāra) and Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way (Madhyamakālokā), which are the other two of the three texts illuminating Svātantrika. Neither Shāntarakṣhita's autocommentary to the Ornament for the Middle Way nor Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way have been translated. Shāntarakṣhita's massive encyclopedia of Indian philosophy, the Compendium of Principles (Tattvasaṃgraha) is a critical survey of Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools and does not explicitly elucidate Shāntarakṣhita's own system. Thus, its translation by Ganganatha Jha[16] does not

contribute directly to our understanding of Svātantrika.

By far the most extensive study of the Svātantrika system took place in Tibet. The two chief figures of the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika school, Shāntarakṣhita and Kamalashīla, played a central role in the first dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet during the eighth century. During this early period many Tibetan scholars followed the Svātantrika system whose influence seems to have carried over into the period of second dissemination during the eleventh century, for it is reported that Atīsha lectured on Bhāvaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning on numerous occasions.[17] However, with the translations of the of Chandrakīrti by B̄a-tsap-nyi-ma-drak (Pa-tshab-nyi-ma-grags), his students began to spread the Prāsaṅgika view, which was also the final view of Atīsha. From this time on, the Prāsaṅgika view continued to gain currency, with the works of Chandrakīrti being highly valued by the most eminent scholars of the most creative period in Tibetan thought (1100-1400) such as Mar-ba (Mar-pa, 1012-1096), S̄a-ḡya (Sa-skya) Paṇḍita (1182-1251), Bu-d̄ön (Bu-ston, 1290-1364), Ren-da-wa (Red-mda'-ba, 1349-1412), and D̄zong-ka-b̄a (Tsong-kha-pa, 1357-1419).

The primacy of the Prāsaṅgika view was firmly established by D̄zong-ka-b̄a, the founder of the Ge-luk-b̄a Order of Tibetan Buddhism, in works such as the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Lam rim chen mo), the Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bshad snying po), and the Great Commentary on

(Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement" (*'Jug dik chen mo*). In these works he presents both the central issues and most intricate points of the Prāsaṅgika school with a precision and style unmatched in Buddhist literature. Thus, it can be said that from the time of D̄zong-ka-b̄a, if not before, the Prāsaṅgika school became the dominant philosophical tenet system in Tibet. It is not the case, as A. K. Warder claims, that Shāntarak-ṣhita's "philosophy has formed the basic theoretical outlook of the Buddhists in that country [Tibet]" since the eighth century.[18]

One of the great contributions made by the Tibetans to the study of Buddhist philosophy was their tenets (*grub mtha'*) texts, surveys of the Indian philosophical systems. Some of the early examples to present an overview of Buddhist philosophy in one work are the first Dalai Lama's (*dGe-'dun-grub*, 1391-1475) *Ship Entering the Ocean of Tenets* (*Grub mtha' rgya mtshor 'jug pa'i gru rdzings*), the Nying-ma lama Long-chen-rap-jam's (*kLong chen rab 'byams*, 1308-1363) *Treasury of Tenets* (*Grub mtha mdzod*), and the S̄a-ḡya translator D̄ak-tsang's (*sTag-tshang*, born 1405) *Freedom from Extremes Through Understanding All Tenets* (*Grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa*). However, the best known tenets texts are those by two later Ge-luk-ba authors, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's (*'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa*, 1648-1721) *Great Exposition of Tenets* (*Grub mtha' chen mo*) and J̄ang-ḡya's (*lCang-skya-rol-pa'i rdo-rje*, 1717-1786) *Presentation of Tenets*

(Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa). These two works seek to present an accurate overview of the schools of Indian philosophy, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. With extensive citation of Indian texts, they survey the central issues of each system. Beyond this, they place the schools in a hierarchical order from bottom to top, beginning among the Buddhist schools with the Vaibhāṣhikas and then proceeding to the Sautrāntikas, Chitta-mātrins, Svātantrikas, and Prāsaṅgikas. They rely heavily on the perspective of D̄zong-ka-b̄a, often appealing to his statement on a particular point as the final opinion. At other times, they lift lengthy sections from his writings without citation.

In the dominant Ge-luk-b̄a order, these tenet texts provide an important medium for the study of the Svātantrika school. Traditionally, the most advanced study of Buddhist philosophy took place in one of six colleges in the three great monasteries located in the vicinity of Lhasa—Dre-b̄ung, Gan-den, and S̄e-ra. Each college, both in Tibet and in the Ge-luk-b̄a monasteries which have relocated in India since 1959, have their own curriculum which includes a survey of tenets. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a and J̄ang-ḡya's expositions of tenets are the most extensive of all such surveys and thus have been studied by scholars of all six colleges, although they are formally associated with Go-mang College of Dre-b̄ung Monastery. The knowledge of the Svātantrika system of most Ge-luk-b̄a scholars would thus come through literature of this genre in conjunction with the study

of textbooks on the structure of the path to enlightenment based on the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika Haribhadra's commentaries to Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayālaṃkāra); it would be a rare scholar who had devoted extensive effort to the study of the original Svātantrika texts in Tibetan translation.

The chief educational technique in the Ge-luk-b̄a monastic universities is a stylized form of logical debate in which the student is expected to be able to defend the positions of the various Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical systems. Thus, although Prāsaṅgika rather than Svātantrika is held to be the highest system of philosophy such that all Ge-luk-b̄as consider themselves to be Prāsaṅgikas, a monk's scholarship is judged in part by his ability to present the Svātantrika position accurately and defend it against criticisms that might be leveled by a Prāsaṅgika. Therefore, both in the context of writing texts such as J̄ang-ḡya's Presentation of Tenets as well as in the debating courtyard, the ability to present accurately a view which is not one's personal view is valued highly. Thus, although Svātantrika is seen as only the penultimate system, one must be able to present it clearly and defend it in debate.

Because of the unique perspective provided by the Tibetan tenet genre, the Svātantrika chapter of J̄ang-ḡya's Presentation of Tenets is translated in its entirety and forms the second part of this study. J̄ang-ḡya's study of the Svatantrika school

is, in part, a compilation of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's statements concerning the system drawn from a number of different works. D̄zong-ka-b̄a never wrote a systematic presentation of the Svātantrika school; his only work devoted solely to the Svātantrika view is his <u>Notes on (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle Way"</u> (<u>dbU ma rgyan zin bris</u>). However, he devotes important sections of his major works such as his commentaries to Nāgārjuna's <u>Treatise on the Middle Way</u> and Chandrakīrti's <u>Supplement to the Middle Way</u>, the <u>Essence of the Good Explanations</u>, and the <u>Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path</u> to discussions of the Svātantrika position and the differences between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. These are J̄ang-ḡya's main sources and his estimation of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's scholarship is evident by the fact that he refers to him simply as "the foremost omniscient one" (<u>rje thams cad mkhyen pa</u>) or "the foremost great being" (<u>rje bdag nyid chen po</u>). However, J̄ang-ḡya's study is not merely a paraphrase and compilation of D̄zong-ka-b̄a. His extensive sections on Bhāvaviveka's refutation of Chittamātra and on the reasoning of the lack of being one and many are original studies resulting from considerable research in the Indian sources. J̄ang-ḡya's fundamental concern with the pivotal issues in the Svātantrika school makes this chapter of the <u>Presentation of Tenets</u> the most valuable study of the Svātantrika system in Tibetan literature.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

In order to assess the place of this study, it is worthwhile to survey earlier studies of Svātantrika in the West. Because Chandrakīrti's Clear Words is preserved in Sanskrit, it is the best known of the commentaries to Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way. In the first chapter of that text Chandrakīrti defends Buddhapālita and attacks Bhāvaviveka. This chapter has until recently been the major source for the Svātantrika position, albeit presented in the words of its most strident critic. The dispute between Chandrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka on the question of consequences and syllogisms has been brought to light in the West in the writings of Stcherbatsky,[19] Kajiyama,[20] and Hopkins.[21]

In 1933 Louis de La Vallée Poussin translated a text attributed to Bhāvaviveka which is not preserved in Tibetan, the Jewel in the Hand (Chang-chung-lun).[22] N. A. Sastri restored this text into Sanskrit and wrote a summary of its contents.[23] He also translated a short work by Bhāvaviveka, the Condensed Meaning of the Middle Way (Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha).[24] It is noteworthy that neither of these texts is cited by Dzong-ka-ba, Jam-ȳang-shay-ba, or Jang-gya, indicating in the case of the Jewel in the Hand that they either were not aware of its existence, did not consider it to be a significant work, or did not consider it to have been written by Bhāvaviveka.

With the discovery of a partial Sanskrit manuscript of Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way in 1936, this text became available to Sanskritists and a number of chapters have been translated, most of them dealing with non-Buddhist schools.[25]

Considering the wide range of original Tibetan literature, it is interesting that one brief exposition of the Svātantrika system has been translated into English three times. In 1968, Shotaro Iida included a translation of the Svātantrika chapter of Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's (dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, 1728-1791) brief Precious Garland of Tenets (Grub mtha' rin chen 'phreng pa) in his doctoral dissertation, recently published as Reason and Emptiness: A Study of Logic in Mysticism.[26] In 1971 the same text was translated as part of Herbert Guenther's Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice[27] and in 1976 it appeared for the third time in a more readable translation as part of Sopa and Hopkins' Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism.[28]

Iida's doctoral dissertation mentioned above also includes a partial translation of the third chapter of Bhāvaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning which presents Bhāvaviveka's own system. Iida's book includes a valuable study of the life and works of Bhāvaviveka. In addition, Iida has written two articles which discuss, in part, the third and fifth chapters of the Blaze of Reasoning.[29]

Three other doctoral dissertations have appeared recently which are of interest. In 1978, Peter della Santina completed a study of the difference between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika as understood by the S̄a-gya order of Tibet, soon to be published as Mādhyamika Schools in India.[30] Kennard Lipman's "A Study of Śāntarakṣhita's Madhyamakālaṃkāra" is the first full-length study of Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way.[31] It considers several of the important issues raised by the text and includes a translation of the root text as well as excerpts from the nineteenth-century N̄ying-ma lama Mi-pam's (Mi-pham-rgya-ntsho, 1846-1912) important commentary to the Ornament for the Middle Way.[32] Finally, David Eckel has recently completed "A Question of Nihilism: Bhāvaviveka's Response to the Fundamental Problems of Mādhyamika Philosophy"[33] which includes an annotated translation of the eighteenth, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth chapters of Bhāvaviveka's Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom".

It is thus clear that previous research on Svātantrika in the West has been limited to selected studies of isolated topics within the system. The one Tibetan presentation of the system as a whole which has been translated is so brief as to provide merely a sketch. The purpose of the present study is thus first to provide a more comprehensive and detailed overview of the Svātantrika system as a whole, dwelling at length on a number of central issues. This purpose is fulfilled in

part by the translation of the Svātantrika chapter of Jang-gya's <u>Presentation of Tenets</u>. From the time that Chandrakīrti sought to distinguish the view of Buddhapālita and himself from that of Bhāvaviveka, the difference between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika has been an important one in the history of Buddhist thought. Therefore, this study seeks to establish what the two schools have in common as Mādhyamikas and to identify the fundamental questions on which they part company. These are the topics of the first three chapters.

As a school of Buddhism, the Svātantrikas assert that ignorance is the source of all suffering; a basic misconception about the way things are is the root cause of all desire, hatred, pride, jealousy and so forth. They also assert that through the use of reason and introspection this misconception can be destroyed, making suffering impossible. Hence, the identification of this misconception and the employment of the means of destroying it are of primary importance. The Svātantrikas offer a unique interpretation of the fundamental misconception, and this is presented in Chapter Four. Chapter Five is the first extensive treatment of one of the reasonings which the Svātantrikas found most effective in destroying the conception of true existence, the reasoning of the lack of being one or many.

This study is thus intended to fill an important gap in not only the understanding of Svātantrika and its relationship with

Prāsaṅgika, but of the fundamental issues of one of the most creative periods in Indian thought. The Svātantrika school is important not only because Bhāvaviveka's criticism of Buddhapālita provided Chandrakīrti with the occasion to delineate the Prāsaṅgika position. The nature and cause of suffering, the identification of the final nature of phenomena, the status of external objects, and the means by which the truth may be known are perennial problems in the history of philosophy and religion and each of these problems is central to the Svātantrikas. Their unique posing of these problems and the solutions they put forth bear our consideration. The Svātantrika school is dead in the sense that there are no more Svātantrikas. But the study of the Svātantrika in the West is in its infancy. This study is then not intended as the final word on the Svātantrika system, but as a beginning in the hope that it will serve as a basis and background for further research.

Sources and Methods

In the study of the Svātantrika system, eight strata of source material are available for the researcher. In chronological order, the first level is that of the statements by the Buddha, appearing for the most part in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, which provide the canonical basis for the Mādhyamika school. Those statements were interpreted by Nāgārjuna, the founder of

Mādhyamika, whose writings constitute the second level. Third are the writings of the systematizers of Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika, the central figures of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika—Buddhapālita, Chandrakīrti, Bhāvaviveka, and Shāntarakṣhita. On the fourth level are the Indian commentators on the works of these authors whose explanations are often invaluable for unpacking the terse pronouncements of the root texts. In this category are writers such as Avalokitavrata, Jñānagarbha, Kamalashīla, and Jayānanda. The first four levels occur in Indian literature, lost for the most part in the original Sanskrit but preserved in Tibetan translations.

The next four strata have their origin in Tibet. The first is the writings of D̄zong-ka-b̄a. For the Ge-luk-b̄as, this is also the most important of the Tibetan levels because just as the Indian writers cite a statement by the Buddha or, among the Mādhyamikas, by Nāgārjuna, as scriptural support for their arguments, so Ge-luk-b̄a writers appeal to the works of D̄zong-ka b̄a. It was his careful scrutiny of the writings of all the authors mentioned above that resulted in the detailed and precise presentation of Mādhyamika that is a hallmark of the Ge-luk-b̄a curriculum.

There is a special methodological problem associated with the study of the Svātantrika school and that is that the terms "Svātantrika" and "Prāsaṅgika" were not used by the Indian principals such as Bhāvaviveka and Chandrakīrti. The terms

were coined by Tibetan scholars, probably in the eleventh century. If Bhāvaviveka and Shāntarakṣhita saw themselves simply as Mādhyamikas, the question of the efficacy of the retrospective designation "Svātantrika" to what may have not been a self-conscious "system" must be raised. In other words, the Tibetans say that there were two subschools of Mādhyamika, Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. D̄zong-ka-b̄a says that these terms were not used in India. Thus, were individual subschools which were not present in name present in fact? Is the Tibetan division accurate? The answer to this question will be found by extensively and systematically analyzing D̄zong-ka-b̄a's exegesis of the Indian Mādhyamika literature because his is the most complete, the most influential, and the most articulate presentation. If the Tibetan approach is to be questioned, it is D̄zong-ka-b̄a's writings which must be scrutinized. His arguments are considered in Chapter Two.

Returning to the levels of source material, the sixth level is that of the tenet literature, represented most notably by the works of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a and J̄ang-ḡya. These texts offer a systematic presentation of the schools of Buddhist philosophy which provide a valuable overview and basis for comparison of specific problems.

The seventh level is comprised of Tibetan works which are devoted to a more specific and extensive study of a particular topic. In this category fall such works as D̄en-dar-hla-ram-b̄a's

(bsTan-dar-lha-ram-pa, born 1759) Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many (gCig du bral gyi rnam gzhag) and Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's (Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, born 1797) Explanation of the Meaning of "Conventional" and "Ultimate" in the Four Tenet Systems (Grub mtha' gzhi'i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i don rnam par bshad pa).

The eighth and final level of potential sources is traditionally not committed to paper. This is the oral commentary of the Tibetan scholar. Since none of the Tibetan texts described above is intended to be complete in and of itself, in the traditional Tibetan curriculum these texts serve as lecture notes for the teacher who expands on and raises questions about points in the text. The texts are often written in such a terse style that certain passages would be incomprehensible without the benefit of a skilled scholar. In addition to unravelling seemingly intractable problems, the best Tibetan scholars have the ability to bring together problems which are ostensibly utterly unrelated, to reveal illuminating parallels.

In the preparation of this study, all eight strata were drawn from. Using the sixth and eighth levels as the basis, specifically the Svātantrika chapter of J̄ang-ḡya's Presentation of Tenets conjoined with the oral commentary of an eminent ge-s̄hay (dge-bshes), I went on to examine the works of D̄zong-ka-b̄a, the writings of the Svātantrika masters and Nāgārjuna, and occasionally their sutra sources. D̄en-dar-hla-ram-b̄a's

exposition of the reasoning of the lack of being one or many proved to be a most valuable source for unfolding the intricacies of the reasoning. However, I found myself in moments of difficulty returning again and again to D̄zong-ka-b̄a, especially to his Essence of the Good Explanations and Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, for both concise and incisive answers to the most difficult problems. His works became the pivot, explaining the Indian texts and providing the source of the Tibetan studies.

* * *

My study of the Svātantrika school began in 1977 when I began reading D̄en-dar-hla-ram-b̄a's Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many. Finding it difficult to take full advantage of this text without a broader understanding of the Svātantrika system, I turned my attention to the Svātantrika chapter of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's Great Exposition of Tenets. Intending to include this chapter as the translation section of my dissertation, I set out for India under the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Abroad Program. With the kind cooperation of my advisor, Dr. K. K. Mittal of Delhi University, and the assistance of C. S. Ramakrishnan, Director of the United States Educational Foundation in India, I soon left for Dharmsala and the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives where I completed a rough translation of the Svātantrika chapter of the Great Exposition

of Tenets along with Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's invaluable Annotations (mChan 'grel). While in Dharmsala, I had the opportunity to study the root text of the Mādhyamika chapter of the Great Exposition of Tenets with Go-mang (sGo-mang) D̄en-b̄a Gyel-tsen (bsTan-pa-rgyal-mtshan), currently scholar-in-residence at Toyo Bunkyo in Japan. Upon returning to New Delhi, I began classes with Ge-shay B̄el-den Drak-b̄a (dPal-ldan-grags-pa), Librarian of Tibet House Library, who read with me the entire Svātantrika chapter of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's Great Exposition of Tenets. His skillful exposition kept me in Delhi longer than I had planned.

On a trip to Sarnath, I visited the Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies, where I was able to put the questions that were beginning to accumulate to two senior instructors of the Institute, L̄o-s̄el-ling (bLo-gsal-gling) Ge-s̄hay Ye-s̄hay Tap-kay (Ye-shes-thaps-mkhas) and Go-mang Ge-s̄hay Tsul-trim Gya-tso (Tshul-khrims-rgya-mtsho). I later had the opportunity to meet the Principal of the Institute, S̄am-dong Rin-b̄o-chay, who encouraged me to consult the works of D̄zong-ka-b̄a.

In January of 1979, I made the first of two trips to the Ge-luk-b̄a monasteries of Gan-den (dGa'-ldan) and Dre-b̄ung ('Bras-spungs) in Karnataka State. There I was able to study the Great Exposition of Tenets with the abbot of Go-mang College, Nga-w̄ang Nyi-ma (Ngag-dbang-nyi-ma). Realizing that at some point I should also read the Svātantrika chapter of J̄ang-ḡya's Presentation of Tenets, I asked the former abbot of L̄o-sel-l̄ing

College, Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en (Ye-shes-thub-brten), to read the text with me. His commentary proved captivating, and I soon decided that J̄ang-ḡya's chapter should form the translation section of my thesis. After returning to Dharmsala in April to attend public lectures by the Dalai Lama, I came once again to Dre-b̄ung where I began to translate J̄ang-ḡya. During this second visit I also studied the Chittamātra and Svātantrika chapters of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Essence of the Good Explanations with Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en. I returned to the United States in August of 1980. In 1981, I reviewed Bhāvaviveka's refutation of Chittamātra in J̄ang-ḡya's chapter with the former abbot of the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa, Lo-sang Wang-du (bLo-bzang-dbang-'dus).

I wish to express my appreciation to all of the scholars mentioned above. Their insights into the world of Buddhist philosophy are the reward to those who learn to speak Tibetan. In addition, I offer my deep thanks to His Holiness, the Dalai Lama who offered penetrating answers to my most difficult questions in audiences in Dharmsala, Montreal, and most recently, at Harvard University. Finally I wish to thank my thesis advisor and mentor, Professor Jeffrey Hopkins, for all of his help and encouragement during my research, both in India and the United States. It is often the case that after studying with one person for an extended period of time we sadly reach the end of his learning. This has not been my experience with Professor Hopkins.

> Abandoning the two extremes, the Tathāgata realized the middle path, producing vision, producing knowledge, leading to clairvoyance, enlightenment, and nirvana.
>
> Saṃyutta Nikāya

In his first sermon after his enlightenment, Buddha spoke of a middle way free from the two extremes. Here, the two extremes refer to the life of self-indulgence he experienced as a prince and the self-mortification he practiced as an ascetic. In his first sermon, he goes on to say that the middle way is the eight-fold path, beginning with right view (samyak-dṛṣhṭi). In the centuries following Buddha's nirvana, schools of Buddhist tenets (siddhānta) arose, each with its own position as to what constitutes the right view, the philosophical middle free from extremes. Although all Buddhist schools consider themselves to be proponents of the middle way, it is only the school founded by Nāgārjuna that overtly calls itself Mādhyamika. What is the middle way for Nāgārjuna and his followers?

A Mādhyamika is defined as a person who propounds the correctness of a middle way which is free from the extreme of permanence (shashvatānta)—that phenomena ultimately exist (paramārtha-sat)—and the extreme of annihilation (uchchhedānta) that phenomena do not exist even conventionally (vyavahāra-sat).[1] The extreme of permanence, also known as the extreme of

existence (astyanta) and the extreme of superimposition (āropānta) is the true existence (satya-sat), ultimate existence (paramārtha-sat), or real existence (samyak-sat) of persons and other phenomena. The extreme of annihilation, also referred to as the extreme of non-existence (nāstyanta) and the extreme of denial (abhyākhyānānta), is the utter non-existence of persons and other phenomena.[2]

Conceiving or actively asserting that things truly exist or that they do not exist even conventionally is a case of falling to an extreme. The extremes are dangerous places, compared to the abyss beneath a rocky precipice[3] and holding one of the extremes is likened to falling off a cliff. There are specific dangers associated with each of the extremes. Through holding the view of utter non-existence, one is reborn in one of the bad migrations (gati) as an animal, hungry ghost, or hell being.[4] Presumably, such a nihilistic view would inspire non-virtuous actions, such as murder, which would then serve as the cause of a painful rebirth. Through conceiving phenomena to be truly existent, that is, by falling to the extreme of permanence, one could not be liberated from cyclic existence.[5] Thus, one might engage in virtuous activities which cause rebirth as a god, demigod, or human, but so long as the conception of true existence underlay those deeds, one could not cut the final root of cyclic existence (saṃsāra).

J̄ang-ḡya distinguishes between an extreme and holding an

extreme. An extreme is, for example, the non-existence of cause and effect. Holding an extreme would, in this case, be the conception of the non-existence of cause and effect. Therefore, as J̄ang-ḡya points out, an extreme necessarily does not exist whereas holding an extreme, that is, the consciousness conceiving of an extreme, does exist.

D̄zong-ka-b̄a clarifies the meaning of the extremes in the first chapter of his commentary to Nāgārjuna's <u>Treatise on the Middle Way</u> (<u>Madhyamakashāstra</u>). He emphasizes that the mere presence of the terms "existence" and "non-existence" do not constitute extremes of existence and non-existence. For example, the non-existence of faults in a Buddha is not an extreme of non-existence, nor is the existence of wisdom and mercy in a Buddha an extreme of existence.[7]

More importantly, the fact that phenomena do not exist ultimately is not an extreme of non-existence. To say that something does not ultimately exist does not mean that it is utterly non-existent. The Mādhyamikas hold that since ultimate/ real / true existence does not exist conventionally, non-ultimate/non-real/non-true existence must exist conventionally. Ultimate existence and non-ultimate existence are mutually exclusive, the presence of one precluding the presence of the other. They are also a dichotomy, for when ultimate existence is refuted, its negative—non-ultimate existence—is established as an object of awareness.[8] Therefore, when ultimate existence—the extreme of permanence—is

negated, non-ultimate existence is implied; thus, non-ultimate existence is not an extreme of non-existence. Since ultimate existence does not conventionally exist, its opposite, non-ultimate existence, must conventionally exist.[9]

D̄zong-ka-b̄a also enumerates types of extremes. Although extreme of permanence, extreme of existence, and extreme of superimposition are synonyms and extreme of annihilation, extreme of non-existence, and extreme of denial are synonyms, there are superimpositional extremes of non-existence and deprecational extremes of non-existence. An example of the latter would be to say that phenomena such as actions and their effects, the existence of which is undeniable for Buddhists, do not even conventionally exist. A superimpositional extreme of non-existence would be to hold that the non-existence of the object of negation—true existence—itself truly exists, that is, that emptiness—the negative of true existence—itself truly exists.[10]

Mādhyamikas are so-called because they abide in the middle free from all extremes. They are able to do this because of their understanding of the relationship between emptiness (shūnyatā) and dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda). An emptiness is a phenomenon's lack of true existence. Each phenomenon is empty of true existence and that mere absence of true existence is the final nature of that phenomenon. Dependent arising is, loosely speaking, the positive implication of

the absence of true existence. All phenomena are dependent arisings in the sense that they either arise in dependence on causes and conditions, are designated in dependence on their basis of imputation, or are imputed in dependence on a designating term or thought.[11] This third type of dependent arising is the most subtle and is asserted only by the Prāsaṅgikas.

Only the Mādhyamikas assert that all phenomena are empty of true existence and that all phenomena are dependent arisings. The other schools of Buddhist tenets assert the true existence of at least some phenomena and limit the category of dependent arisings to impermanent things, taking the term "arising" (samutpāda) in "dependent arising" to mean arising in dependence on causes and conditions. Since whatever is a caused phenomenon is necessarily impermanent (anitya) according to the Sautrāntikas, Chittamātrins, and Mādhyamikas, dependent arisings must be impermanent. The Mādhyamikas, however, take the term samutpāda also to mean "established" and assert that all phenomena, caused and uncaused, impermanent and permanent, are dependently established.[12]

J̄ang-ḡya notes that dependent arising means being empty of true existence and being empty of true existence means dependent arising.[13] This compatability of emptiness and dependent arising is a hallmark of Mādhyamika philosophy. Something that lacks ultimate existence cannot be independently established, it must be dependently established, a dependent arising. Something that is a dependent arising

cannot be ultimately existent, it must lack ultimate existence, be empty of ultimate existence. This is what is meant by the synonymity of emptiness and dependent arising.

The emptiness of a phenomenon such as a sprout and the sprout's dependent arising are synonymous because if the sprout were truly established it would not be a dependent arising and if it were not a dependent arising, it would be truly established.[14] Technically, however, emptiness and dependent arising are not synonymous because, in that case, whatever was a dependent arising would have to be an emptiness. Although whatever is an emptiness is necessarily a dependent arising, the converse is not true because an emptiness is necessarily a permanent (nitya), non-affirming negative (prasajya-pratiṣhedha) phenomenon, whereas dependent arisings include all phenomena, permanent and impermanent. Nonetheless, it is accurate to say that whatever is empty of true existence is a dependent arising and whatever is a dependent arising is empty of true existence.[15]

Dependent arising is called the king of reasonings because it allows the Mādhyamikas to refute both extremes simultaneously. The Chittamātrins, for example, need two separate reasons to abandon the two extremes as they define them. They say that they abandon the extreme of annihilation because they assert that impermanent phenomena truly exist as the same entity as the consciousness perceiving them. They abandon the extreme of permanence by asserting that impermanent phenomena do not have

a nature separate from that of consciousness.[16] The Mādhyamikas refute both extremes merely by asserting that all phenomena in the universe are dependent arisings. Specifically, the fact that they are "dependent" refutes the extreme of permanence. Whatever is dependent cannot be truly existent. The fact that they are "arisings" or "established" refutes the extreme of annihilation because whatever is arisen or established cannot be utterly non-existent.[17]

A formal statement of the reasoning of dependent arising in syllogistic form would be "All phenomena do not truly exist because of being dependent arisings." By ascertaining the property of the subject (pakṣhadharma)—that all phenomena are dependent arising—the extreme of annihilation is refuted because if something is dependently arisen, it must exist. The extreme of permanence is also refuted because whatever is dependently arisen cannot be independently or ultimately established. Having ascertained the pervasion (vyāpti), that "whatever is a dependent arising does not truly exist" and having ascertained the property of the subject (pakṣhadharma), that all phenomena are dependent arisings, one ascertains the thesis (pratijñā), that all phenomena do not truly exist. The thesis further refutes the two extremes because the fact that phenomena do not truly exist avoids the extreme of permanence—that phenomena truly exist—and the extreme of annihilation in that only true existence, not conventional existence, is

negated.[18]

That Nāgārjuna found dependent arising to be the most praiseworthy of Buddha's teaching is evident from the expressions of worship of his major works. His Treatise on the Middle Way begins:

> I bow down to the perfect Buddha
> The best of proponents [who teaches]
> That what dependently arises
> Has no cessation, no production,
> No annihilation, no permanence,
> No coming, no going,
> No difference, no sameness,
> Pacified of elaborations, at peace.[19]

Dependent arisings lack truly existent cessation, production, annihilation, permanence, coming, going, sameness, and difference.

His Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktiṣhaṣhtikākārikā) begins:

> I bow down to the King of Subduers
> Who set forth dependent arising,
> This mode by which production and
> Disintegration are abandoned.[20]

Because of being dependent arisings, phenomena lack truly

existent production and disintegration.[21]

His Refutation of Objections (Vigrahavyāvartinīkārikā) begins:

> I bow down to the perfect Buddha
> Who made the supreme, unique statement
> That emptiness and dependent arising
> Are synonymous with the middle way.[22]

Dependent arising, the middle path free from the two extremes, and the emptiness of true existence are synonyms.[23]

His Praise of the Inconceivable (Achintyastava) begins:

> I bow down to the one with incomparable,
> Inconceivable, unparalleled wisdom
> Who taught that dependently arisen things
> Are just without entityness.[24]

Because phenomena are dependent arisings, they lack a truly established entity.[25]

Finally, his Friendly Letter (Suhṛllekha) says:

> This dependent arising is the most precious and profound
> Of the treasures of the Conqueror's speech.
> Those who see it correctly see the supreme aspect
> Of [the teaching of] the Buddha, the knower of suchness.[26]

Dependent arising is thus praised by Nāgārjuna as the most valuable of all the Buddha's teachings.

Dependent arising and its compatability with emptiness are seen as a unique tenet of Mādhyamika, distinguishing it from and raising it above the other Buddhist tenet systems. All schools of Buddhist tenets purport to follow the middle way and offer their own interpretation of the extremes. The Vaibhāshikas and Sautrāntikas assert that all impermanent phenomena are dependent arisings in the sense that they arise in dependence on causes and conditions. They refute the extreme of permanence, which for them is the existence of an unchanging agent such as the principal (<u>pradhāna</u>) asserted by the Sāṃkyas. They avoid the extreme of annihilation by upholding the doctrine of the cause and effect of actions, which is rejected by the Chārvākas.[27]

The Chittamātrins assert that the extreme of permanence is the true existence of imaginary natures (<u>parikalpita-svabhāva</u>). Specifically, they identify the belief that objects exist as separate entities from the consciousnesses perceiving them and the conception that objects truly exist as the bases of their names as cases of holding the extreme of permanence. They abandon this extreme because they hold that other-powered phenomena (<u>paratantra</u>) lack this imaginary nature. They identify the extreme of annihilation as the utter non-existence of other-powered natures—impermanent phenomena—and thoroughly

established natures (parinishpanna-svabhāva)—the emptiness of subject and object existing as separate entities. They avoid this extreme by asserting that these two natures ultimately exist, that is, that objects truly exist as the nature of consciousness, consciousnesses truly exist, and the emptiness of the duality of subject and object truly exist.[28]

From the Mādhyamika perspective, the extremes identified by the other tenet systems are trifling in the sense that they do not apply to all phenomena and fabricated in the sense that they are inaccurate. The Hīnayāna assertion that impermanent phenomena are free of the extreme of permanence because they arise in dependence on causes and conditions is not rejected by the Mādhyamikas, but it does not apply equally to all phenomena, specifically to permanent phenomena and is therefore trifling.[29] The Chittamātrin middle way is also considered to be trifling. The fact that other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena exist by way of their own character (svalakshana) avoids the extreme of annihilation and the fact that imaginary natures do not exist by way of their own character avoids the extreme of permanence. But because the Chittamātrins are incapable of positing one mode of being by which all phenomena are free of both extremes (as the Mādhyamikas do with dependent arising), the extremes as they understand them are considered to be trifling by the Mādhyamikas.[30]

Furthermore, according to the Mādhyamikas, not only is

the Chittamātrin middle way trifling, it is wrong. Because the Mādhyamikas assert that objects conventionally exist as separate entities from the perceiving consciousness, they reject the Chittamātrin assertion that the duality of subject and object is an extreme of permanence. Because the Mādhyamikas also assert that all phenomena are empty of true existence, they do not identify the lack of ultimate existence of other-powered phenomena as an extreme of annihilation. The Chittamātrins come to this view because they assert, in contrast to the Mādhyamikas, that if other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures did not ultimately exist, they would not exist at all.[31]

Furthermore, besides contending that the other systems misidentify the extremes, the Mādhyamikas assert that all non-Mādhyamika systems fall to the extremes. The Vaibhāshikas assert that partless particles are ultimate truths and truly exist.[32] The Sautrāntikas assert that impermanent phenomena are ultimately able to perform functions and truly exist.[33] The Chittamātrins assert that other-powered and thoroughly established natures truly exist. Thus, although the Vaibhāṣhikas, Sautrāntikas, and Chittamātrins respectively assert that partless particles, functioning things, and other-powered natures are impermanent, from the Mādhyamika perspective they have fallen to the extreme of permanence by asserting true existence.[34] Once they assert true existence, they also

implicitly fall to the extreme of annihilation, according to Jang-gya.[35] If a phenomenon is truly existent, it must be unchanging in nature; thus, for it to cease, it must become utterly non-existent. Since the Vaibhāshikas, Sautrāntikas, and Chittamātrins assert that these impermanent phenomena, which they hold to be truly existent, disintegrate every moment, they thereby come to hold the extreme of annihilation. The Chittamātrins explicitly fall to the extreme of annihilation by asserting that sense objects do not exist even conventionally as entities separate from a perceiving consciousness.[36]

The fact that the non-Mādhyamika systems fall to the two extremes does not negate their heuristic value. The Mahāyāna tenet systems believe that Buddha clairvoyantly knew the minds and capacities of his listeners and through his skillful means (upāyakaushala) taught what was most appropriate for each. To those who could not accept or understand the view that the self does not exist, he taught that a self does exist. In that way he was able to inspire faith in his teaching and eventually lead these trainees to the more subtle view.[37] Nāgārjuna describes Buddha's approach in his Precious Garland (Ratnāvalī):

> Just as grammarians
> Begin with reading the alphabet
> So the Buddha teaches doctrines
> Which students can bear.

To some he teaches doctrines
For reversal of sins.
To some, for the sake of achieving merit.
To some, doctrines based on duality.

To some [he teaches doctrines] based on non-duality.
To some, the profound, frightening to the fearful,
Having an essence of emptiness and compassion
The means of achieving highest enlightenment.[38]

The first stanza indicates that just as a grammar teacher begins by teaching children the individual letters of the alphabet before teaching them how the letters are put together to form words, the Buddha teaches doctrines which are suitable to the level of awareness of his followers.[39]

The first three lines of the second stanza identify the doctrine of the cause and effect of actions whereby non-virtues may be abandoned and virtuous actions practiced, resulting in the accumulation of merit which will bring rebirth in a good migration. The last line of the second stanza refers to the doctrine taught to followers of the Vaibhāṣhika and Sautrāntika lineages to whom Buddha teaches that a self of persons (pudgalātman) does not exist but that objects and subject do truly exist as separate entities.

The first line of the third stanza identifies the doctrines taught to those Mahāyānists who are temporarily incapable of understanding the Mādhyamika view and therefore are taught the existence of an emptiness of duality of subject and object. The last three lines refer to the teachings of non-true existence and compassion which the Buddha gives to Mahāyāna trainees of greatest awareness; the teaching of emptiness would frighten those who believe strongly in true existence because they would mistake it for utter non-existence.[40]

This idea of a progression of doctrines, culminating in the Mādhyamika view is also reflected in Āryadeva's Four Hundred (Chatuḥshataka):

> In the beginning non-merit is overcome.
> In the middle self is overcome.
> In the end all [bad] views are overcome.
> Those who understand this are wise.[41]

Initially Buddha teaches the existence of a substantially existent (dravya-sat) self which is the accumulator of actions and experiencer of effects in order that his followers may turn away from non-virtues which are causes of rebirth in the bad migrations. He then refutes the existence of a substantially existent self in order to make them suitable vessels of the path. Finally, they are liberated through his teaching of

the subtle emptiness of true existence which overcomes all elaborations (prapañcha) of bad views.[42]

Thus, as long as the teaching of non-true existence was not compatible with the viability of all phenomena for a student, the Buddha made distinctions with some phenomena truly existent and some not; students were led gradually, being taught a portion of selflessness. It is not suitable to present even a coarse form of emptiness if there is the possibility that it will undercut the validity of cause and effect. Therefore, for some, Buddha refuted the true existence of the person but for the most part did not refute that of the aggregates (skandha). For those of the Chittamātrin lineage, he refuted a difference of entity of subject and object but did not refute the true existence of the emptiness of duality of subject and object. When his followers of sharp faculties were able to realize that dependent arising is the meaning of emptiness, there was no purpose in making the distinctions he had made before because it was possible to uphold the viability of all presentations of phenomena in terms of the basis of refutation of true existence.[43] That is, because of the compatability of emptiness and dependent arising, the Mādhyamikas are able to assert that there does not exist, has never existed, and never will exist a single atom which is truly established while at the same time being able to make accurate presentations of cyclic existence and nirvana, that is, of all the varieties of

phenomena in the universe. The very phenomena which are empty of true existence—the bases with respect to which true existence is refuted—are themselves dependently established and validly existent.[44]

This compatability of dependent arising and emptiness is difficult to maintain. D̄zong-ka-b̄a notes that among those having the Mahāyāna lineage, there are many who are in little danger of falling to the view of annihilation but who refute a coarse form of true existence and do not refute the subtle form. There are also many, he says, who refute the subtle object of negation but thereby are rendered incapable of presenting validly established phenomena.[45] There has been a greater proclivity to this latter imbalance among Tibetan scholars as well as in the study of Mādhyamika in the West. Due to misunderstanding a number of statements in the Mādhyamika literature, they draw the conclusion that the Mādhyamikas merely refute the views of others and have no system of their own. Let us examine the statements which they put forth as support for their idea that Mādhyamika has no system. Nāgārjuna's <u>Refutation of Objections</u> (<u>Vigrahavyāvartinī</u>) says:

> If I had any thesis
> Then I would have that fault.
> Because I have no thesis
> I am only faultless.[46]

He says in his Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktiṣhaṣhṭikā):

> Those of great nature have
> No position and no dispute.
> How could those with no position
> Have another position?[47]

Āryadeva says in his Four Hundred (Chatuḥshataka):

> It is impossible to blame
> Even after a long time
> Someone who does not have a position that [things]
> Exist, do not exist, or [both] exist and not exist.[48]

Based on such statements, a number of Western interpreters of Mādhyamika have been led to believe that Mādhyamikas only refute the assertions of others and have no position of their own. T. R. V. Murti writes, "The Mādhyamika is a prāsaṅgika or vaitaṇḍika, a dialectician or free-lance debater. The Mādhyamika disproves the opponent's thesis, and does not prove any thesis of his own."[49] Conze quotes this statement by Murti when he describes the Mādhyamika dialectic in his Buddhist Thought in India.[50]

Similar views are expressed by the earlier generation of Indologists. Surendrenath Dasgupta describes the final Mādhyamika view in his History of Indian Philosophy, explaining

that:

> the nihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced confidence of the people that things are true. Those who are really wise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly they do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves with the question of truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus there are neither works nor cycles of births (saṃsāra) and also he does not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of any of the appearances.[51]

Thus, for Dasgupta, if phenomena are empty, they are necessarily utterly non-existent and causation becomes impossible.

Louis de la Vallée Poussin, in an article entitled "Nihilism (Buddhist)" in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics states that, "there is no doubt that the absolute truth (paramārthasatya) of the extreme Buddhist and of the extreme Vedāntist is an unqualified negation of the world of appearance, a negation of existence (saṃsāra)."[52] Finally, A. B. Keith describes Nāgārjuna's method in his Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon:

> Nāgārjuna denies consistently that he has any thesis of his own, for to uphold one would be wholly erroneous; the truth is silence, which is neither affirmation nor negation, for negation in itself is essentially positive

> in implying a reality. He confines himself to reducing every positive assertion to absurdity, thus showing that the intellect condemns itself as inadequate just as it finds hopeless antimonies in the world of experience.[53]

This leads Keith to conclude that:

> If we accept the strict doctrine of Nāgārjuna, as interpreted by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, and accepted by Cāntideva, we must admit that the phenomenal world has not merely no existence in absolute truth, but has no phenomenal existence, difficult as this conception is, and numerous as are the failures of its holders to exactly express it.[54]

Opinions similar to those above were held by contemporaries of D̄zong-ka-b̄a, who reports their positions in his Great Exposition of Special Insight (lHag mthong chen mo). D̄zong-ka-b̄a refutes the contention that Mādhyamika has no system of its own. His arguments bear consideration because they speak directly against the positions of Murti, Conze, Dasgupta, La Vallée Poussin, and Keith.

D̄zong-ka-b̄a explains the meaning of the passages cited from Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva above. With regard to the passage from the Refutation of Objections which says, "Because I have no thesis / I am only faultless," D̄zong-ka-b̄a admits that there

are explanations of no position and no thesis such as the stanzas cited, but it is also stated many times that one must present one's assertions. Therefore, it is impossible to prove that the Mādhyamikas have no thesis merely by citing that stanza. He then elucidates the context of Nāgārjuna's statement. A Mādhyamika has said, "Things do not inherently exist" to which a Proponent of True Existence responds, "Thus, if the words of that thesis inherently exist, then it is not correct that all things lack inherent existence. If the words of the thesis do not inherently exist, they are incapable of refuting inherent existence." Thus, the context of the passage from the Refutation of Objections about having or not having a thesis is not a dispute about the possession of a thesis in general; it is a debate about whether the words of the thesis, "All things lack inherent existence" inherently exist or not. When Nāgārjuna replies:

> If I had any thesis
> Then I would have that fault.
> Because I have no thesis
> I am only faultless.

what he means is that, "If I asserted that the words of such a thesis inherently existed, then I would incur the fault of contradicting the thesis that all things lack inherent existence. However, since I do not assert such, I do not have that

fault." Thus, for D̄zong-ka-b̄a, this passage from the Refutation of Objections is not suitable as a proof that Mādhyamikas have no thesis. Nāgārjuna is saying that he has no inherently existent thesis and that for the Mādhyamikas there is a very great difference between non-inherent existence and non-existence.[55] The Mādhyamikas uphold the conventional existence of phenomena while denying their true existence. This distinction was not clear to Keith, for example, when he wrote that the Mādhyamikas contend that the world has no phenomenal existence.

The passage cited above from Nāgārjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning also makes use of the term "no position," saying that "Those of great nature have / No position and no dispute." Chandrakīrti's commentary to this stanza says:

> When the positions of [a truly existent] self and other do not occur because things do not exist in that way, the afflictions of those [yogis] who see such definitely cease.[56]

Here, the non-existence of things (bhāva) is stated as a reason for not having a position. D̄zong-ka-b̄a identifies the term "thing" as referring to existence by way of the object's own character (svalakṣhaṇa) or inherent existence (svabhāva). If it were taken to mean the ability to perform a function, which is its primary meaning, it would be contradictory to say that through seeing the non-existence of functionality the afflictive

emotions cease. Therefore, in this passage from the Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning, having no position refers to having no position which is an assertion of inherent existence.

That "thing" refers to existence by way of its own character is evident from another passage in Chandrakīrti's commentary to the Sixty Stanzas, where he says:

> If those who have not penetrated this reality of dependent arising and thoroughly conceive of the existence of things by way of their own character have an assertion [that] things [exist inherently], then it is only definite that:
>
> Disputation will arise
> From holding the unbearable and unsuitable view
> [Which is the basis] of the arising of desire
> and hatred.[57]

Here, the superimposition of existence by way of its own character onto things is referred to as asserting things. Therefore, the stanza from the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning is not a source proving that the Mādhyamikas have no position.[58]

In commenting on Āryadeva's statement that:

> It is impossible to blame
> Even after a long time
> Someone who does not have a position that [things]

> Exist, do not exist, or [both] exist and not exist.

Chandrakīrti says, "This indicates that it is impossible to refute, even after a long time, a proponent of emptiness."[59] Existence and non-existence thus refer to true existence and utter non-existence. Thus, Āryadeva's statement indicates that the Mādhyamikas who assert that phenomena are imputedly existent (prajñapti-sat) and refute substantial existence (dravya-sat), which means to be established by way of the object's own entity, are not refuted by those who propound that things "exist"; that is, that they are established by way of their own entity. Nor are they refuted by those who propound that things "do not exist," who negate all functionality of things such as forms. From this Dzong-ka-ba conclude that:

> It is exceedingly clear that [Āryadeva's stanza] is not suitable as a source [proving] that [the Mādhyamikas] have no system of their own; the positions of existence, no-existence, etc. are like the positions of the proponents of the two [extremes of permanence and annihilation].[60]

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that the statements by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva that they have no position cannot be taken at face value but must be understood in the context of the specific argument being put forth at the point at which those statements occur. When Nāgārjuna says that he

has no position, he means that he has no inherently existent position. When Āryadeva says that he does not have a position that things exist nor that they do not exist, he means that he does not hold that things inherently exist nor that they do not exist even conventionally. By taking these statements literally, the Western scholars cited above have been led to the conclusion that the Mādhyamikas have no position of their own, that they refute all philosophical views while upholding none. From this point it is a short jump to the charge that the Mādhyamikas are nihilists.

The root of their confusion lies at a misunderstanding of the meaning of the two extremes. The Mādhyamikas refute one form of existence but uphold the other, refute one form of non-existence but uphold the other. The two forms of existence are that all phenomena ultimately exist and that all phenomena conventionally exist. The two forms of non-existence are that no phenomena ultimately exist and that no phenomena conventionally exist. The Mādhyamikas reject the view that all phenomena ultimately exist and label it the extreme of permanence. They reject the view that no phenomena conventionally exist and label it the extreme of annihilation. They uphold the two remaining views, that all phenomena conventionally exist and no phenomena ultimately exist, the former referring to dependent arising, the latter to emptiness. They further contend that the two are in all ways compatible, that the emptiness of true existence does not contradict but makes

possible conventional existence and vice versa. This is what they identify as the middle way free from extremes.[61]

Thus, the Mādhyamikas refute the two extremes of ultimate existence and utter non-existence and assert emptiness and dependent arising. Not understanding that the Mādhyamikas assert the compatibility of emptiness and dependent arising, Edward Conze describes Bhāvaviveka as having "upheld the well-nigh incredible thesis that in Mādhyamika logic valid positive statements can be made."[62] Yet in the Mādhyamika texts, positive assertions are easily found. Nāgārjuna's Refutation of Objections says:

> We do not make the explanation
> That conventionalities are not asserted.[63]

His Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says:

> Those who assert that dependent phenomena
> Are like [reflections] of moons in water,
> Not real and not unreal,
> Are not captivated by views.[64]

His Praise of the Supramundane (Lokātītastava) says:

> You [Buddha] taught that
> Agent and actions are conventionalities
> You asserted well
> That they are established as mutually dependent.[65]

Also, Chandrakīrti writes in his Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's Treatise on) the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra), "The wise should consider this position to be faultless and beneficial and should indubitably assert it." He also says:

> Therefore, because dependent imputation is asserted in the same way as dependent arising, as mere conditionality, it does not follow that for our position all conventionalities are annihilated. It is suitable for the opponent to assert this as well.[66]

In addition to these statements there are numerous Mādhyamika texts devoted to instructions and advice on the practice of virtue and the path to enlightenment, such as Nāgārjuna's Compendium of Sutra (Sūtrasamuchchaya), Precious Garland (Ratnāvalī), and Friendly Letter (Suhṛillekha), and Shāntideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharyāvatāra).

For Dzong-ka-ba, what sets the Mādhyamika school above all others is its ability to refute the ultimate existence of all phenomena, holding that there is not a single particle in the universe which is ultimately established, while at the same time asserting that conventionally all phenomena are validly established. By upholding the compatibility of emptiness and appearance in this way, they abandon the two extremes and abide in the middle.

Nāgārjuna was prophesied by the Buddha in a number of Mahāyāna sutras and tantras, such as the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra (Laṅkāvatārasūtra), the Great Cloud Sutra (Mahāmeghasūtra), and the Mañjushri Root Tantra (Mañjushrīmūlatantra).[1] He is credited with retrieving several Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, upon which the Mādhyamika system is based, from the Land of the Nāgas. He thereafter wrote numerous treatises, such as the Five Collections of Reasoning, commenting on and explaining the meaning of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. For these reasons, he is revered as the founder of Mādhyamika. His works and those of his student, Āryadeva, served as models and foundations for all subsequent Mādhyamika authors, such as Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, Chandrakīrti, Shāntarakṣhita, Kamalashīla, Shāntideva, and Atīsha. Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva were therefore labelled "Mādhyamikas of the Model Texts" (gZhung phyi mo'i dbu ma pa) by early Tibetan scholars. Later Mādhyamikas who disagreed on how the meaning of Nāgārjuna's writings should be interpreted and took positions distinguishing themselves from each other were labelled "Partisan Mādhyamikas" (Phyogs 'dzin pa'i dbu ma pa, literally "Mādhyamikas who hold positions").

When one seeks to discover among the Partisan Mādhyamikas exactly what positions were held and by whom, some difficulties are encountered. In his Great Exposition of Special Insight, Ḏzong-ka-ḇa says, "I will delineate how the system of the great

Mādhyamikas follows the master Nāgārjuna." He then adds rhetorically, "Who could explain the minor ones?"[2] He reports that some early Tibetan scholars classified the Indian Mādhyamikas according to their position concerning ultimates. Those who asserted that a composite of emptiness and appearance is an ultimate truth were called Establishers of Illusion through Reasoning (sGyu ma rigs grub pa). Those who held that a mere elimination of superimpositions with respect to appearance is an ultimate truth were called Proponents of Thorough Non-Abiding (Rab tu mi gnas par smra ba). Dzong-ka-ba concurs with the assessment of the translator Lo-den-shay-rap (bLo ldan shes rab) who said in his Drop of Ambrosia (bDud rtsi' thigs pa) that it is deluded to divide Mādhyamika from the point of view of assertions on the ultimate.[3]

Dzong-ka-ba explains that other early Tibetans classified the Indian Mādhyamikas in terms of their position on the conventional status of external objects. Those who asserted that external objects exist as entities separate from consciousness were labelled Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas because their assertion accorded with that of the Sautrāntika school on that point. Those who asserted that external objects do exist in that way were labelled Yogāchāra-Mādhyamikas because they accorded with the Chittamātrins in asserting that external objects do not exist. This system of classifying the Mādhyamika schools was current during the eighth century for we find that the

translator Ye-shay-day (Ye-shes-sde), who was a student of both Padmasambhava and Shāntarakṣhita, explains in his *Difference Between the Views* (*lTa ba khyad par*) that:

> In the Mādhyamika treatises composed by the master, the Superior [Nāgārjuna], and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], the mode of existence or non-existence of external objects is not clarified.[4] After that, the master Bhāvaviveka refuted the system of the Vijñāptikas [Chittamātrins] and posited a system of the conventional existence of external objects. Then the master Shāntarakṣhita, relying on Yogāchāra texts, made a different type of Mādhyamika [system] which taught that external objects do not exist conventionally and that the mind lacks inherent existence ultimately. Thus, the Mādhyamikas arose as two types, the former called the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas and the latter, the Yogāchāra-Mādhyamikas.[5]

Such a classification provides an accurate chronology[6] and accounts for the assertions of Bhāvaviveka, Shāntarakṣhita, and their followers, but does not provide a category for Chandrakīrti because, although he asserted the conventional existence of external objects, his mode of assertion does not accord with the Vaibhāṣhikas, Sautrāntikas, or Chittamātrins[7] (see pp. 90-91).

It is only with the second dissemination of Buddhism to Tibet (marked by the translations of Rin-chen-sang-ḃo [Rin-chen-bzang-po, 958-1055] and the arrival of Atīsha in 1054) that the division of Mādhyamika which is considered standard today gained prevalence. Ḍzong-ka-ḃa reports that at the time of the second dissemination Tibetan scholars coined the terms Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika, dividing Mādhyamika in terms of how the view realizing emptiness is to be generated in the continuum of another party. This distinction was based on statements made by Chandrakīrti in his Clear Words (Prasannapadā).[8] It was during this period that Ba-tsap Nyi-ma-drak (Pa-tshab Nyi-ma-grags, died 1158) collaborated with the Kashmiri scholar Jayānanda to translate the major works of Chandrakīrti including the Clear Words, the Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatara), and his commentary to Nāgārjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktiṣhaṣhṭikāvṛitti).[9]

Thus, it is significant to note that the designations "Svātantrika" and "Prāsaṅgika" did not gain currency in India but in Tibet, and not until the eleventh century, not long before the eclipse of Buddhism in India. We often assume, perhaps because the Sanskrit terms are used, that the names Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika were used by Bhāvaviveka and Chandrakīrti. They were not. In fact, the names were bestowed retrospectively. Thus, although Bhāvaviveka is credited with founding the Svātantrika system, nowhere in his writings do we find

him saying, "I am a Svātantrika." Although Chandrakīrti uses the adjective svatantra four times in his Clear Words,[10] he never accuses Bhāvaviveka of being a "Svātantrika" or defends Buddhapālita as a "Prāsaṅgika."

Furthermore, not only were the names unknown to the principals, the implications of those names seem to have escaped all but one, Chandrakīrti. Dzong-ka-ba writes in his Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bshad snying po) that although Bhāvaviveka found many faults with Buddhapālita's commentary to Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way, he did not disagree with him on the selflessness of persons and phenomena.[11] Bhāvaviveka's commentator, Avalokitavrata, also finds no disagreement between Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka concerning the conventional and ultimate nature of phenomena. He writes:

> The knowledge that external and internal dependent arisings conventionally exist as mere illusions capable of performing functions and ultimately are without entityness is the mode of the perfection of wisdom taught by the proponents of the middle path—the Superior [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], Bhāvaviveka, Buddhapālita, and so forth.[12]

Dzong-ka-ba goes on to note that none of the great Svātantrikas—Jñānagarbha, Shāntarakṣhita, Kamalashīla—found any difference

between the selflessness of their own system and that of the system of Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti.[13]

Chandrakīrti did not assert that there was any difference between himself and Buddhapālita concerning the ultimate and conventional. However he, and he alone among the great Mādhyamikas, distinguishes the system that he shares with Buddhapālita from that of the other Mādhyamikas. He writes in the autocommentary to his Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra):

> I implore the wise to ascertain that just as, except for [Nāgārjuna's] Treatise on the Middle Way, other treatises do not express this doctrine called "emptiness" without perversion, so other systems do not have anything like the doctrine of emptiness which appears in this system in which we state disputations and replies.[14]

Chandrakīrti thus contends that his understanding of the doctrine of emptiness is unique and is not shared by others, such as Bhāvaviveka. Exactly how Chandrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka differ on the meaning of emptiness will be considered later (see pp. 223-230). The important conclusion to be drawn here is that the difference between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika was by no means evident to the Svātantrika masters Bhāvaviveka, Avalokitavrata, Jñānagarbha, Shāntarakṣhita, and Kamalashīla.

This is most surprising in the cases of Avalokitavrata, Jñānagarbha, Shāntarakṣhita, and Kamalashīla in that they postdated Chandrakīrti[15] and would have had access to his Clear Words and Supplement to the Middle Way in which Chandrakīrti criticizes what came to be known as the Svātantrika position, at times mentioning Bhāvaviveka by name.[16]

It is interesting to note that the significance of the division of Mādhyamika into Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika has proved confounding to Western Buddhologists. In the early part of this century, La Vallée Poussin wrote:

> There are two branches of Mādhyamika, but the difference between them has not been studied, and seems to consist in a mere divergence in the method of demonstration.[17]

The implications of this "divergence in the method of demonstration" will be considered later in this chapter. In 1962 Edward Conze noted:

> We still have no clear idea of Bhāvaviveka's Svātantrika system, which can only be studied in Tibetan translations. . . . Likewise we continue to be puzzled by the teachings and affiliations of the Yogāchāra-Mādhyamikas who were responsible for the final synthesis of the Mahāyāna in India.[18]

More recently, K. Venkata Ramanan has written in his Nāgārjuna's Philosophy that, "Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka belong to two different traditions (the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika) of the Mādhyamika School, although the difference between them is still far from clear."[19]

If the Indian masters of the Svātantrika school did not perceive themselves as different from Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti, on what grounds did the eleventh century Tibetan scholars make the distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika? From their vantage point, what essential differences were evident in the literature between Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti on the one hand and Bhāvaviveka, Shāntarakṣhita, et al. on the other which would cause them to perform an ex post facto bifurcation of Mādhyamika? Is the distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika innately evident from the Indian sources or was it an artificial distinction imposed from hindsight? The most articulate elaboration of the distinction between the two Mādhyamikas derives from Dzong-ka-ba and his Ge-luk-ba followers, the most important of whom for our purposes are the tenet chroniclers Jam-yang-shay-ba and Jang-gya. Let us examine their arguments in an effort to determine the efficacy of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika division.

Jang-gya's ostensibly intimidating definition of Svātantrika provides a suitable starting point. The definition will be dissected and examined piece by piece and then reconstructed

in an effort to gain a clear perception of the meaning and implications of the term "Svātantrika":

> Autonomous (svatantra) means that an inferential consciousness (anumāna) realizing the thesis (pratijñā) is generated without taking the lead merely from the opponent's assertions, but by his having ascertained the establishment of the modes (rūpa) of the sign (liṅga) with respect to a subject that is established as appearing commonly to non-mistaken valid cognizers (pramāṇa) of both parties in the debate through the force of an objective mode of subsistence from the side of the basis of designation. Mādhyamikas who assert the correctness of the necessity for such are Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas.[20]

The Instructions on Name and Gender (Nāmaliṅgānushāsana better known as the Amarakosha) by the sixth-century Buddhist lexicographer Amarasinha[21] lists svatantra (own continuum) and svairi (own power) as synonyms.[22] The ninth-century Sanskrit-Tibetan encyclopedia, the Mahāvyutpatti, glosses the Sanskrit term svatantra with the Tibetan rang dbang ("independent" or "own-powered").[23] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a states that the tantra of svatantra means "establish" (grub) or "prove" (sgrub) and concludes that:

> Here, taking it as "establish," *svatantra* (autonomous, own continuum) and *svairi* (own-powered) mean established from its own side, established from the side of its mode of subsistence, and established under its own power.[24]

Therefore, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a and J̄ang-ḡya, following D̄zong-ka-b̄a, explain that the term *svatantra* means own-powered or autonomous. What are the philosophical implications of *svatantra* meaning autonomous, and do these implications apply to Bhāvaviveka and his followers, that is, in what sense are they "Svātantrikas"?

J̄ang-ḡya's definition refers to an "inferential consciousness (*anumāna*) realizing the thesis (*pratijñā*)" and to "the modes (*rūpa*) of the sign (*liṅga*)," thereby indicating that *svatantra* has a special significance in the context of Buddhist logic. In order to elucidate that significance, it is necessary to digress for the moment to a consideration of proof statements (*sādhana-vakya*).

Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium of Valid Cognition"* (*Pramāṇavarttika*) says, "Because there are two objects of comprehension (*prameya*), there are two valid cognizers (*pramāṇa*)."[25] Buddhists hold that there are two valid types of awareness—valid cognizers (*pramāṇa*)—because there are two types of objects to be comprehended, manifest phenomena (*abhimukhī*) and hidden phenomena (*parokṣha*), which

are known by direct perception (pratyaksha) and inference (anumāna) respectively.

The definition of a hidden phenomenon is a phenomenon which definitely must be initially realized by the short-sighted through relying on a sign.[26] A short-sighted person (literally, "one who looks nearby") is a common being (prithagjana), a person who has not achieved the path of seeing (darshana-mārga). A hidden phenomenon is one which cannot be perceived directly be persons who are not Superiors (Ārya), but which must be known through the use of a sign or reason. For example, although a person looking at a smoky mountain pass from a distance cannot see fire, the presence of fire there can be inferred from the presence of the sign, smoke, which is the effect of fire. Many of the most important phenomena in Buddhist philosophy fall into the category of hidden phenomena, such as subtle impermanence, the existence of former and later lifetimes, liberation from cyclic existence, the existence of a Buddha's omniscient consciousness, and emptiness. The definition states that such phenomena must initially be realized in dependence on a sign. This refers to the important tenet that phenomena which are ordinarily inaccessible to direct perception can eventually be directly perceived by gradually transforming the imagistic perception by thought into yogic direct perception (yogi-pratyaksha).[27] It is this yogic direct perception which, in the Mādhyamika school, directly realizes

emptiness, a hidden phenomenon, and destroys the seeds for rebirth.

A manifest phenomenon is a phenomenon which is not an object definitely realized by the short-sighted through relying on a sign.[28] Objects ordinarily within the purview of sense perception, such as colors, shapes, sounds, odors, tastes, and objects of touch are manifest phenomena. Such phenomena may be realized by direct perception without resorting to inference. Direct perception is defined as a non-mistaken knower which is free from conceptuality.[29] Thought consciousnesses are therefore necessarily not direct perceivers because they are conceptual. Thought is also eliminated by the qualification "non-mistaken" in that thought is mistaken with respect to its appearing object (*pratibhāsa-viṣhaya), mistaking the image of the object that appears to it—a meaning-generality (artha-sāmānya)—for the object which it is comprehending (prameya). Direct perception, on the other hand, perceives the object directly, without the medium of a generic image.

The other form of valid cognition, inference, is defined as a determinative knower which, depending on its basis, a correct sign, is incontrovertible with regard to its object of comprehension, a hidden phenomenon.[30] A determinative knower is one which explicitly identifies its object. It is incontrovertible in that it realizes an object with respect to which

superimpositions or misconceptions have been removed.[31]

A correct sign (samyak-liṅga) is a correct reason (samyak-nimitta) or a correct proof (samyak-sādhana) and is the basis upon which an inferential valid cognizer is generated. A sign is one component of a syllogism (prayoga), the other being the probandum (sādhya) or that which one is seeking to prove. The probandum in turn is composed of two parts, the subject (dharmin) about which something is sought to be known (also known as the basis of debate) and the predicate of the probandum (sādhya-dharma). An example of a syllogism is, "The subject, sound, is impermanent, because of being a product." The probandum, also referred to as the thesis (pratijñā) or position (pakṣha), is that sound is an impermanent phenomenon. Sound is the subject and impermanent phenomenon is the predicate of the probandum. Product is the sign or reason.

In order for the syllogism to be correct, thereby yielding an inferential valid cognizer, the sign must be correct. A correct sign in a particular proof must be the three modes (trirūpa) of that proof, in fact, a correct sign is defined as "that which is the three modes."[32] The three modes are three relationships of the sign to other elements of the syllogism.

The first mode is the property of the subject (pakṣha-dharma), which is defined as that ascertained as only existing, in accordance with the mode of statement, with the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of that.[33] More simply

stated, the property of the subject refers to the presence of the reason in the subject; in order to be a correct reason, that reason must be a property of the subject. In the Sanskrit term pakṣhadharma, pakṣha refers only to the subject and not to the entire probandum. This is one of the four meanings of pakṣha according to Dharmakīrti.[34] In the syllogism, "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product," the sign is a property of the subject because product is a property of sound, that is, sound is a product.

The second of the three modes is the forward pervasion (anvayavyāpti) which is defined as that ascertained by valid cognition as existing only in the similar class in accordance with the mode of statement.[35] The similar class (sapakṣha) is that class of phenomena of which the sign must be a member in order for the sign to be correct. In the proof that sound is impermanent because of being a product, all phenomena which are impermanent constitute the similar class. In order for product to be a correct sign, it must be ascertained as existent in only the similar class. To exist only in the similar class means that the sign must be pervaded by the predicate, that is, it must be coextensive with the similar class or a subclass of the similar class; whatever is the sign A must necessarily be the predicate B. Product exists in the similar class of impermanent phenomena because product and impermanent phenomenon are synonyms (ekārtha).[36] Object of knowledge would

not serve as a correct sign in the proof that sound is impermanent because, although object of knowledge exists in the similar class of impermanent phenomena, it does not exist only in the similar class; there are objects of knowledge, such as nirvana, which are not impermanent.

The third of the three modes is the counterpervasion (vyatirekavyāpti) which is that ascertained as only non-existent in the dissimilar class in accordance with the mode of statement.[37] The dissimilar class (vipakṣha) is that class of which the negative of the sign must be a member in order for the sign to be correct. In other words, it is that class of which the sign must not be a member. That the sign is only non-existent in the dissimilar class means that the negative of the predicate is pervaded by the negative of the sign, that is, whatever is not the predicate A must necessarily not be the sign B. In the proof that sound is impermanent because of being a product, the dissimilar class is the not impermanent, or permanent phenomena. Since product and impermanent phenomenon are synonyms, product is only non-existent in the dissimilar class of permanent phenomena, and whatever is a permanent phenomenon is necessarily a non-product.[38]

Based on a syllogism of which the sign has the three modes, an incontroverible inferential valid cognizer realizing the thesis of that syllogism is generated. Syllogisms may be used to generate an inferential consciousness realizing the

thesis in oneself or in others. In distinguishing Svātantrika from Prāsaṅgika, the use of the syllogism in generating a correctly inferring consciousness in an opponent is of primary importance. For example, the syllogism, "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product," might be stated to an opponent who believes that sound is impermanent. According to the logical system of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the stater of the syllogism must accept the three modes of the sign.[39]

This is not the case with the other form of logical statement used by Buddhists in debate, the consequence (prāsaṅga). A consequence, like a syllogism, is used to generate an inferring consciousness in the opponent in a debate, but unlike the syllogism, it does so by using the opponent's own assertions against him so that the opponent is unable to respond. A correct consequence is stated in such a way that the opponent cannot give a factually concordant answer without contradicting his own assertions.[40] For example, to an opponent who holds that a sound is permanent, that sound is also a product, and that whatever is a product is impermanent, the following consequence might be stated, "It follows that the subject, sound, is not a product, because of being permanent." In this case, the Buddhist stating the consequence does not accept all three modes of the sign; he accepts the forward pervasion and the counterpervasion, that whatever is permanent

is necessarily a non-product and that whatever is not a non-product is necessarily not permanent, but he does not accept the property of the subject, that sound is permanent. The opponent, on the other hand, does accept the three modes. He accepts that the sign is a property of the subject—that sound is permanent—as well as the forward and counter pervasions. He is thus unable to make any response to the Buddhist. He cannot respond that the reason is not established (asiddha) as a property of the subject because he accepts that it is. He cannot respond that there is no pervasion because he accepts that whatever is permanent is necessarily not a product. He cannot even accept the thesis that sound is not a product because that contradicts his own assertions. He is left logically speechless. Such a consequence is called a consequence implying a proof, which is defined as a consequential statement capable of implying the three modes.[41]

The three modes implied by a consequence implying a proof are those of the syllogism of the correct position. That is, the consequence, "It follows that the subject, sound, is not a product, because of being permanent," stated to an opponent who believes that sound is a product, sound is permanent, and whatever is a product is impermanent, should cause the person to reassess his position so that he may escape the unwanted consequence that sound is not a product. He thus arrives at the implied proof, "The subject, sound, is impermanent, because

of being a product," the three modes of which were implied by the consequence.

From this perspective, T. R. V. Murti is clearly wrong when he says in The Central Philosophy of Buddhism:

> Prasaṅga is not to be understood as an apagogic proof in which we prove an assertion indirectly by disproving the opposite. Prasaṅga is disproof simply, without the least intent to prove any thesis.[42]

Murti here seems to be confusing the Mādhyamikas' mode of proof with what they are proving. When a Mādhyamika states the consequence, "It follows that the subject, a pot, is not a dependent arising because of being truly existent," to a Proponent of True Existence, the Mādhyamika is implying that and wishes the opponent to understand that, "The subject, a pot, does not truly exist because of being a dependent arising. The Mādhyamika thus employs consequences with the full intention of proving a thesis. The thesis which he wishes to prove in this case is that a pot does not truly exist. The non-true existence or emptiness of true existence of the pot is a non-affirming negative (prasajya-pratiṣhedha), implying no positive phenomenon in its place. The emptiness of the pot is the mere vacuity of the true existence of the pot.[43] Thus, in proofs of emptiness, the Mādhyamika uses consequences to imply a syllogism, but the thesis of that syllogism is a non-affirming

negative and implies nothing positive about the subject.

In a consequence which implies a proof, the reason must be accepted by the opponent but must not be validly established; the opponent accepts that sound is permanent, but that is not correct. The opposite of the sign of the consequence will become the predicate of the implied proof. The forward pervasion of the consequence must be validly established. It becomes the counter pervasion of the implied proof. The thesis of the consequence must be refutable by valid cognition; the opposite of the predicate of the consequence becomes the reason of the implied proof, thereby establishing the property of the subject of the syllogism.[44]

Both Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas use syllogisms and consequences. Consequences are used by both schools to break down the opponent's adherence to his wrong view. However, a disagreement that rises out of the commentaries to Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way is Bhāvaviveka's insistence on the ultimate necessity of explicitly stating the implied syllogism. Chandrakīrti objects, saying that the statement of the consequence is sufficient and that the further statement of the syllogism is redundant for an intelligent opponent; the consequence alone is capable of generating an understanding of the implied syllogism.[45]

Thus, Prāsaṅgikas (Consequentialists) are so-called because they assert that an inferential consciousness realizing

non-true existence is generated through using a sign the three modes of which are renowned to the opponent.[46] The Svātantrikas hold that this alone is not enough, that the implied syllogism, the three modes of which are accepted by the Svātantrika himself, must eventually be stated to the opponent. This is one difference between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. However, this difference is not merely formal, it is not confined merely to techniques of logical disputation. If this were the case, the Svātantrikas should be called the Prāyogikas, the Syllogists. Instead, they are called Svātantrikas because they use autonomous syllogisms (svatantra-prayoga). The meaning of autonomous in this context and its implications become evident in examining the meaning of valid cognition (pramāṇa) in Svātantrika and Prāsangika.

For the Svātantrikas, a direct perceiver is a consciousness which is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken. Non-mistaken refers to apprehending the object's own character just as it is. Since all five sense direct perceivers apprehend this "own-character" (svalakṣhaṇa), their objects' own character is the object comprehended by direct perceivers. Therefore, the Svātantrikas assert that sense direct perceivers are valid cognizers in terms of the existence by way of the own-character of their respective objects.[47]

Chandrakīrti, however, argues that establishment by way of the object's own character or by way of the object's own entity does not exist even conventionally; therefore, he does not hold, as do the Svātantrikas, that sense consciousnesses are valid

cognizers in terms of their perception of own-character. He does not deny that sense consciousnesses perceive objects as existing by way of their own character, but since he asserts that that own-character does not exist, he rejects the Svātantrika assertion that the sense consciousnesses are non-mistaken. The Prāsaṅgikas assert that things exist one way but appear in another; specifically, the objects of the sense consciousnesses are not established by way of their own character but appear to be so established. Therefore, the sense consciousnesses cannot be valid with respect to the own-character which they perceive; they are deceived by the false appearance of the inherent existence of the five sense objects.[48]

The Svātantrikas respond that if forms, sounds, and so forth lacked natures which were established by way of their own character, they would lack any capability to perform functions. Therefore, if direct perceivers are not valid cognizers in terms of the own-character of the five sense objects, it is impossible for sense direct perceivers to be valid cognizers at all; if these consciousnesses are valid with respect to the five objects, they must be valid in terms of the own-character of the five objects.[49]

For Chandrakīrti, if phenomena were established by way of their own character or their own entity, they would be truly established (satya-siddha). In that case, objects would exist as they appear, and consciousnesses which posit those objects would have to perceive correctly that true existence or

existence by way of the object's own character in order to be valid cognizers. However, since the objects are deceptive, appearing one way and existing another, the valid cognizer which posits them need not be valid in terms of own-character. Chandrakīrti refutes that sense direct perceivers are valid cognizers with respect to own-character, but in doing so he does not deny that conventional consciousnesses can be valid cognizers in general.[50]

The difference between the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas rests on two important points: what they understand "non-mistaken" to mean when they define sense direct perceivers as non-mistaken and free from conceptuality and, secondly, their understanding of the conventional status of phenomena. For the Svātantrikas, a sense consciousness is non-mistaken if it is free from four superficial causes of error:

1 a cause of error existing in the object (viṣhaya), such as seeing a whirling firebrand as a circle of fire,
2 a cause of error existing in the basis (āshraya), such as an eye consciousness which perceives a double moon,
3 a cause of error existing in the abode (sthāna), such as seeing trees move when passing them in a boat, and
4 a cause of error existing in the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya), such as seeing red due to being angry.[51]

If these four superficial causes of error are absent, a sense consciousness perceives the object as it exists according to the Svātantrikas. For the Prāsaṅgikas, all sense consciousnesses except those of a Buddha are mistaken because they perceive objects as existing by way of their own character. However, in order not to contradict the world, they posit sense direct perceivers which are conventionally non-mistaken. A sense consciousness, due to being affected by ignorance, is mistaken in that objects which do not inherently exist appear to it to inherently exist, but if it is not polluted by some external or other internal cause of error, it is non-mistaken conventionally.[52] Such a sense direct perceiver is a valid cognizer for the Prāsaṅgikas because, although it is mistaken about the inherent existence of the object, it is valid in terms of the mere existence of the object.

The fundamental difference between the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas however, and the reason why they differ on the meaning of valid cognition, is that the Svatantrikas assert that phenomena are established by way of their own character conventionally whereas the Prāsaṅgikas negate the existence of own-character even conventionally. Existence by way of the object's own character is upheld by the Svātantrikas and rejected by the Prāsaṅgikas. This distinction was not made by any of the Indian Svātantrika masters, and it is not accepted by the S̄a-ḡya (<u>Sa-skya</u>) order of Tibetan Buddhism.[53] The

distinction is made by Dzong-ka-ba and his followers based on careful scrutiny of the writings of Bhāvaviveka, Avalokitavrata, Jñānagarbha, Shāntarakṣhita, Kamalashīla, and Chandrakīrti. What evidence does Dzong-ka-ba present to prove that the Svātantrikas assert own-character? How do we know that Bhāvaviveka believed that phenomena inherently exist conventionally?

Dzong-ka-ba says in his Essence of the Good Explanations:

> There are many explanations in the Prāsaṅgika texts regarding conventional existence of its [i.e., the object's own] entityness, its nature, its own character and so forth and many [explanations that things] are not established by way of their own entityness, not produced by way of their own entityness, not substantially established, and so forth in the texts of this master [Bhāvaviveka]. Thus, it seems difficult to distinguish [Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika]. However, this explanation of the meaning of the existence and non-existence of the entityness set forth in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Saṃdhinirmochana) is the clearest source [proving that] this master [Bhāvaviveka] asserts that things are established by way of their own character conventionally.[54]

The Perfection of Wisdom Sutras say, "This and that phenomena, from forms to omniscient consciousnesses, lack

entityness."[55] The Sutra Unravelling the Thought explains this lack of entityness in terms of the three natures (trisvabhāva): the imaginary (parikalpita), the other-powered (paratantra), and the thoroughly established (parinishpanna). Imaginaries are said to lack entityness in terms of character, the other-powered lack entityness in terms of production, and the thoroughly established are ultimate and lack entityness.

The Sutra Unravelling the Thought says, "Since imaginaries do not abide by way of their own character, they lack entityness of character."[56] In the twenty-fifth chapter of his Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom" (Prajñāpradīpa), Bhāvaviveka says:

> If you [Chittamātrins] say that the entityness of imaginaries which are mental expressions and verbal expressions do not exist, then you are deprecating things because of deprecating mental expressions and verbal expressions.[57]

In commenting on this, Avalokitavrata says:

> This [statement by Bhāvaviveka] indicates that, with respect to the Yogāchārin statement that imaginary natures lack entityness because of lacking entityness of character, it is unsuitable if they say that the entityness of "form" and specifically the entityness of mental expressions—thought consciousnesses—and

> verbal imputations—verbal expressions—lack entityness because of lacking entityness of character because it is a deprecation of things which are conventionally other-powered.[58]

The Chittamātrins assert that because imaginaries, the imputation of names and attributes, do not have an entity which is established by way of its own character, they lack an entityness of character. Bhāvaviveka refutes this. He takes the category of imaginary phenomena to apply to both imputations and imputers, and regarding imputers, he says that if the Chittamātrins assert that names, which are sounds, and thought consciousnesses which impute entities and qualities lack an entityness that does not exist by way of its own character conventionally, they are denying other-powered phenomena. Therefore, Dzong-ka-ba says that it is clear that Bhāvaviveka asserts that other-powered phenomena, that is, impermanent phenomena, are entities which are established by way of their own character.[59] Bhāvaviveka upholds this conventional nature but refutes that phenomena exist by way of their character ultimately because he says in his Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom", "If [the Chittamātrins] are refuting things ultimately, they are proponents who follow Mādhyamika."[60]

By including imputers—terms and thought consciousnesses—in the category of the imaginary and saying that if the

Chittamātrins are holding that these lack entityness of character, they are denying other-powered phenomena, such as terms and thought consciousnesses, Bhāvaviveka implies that terms and thought consciousnesses and by extension all impermanent phenomena are established by way of their own character. This seems clear. Whether Bhāvaviveka is correct is suggesting that the Chittamātrins classify imputers in the class of imaginaries is another question.

Although Bhavaviveka rejects the Chittamātrins interpretation of the three natures, he does not dismiss the three natures. For him, the factor of true existence which is falsely imputed to phenomena is an imaginary nature because it is superimposed on phenomena and does not accord with their mode of being. In this sense, the imaginary—true existence which is utterly non-existent—can be said to lack entityness of character in Bhāvaviveka's system. Dependent arisings are other-powered phenomena and lack entityness of production because they are produced and arise in dependence on another; they ultimately lack inherently existent or own-powered production. Emptinesses of true existence are thoroughly established natures for Bhāvaviveka. Emptiness is an ultimate and a lack of entityness because it is the object of the ultimate consciousness and because it is the absence of the entity of true existence.[61]

Returning to the question of what constitutes valid

cognition for Bhāvaviveka and the implications of his position for the differentiation of Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, it is important to scrutinize his understanding of the composition and status of sense objects. In the fifth chapter of the Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvālā), Bhāvaviveka presents his position on the nature of sense objects in response to a Chittamātrin attack on those who assert external objects.

According to Bhāvaviveka, the Chittamātrin argument is as follows. Individual minute particle (paramāṇu) of form are not the objects of sense consciousnesses because they are too subtle to be perceived by them. Furthermore, an aggregation (saṃghāta) of minute particles is not the object of a sense consciousness because a mere aggregation, like a double moon, is not a substantial existent (dravya-sat). If individual particles are not sense objects and aggregations of many particles are not sense objects, sense perception of external objects composed of minute particles is impossible. Therefore, the Chittamātrins conclude that there are no external objects.[62]

Bhāvaviveka responds that the Chittamātrins' argument that an individual minute particle is not a sense object is irrelevant because he also asserts that the Chittamātrins are needlessly proving what is already established. To the Chittamātrins' contention that a composite (saṃchita) of minute particles of the same type is not the observed-object-condition (alambana-pratyaya) producing a sense consciousness because of

not being substantially existent, Bhāvaviveka responds that the reason is not established; he disagrees with the Chittamātrins, asserting that such a composite is substantially existent. He argues that the entities of the minute particles of one type which aggregate as the entity of the object are connected to each other such that each minute particle contributes to the entity of the object. In that sense, each of the minute particles acts as a part of the entity of the sense object so that an awareness having the aspect of the appearance of an aggregation of subtle particles is produced.[63]

The Chittamātrins agree that minute particles are substantially established but hold that they are too subtle to serve as sense objects. However, they also assert that a minute particle is an aggregation of the eight substances: earth, water, fire, wind, form, odor, taste, and tangibility. Bhāvaviveka argues that since it is accepted by the Chittamātrins that a minute particle is itself an aggregation while being substantially established, it should be equally true that aggregations such as pots are substantially established.[64]

Dzong-ka-ba concludes that since Bhāvaviveka asserts that each particle in a composite of particles serves as a cause of a sense consciousness and that each of the particles is substantially existent and seems to assert that each particle is final (that is, most subtle), Bhāvaviveka asserts that partless particles are observed-object-conditions (_ālambana-pratyaya_) of

sense consciousnesses. Bhāvaviveka holds that objects composed of minute particles are established by way of their own character and substantially established and that the sense consciousnesses which perceive those objects are valid cognizers. Therefore, he asserts that a sense consciousness which is not affected by one of the internal or external causes of error is non-mistaken because it perceives an object which is objectively established as a composite of particles.[65] Bhāvaviveka's position on this point accords with that of the Sautrāntikas, except for the fact that the Sautrāntikas assert that sense objects ultimately exist whereas, for Bhāvaviveka, they conventionally exist. This general agreement with the Sautrāntikas on the nature of the observed-object-condition is the basis for calling Bhāvaviveka's branch of Svātantrika the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika.[66]

It is important here to distinguish this position from that of Chandrakīrti. Bhāvaviveka and Chandrakīrti concur in their rejection of the Chittamātrins' refutation of external objects. But despite the fact that they agree that external objects exist, they do not agree on the conventional mode of being of those objects. Bhāvaviveka holds that at the conclusion of searching for the object designated among its parts, one finds something which is objectively established.[67]

Chandrakīrti asserts that because objects appear falsely to sense consciousnesses, when the object designated is

searched for with analysis, it is not found. Therefore, he asserts that minute particles are mere appearances to the awareness designating them and that the objects of sense consciousnesses are imputedly existent phenomena which do not exist from the side of the object.[68] Apparently referring to Bhāvaviveka, Chandrakīrti says in his Supplement to the Middle Way:

> Some [Mādhyamikas] propound that that which the Sautrāntika system propounds ultimately, the Mādhyamikas assert conventionally. They propound [this] due to completely misunderstanding the suchness [taught] in the Treatise on the Middle Way.[69]

Again, in apparent reference to Bhāvaviveka, he says in his Commentary to (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred" (Chatuḥshatakaṭīkā), "Those of our own school who, like the Vaisheṣhikas, assert that subtle particles are substantially [existent] are not correct."[70]

Thus far, we have examined Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's evidence for his assertion that Bhāvaviveka believes that phenomena are established by way of their own character conventionally. There are other statements in Bhāvaviveka's writings which support this claim, and these will be considered in the next chapter in the discussion of the nature of the person and the selflessness of the person. It is necessary at this point to

examine the implications of Bhāvaviveka's understanding of the conventional status of objects and the valid cognizers which perceive them in the context of the syllogism. If Bhāvaviveka asserts that phenomena are established by way of their own character (svalakṣhaṇa), by way of their own continuum (svatantra), what is the significance of an autonomous syllogism (svatantraprayoga) and how does it differ from a consequence?

That Bhāvaviveka supports the use of autonomous syllogisms is evident to Dzong-ka-ba, at least in part, from a statement Bhāvaviveka makes in his Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom":

> The thirteenth chapter was composed for the purpose of setting forth the lack of entityness of conditioned phenomena in terms of another aspect, through the force of answers to refutations [by opponents] and own-powered inferences.[71]

Avalokitavrata's commentary says:

> Here, regarding that, the purpose of the chapter is to indicate that conditioned phenomena are just without entityness [through] giving answers to the refutations by opponents and [through] flawless own-powered inferences.[72]

Here, Bhāvaviveka explains that the thirteenth chapter of

Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way teaches emptiness by answering the refutations of opponents and by using autonomous or own-powered inferences. Inference in this context refers not to the consciousness but to the proof statement, a syllogism, intended to produce a consciousness inferring the thesis. The fact that Bhāvaviveka refers to such inferences as "own-powered" indicates that such proof statements are not merely stated in terms of the opponent's position but that they have an autonomous status which is accepted by both parties. This interpretation of the term "own-powered" is strongly supported by two statements from Jñānagarbha's Differentiation of the Two Truths (Satyadvayavibhaṅga), "Just as what is seen by cowherds and above abides as conventional truths . . ." and "No one has any quarrel concerning the factor which appears to the consciousnesses of the two parties [in a debate]."[73] According to Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's annotator, Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan), the first passage is the clearest source proving that the Svātantrikas assert that phenomena are established from their own side because it says that things exist conventionally in accordance with how they are seen by cowherds and above (those of greater intelligence), and it is undeniable that whatever object appears to ordinary, common beings such as cowherds appears to be established from the side of its own mode of subsistence.[74] It is important to note that Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den sees no reason to prove that objects appear to be

established by way of their own character; it is something everyone would agree on. The disagreement arises from the fact that the Svātantrikas hold that this appearance is correct, that is, the inherent existence which appears to cowherds conventionally exists, and the Prāsaṅgikas hold that it is false—nothing inherently exists even conventionally.

In the context of debate, this problem manifests itself in the question of a commonly appearing subject (chos can mthun snang). A commonly appearing subject refers to a subject which is established within appearing commonly to both parties by a valid cognizer which is non-mistaken with respect to the subject's being established by way of its own character. To be established as commonly appearing means that the subject is established for the challenger by the kind of valid cognizer by which that subject is established for the opponent.[75] That is, the Svātantrikas assert that phenomena are established by way of their own character conventionally; therefore, this type of existence pertains to the components of a syllogism and their relationships, the three modes, as well. Thus, the subject, predicate, and reason exist by way of their own character. The presence of the reason in the subject and the presence of the reason in only the similar class of the predicate exist by way of their own character. Since the Svātantrikas hold that non-conceptual sense consciousnesses which are not defective due to not being polluted by a cause of error

are non-mistaken, the objects with respect to which such subjects are non-mistaken must be established by way of their own character because they appear to be.[76] That is, since phenomena appear to be established by way of their own character and also exist that way, according to the Svātantrikas, consciousnesses which correctly perceive that own-character are valid cognizers. Thus, when a phenomenon, such as a form, is posited as the subject of a debate, that form appears to exist by way of its own character to the valid cognizers of both parties and they assent to that appearance; it appears commonly.

Therefore, an autonomous syllogism is a syllogism which generates an inference realizing the probandum, without taking the lead from the opponent's assertions, after having ascertained the subject and three modes of the sign with a valid cognizer which is non-mistaken with respect to their existence by way of their own character. Not taking the lead from the assertions of the opponent means that it is not sufficient that the subject and three modes be established by a valid cognizer which is renowned to the opponent alone. Once one uses autonomous syllogisms, one is admitting that the subject appears in the same way to both parties.[77] Jñānagarbha says, "No one has any quarrel concerning the factor which appears to the consciousnesses of the two parties."

There are other statements which can be pointed to that

corroborate the Ge-luk-ba position that the Svātantrikas assert that phenomena exist in the way that they appear, as established by way of their own character. Jñānagarbha says in the autocommentary to his Differentiation of the Two Truths: "Real production and so forth do not appear when a thing appears."[78] In other words, when something appears to a sense consciousness, its ultimate production, which is conceived by ignorance, does not appear to the sense consciousness. He says in the root text:

> If you assert that [things]
> As they appear are not [analyzed with] reasoning
> We agree with that.
> If they were [analyzed with] reasoning, everything would be disturbed.[79]
>
> Because of being entities [which exist] as they appear,
> This [factor] is not analyzed.
> If they were analyzed,
> Since they would be other, that would be damaged [by direct perception].[80]

If the Proponents of True Existence assert that phenomena exist as they appear to an awareness which is not damaged by another valid cognizer and assert that they are not investigated by a reasoning consciousness which analyzes the ultimate,

then Jñānagarbha agrees with their assertions. If phenomena as they appear to sense consciousnesses were analyzed with ultimate analysis, all presentations of conventionalities would be confused. Because phenomena are established as they appear to non-defective awareness, ultimate analysis is not applied to this existence by way of the object's own character. If they were investigated with ultimate analysis, they would become other than they are, that is, non-existent. Therefore, that non-existence would be contradicted by direct perception.[81] Jñānagarbha's position is that ultimate existence is to be analyzed and refuted by reasoning, but existence by way of the object's own character—the way that objects appear to non-defective awarenesses— is not to be analyzed. If it were the object of analysis, since it is a central tenet that the object of analysis is not found by the reasoning consciousness investigating the ultimate, the conventional status of phenomena would be negated such that presentations of the world would be impossible. Cause and effect, and so forth could not be posited for him if objects did not exist in the way that they appear. Such an appearance is certified by direct perception which precludes the possibility of its being scrutinized by ultimate analysis. Thus, for Jñānagarbha, objects must exist in the way that they appear; otherwise, they would not exist at all. He cannot conceive of the possibility of positing conventionalities within the emptiness of inherent

existence.

Shāntarakṣhita also seems to agree that the unanalyzed perceptions of non-defective awareness exist as they appear when he writes in his Ornament for the Middle Way, "From the context of children up to omniscient wisdom, I do not refute the pleasant nature of a single unanalyzed experience."[82]

Thus, although the Svātantrikas assert that phenomena are not truly established (satya-siddha), ultimately established (paramārtha-siddha), or established in reality (samyak-siddha), they uphold that phenomena are established by way of their own character (svalakṣhana-siddha), from their own side (svarūpa-siddha), and are inherently established (svabhāva-siddha). For the Prāsaṅgikas, true existence, ultimate existence, existence in reality, existence by way of its own character, existence from the object's own side, and inherent existence are synonyms and are equally utterly non-existent.[83] Therefore, a consciousness which establishes the subject and the three modes of the sign in terms of their existence by way of their own character is not a valid cognizer, it is a wrong consciousness (viparyaya-jñāna), according to Prāsaṅgika. Therefore, Prāsaṅgikas, who are seeking to prove that phenomena do not exist by way of their own character, reject the use of autonomous syllogisms because an autonomous syllogism requires a commonly appearing subject. Acceptance of a commonly appearing subject implies consent to the appearance of phenomena as

being established by way of their own character. The Prāsaṅgikas reject such establishment and therefore, in the light of their tenets, it is impossible for the subject of the debate to appear in the same way to a Prāsaṅgika and non-Prāsaṅgika.[84] This appears to be Nāgārjuna's point when he says in his <u>Refutation of Objections</u> (<u>Vigrahavyāvartinī</u>):

> If something were observed,
> Such as an object of direct perception,
> It would be proven or disproven.
> Because it does not exist, I am blameless.[85]

If an object of comprehension which was inherently established and established by way of its own entity were an object observed by a valid cognizer such as a direct perceiver, then it would be suitable that the object observed by such a valid cognizer be proven or refuted in the opponent's system. However, since in Nāgārjuna's system such an object of comprehension does not exist even conventionally, Nāgārjuna cannot be blamed for not having an inherently existent thesis.[86] Thus, this passage indicates that inherently existent objects of observation and observers do not exist; it is not suggesting that dependently arisen valid cognizers and objects of comprehension do not exist.[87]

Does this mean that the Prāsaṅgikas are unable to prove the emptiness of non-inherent existence? No, although they

are prohibited from using autonomous syllogisms, they use consequences or other-approved syllogisms which do not entail any of the dangers of the autonomous syllogism. If autonomous syllogisms are not asserted, it is sufficient that the subject and three modes be established by a "valid cognizer" of a non-Prāsaṅgika opponent; these do not have to be established as inherently existent for the Prāsaṅgika, in fact, they cannot be.[88]

For the Svātantrikas, when two parties are debating about an attribute of an object such as permanence or true existence, the substratum of that attribute—the subject of the debate—must be established as commonly appearing, it must be demonstrable that the object upon which the attribute is based is objectively established; without an objectively established subject, it is impossible to prove the modes of the sign because the Svātantrikas hold that an attribute which lacks an inherently existent substratum is infeasible. This is the meaning of a commonly appearing subject. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the existence of a subject which is demonstrably established from its own side implies that it is established by way of its own entity which means that it would be ultimately established. Thus, for the Prāsaṅgikas, it is incorrect to assert the existence of a common appearance to both parties when proving qualities in terms of a substratum which exists by way of its own entity.[89]

Let me refer briefly at this point to Robert A. F. Thurman's article, "Philosophical Nonegocentrism in Wittgenstein and Candrakīrti in their Treatment of the Private Language Problem."[90] Without digressing into a discussion of the parallels that Thurman discovers between Prāsaṅgika and modern articulations of the private language problem, I feel compelled to argue that Thurman's translation of the terms svatantrya as "logical privacy" and paraprasiddha as "public" is, at the very least, misleading. In the context of debate, according to Svātantrika, the subject of an autonomous syllogism (svatantra-prayoga) appears commonly to both parties, and to everyone else for that matter, because the subject exists in the way that it appears. The autonomous nature of phenomena, existing by way of their own character, is the conventional mode of being of phenomena, validly established, and in no way private, logically or otherwise. Also, Prāsaṅgikas use consequences, the subject and three modes of which are renowned to the other (paraprasiddha). The Prāsaṅgika and his opponent do not conceive of the valid cognizer that certifies the subject in the same way; for the Prāsaṅgika it does not certify that the subject exists by way of its own character, for the opponent it does. In this sense, the subject of the debate remains private until the opponent realizes the Prāsaṅgika view. Thus, I would suggest that Thurman's translations be reversed with svatantrya implying publicity and

<u>paraprasiddha</u> privacy.

For the Prāsaṅgika, since existence by way of the object's own entity does not exist, such a commonly appearing subject does not exist. As long as the opponent has not generated the Prāsaṅgika view in his continuum, he is not able to differentiate existence by way of the object's own entity and mere existence. He is not able to understand the modes of the sign in the Prāsaṅgika's terms. He cannot be shown how phenomena are merely conventionally existent until he realizes the view of emptiness. Until this happens, the Prāsaṅgika is unable effectively to state reasons in his own terms because the opponent will not understand them, continuing to confuse inherent existence and conventional existence. Therefore, the Prāsaṅgikas assert that a mode of existence which is objectively established that appears commonly to both parties is not to be found; they assert that a commonly appearing subject does not exist.

Nonetheless, although the Prāsaṅgikas do not assert autonomous reasons, in order for reasoning to provide a means of generating valid understanding, they must assert that the three modes of the sign can be ascertained and that the three modes are validly established. They are able to uphold this by using reasons which are renowned to others, taking the lead from the opponent's own assertions. They state signs which are renowned to the opponent himself or, from the point

of view of the Prāsaṅgika, renowned to others; the terms "renowned to oneself" (svaprasiddha) and "renowned to others" (paraprasiddha) are synonyms, with "oneself" and "other" both referring to the opponent. The Prāsaṅgika is able to generate the view in his opponent by stating reasons, the three signs of which are established in terms of the opponent's assertions, without the Prāsaṅgika having to assert the subject and the three modes himself.[91]

With all of the foregoing discussion in mind, J̄ang-ḡya's definition of Svātantrika may be restated in the hope that its meaning will be clear, at least clearer than it was upon first reading.

> Autonomous (svatantra) means that an inferential consciousness (anumāṇa) realizing the thesis (pratijñā) is generated, without taking the lead from the opponent's assertions, but by his having ascertained the modes (rūpa) of the sign (liṅga) with respect to a subject that is established as commonly appearing to non-mistaken valid cognizers (pramāṇa) of both parties in the debate through the force of an objective mode of subsistence from the side of its basis of designation. Mādhyamikas who assert the correctness of the necessity for such are Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas.

If the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas differ so radically

on the meaning of valid cognition, the means of generating the view in an opponent, and the conventional status of phenomena, in what sense may they both be called Mādhyamikas? Why are Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika divisions of the same school? Chandrakīrti remarks in his Clear Words that, "If one is a Mādhyamika, it is unsuitable to make use of autonomous inferences because another [inherently existent] position is not asserted."[92] Dzong-ka-ba says in his Great Exposition of Special Insight:

> In general [Chandrakīrti's opponents] are both the Proponents of True Existence who assert that things have an ultimate nature and the Svātantrikas who assert that they have a nature which is established by way of its own character conventionally. The Svātantrikas are also called Proponents of No Entityness (Niḥsvabhāvavādin) but here, for the sake of brevity, the proponents of non-inherent existence should be understood to be the Prāsaṅgikas, and the proponents of inherent existence should be understood to be both the Proponents of True Existence and the Svātantrikas.[93]

Based on Dzong-ka-ba's statement in his Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental (Treatise on the Middle Way Called) Wisdom" that the conception that the non-existence which is the refutation of the object of negation really exists is a

conception of an extreme of non-existence and that the conception that phenomena exist by way of their own character is an extreme of existence,[94] the twentieth century Tibetan scholar Sha-mar-gen-dun-d̄en-dzin-gya-tso (<u>Zhwa-dmar-dge-bdun-bstan-'dzin-rgya-mtsho</u>) raises the argument that the Svātantrikas are not Mādhyamikas because they assert that emptiness—the non-existence which is the refutation of the object of negation—exists by way of its own character and that all phenomena are established by way of its own character, thereby falling to both extremes.[95]

Despite these statements suggesting the contrary, the Svātantrikas are considered to be members of the Mādhyamika school. D̄zong-ka-b̄a explains Chandrakīrti's comment that it is unsuitable for Mādhyamikas to use autonomous syllogisms saying that it is indeed unsuitable for Mādhyamikas to assert that phenomena exist by way of their own character but it does not follow from that that anyone who asserts such is not a Mādhyamika, that is, there may be Mādhyamikas who assert inherent existence. For example, he says that although it is unsuitable for a monk to break vows of their formulated code of conduct, there are monks who go against that code but who are nonetheless monks.[96]

Still, just as there must be a certain level of conformance with the code of conduct for a person to be considered a monk, there must also be certain assertions which classify the

Svātantrikas as Mādhyamikas. J̄ang-ḡya explains what they are. He concedes that the Svātantrikas assert that phenomena exist by way of their own character conventionally and that they hold that the object designated is findable among its bases of designation. However, they assert that all phenomena in the universe are empty of true existence, which they define as being established by way of a mode of subsistence which does not depend on appearing to a non-defective awareness. This emptiness is accepted by the Prāsaṅgikas (although they would say that it is a coarse emptiness); it is not false as is the Chittamātrin emptiness of subject and object being different substantial entities. It is also not a trifling emptiness in that it applies to all phenomena equally; everything lacks true existence. It is compatible with dependent arising, allowing the Svātantrikas to abandon the extremes of existence and non-existence and to establish the viability of conventionalities such as cause and effect within emptiness.[97] D̄zong-ka-b̄a notes that, "These scholars also refute the tenet of the true existence of phenomena through many doors of reasoning and assert non-true existence well. Hence, they are Mādhyamikas."[98] Finally, Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den says in his Annotations (mChan 'grel) to Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's Great Exposition of Tenets:

> Because they propound a middle way free from the extreme of permanence—that phenomena ultimately

exist—and the extreme of annihilation—[that phenomena] do not exist conventionally, and because they propound that an entityness which is truly established does not exist, they are called Mādhyamikas and Proponents of Non-Entityness (niḥsvabhāvavādin). The divisions are two, Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika; those who claim to be Mādhyamikas who are other than those two are merely designated as Mādhyamikas; it is unsuitable that they be Mādhyamikas in fact. Because they are similar in refuting the extreme of non-existence—[that phenomena] do not exist even conventionally—and the extreme of permanence—that things truly exist—and assert a middle which is a non-affirming negative, the mere elimination of true establishment in dependently arisen phenomena, both the Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas are Mādhyamikas. However, that [school] which is free from all subtle extremes of permanence, such as [phenomena] being established from their own side, and extremes of annihilation, such as forms not being established as external objects, is the system of the Prāsaṅgikas.[99]

Another fundamental distinction between the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas lies in the question of whether the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna sutras. The positions of the two schools on this point entail further differences concerning the object of the Hīnayāna wisdom, the distinguishing feature of the Mahāyāna, and the root cause of suffering.

Bhāvaviveka argues that the selflessness of phenomena is not taught in the Hearer scriptural collection (Shrāvakapiṭaka) because the exposition of the selflessness of phenomena is the distinguishing feature which sets the Mahāyāna apart from Hīnayāna. According to Bhāvaviveka, that which obstructs liberation from cyclic existence is the conception of a self of persons (pudgalātman). That which obstructs the attainment of Buddhahood is the conception of true existence. If the selflessness of phenomena (dharmanairātmya) were set forth in the Hīnayāna scriptures, Hearers and Solitary Realizers—who merely seek liberation from rebirth—would be able to achieve Buddhahood by realizing the selflessness of phenomena taught in their scriptures. In that case, there would be no reason for Buddha to have taught another vehicle, the Mahāyāna, because the means for achieving Buddhahood, the wisdom of the selflessness of phenomena, is accessible in the Hīnayāna.

In Bhāvaviveka's system, Hīnayānists realize the

selflessness of persons in order to overcome the afflictive obstructions (kleshāvaraṇa) and thereby gain liberation. It is unnecessary for them to realize the more subtle selflessness of phenomena, the object of Bodhisattvas' wisdom. Thus, Bhāvaviveka admits that it is possible to be liberated from cyclic existence without penetrating the final nature of reality—the selflessness of phenomena.

The Prāsaṅgikas, in the persons of Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti, hold that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hearer scriptural collection and that Hīnayānists realize the subtle selflessness. They assert that there is no difference in subtlety between the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena and that in order to achieve the enlightenment of the Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna path, both selfessnesses must be realized. Therefore, unlike Bhāvaviveka, the Prāsaṅgikas see no different between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna in terms of the subtlety of the object of their wisdom; Foe Destroyers (Arhan)[1] and Buddhas realize the same subtle emptiness of inherent existence. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the Mahāyāna is distinguished from the Hīnayāna in terms of method, not wisdom.

As is the case with the debate over syllogisms and consequences, the commentaries to Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way provide the context for this controversy. In commenting on the seventh stanza of the fourth chapter of

the *Treatise*, "Analysis of the Aggregates" (*Skandhaparikṣhā*), Buddhapālita cites the following passage from a Hīnayāna sutra:

> Form is like a ball of foam.
> Feeling is like a bubble.
> Discrimination is like a mirage.
> Compositional factors are like a banana tree.
> Consciousness is like an illusion.
> So said the Sun-Friend[2] [Buddha].[3]

Before considering the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika positions on whether the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna sutras, it is worthwhile to digress into a general analysis of the meaning of this stanza in order to provide a background for the discussion to follow.

In this stanza, Buddha describes the insubstantial nature of the five aggregates (*panchaskandha*). The form aggregate (*rūpaskandha*) encompasses not only visible forms which are objects of the eye consciousness, but includes also sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. In addition, the five sense powers (*indriya*) which provide the physical bases for the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses are also instances of the form aggregate. A final category of those forms which are imperceptible by the sense consciousnesses and can only be known by the mental

consciousness are also classified as form aggregates, such as a single subtle particle.

FORM IS LIKE A BALL OF FOAM[4]

Forms are compared to a ball of foam which when seen from a distance appears to be a solid whole but disappears when one tries to separate it into parts. In the same way, a form appears to be a single mass until reasoning is used to analyze the single mass and divides it into its component parts, at which point the subjective apprehension of the form as a solid unit disappears.

The use of analysis to destroy the misconception of objects as single independent wholes is found throughout Buddhist philosophy. In the Vaibhāshika school, anything which can be broken down into parts, either physically or analytically, such that the thought apprehending that object ceases is identified as a conventional truth[5] (saṃvṛiti-satya), a truth for ignorance which does not exist in the way that it appears. A clay pot, for example, is a conventional truth because, although it appears to be a solid whole, the thought apprehending that pot ceases when it is smashed with a hammer. The Vaibhāshikas assert that there exist directionally partless physical particles and temporally partless moments of consciousness which cannot be broken

down into component parts. These subtle particles and moments of consciousness are identified as ultimate truths by the Vaibhāṣhikas.[6] The existence of partless particles is refuted by the Sautrāntikas Following Reasoning, the Chittamātrins, and Mādhyamikas.[7]

In the Mādhyamika school, the assertion that all phenomena, permanent and impermanent, have parts provides the foundation for the reasoning of the lack of being either one or many which proves that all phenomena are empty of true existence (see pp. 257-301).

FEELING IS LIKE A BUBBLE

The second of the five aggregates, feeling (vedanā), is one of the five omnipresent (sarvatraga) mental factors (chaitta) which accompanies every moment of an eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, or mental consciousness. The other four omnipresent mental factors are discrimination (samjñā), intention (chetanā), contact (sparsha) and mental engagement (manaskāra).[8]

In Asaṅga's Compendium of Knowledge (Abhidharmasamuchchaya), feeling is defined as "that which has the character of experience, that is, the entity of experience which experiences individually the fruitions that are the effects of virtuous and non-virtuous actions."[9] Feelings are of three types—those of pleasure (sukhā), of pain (duḥkha), and of neutrality (aduḥkhasukhā), pleasure being that which

one wishes to meet with again when it ceases, pain being that which one wishes to separate from when it arises, and neutral feeling, that which one wishes neither to meet with nor separate from when it arises.[10] Pleasure, pain, or neutrality accompanying one of the five sense consciousnesses is called physical (kāyikā) feeling and is called mental (chaitasikī) feeling as an omnipresent mental factor accompanying a mental consciousness. All feelings of pleasure and pain, all happiness and suffering, are the effects of past actions, the fruitions of potencies established on the mind by virtuous and non-virtuous activities of body, speech, and mind performed in the past. A clear understanding of the cause and effect of actions is seen as essential prerequisite for the practice of the path because with the understanding that one's happiness and suffering is a direct result of one's own action, virtue is adopted and non-virtue discarded. D̄zong-ka-b̄a writes in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path:

> Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland (Ratnāvalī) [Stanza 21] says:
>
> From non-virtues come all sufferings
> As do all bad migrations.
> From virtues come all good migrations
> And do the pleasures of all births.

> Therefore, ascertaining that pleasures and suffering do not arise causelessly, nor do they arise from a dissimilar cause such as the principal (pradhāna) or Īshvara, [and ascertaining] the definite, incontrovertible [relationship] of action and effect in which general pleasure and suffering arise respectively from general virtue and non-virtue and the variety of specific pleasures and sufferings [arise respectively] from the variety of specific [cases] of the two actions without the slightest disorder is called the correct view of all Buddhists and is praised as the foundation of all pure qualities.[11]

The Buddhists reject the assertions of the non-Buddhist schools such as the Nihilists [Chārvāka] who assert that happiness and suffering arise causelessly, the non-theistic Sāṃkhyas who assert that all manifest objects, including happiness and suffering, are transformations of the general principal (pradhāna) and the theistic Sāṃkhyas who hold that pleasure and pain are creations of the god Īshvara.[12] It is the Buddhist position that all experiences of pleasure and pain—the general, such as rebirth in a happy or bad migration, and the specific, such as the individual feelings of pleasure and pain in a given lifetime—are the definite results of action performed in the past and that this relationship of cause and effect is unconfused in the sense that

happiness always arises from virtue and suffering always arises from non-virtue and because a person never experiences the effect of an action that he did not perform.[13]

Thus, the happiness of cyclic existence is achieved through the practice of virtue which brings pleasurable feelings, and the manifest sufferings of the cyclic existence are avoided by abandoning non-virtuous activities which fructify in feelings of pain. However, this identification of the means for achieving pleasant feelings and avoiding unpleasant feelings is not the final position; Buddha indicates the unsatisfactory nature of all feelings when he states that, "Feeling is like a bubble."

Feeling is compared to a bubble for two reasons, the first being that just as a water bubble is destroyed as soon as it appears, so feeling disintegrates in the second moment after its production and becomes non-existent. This metaphor points to the impermanent nature of all feelings, whether they be pleasurable, painful, or neutral. The Sautrāntikas, Chittamātrins, and Mādhyamikas assert that all conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛitadharma) are produced and cease every moment. Unlike the Vaibhaṣhikas, who assert that production (utpatti), abiding (sthiti), aging (jarā), and disintegration (anityatā) are four external agents which operate on a conditioned phenomenon in succession, the upper schools hold production, abiding, aging, and disintegration

to be four qualities of the object itself and exist simultaneously.[14] Thus, the object's quality of being the arising of that which did not exist before is its production, its remaining as a type similar to the former moment is its abiding, its being of a different character from the former moment is its aging, and its not staying for a second moment is its disintegration. Rather than being four agents acting on the object in sequence, production, abiding, aging, and disintegration are four different perspectives on one instant, with the object ceasing in the very moment that it is produced. Thus, according to the Sautrāntikas, Chittamātrins, and Mādhyamikas, conditioned phenomena are unable to last beyond the moment of their production; momentary disintegration is inherent in everything that is produced from causes and conditions.[15] Feelings, which are conditioned phenomena produced by actions in the past, are produced and disintegrate every instant.

The second reason why feelings are compared to water bubbles is that just as bubbles have a nature of water, so feelings have a nature of suffering. In order to understand the meaning of this statement, it is essential that the three types of suffering—the suffering of pain (duḥkhaduḥkhatā), the suffering of change (vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā), and the suffering of conditioning (saṃskāraduḥkhatā)—be identified.

Sufferings of pain include all feelings of physical or mental pain, discomfort, or dissatisfaction, that is, all feelings ordinarily identified as unpleasant in the world. Such manifest forms of suffering are commonly recognized as having a nature of suffering.

All feelings of pleasure in cyclic existence are sufferings of change, so called because such feelings inevitably turn into suffering. When feelings of pleasure are observed over a long period of time, it is seen that suffering is eventually generated, such that what is imagined to be pleasure is in fact merely the period between the gradual cessation of one suffering and the gradual arising of another. For example, if one remains in the shade too long and becomes cold, one moves into the sunlight. If standing in the warmth of the sun was truly pleasurable, then no matter how long one stayed in the sun pleasure would continue without any feeling of discomfort. Since this is not the case and one must eventually return to the shade to avoid suffering the heat of the sun, the feeling of pleasure that initially arose from moving to the sunlight is a suffering of change. What was experienced as pleasure was the period between the cessation of the feeling of cold and the time at which the feeling of warmth became uncomfortable—a suffering of pain. If one has become exhausted by walking a long distance, sitting down appears to be pleasurable, but

this apparent pleasure is the cessation of the suffering of standing. Because the suffering of sitting is increasing gradually, it is not manifest. When the suffering becomes apparent, one must get up and go for a walk. Upon rising the suffering of sitting quickly ceases and the suffering of standing gradually is produced, even though it is not immediately evident.[16]

Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path says:

> Furthermore, present feelings of pleasure which increase attachment are for the most part cases of producing an awareness of pleasure in a lessening of suffering; a nature of pleasure which does not depend on the elimination of suffering does not exist. For example, when one suffers because of traveling too much, the awareness of pleasure arises through resting. At that time of the rapid cessation of suffering, pleasure appears to be gradually increasing, but it is not pleasurable by nature because again, if one rests too long, suffering is produced as before. If it were a cause of pleasure by way of its entity, then just as through merely relying on a cause of suffering, suffering continues to increase, so as long as one relies on such things as moving

> and resting, sleep, food and drink, sunlight, and shade, pleasure should continue to increase for that long. However, [if one relies on these] for too long, it seems that only suffering is produced.[17]

The existence of feelings of pleasure is not being denied. The essential point is that those activities identified as pleasurable are so only in relation to a corresponding decrease of suffering. Further, nothing in cyclic existence has an inherent nature of pleasure such that one could continually eat a certain food or listen to a particular piece of music, for example, and constantly derive enjoyment from doing so. Unlike causes of suffering which will continue to bring discomfort indefinitely, these activities commonly identified as sources of pleasure will eventually bring pain. Since feelings of pleasure turn into suffering, they are said to have a nature of suffering and are identified as sufferings of change.

Contaminated feelings of equanimity are identified as pervasive sufferings of conditioning (vyāptisaṃskāra-duḥkhatā), the most subtle and difficult to realize of the three types of suffering. Lacking the manifest discomfort of the suffering of pain and the observable tendency to turn into suffering of the suffering of change, feelings of equanimity are identified as suffering because of being under

the "other power" of contaminated actions and afflictions. Although a feeling of equanimity is neither pleasurable nor painful, since it is an impermanent phenomenon, suffering can arise in an instant upon the aggregation of suitable causes and conditions. As soon as one has a mind and body under the power of contaminated actions and afflictions, even though manifest suffering may be temporarily absent, suffering is ready to appear immediately. Therefore, the pervasive suffering of conditioning is extended to all five aggregates and is not limited to feelings of equanimity. D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path says:

> In carrying a great burden, inasmuch as that burden must be carried, their is no pleasure. Similarly, as long as one must bear the burden of the appropriated aggregates, so long must one suffer. When the suffering of conditioning exists through these aggregates having as their basis the assumption of the bad states of suffering and the afflictions, although there occasionally occur times without the feeling of suffering temporarily, many sufferings are produced immediately from a myriad of sources. Therefore, the suffering of conditioning pervades all suffering and is the root of the other two types of suffering.[18]

The suffering of conditioning is then called pervasive because it pervades sufferings of pain and sufferings of change; the domination of mind and body by the power of contaminated actions and afflictions, the fact that mind and body are so conditioned so as always to be ready to experience feelings of pleasure and pain make the first two types of suffering possible.

The third type of suffering is called pervasive also because it is a quality of the three realms and nine levels of cyclic existence. Sufferings of pain occur only in the Desire Realm, sufferings of change occur in the Desire Realm and the first three Concentrations of the Form Realm; in the Fourth Concentration and the four levels of the Formless Realm the feeling is only one of equanimity.[19]

The pervasive suffering of conditioning, though serving as the root of the sufferings of pain and change, is difficult to understand and is not identified as a suffering by common beings. As it says in sutra:

> Just as a wisp of wool in the hand is not felt by men
> But when it comes in the eye creates displeasure and pain,
> A fool, like the palm of the hand, does not feel the wisp of the suffering of conditioning.

> But, like the eye, the wise one is greatly
> moved by just that.[20]

Worldly beings do not identify the aggregates as sources of suffering and continue to seek pleasure in cyclic existence whereas the wise understand that as long as mind and body are under the power of past actions and the afflictions of desire, hatred, and ignorance, there can be no final happiness and no control over the indiscriminate occurrence of feelings of pain. Worldly beings allow feelings of pain and pleasure to serve as the causes of future suffering by generating attachment for pleasurable feelings and hatred for feelings of pain, with attachment producing the suffering of future births in cyclic existence and hatred producing sorrow in this life and rebirth in the bad migrations in the future. The wise, on the other hand, see feelings of pleasure as suffering and stop desire. Since the aggregates are a collection of causes for suffering, the wise consider feelings of pain as arising from the aggregates and endeavor to stop hatred of pain. They see feelings of equanimity as impermanent and having a nature of extinction and cessation and thus stop obscuration. In this way the wise do not allow the three feelings, which have a nature of suffering, to become causes of the three poisons—desire, hatred, and obscuration—the sources of future suffering.[21]

The doctrine of the three types of suffering points out that almost all experience is suffering on some level, in the sense of being manifest feelings of pain, feelings of pleasure that are merely designated to periods of non-manifest suffering, or feelings of equanimity that are so conditioned as to be ready to turn into suffering upon the aggregation of appropriate conditions. It is not being said that feelings of pleasure are feelings of pain. When Buddha said, "Whatever is experienced here is suffering," he did not mean that all feelings are feeling of actual pain. Rather, as he says, "Ānanda, I said that 'Whatever is experienced here is suffering,' referring to the impermanence of conditioned things and the change of conditioned things."[22] Experience is a form of suffering because the three feelings have a nature of impermanence and are produced by contaminated actions and afflictions, and are therefore unable to provide any final source of happiness. All those activities that sentient beings perform in hope of gaining final happiness in cyclic existence are thus doomed by their very nature to end in failure, or as Buddha says in the chapter on impermanence in the Verses of Uplift (Udānavarga I):

> The end of all amassing is depletion.
> The end of rising is collapse.
> The end of meeting, separation.
> The end of living is death.[23]

Thus, nothing in cyclic existence can provide a final source of happiness, and specifically, none of the three feelings offers satisfaction. D̄zong-ka-b̄a graphically illustrates the displeasing nature of the three feelings when he compares feelings of pleasure to the relief felt by pouring cool water on a burn, feelings of pain to the added suffering of pouring hot water on a burn, and feelings of equanimity to the sensation just at the moment of being burned before the pain becomes intense.[24] From this analogy it can be gathered that what is perceived as pleasure is merely a brief lessening of pain, what is perceived as pain is an intensification of already present suffering, and feelings of equanimity are capable of yielding feelings of pain in the next moment.

In the verse, feelings are compared to bubbles because just as a bubble is destroyed as soon as it arises, feelings disintegrate in the second moment after their production. This expresses the impermanent nature of feelings, that they disintegrate as soon as they arise, and thus cannot provide a permanent source of happiness. On the contrary, just as a bubble has a nature of water, all contaminated feelings—pleasurable, painful, and neutral—have a nature of suffering, as the presentation of the three types of suffering—of pain, change, and pervasive conditioning—indicates.

DISCRIMINATION IS LIKE A MIRAGE

Discrimination, the third of the five aggregates, is, like a feeling, an omnipresent mental factor that accompanies every main mind whether it be a sense or mental direct perceiver or a conceptual thought consciousness. It is that factor which apprehends the uncommon signs of an object. Discrimination involves the distinguishing and identification of objects.[25] The fact that we are able to differentiate one object from another and identify an object as something we have seen before is the result of discrimination.

Discrimination is compared to a mirage in the sense that, just as a mirage appears to be water but is not, discrimination appears to be something owned by a self-sufficient person but is not established as such. An individual's discriminations falsely appear to be self-sufficient possessions of the person due to considering one's own discriminations to be valid and those of others to be invalid.[26]

COMPOSITIONAL FACTORS ARE LIKE A BANANA TREE

In the division of awarenesses into minds and mental factors, the six main minds—the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental perceivers—constitute the fifth aggregate, consciousnesses. The fifty-one mental factors are divided into six categories: the five omnipresent factors (sarvatraga),

the five determining factors (viniyata), the eleven virtuous factors (kushala), the six root afflictions (mūlaklesha), the twenty secondary afflictions (upaklesha), and the four changeable factors (aniyata).[27] From among the five omnipresent factors, two—feeling and discrimination—are distinguished as separate aggregates because they are causes of disputation; discrimination serves as the basis of quarrels among philosophical systems and feeling serves as the basis of quarrels among ordinary people.[28] The other three omnipresent factors—intention (chetanā), contact (sparsha), and mental engagement (manaskāra)—and the reamining forty-six mental factors fall into the category of compositional factors, specifically as compositional factors associated with mind (chittaprayuktasaṃskāra).

The other components of the compositional factor aggregate are compositional factors which are neither form nor consciousness (arūpachittasaṃskāra), numbering twenty-four according to the Sautrāntikas, Chittamātrins, and Mādhyamikas, fifteen according to the Vaibhāṣhikas. These are the non-associated compositional factors (viprayuktasaṃskāra), called non-associated because of not being associated with minds or mental factors (chittachaittaviprayukta). They are called compositional because they allow for the aggregation of causes and conditions and allow for the production, abiding, and cessation of products.[29]

The twenty-four non-associated compositional factors are: person (pudgala), acquisition (prāpti), absorption without discrimination (asaṃjñisamāpatti), absorption of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti), one having no discrimination (āsaṃjñika), life faculty (jīvitendriya), similarity of type (nikāyasabhāgata), birth (jāti), aging (jarā), duration (sthiti), impermanence (anityatā), group of stems (nāmakāya), group of words (padakāya), group of letters (vyañjanakāya), state of an ordinary being (pṛithagjanatva), continuity (pravṛitti), distinction (pratiniyama), relatedness (yoga), rapidity (jāva), order (anukrama), time (kāla), area (desha), number (saṃkhyā), and collection (sāmagrī).[30] Since these are factors which apply to both form and consciousness, they cannot be placed in the form aggregate or in one of the mental aggregates, but are placed in a separate category, the aggregate of compositional factors.

These compositional factors are compared to a banana or plantain tree (Musa Sapientum). Buddha provides the background of the metaphor in the Kindred Sayings (Saṃyutta-nikāya III) where he describes a man who goes into the forest in search of heartwood, the hard, dry core of a tree trunk. He comes upon a tall, strong plantain tree and chops it down. Having cut off the top, he begins to peel away layers of bark to reach the heartwood. But below the first layer, he finds a second, and he peels away the layers

until there is nothing left, for the plantain tree has no heartwood, no core.[31]

Just as a banana tree is taken apart in many ways but a core does not appear, so compositional factors are analyzed with numerous reasonings, but the essence of something owned by a substantially existent person is not found.

CONSCIOUSNESS IS LIKE AN ILLUSION

The fifth aggregate includes the six minds: the eye consciousness (chakṣhurvijñāna), which observes visible forms, ear consciousness (shrotravijñāna) which observes sounds, nose consciousness (ghrānavijñāna) which observes odors, tongue consciousness (jihvavijñāna) which observes tastes, body consciousness (kāyavijñāna) which observes tangible objects, and mental consciousness (manovijñāna) which observes phenomena. No mental factors are included in the consciousness aggregate. The six consciousnesses, like all impermanent phenomena, arise in dependence on causes and conditions with three conditions being necessary for the production of any consciousness: 1) the uncommon empowering condition (asādhāraṇa-adhipatipratyaya) which for the five sense consciousnesses is clear subtle matter located in the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and throughout the body. These are the physical sense powers (indriya) which provide the physical ability

to perceive objects. For the mental consciousness, the uncommon empowering condition is not physical; any former moment of consciousness can act as the uncommon empowering condition of a mental consciousness. 2) The observed-object-condition (_ālambana-viṣhaya_) is the object of observation of the consciousness, that is, the visible form, sound, odor, taste, tangible object, or phenomenon apprehended by the particular consciousness. 3) The immediately preceding condition (_samanantara-pratyaya_) is a former moment of any of the six consciousnesses which serves as a cause of similar type of the consciousness produced and accounts for the fact that the continuum of consciousness is never severed; at least one of the six types of consciousness is constantly operating.[32]

The five sense consciousnesses (*_indriya-jñāna_) are necessarily non-conceptual (_nirvikalpaka_) whereas the mental consciousness can be either non-conceptual as in the case of a yogic direct perceiver (_yogi-pratyakṣha_) and clairvoyance (_abhijñā_) or conceptual, as in the case of thought (_kalpanā_).

Buddha compares consciousness to an illusion. A magician is able to cause a pebble to appear as a horse to his audience by casting a mantra which affects their eyes. The illusion appears to be a real horse but, in truth, is not. In the same way, consciousness appears to be a self-sufficient

person but is not established as such.

When consciousness is spoken of as appearing as a self-sufficient person, it is the mental consciousness that is being referred to more than the five sense consciousnesses. The mental consciousness which thinks thoughts, makes assumptions, draws conclusions, and directs activities of body and speech is wrongly conceived to be a substantially existent person in the sense of being self-sufficient. The nature of this misconception must be explored.

The term substantial existence (dravya-sat) occurs in many different contexts in Buddhist literature, in most cases meaning one of the following:

1 substantial existence which is established by reasoning; this is synonymous with being an object of knowledge (jñeya)
2 substantial existence which is steady and unchanging; this is synonymous with permanent phenomenon (nitya)
3 substantial existence which is the ability to perform a function; this is synonymous with impermanent thing (bhāva)
4 substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency (Tib. rang-rkya-thub-pa, literally "the ability to support itself").

This last sense of substantial existence is of interest in

delineating the manner in which the mental consciousness is misconceived as self. All four schools of Buddhist tenets agree that substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency refers (hypothetically) to an existence which does not depend on the apprehension of some other phenomenon in order to be identified.[33] Nothing substantially exists in that sense. In the context of the conception of a substantially existent or self-sufficient self, it is the conception of the existence of a self which can be identified independently without depending on the identification of the aggregates.[34]

When consciousness is said to appear as a substantially existent self, it is difficult to construe consciousness as such a self in the sense of being identified without depending on the aggregates, since consciousness is itself the fifth of the five aggregates. Rather the mental consciousness is wrongly conceived to be a substantially existent self in the sense of being the master or controller of the aggregates, the servants—those controlled. This conception of self does not require that the self be a different entity from the aggregates, be totally independent of them, or have a character completely unlike that of the aggregates.

A magician's illusion appears to be a horse but is not established as such. In the same way, the mental

consciousness appears to be a substantially existent person but, in fact, is not. Such a person does not substantially exist because its identification must depend on the appearance of other phenomena.[35] Therefore, the mental consciousness is not a substantially existent self. In the Svātantrika system, the mental consciousness is identified as the imputedly existent (<u>prajñaptisat</u>) person as will be explained below (pp. 156-165). All four tenet systems refute the existence of a substantially existent person.[36]

Having thus explained the manner in which form is like a ball of foam, feeling is like a bubble, discrimination is like a mirage, compositional factors are like a banana tree, and consciousness is like an illusion, it remains to be seen how this stanza from a Hīnayāna sutra became a point of contention between the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas. How do Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka interpret the stanza?

In commenting on the thirty-fourth stanza of Chapter Seven of Nāgārjuna's <u>Treatise on the Middle Way</u> which says:

> Production, abiding, and disintegration
> Are said to be like
> A dream, an illusion,
> And a city of the Gandharvas.

Buddhapālita writes:

> In this way, the Supramundane Victor (<u>Bhagavan</u>) set

> forth the categories of an illusion, an echo, a reflection, a mirage, a dream, a ball of foam, a water bubble, and a banana tree as examples of the selflessness of conditioned phenomena. There is nothing whatsoever real or non-mistaken in these. It is said that these are elaborations, these are falsities. In the statement, "All phenomena are selfless," selfless means entitynessless because the term "self" is a word for entityness.[37]

Buddha used the examples of deceptive phenomena such as illusions, mirages, and dreams to indicate that phenomena do not exist in the way that they appear. All phenomena are selfless in the sense that they lack inherent existence and do not exist by way of their own entity. When Buddha says in Hīnayāna sutras that form is like a ball of foam, feeling is like a water bubble, discrimination is like a mirage, compositional factors are like a banana tree, and consciousness is like an illusion, he is indicating that all conditioned phenomena are selfless, empty of inherent existence. This is Buddhapālita's position.

In commenting on the same verse from Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (VII 34), Bhāvaviveka disagrees with Buddhapālita's assertion that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in Hīnayāna sutras:

Self and mine are without entityness, but they are perceived in that way. Therefore, as an antidote to the afflictive obstructions, the Supramundane Victor taught in the [scriptures of the] Hearer vehicle:

> The Seerer of Reality [Buddha] said that
> Form is like a ball of foam,
> Feeling is like a bubble,
> Discrimination is like a mirage,
> Compositional factors are like a banana tree,
> Consciousness is like an illusion.

In the Mahāyāna [scriptural collection], conditioned phenomena are just without entityness, but they are perceived in that way and are [wrongly] taught in that way [by others]. Therefore, as an antidote to the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience, it is said [in the Diamond Cutter (Vajrachchedika)]:

> Products are to be viewed as like
> Stars, cataracts, butter lamps,
> Illusions, dew, bubbles,
> Dreams, lightning, and clouds.

Therefore, this is not something to be feared: the intelligent, having analyzed, should generate forbearance.

Another [Buddhapālita] says:

> The Supramundane Victor set forth the categories of illusion, echo, reflection, mirage, dream, ball of foam, water bubble, and banana tree as examples of the selflessness of conditioned phenomena. There is nothing whatsoever real or non-mistaken in this. It is said that these are elaborations, these are falsities. In the statement, "All phenomena are selfless," selfless means entitynessless because the term "self" is a word for entityness.

Regarding that, one who is not another [i.e., myself, Bhāvaviveka], says that here, since the appearance as self is a mistaken reality and since the term "self" is a word for self [of persons and does not mean entityness] and since a self that is a separate entity does not exist in those [aggregates] and they themselves are not a self just as they are not Īshvara, that scripture, because of having the meaning of the term selflessness of persons which is to be specifically realized in the Hearer Vehicle, cannot indicate that phenomena are selfless. If it could, it would be meaningless [for Buddha] to have taken up another vehicle [the Mahāyāna].[38]

Before exploring Bhāvaviveka's argument in detail, the stanza he cites from the Diamond Cutter Sutra warrants explanation.

> Products are to be viewed as like
> Stars, cataracts, butter lamps,
> Illusions, dew, bubbles,
> Dreams, lightning, and clouds.

According to Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a and the annotator of his Great Exposition of Tenets, Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den, this stanza sets forth nine examples which illustrate four characteristics of products.[39] The characteristic of nature is indicated by the examples of stars, cataracts, and a butter lamp. The characteristic of experience of the taste is indicated by the example of a magician's illusion. The characteristic of fault is indicated by the examples of dew and bubbles, and the characteristic of renunciation, by the examples of dreams, lightning, and clouds.

THE CHARACTERISTIC OF NATURE

The Nature of Products is Like Stars

Products' nature of being a composite of appearance and emptiness is illustrated by stars. All phenomena have two

natures. Their emptiness of true existence is their final, ultimate mode of being which appears to a non-conceptual exalted wisdom (nirvikalpakajñāna). This ultimate mode of being which is the mere elimination of true existence is illustrated by the fact that during the day, only the clear sky appears and stars are not visible. In the same way, the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise sees only the emptiness which is the negative of true existence and does not see any conventional elaborations whatsoever.

The other nature of products is their conventional mode of being which appears to conventional conceptual consciousnesses. This conventional mode of being is posited through appearing to a non-defective awareness. Just as when the night is covered by darkness, the constellations of stars appear clearly, so the varieties of conventional phenomena appear to a conventional thought consciousness. For those with the obstructive covering of ignorance (like darkness), various mistaken appearances (like stars) are perceived. Nevertheless, not all appearances to conventional thought consciousnesses are mistaken in the Svātantrika system. Products appear correctly to factually concordant consciousnesses—conventional valid cognizers. The appearance of objects as truly established from their own side, without being posited through appearing to a non-defective awareness exists only for mistaken minds. Phenomena do not exist in

that way and appear so through the force of predispositions for ignorance.

The example of stars which do not appear during the day but do appear at night illustrates the mode of apprehension of a non-conceptual exalted wisdom and a conceptual conventional consciousness. For a non-conceptual exalted wisdom of those who have not achieved Buddhahood, only emptiness—the absence of true existence and the final mode of being of phenomena—appears. To a conceptual conventional consciousness the varieties of conventional truths appear. This appearance of conventional phenomena is not an object of abandonment of the path to Buddhahood, for conventionalities appear to a Buddha's exalted wisdom knowing the varieties. Rather, it is the conception of these phenomena as truly existent, ultimately existent, without being posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective consciousness which is abandoned on the path.

The Nature of Products is Like Cataracts

Due to ignorance, products appear to be truly established but, in fact, are empty of being established in the way that they appear. This nature of emptiness is examplified by cataracts.

If a phenomenon were ultimately established, then the

phenomenon itself would have to be its own final mode of being. If this were the case, then a reasoning consciousness searching for the mode of being of that phenomenon would have to find the phenomenon itself at the conclusion of its analysis into the mode of being. However, a consciousness which analyzes with reasonings, such as the lack of being one or many, finds that the phenomenon under investigation is not ultimately one or many and therefore is not ultimately established. The reasoning consciousness finds that the mode of being of the phenomenon, rather than being the phenomenon itself, is its lack of ultimate establishment, its emptiness of being established in the way in which it appears.

This is similar to the case of a person with cataracts who sees falling hairs. If the falling hairs actually existed, they would have to be seen even more clearly by a person with good vision. The fact that such a person does not see falling hairs indicates that they do not exist. Similarly, if phenomena were ultimately established, as they appear to be to an ignorant consciousness, that ultimate establishment would have to be ascertained by an analytical consciousness specifically investigating ultimate establishment. The fact that such a consciousness, after searching for ultimate establishment, does not find it indicates that phenomena are empty of ultimate establishment.

The Nature of Products is Like a Butter Lamp

Although phenomena do not ultimately exist, they do exist, and it is necessary to posit the factors of the category of appearance—conventional truths. This is illustrated by a butter lamp. Although the flame of a butter lamp does not naturally abide in the lamp, it is undeniable that the flame arises when such things as butter and a wick are assembled. In the same way, although no phenomenon whatsoever ultimately exists, all of cyclic existence and nirvana arise in dependence on the phenomena of the impure class, such as contaminated actions and afflictions, and the phenomena of the pure class, such as the six perfections, the eighteen emptinesses, and the four noble truths.

In this way the nature of products is illustrated by the examples of stars, cataracts, and a butter lamp. The nature of emptiness is exemplified by cataracts, the nature of appearance by a butter lamp, and the nature of a combination of emptiness and appearance is illustrated by stars.

THE CHARACTERISTIC OF EXPERIENCE

The Experience of Products is Like that of a Magician's Illusion

A magician is able to take pebbles or sticks and, by rubbing

them with a salve and casting a mantra, cause them to appear as various pleasant or unpleasant things. The audience, viewing these false appearances reacts to them with attachment or fear even though, in fact, there are no circumstances of benefit or harm. In the same way, sentient beings are tortured by the sufferings of cyclic existence due to misconceiving the nature of phenomena. They generate various attachments and hatreds through the force of being affected by the ignorance which conceives of true existence, whereas, in fact phenomena are not truly existent, and they experience suffering as the result of desire and hatred. Being led like a dog who chases a stone thinking that it is food or tempting a child with an empty fist that he thinks holds candy, sentient beings manufacture various hopes and fears about things which do not truly exist. One must reverse attachment and not follow after those objects attempting to experience their taste.

THE CHARACTERISTIC OF FAULT

Products are viewed as faulty from the viewpoint of their nature of impermanence and from the viewpoint of their nature of suffering.

Products' Fault of Impermanence is Like Dew

A tiny dewdrop on the tip of a blade of grass immediately dries up at the slightest cause, such as being touched by sunlight. It has a nature of utter instability. In the same way, all conditioned phenomena, as soon as they are established, have an inner nature of disintegration, without depending on a later cause for them to fall apart. For this reason, the Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Stanzas (Shatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra) and Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayālaṃkāra) refer to impermanence as the aspect of non-being and the aspect of non-existence (because of being the aspect of the non-existence of permanence).[40]

Products' Fault of Suffering is Like a Water Bubble

When water bubbles appear, they have a nature of water, when they disappear, they return to the nature of water. With regard to contaminated feelings, sutra says, "Whatsoever feeling is here a suffering." Feelings of suffering arise in the aspect of suffering as soon as they are produced. When contaminated pleasures cease, they become entities of suffering and are therefore called sufferings of change. Because feelings of equanimity are the basis of all suffering, they are explained to be pervasive sufferings of conditioning.

Thus the three types of contaminated feelings—those of pain, pleasure, and equanimity are all identified as being types of suffering, the suffering of pain, the suffering of change, and the pervasive sufferings of conditioning respectively. For common beings (pṛithagjana) (etymologically, those who take birth (jana) by the power of individual (pṛithak) contaminated actions and afflictions)[41] do not perceive the three types of feelings as having a nature of suffering. Rather, such beings, often derogatorily referred to as children (balaka) by the Buddha, attribute qualities of pleasure and pain, pleasantness and unpleasantness to contaminated feelings. To the sight of Superiors, those who have achieved the path of seeing or above, it is said that "Pleasure never exists on the point of the needle of cyclic existence." That is, all experience in the cycle of existence has a nature only of suffering. This is something that can only be understood fully by Superiors; it cannot be understood by common beings. Therefore, the suffering nature of all contaminated feelings is called a truth for Superiors (Āryasatya).

CHARACTERISTIC OF RENUNCIATION

The characteristic of renunciation is the lack of true existence of products—that quality of products which, when

realized, causes them to be renounced. This characteristic of non-true existence of past, present, and future products is illustrated by a dream, lightning, and clouds, respectively.

Past Products' Characteristics of Renunciation is Like a Dream

When remembering a dream, one may feel desire or hatred for objects that appeared in the dream. Even though the dream objects are not real, they are nonetheless capable of serving as the basis of desire and hatred. In the same way, although the effects of past actions are experienced, it is not necessary that the actions which cause those effects be truly established. The mere fact that an effect is experienced does not entail that its cause must truly exist. Past products, such as actions in former lifetimes, produce effects yet are empty of true establishment, much as past dream objects can cause desire and hatred.

Present Products' Characteristics of Renunciation is Like Lightning

Lightning appears with radiant whiteness just for an instant and then immediately becomes non-existent without one being able to say, "First it appeared there, then it stayed here,

and finally disappeared there." In the same way, when one searches for present things, whether it be from the viewpoint of object, agent, and action or cause, effect, and entity, one can find no nature which is more than an appearance to a non-defective awareness. Through merely seeking for a truly existent thing with a reasoning consciousness, this object sought is broken down and disappears and cannot be found anywhere.

Future Products' Characteristic of Renunciation is Like Clouds

A pure empty sky does not have the capacity to produce rain, but rain falls from clouds gathered in the sky, and those clouds can continuously yield such effects as a ripened harvest. In the same way, contaminated actions, afflictions, and predispositions for assuming bad states gather in the natural clear light of the mind. These defilements are merely adventitious and are not the final nature of the mind; otherwise, liberation would be impossible because the mind could not be purified of defilement. The mind is naturally pure and empty of true existence. As the clouds are capable of producing harvests, contaminated actions, afflictions, and predispositions for assuming bad states are capable of producing a variety of fruitional effects,

such as rebirth as an animal, in the future. These future fruits are empty of true existence. If future things were ultimately established, they would have to exist at all times whereby all effects would have to abide in their causes, in which case it would absurdly follow that all the effects which arise in dependence on a cloud, such as a harvest, would have to exist in the cloud. Because future effects do not exist in their causes but rather arise gradually through a process of maturation, it can be inferred that future products lack ultimate establishment; they are empty of true existence.

Having examined the meaning of the stanza from the Diamond Cutter, it is now necessary to explore Bhāvaviveka's argument that this stanza in particular and the Mahāyāna scriptures in general teach the selflessness of phenomena, whereas the stanza from the Hīnayāna sutra which says "form is like a ball of foam . . ." and all other Hīnayāna sutras teach only the selflessness of persons.

Buddha is ostensibly saying very nearly the same thing in the two stanzas, even repeating the two metaphors of bubbles and a mirage. On face value, there is nothing to point to that indicates that the passage from the Hīnayāna sutra merely teaches the selflessness of persons while the Mahāyāna passage teaches the more subtle selflessness of phenomena. Bhāvaviveka's assertion that the selflessness of

phenomena is not taught in the Hīnayāna scriptural collection (*piṭaka*) revolves around two essential points of disagreement between the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas: the meaning of the term self (*ātman*) and what constitutes the two obstructions—the afflictive obstructions (*kleshāvaraṇa*) and the obstructions to omniscience (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). This becomes clear through examining again his commentary to the thirty-fourth stanza of the seventh chapter of Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*:

> Self and mine are without entityness, but they are perceived in that way. Therefore, as an antidote to the afflictive obstructions, the Supramundane Victor taught in the [scriptures of the] Hearer Vehicle:
>
> > The Seerer of Reality, [Buddha] said that
> > Form is like a ball of foam,
> > Feeling is like a bubble,
> > Discrimination is like a mirage,
> > Compositional factors are like a banana tree,
> > Consciousness is like an illusion.
>
> In the Mahāyāna [scriptural collection], conditioned phenomena are just without entityness, but they are perceived in that way and are [wrongly] taught in that way [by others]. Therefore, as an antidote to the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to

omniscience, it is said [in the Diamond Cutter]:

> Products are to be viewed as like
> Stars, cataracts, a butter lamp,
> An illusion, dew, a bubble,
> A dream, lightning, and clouds.

Therefore, this is not something to be feared; the intelligent, having analyzed, should generate forbearance.

Another [i.e., Buddhapālita] says:

> The Supramundane Victor set forth the categories of illusions, echoes, reflections, mirages, dreams, balls of foam, water bubbles, and banana trees as examples of the selflessness of conditioned phenomena. There is nothing whatsoever real or non-mistaken in them. It is said that these are elaborations, these are falsities. In the statement, "All phenomena are selfless," selfless means entitynessless because the term "self" is word for entityness.

Regarding that, one who is not another [i.e., myself, Bhāvaviveka], says that here, since the appearance as self is a mistaken reality and since the term "self" is a word for self [of persons and does not mean

> entityness] and since a self that is a separate entity does not exist in those [aggregates] and they themselves are not a self just as they are not Īshvara, that scripture, because of having the meaning of the term "selflessness of persons" which is to be specifically realized in the Hearer vehicle, cannot indicate that phenomena are selfless. If it could, it would have been meaningless [for Buddha] to have taken up another vehicle [namely, the Mahāyāna].[42]

Bhāvaviveka states that the self of persons lacks entityness but is falsely perceived to exist truly. This misconception of the nature of the person constitutes the chief of the afflictive obstructions which prevent liberation from cyclic existence. Since Hīnayānists seek to be liberated from cyclic existence, they must overcome the afflictive obstructions, and therefore, Buddha taught the selflessness of person—the thorough knowledge of which is the antidote to the afflictive obstructions—in the Hearer or Hīnayāna scriptural collection. For Bhāvaviveka, the stanzas, "Form is like a ball of foan . . ." are an instance of a Hīnayāna scripture which teaches the selflessness of persons.

Bhāvaviveka goes on to say that all conditioned phenomena, persons and other things, lack entityness but are falsely perceived to exist truly. The conception of

phenomena as truly existing by way of their own entity is the chief of the obstructions to omniscience preventing the achievement of the omniscient consciousness of a Buddha which is able to perceive directly all objects of knowledge (jñeya) simultaneously. This conception of phenomena as truly existent is more subtle than the conception of a self of persons, and therefore the wisdom realizing that phenomena do not truly exist serves as an antidote to the more coarse afflictive obstructions as well as to the obstructions to omniscience. Buddha taught that conditioned phenomena are without entityness in the Mahāyāna scriptural collections so that those with the Mahāyāna aspiration to achieve Buddhahood for the welfare of all sentient beings could realize the non-true existence of phenomena and overcome both obstructions. Bhāvaviveka cites the passage from the Diamond Cutter as an instance of a Mahāyāna sutra which teaches that conditioned phenomena are without entityness.

He then goes on to quote Buddhapālita's commentary to the Treatise on the Middle Way (IV.7) in which Buddhapālita states that the similes of illusions, balls of foam, banana trees, and so forth that Buddha employs in the passage from the Hīnayāna sutra denote the selflessness of phenomena, not merely that of persons. This is due to the fact that, according to Buddhapālita, when Buddha says in the Hīnayāna scriptures that all phenomena are selfless, the word selfless

(anātman) means entitynessless (niḥsvabhāva), that is, not being established by way of its own entity, because self (ātman) is another word for entityness (svabhāva).

Bhāvaviveka disagrees, saying that the term self in this context refers only to a misconceived nature of the person. The Hīnayāna scriptures, by saying that form is like a ball of foam, feeling is like a bubble, discrimination like a mirage, conpositional factors like a banana tree, and consciousness like an illusion, are indicating that a self which is different entity from the aggregates does not exist anywhere among the aggregates, nor are the aggregates individually or collectively the self. The passage discusses only the nature of the person in terms of the five aggregates and in no way refers to the lack of entityness of phenomena, as Buddhapālita contends. Hearer scriptures teach only the object of a Hearer's wisdom, namely, the selflessness of persons. If the object of a Bodhisattva's wisdom, the entitynessless of phenomena, were taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures, then the complete antidote for the removal of both obstructions would be available in the Hīnayāna canon and the Buddha's teaching of the Mahāyāna scriptures would be totally redundant.

This controversy between Bhāvaviveka and Buddhapālita rests on the disagreement between the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas on three fundamental issues: the meaning of

self and selflessness, the nature of the two obstructions, and the distinguishing feature of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.

According to the Svātantrikas, Chittamātrins, Sautrāntikas, and Vaibhāṣhikas, the term "self (atman) in isolation, and not in phrases such as "selflessness of phenomena" (dharmanairātmya), refers only to an attribute falsely ascribed to the person (pudgala); it does not refer to other phenomena. It should be noted that self, in this context, is not a synonym for person as it usually is; when these tenet systems refute the existence of self, they are not refuting the existence of persons. Rather, they are negating a special type of person, a person which cannot appear to the mind except in dependence on the appearance of other phenomena.[43]

The Prāsaṅgikas apply the bare term "self" to a wider context than merely the false nature of the person.[44] Buddhapālita says that self is a word for entityness,[45] the inherent existence which is falsely ascribed to all phenomena, including persons. Chandrakīrti says in his Commentary to Āryadeva's "Four Hundred" (Chatuḥshatakaṭīkā):

> Regarding this, "self" is the entity of things which does not depend on another, [it is] inherent existence. The non-existence of that is selflessness. Through the division into phenomena and persons it is understood as twofold, the selflessness of phenomena

and the selflessness of persons.[46]

Thus, for the Prāsaṅgikas, self does not refer merely to a falsely attributed quality of just persons, but refers to an independent entity, an entity which exists under its own power, the existence of an objective mode of subsistence which is not merely imputed by terminology.[47] A person's quality of being an independent, inherently existent entity is a self of persons. Such a quality superimposed on phenomena other than the person is a self of phenomena. The non-existence of those two false qualities of persons and phenomena are the selflessnesses of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. In the Prāsaṅgika system there is no difference in subtlety between the two selflessnesses. They are distinguished from the point of view of the bases which are selfless, that is, persons and phenomena.

The Svātantrikas assert a difference in coarseness and subtlety between the two selflessnesses and also assert different objects of negation by the two selflessnesses. The lack of being a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency is the subtle selflessness of persons. This selflessness is coarser and more easily realized than the selflessness of phenomena—that phenomena do not exist from their own side without being posited by the power of a non-defective awareness (see pp. 215-226). Thus, unlike

the Prāsaṅgikas, the Svātantrikas do not negate the same quality when they establish the selflessnesses of persons and phenomena. When they say that the person is selfless, they are negating the person's substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency. When they say that phenomena are selfless, they are negating the existence of phenomena from their own side without being posited by the power of appearing to a non-defective awareness. Though the Prāsaṅgikas distinguish the two selflessnesses from the point of view of that which is selfless, the Svātantrikas distinguish the two selflessnesses from the point of view of how they are selfless.[48] Let us examine the Svātantrika presentation of selflessness of persons in more detail.

In the Svātantrika system, the conception of the self of persons (pudgalātmagraha) takes three forms:

1 the conception of a substantially existent self in the sense of self-sufficiency which is the conception of the existence of a self which is capable of being identified independently without relying on the identification of the aggregates. This is the innate (sahaja) conception of a self of persons according to the Svātantrikas, present in the continuum of all sentient beings.

2 the conception of a self that is of a different character from the aggregates, that is, the conception of the

existence of a self which does not share the aggregates' qualities of production, abiding, and disintegration.

3 the conception of a permanent, single, independent self which is permanent in the sense that it is without production and disintegration, single in the sense that it lacks parts, and independent in the sense that it does not rely on another.

The last two conceptions of a self of persons do not exist in the mental continuums of persons whose minds have not been affected by the study of non-Buddhist systems of tenets which propound such a self, like Sāṃkhya or Vedānta. Because the latter two conceptions do not exist in the continuums of all sentient beings, but exist only for those who have studied false systems, these conceptions are called artificial (parikalpita) conceptions of a self of persons by the Svātantrikas.[49]

The first conception, that of a substantially existent self, is the subtle conception of a self of persons which must be abandoned in order to be liberated from cyclic existence. This subtle conception of the I holds the self and the aggregates to be like a master and his servants, with the self seen as the controller of the body, for example. This innate conception of self holds the I or person to be substantially existent because it conceives of the I as self-sufficient, not depending on the aggregates.[50]

The self-sufficient person is conceived to have a character different from and independent of the aggregates in the sense of acting as their controller.

The existence of such a self-sufficient person is refuted by acknowledging that in order for the person to be identified, one must rely on the prior identification of some other phenomenon, namely one or more of the aggregates, in which case the person cannot be self-sufficient. For example, the mottle of colors on a butterfly's wing cannot be identified without reference to the colors that compose it; it does not exist separately from those colors.[51]

The Svātantrikas reject the existence of a substantially existent person which is something other than the aggregates and assert that the person is merely designated to the aggregates. They find support in the statement from sutra which says:

> Just as, for example, to a collection parts
> A chariot is designated,
> So, in dependence on the aggregates,
> Conventionally, a sentient being is named.[52]

Thus, the Svātantrikas reject the existence of a self-sufficient person but do not reject the existence of the person. Bhāvaviveka says in the eighteenth chapter of his Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom", "Thus, we also actually impute the

term self to consciousnesses conventionally because, since consciousness takes rebirth, it is the self."[53] For scriptural support that consciousness is the self, Bhāvaviveka cites two statements:

> Oneself is one's own protector
> Who else can offer protection?
> Through taming the self well
> The wise attain high status.[54]

Another sutra says:

> Taming the mind is good
> Taming the mind brings bliss.[55]

Since one sutra refers to taming the self and the other to taming the mind, the terms mind and self are, according to Bhāvaviveka, used interchangeably in this context. Bhāvaviveka reasons that consciousness is the conventionally existent self because the self and consciousness is that which takes rebirth; it appropriates the other aggregates which, together with consciousness, serve as the basis of designation of the conventionally existent person in the new lifetime.[56]

Those who assert that the five aggregates are the person, citing the quotation above about the chariot, are not saying that all five aggregates are the person nor that the

five aggregates individually are the person. Rather, they assert that the collection of the five aggregates is the person. Furthermore, when Bhāvaviveka states that the mental consciousness is the person, he is not implicitly denying that the collection of the aggregates is the person. Rather, he holds that the main mental consciousness is the traveller continuously migrating through cyclic existence and therefore is appropriately designated with the term "person."[57] The positions on the conventional status of the person of the non-Prāsaṅgika Buddhist schools may be summarized in a general way as follows:

School	Conventionally Existent Person
Kashmiri Vaibhāṣhika	continuum of the aggregates
Sautrāntika Following Scripture	continuum of the aggregates
Sautrāntika Following Reasoning	mental consciousness
Chittamātra Following Reasoning	mental consciousness
Chittamātra Following Scripture	mind-basis-of-all (*ālayavijñāna*)
Sautrāntika-Svātantrika	mental consciousness
Yogāchāra-Svātantrika	continuum of consciousness[58]

Dispensing with the qualification "continuum" (*saṃtāna*) which here refers to the possessor of a series of moments, for example, the continuation of moments of the mental consciousness over time,[59] the non-Prāsaṅgika schools posit either the collection of the five aggregates or some form of the mental

consciousness as the person. Their views are summarized by Chandrakīrti in his Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's "Treatise on the) Middle Way" (Madhyamakāvatāra) when he says:

> [Buddha said,] "There is no establishment of
> self which is other than the aggregates."
> Therefore, the object of observation of the
> view of self is only the aggregates.
> Some assert all five aggregates as the basis
> Of the view of self, some assert just the mind.[60]

The Prāsaṅgikas deny that the collection of the aggregates is the person and that the mental consciousness is the person. They reject the view that the collection is the person by analyzing the relationship between a chariot and its parts.

The Svātantrikas assert that the collection of the axle, nails, wheels, car, and so forth of the chariot is the chariot and that when one searches for the object designated by the term "chariot" the collection of the parts of the chariot is found.[61] They say that the chariot is not just imputed to its parts nominally; if the basis of the designation of the name "chariot" were not the chariot, then the chariot would not exist. In the same way, they assert that the collection of the aggregates, the basis of designation of the term "person," is the person.[62]

Chandrakīrti, in his Supplement to the Middle Way, rejects the view that the collection of the parts of the chariot is the chariot and that the collection of the aggregates is the person.[63] Although the chariot is designated in dependence on its parts, the parts of the chariot are not the chariot. If the mere collection of the parts of the chariot were the chariot, it would absurdly follow that the pile of disassembled parts of the chariot would be the chariot itself because, as the Svātantrikas and so forth say, the collection of the parts of the chariot is the chariot.[64]

Someone might object that it is not being said that the mere collection of the parts is the chariot. Rather, the special shape of the arranged parts is the chariot. Chandrakīrti rejects this view, saying that there is no difference in the shape of the axles, wheels, and so forth before and after assembly. Therefore, since the chariot does not exist among the disassembled parts, it also does not exist among the assembled parts. It is also not feasible that the parts' shapes somehow change after they are assembled because no such change is observed. Finally, the general (sāmānya) shape of the collection of the parts cannot be the chariot because, according to the Svātantrikas, the chariot is substantially established (dravyasiddha), but the collection of the parts and its shape are imputedly

existent (prajñaptisat).[65]

The Prāsaṅgikas do not negate the existence of the chariot; they negate the existence of the chariot as the collection of its parts. They assert that the collection of the parts of the chariot is the basis of the designation of the term "chariot," but the chariot is merely imputed to those parts. No matter how thoroughly the parts are scrutinized, the chariot cannot be found. The basis of the designation—the collection of the parts—is not and cannot be the object designated—the chariot. The basis of a particular designation and the object of that designation are mutually exclusive.[66] Just as the collection of the parts of the chariot is not the chariot, the collection of the aggregates is not the person.

The late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Tibetan scholar, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, argues that Bhāvaviveka's contention that the mental consciousness is the person demonstrates that he has not abandoned the conception of a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency because he asserts that the person has a character different from that of the aggregates. According to Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, the conception of the person as having a character different from that of the aggregates takes two forms. The first is exemplified by that of the master and servant in which the person is the appropriator, the owner

of the aggregates, with the self or person having the character of permanence, in contrast to the impermanent nature of the aggregates. According to Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, this conception of self, the type of self asserted by the non-Buddhists, is what Bhāvaviveka and the Svātantrikas refute. They are unable to refute the more subtle conception of a self of persons in which the person is seen to be like a head salesman and the aggregates as junior salesmen. Here, the head salesman and the junior salesmen are similar in being salesmen, but the head salesman stands apart as the controller and supervisor of the others and thus has a distinct character. When Bhāvaviveka asserts that consciousness is the person, he falls into this type of conception of a self of persons because consciousness is itself an aggregate, as the head salesman is a salesman, but is nonetheless set above the other aggregates as their controller. The fact that consciousness has a distinctive character which separates it from the other aggregates is implicit in Bhāvaviveka's statement that consciousness is the person; when one searches among the aggregates for the conventionally existent person, it is Bhāvaviveka's contention that one will find consciousness. Thus, there must be some special quality of consciousness which sets it apart.[67]

What then is the person? In Chandrakīrti's sevenfold reasoning, the person is shown not to exist inherently

because when the object designated by the term "person" is sought, it is not found to be inherently the same as the aggregates, different from the aggregates, the basis of the aggregates, based on the aggregates, the possessor of the aggregates, the shape of the aggregates, or the collection of the aggregates. According to the Prāsaṅgikas, the self or person is the mere I which serves as the basis for the generation of the awareness thinking "I" in dependence on the aggregates. The person is merely imputed in terms of the aggregates and is not established by way of its own entity but nonetheless exists, performing the functions of accumulating actions and experiencing the fruition of effects.[68]

The Prāsaṅgikas assert that the conception of the person as existing by way of its own entity and not merely being posited conventionally is the subtle conception of a self of persons. In reality, the person is merely posited by the power of convention; when the object designated by the verbal convention "person" is searched for, it is not found because the person and the aggregates do not inherently exist in any of the seven ways which are considered to be exhaustive. That is, if the person is not inherently the same as, different from, based on, the base of, the possessor of, the collection of, or the shape of the aggregates, then the person does not inherently exist, substantially exist,

or exist by way of its own character. This non-existence of the person by way of its own entity is the very subtle selflessness of persons.

According to Prāsaṅgika, through directly seeing and meditating on the mere absence of a person which exists by way of its own entity without being designated by conventions, one is able to abandon the innate conception of a self of persons. This follows because the wisdom directly realizing the person's non-existence by way of its own entity and the ignorant consciousness conceiving the person to be established by way of its own entity both observe the same object—the mere I designated to the aggregates. However, their mode of apprehension of that object is directly contradictory, with the wisdom consciousness apprehending the mere I as empty of inherent existence and the ignorant consciousness apprehending the mere I as inherently existent. Through directly seeing and then accustoming to the emptiness of inherent existence of the person, this wisdom consciousness uproots and abandons the conception of a self of persons.

For the Prāsaṅgikas, the selflessness of persons taught by the Svātantrikas, the lack of being a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency, is not the subtle selflessness of persons, being coarser then the person's lack of inherent existence. Even though the Svātantrikas, at least in terms of their own assertions, realize the

person's lack of being substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency, they are incapable of abandoning the conception of the person as established by way of its own character because they hold that the person does in fact exist by way of its own character conventionally in the sense that the person is analytically findable among the aggregates. Thus, according to the Prāsaṅgikas, the Svātantrikas retain the subtle conception of a self of persons.[69]

Let us reiterate the coarse and subtle conceptions of self according to the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas. For the Svātantrikas, the conception of a self of persons has coarse and subtle forms. The coarse conception of a self of persons is the conception of a permanent, single, independent self. This is also an artificial conception in the sense that it is present only in the continuums of those whose minds have been affected by the study of false systems of tenets which propound the existence of such a self. The subtle conception of a self of persons is that of a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency. This conception is innate, existing in the continuums of all sentient beings who have not abandoned it, but can also be artificial.

The selflessness of phenomena, which is more subtle than that of persons, has only one form for the Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas: a phenomenon's lack of being established from

its own side without being merely posited through the power of appearing to a non-defective awareness (see pp. 215-226). For the Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas, this becomes the subtle selflessness of phenomena, adding the emptiness of subject and object being different substantial entities as the coarse selflessness of phenomena to be realized by Solitary Realizers.

The conception of the person as substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency, the subtle conception of a self of persons for the Svātantrikas, is asserted to be the coarse conception of self by the Prāsaṅgikas. Further, this coarse conception has artificial and innate forms, the artificial coarse conception being like master and servant with the self having a character different from that of the aggregates. The innate coarse conception of a self of persons is that in which the self and the aggregates are conceived to be like a head salesman and junior salesmen, with the self sharing some of the qualities of the aggregates but still maintaining a special status, being identifiable as the mental consciousness when analyzed.

The Prāsaṅgikas contend that the Svātantrikas only refute the artificial coarse conception of a self of persons. They are therefore said to abandon only the conception of self asserted by the non-Buddhists. They do not abandon, nor are they aware of the innate coarse conception of a self

of persons, that of the head salesman-junior salesmen analogy.

Being incapable of recognizing and abandoning even this form of the coarse conception of a self of persons which exists naturally in the continuums of all sentient beings who have not found the Prāsaṅgika view, the Svātantrikas and other Buddhist tenet systems are afflicted further by the subtle conception of a self of persons, the conception of the person as inherently existent, or established by way of its own entity and existing by way of its own character. This is the very subtle conception of persons and is abandoned by the wisdom realizing the emptiness of inherent existence of the person.

The selflessness of phenomena is the emptiness of inherent existence of phenomena other than persons, according to Prāsaṅgika. There is no difference in subtlety nor in the object of negation of the two selflessness; they are distinguished merely by the substratum qualified by the emptiness of inherent existence, namely persons and phenomena.[70]

In summary, what the Svātantrikas assert to be the innate subtle conception of self, the Prāsaṅgikas call artificial and coarse. There is an innate coarse conception of self which the Prāsaṅgikas say is not identified by the Svātantrikas, but even this is coarse. The subtle conception of a self of persons is the conception of the person as

inherently existent, and this conception is identified and abandoned only by the Prāsaṅgikas.

The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika schism on the question of self and selflessness relates directly to their assertions concerning the two obstructions. The obstructions to liberation, literally the afflictive obstructions (kleshāvaraṇa), are those factors preventing liberation from cyclic existence. The obstructions to omniscience, literally the obstructions to objects of knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa), prevent the achievement of a Buddha's omniscient consciousness which simultaneously cognizes all objects of knowledge (jñeya).[71]

According to the Vaibhāṣhikas, Sautrāntikas, Chittamātrins, and Svātantrikas, the conception of the person as substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency, having a character different from the aggregates, is the conception of a self of persons and is the chief of the afflictive obstructions, the others being desire, hatred, pride and so forth. By negating the referent object of that conception—a self of persons—and accustoming to it over the path, one is liberated from rebirth in cyclic existence. The selflessness of persons is thus the chief object of meditation for Hearers and Solitary Realizers (except in Yogāchāra-Svātantrika, where it is said that Solitary Realizers meditate on the emptiness of subject and object being different substantial entities).[72] For the

Svātantrikas, the obstructions to omniscience (or subtle obstructions to omniscience according to the Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas) are the conception of true existence together with its seeds—the conception that phenomena are established as their own mode of subsistence without being posited by a non-defective awareness.

Bodhisattvas meditate on the emptiness of true existence in order to overcome the obstructions to omniscience and achieve Buddhahood. Their motivation is this. It is said in sutra:

> Buddhas neither wash sins away with water, nor remove the sufferings of beings with their hands. They transfer not their realizations to others. Beings are freed through the teaching of truth, the nature of things.[73]

Thus, the benefit bestowed on sentient beings by Buddhas derives from their abilities as teachers. In order to teach effectively, it is not sufficient that they have a good motivation; they must know what to adopt and discard as well as the individual capacities and interests of their students. Therefore, they must be omniscient, and this entails the abandonment of the obstructions to omniscience. The Prāsaṅgikas assert that Bodhisattvas must first abandon the obstructions to liberation—the afflictive obstructions—

before beginning to work on the obstructions to omniscience, but the Svātantrikas assert that Bodhisattvas begin to abandon the two obstructions simultaneously, beginning on the first Bodhisattva ground (bhūmi). The Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas hold that the afflictive obstructions are fully abandoned by the eighth ground, with the last three grounds devoted entirely to removing the remaining obstructions to omniscience. The Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas assert that the abandonment of both obstructions and achievement of Buddhahood are simultaneous.[74]

According to the Svātantrikas, Hīnayānists do not realize the emptiness of true existence. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the conception of true existence together with its seeds are the afflictive obstructions, and mistaken dualistic appearance—the false appearance of phenomena as truly existent—together with its predispositions are the obstructions to omniscience. In order to be liberated from cyclic existence one must destroy the conception of true existence through repeated cognition of the emptiness of true existence of persons and phenomena. After the conception of true existence—the obstructions to liberation—have been destroyed, the false appearance of phenomena as inherently existent remains, even to the non-conceptual sense consciousnesses, despite the fact that Bodhisattvas do not assent to that false appearance, instead viewing

phenomena as like illusions, appearing one way but existing another. They then go on to abandon the obstructions to omniscience, removing this false appearance, until they are able to perceive simultaneously and directly the two truths at Buddhahood.[75]

Therefore, it is the position of the Prāsaṅgikas that anyone who wishes to be liberated from cyclic existence must realize the emptiness of inherent existence of persons and phenomena. The Svātantrika assertion that one merely need to cognize the selflessness of persons is rejected, as is their explanation of what constitutes the subtle selflessness of persons. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the conception of inherent existence is the chief of the afflictive obstructions, the root of all the other afflictive emotions such as desire and hatred. The realization of a selflessness less subtle than the emptiness of inherent existence, such as the selflessness of persons realized by the Svātantrikas, does not destroy any afflictions because it has not penetrated to the final nature of the person. Chandrakīrti says in his Supplement to the Middle Way (VI.131):

> [According to] you, yogis perceiving selflessness
> Do not realize the reality of forms and so forth.
> [Therefore,] due to seeing forms [as truly existent] and relating [to them as such]

> Desire and so forth are produced because
> their nature has not been realized.[76]

The emptiness of being a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency is not the very subtle selflessness of persons because when the former is realized, one does not realize that the person is not established by way of its own entity, and the person's not being established by way of its own entity is the very subtle selflessness of persons. Furthermore, through merely seeing and then accustoming to the person's emptiness of substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency, one is not able to abandon the desire which apprehends forms because such a realization does not entail an understanding of forms as empty of inherent existence and the conception of forms as inherently existent is the cause of the desire apprehending forms.[77] Therefore, Chandrakīrti is saying that the Svātantrikas and all others who merely realize a coarse selflessness of persons are incapable of abandoning the afflictive emotions and being liberated from cyclic existence because they have not destroyed the conception of true existence, the chief of the obstructions to liberation. Chandrakīrti says in his commentary to Nāgārjuna's <u>Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning</u>:

> The abandonment of the afflictive emotions just does not

> occur for those who wish to abandon the afflictive emotions but who apprehend the inherent existence of forms and so forth.[78]

Merely realizing that the person lacks substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency is not enough to abandon the afflictive emotions. It is impossible to abandon desire without directly realizing that forms do not inherently exist.[79]

It is the Prāsaṅgika position, then, that everyone who seeks liberation from cyclic existence must realize the subtle selflessness—the emptiness of inherent existence of persons and phenomena—whether that liberation is sought for one's own sake, the Hīnayāna motivation, or for the sake of others, the Mahāyāna motivation. There is no difference between the objects of the wisdom of Hearers and Solitary Realizers on the one hand and Bodhisattvas on the other. Referring to this subtle selflessness, the Prāsaṅgika master Shāntideva says in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharyāvatāra, IX.41cd):

> Scripture says that without this path
> There can be no enlightenment.

That is, it is said in scripture that without the path realizing the emptiness of inherent existence, one cannot achieve the enlightenment of a Hearer or Solitary Realizer

Foe Destroyer (Arhan) or that of a Buddha. Chandrakīrti stresses that the knowledge of both selflessnesses is necessary in order to be liberated from cyclic existence. He says in his Supplement to the Middle Way:

> For the liberation of migrators, this selflessness
> Was taught in two aspects, with the divisions of persons and phenomena.[80]

He also cites the Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Dashabhūmika-sūtra) to support the Prāsaṅgika position that Hīnayānists—Hearers and Solitary Realizers—and Mahāyānists realize the same selflessness. The sutra states that Bodhisattvas on the seventh ground are able to outshine Hearers and Solitary Realizers in terms of their realizing the non-inherent existence of phenomena. Bodhisattvas on the sixth ground and below are not able to outshine them. If Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not realize the subtle selflessness of phenomena, as Bhāvaviveka contends, then it would follow that even Bodhisattvas abiding on the first ground would outshine all Hearers and Solitary Realizers in terms of their understanding of the emptiness of inherent existence of phenomena. However, because the sutra states that they are only outshone on the seventh ground, Chandrakīrti concludes that Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas all realize the same subtle

emptiness of inherent existence.[81]

Because Chandrakīrti identifies the conception of inherent existence as the root of the afflictive emotions, if Hearers and Solitary Realizers did not realize the emptiness of inherent existence, it would absurdly follow that they could not abandon any of the afflictive emotions and would never be liberated from cyclic existence. Furthermore, if Hearers and Solitary Realizers did not realize the subtle selflessness of phenomena, they would continue to apprehend the aggregates to be inherently existent, in which case they could not fully realize the selflessness of the person because the aggregates are the basis of the designation of the I or the person. Without refuting the referent object of the conception of inherent existence with respect to the aggregates, the basis of designation of the person, the referent object of the conception of an inherently existent person, the object designated, cannot be refuted.[82] This raises a problem. It is the position of the Prāsaṅgikas that as long as one misconceives the nature of the aggregates, one misconceives the nature of the person because the aggregates are the basis of designation of the person; in order for the person to appear to the mind, the aggregates must appear first. Thus, if the basis of designation is conceived to be truly existent, the object designated, in this case the person, is conceived to be truly existent. The conception of a

truly existent person arises from the conception of the aggregates as truly existent. However, in practice it is said that the emptiness of the person is to be realized before the emptiness of the aggregates. How can this be, if the Prāsaṅgikas also wish to maintain that one continues to misconceive the nature of the person as long as the aggregates are misconceived and that without realizing the emptiness of the aggregates one cannot realize the emptiness of the person? In answer, it is said that the consciousness realizing the emptiness of the person can, without relying on another consciousness, remove superimpositions, misconceptions about the aggregates. However, as long as the consciousness actively misconceiving the nature of the aggregates has not been abandoned, it is impossible to generate a wisdom consciousness understanding the emptiness of the person.[83]

Chandrakīrti also finds support for his contention that Hīnayānists realize the subtle selflessness in statements by Nāgārjuna. He says in his Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment (Bodhichittavivāraṇa):

> Those who know not emptiness
> Are not bases of liberation.
> The obscured wander in the six migrations
> In the prison of cyclic existence.[84]

That is, it is necessary to realize the emptiness of inherent existence in order to be liberated from rebirth. In his proof that the Mahāyāna sutras are the word of Buddha, he says in his Precious Garland (Ratnāvalī):

> The teaching in the Mahāyāna of non-production
> And of extinction in the Hīnayāna are the same
> Emptiness [since they show that inherent
> existence] is extinguished
> And that nothing [inherently existent] is produced.
> Thus, let the Mahāyāna be accepted [as Buddha's
> word].[85]

The emptiness of inherently existent production taught in the Mahāyāna sutras and the extinguishment of products referred to in the Hīnayāna sutras refer to the same thing. Therefore, the subtle selflessness of phenomena is taught for the sake of Hīnayānists in their own scriptures.

Bhāvaviveka's contention that the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena differ in subtlety and that they are objects of the wisdom of Hīnayānists and Mahāyānists respectively is objectionable to the Prāsaṅgikas for several reasons. First, as we have seen, the Prāsaṅgikas assert that Hearers and Solitary Realizers realize the selflessness of phenomena. This assertion rests on the Prāsaṅgikas' identification of the conception

of an inherently existent person as the subtle conception of a self of persons. This conception of inherent existence also applies to the aggregates, the basis of designation of the person, and having realized the non-inherent existence of the person, through merely reflecting on the same reason with respect to the aggregates, such as the sevenfold reasoning, one is able to realize the non-inherent existence of the aggregates. One is thereby able to realize that phenomena do not inherently exist.[86] Because there is no difference in subtlety between the selflessness of persons and phenomena, having realized one, it is possible easily to realize the other by merely applying a similar form of reasoning, substituting a phenomenon such as "form" in place of the "I" as the subject of the consequence.

The Prāsaṅgikas are thus able to assert that anyone who realizes the selflessness of persons can realize the selflessness of phenomena by merely shifting the focus of the reasoning. Because Hearers and Solitary Realizers understand the subtle selflessness of persons—the non-inherent existence of the person—they are equally capable of penetrating the selflessness of phenomena. Through merely realizing the non-existence of a self which is substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient and which has a character different from that of the aggregates, one cannot realize the selflessness of phenomena because one has not

fully refuted the conception of a self of persons.[87] Because the Svātantrikas refute only the coarse conception of a self of persons and have not penetrated the subtle selflessness, they are incapable of asserting that Hīnayānists can realize the selflessness of phenomena through having realized the selflessness of persons in that they hold the two selflessnesses to differ in the subtlety of their object of negation.

Bhāvaviveka's contention that there is a difference in subtlety in the two selflessnesses and that only the coarser selflessness, that of persons, needs to be realized in order to be liberated from rebirth is attacked by Chandrakīrti from another perspective as well. He argues that it is not correct that one can abandon the afflictions and their seeds and be liberated from cyclic existence by meditating on the person's lack of being substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency because that selflessness is not the final mode of being of phenomena. Bhāvaviveka agrees that the selflessness of persons is not the final reality, rather the more subtle selflessness of phenomena—their emptiness of true existence—is the final reality. Further, he holds that ultimately the root cause of cyclic existence is the conception of true existence. Chandrakīrti argues that it is contradictory for Bhāvaviveka to assert on the one hand that sentient beings cycle in mundane existence

through the force of the innate conception of a self, true existence, and yet hold on the other hand that through meditating on the selflessness of a substantially existent person one can be liberated from cyclic existence. In other words, Chandrakīrti finds it senseless for Bhāvaviveka to assert that the conception of a self of phenomena is the root of cyclic existence but that one can be liberated from cyclic existence without using the antidote to the conception of a self of phenomena. According to Bhāvaviveka, one can be freed from suffering without uprooting the ultimate cause of suffering; one can be released from rebirth which is caused by the conception of a self of phenomena by abandoning something which, according to Bhāvaviveka, is less subtle and fundamental, the conception of a self of persons. The Svātantrikas assert that the conception of a self of persons arises in dependence on the more subtle conception of true existence; yet they posit the conception of a self of persons as the root of cyclic existence.[88] Chandrakīrti finds this to be unacceptable. He writes in his Supplement to the Middle Way:

> [You propound] that when selflessness is
> realized
> One abandons the permanent self, [but] it is
> not asserted

> As the base of the conception of self. Hence
> it is fantastic to propound
> That through knowing selflessness [of substantially existent persons], the view of
> self [i.e., true existence] is eradicated.
>
> That while seeking a snake living in a hole in
> the wall of your house,
> One's fears can be removed and the fright of a
> snake abandoned
> By [someone's saying], "There is no elephant
> here,"
> Is, alas, laughable to other [scholars].[89]

That is, Bhāvaviveka's saying that one can overcome the view of a self of phenomena by abandoning the less subtle view of a self of persons is like trying to calm someone who fears that there is a snake in their house by telling them that there is no elephant in the house.

Bhāvaviveka, however, has already considered this qualm and answered it. He accepts that sentient beings cycle in mundane existence through the force of the innate conception of a self of phenomena, the conception that phenomena truly exist. He also holds that the selflessness of persons is not the final mode of subsistence of phenomena. However, he contends that one does not have to meditate on the

selflessness of phenomena in order to be liberated from cyclic existence. He says in his Essence of the Middle Way:

> Some who are frightened
> Mistake a rope for a snake,
> The knowledge that it is a coiled vine
> Is a mind classed as an antidote.[90]

That is, a person might see a coiled piece of speckled rope and think that it was a snake. If that person were told, "It isn't a snake, it's a coiled vine from a tree," the person's fear of a snake would be allayed. Despite the fact that a vine is not the mode of being a rope, one can nonetheless effectively remove the fear of a snake with an erroneous statement. In the same way, although the selflessness of persons is not the final mode of subsistence of phenomena, it is not contradictory that by meditating on it one can abandon cyclic existence and its causes.[91] Bhāvaviveka cites a passage from sutra to prove that Buddha used this technique of expedience; not telling the truth in order to more easily benefit others. The Treasury of Tathāgata Sutra (Tathāgatakoshasūtra) says:

> Kāshyapa, it is thus. Some persons are pained by the untrue doubt [that they have drunk] poison and say, "I drank poison! I drank poison!" and beat their breasts and wail. To those, one who is skilled in

> in medical methods acts in such a way as to remove the unreal poison [by giving them a medicine to make them vomit so that they believe that the poison has been removed[92]]. Similarly, Kāshyapa, for childish beings who are afflicted by the afflictive emotions, I teach doctrines in an incorrect way.[93]

Bhāvaviveka is thus willing to go to considerable lengths to uphold his contention that the selflessness of phenomena is not taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures and therefore not realized by Hearers and Solitary Realizers. He asserts that statements in the Hīnayāna scriptures which state that all phenomena are selfless are teaching that phenomena lack a self of persons because when the term "self" is used in those scriptures in referring to phenomena as selfless, it refers to a self of persons.[94] According to Bhāvaviveka, if the selflessness of phenomena—the emptiness of true existence—were taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures, then the teaching of the Mahāyāna would have been pointless. As noted before, Bhāvaviveka's position rests on his understanding of the two obstructions, an understanding not shared by the Prāsaṅgikas. For Bhāvaviveka, the conception of a self of persons is the chief of the obstructions to liberation. By realizing the selflessness of persons, one can achieve liberation from cyclic existence, the goal of the Hīnayānists. The conception of true existence on the

other hand, is the chief of the obstructions to omniscience. Through realizing the selflessness of phenomena, Bodhisattvas achieve Buddhahood. If the selflessness of phenomena, the object of a Bodhisattva's wisdom, were taught in the Hīnayāna sutras, the means of achieving Buddhahood would be fully accessible in their scriptures; any further exposition would be redundant. Therefore, Bhāvaviveka says that Buddha's teaching of the Mahāyāna would have been meaningless. It is clear then that Bhāvaviveka distinguishes the trainees of the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna by the object of their wisdom. Although the difference in motivation is clearly important, with Hīnayānists seeking mere liberation from cyclic existence and Bodhisattvas seeking Buddhahood for the welfare of others, motivation alone does not distinguish the two vehicles for Bhāvaviveka because he seems to imply that if the teaching of the selflessness of phenomena were available to Hearers, they would be capable of achieving Buddhahood. In order to defend the efficacy and purpose of the Mahāyāna scriptures, Bhāvaviveka is therefore willing to disregard or explain away any and all references to the selflessness of phenomena that appear in Hīnayāna sutras.

It is important to note that Bhāvaviveka is not arguing with Buddhapālita and the Prāsaṅgikas about the meaning of the selflessness of persons and phenomena. It is his belief that he and Buddhapālita, as Mādhyamikas, are in

agreement on that point. He is apparently unaware that the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena that he propounds is something other than that held by the Prāsaṅgikas. Indeed, it is only in the works of Chandrakīrti, and later D̄zong-ka-b̄a, that we find this distinction elucidated. Thus, Bhāvaviveka from his standpoint has no quarrel with Buddhapālita about what the selflessness of phenomena is; his objection concerns where it is taught.

Chandrakīrti argues strongly against Bhāvaviveka, holding that the non-inherent existence of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna and that method (upāya), not wisdom, is the distinguishing feature of the two vehicles. He writes in his commentary to Nāgārjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning that statements such as "All conditioned phenomena are false, having the character of deception," appear repeatedly in the Hīnayāna literature.[95] He interprets this deceptive nature as phenomena appearing to exist inherently when in fact they do not.[96] The non-inherent existence of phenomena—the selflessness of phenomena—is therefore indicated by such statements in the Hīnayāna scriptures. He further holds that Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika school, asserts that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna. For support he cites this stanza from the Treatise on the Middle Way (XV.7):

In the Advice to Katyayana
"Exists," "not exists," and both
Are rejected by the Supramundane Victor
Knowing [the nature of] things and non-things.

Nāgārjuna states that Buddha refuted inherent existence ("exists"), utter non-existence ("not exists"), and both inherent existence and utter non-existence in the Advice to Katyayana. Since that text is a Hīnayāna scripture included in the Brief Scriptures on Discipline (Vinayakṣhudravastu), non-inherent existence is taught in the Hīnayāna.[97]

Demonstrating that Nāgārjuna does not hold Bhāvaviveka's position that the selflessness of phenomena is not taught in the Hīnayāna constitutes a refutation with scripture (āgama). Chandrakīrti's refutation of Bhāvaviveka's position with reasoning (yukti) appears in the first chapter of the auto-commentary to his Supplement to the Middle Way. His argument is expanded by Dzong-ka-ba in his Great Commentary to (Chandrakīrti's) Supplement as follows:[98]

Bhāvaviveka has stated in his Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom" that if the selflessness of phenomena were taught in the Hīnayāna scriptural collection, then the teaching of the Mahāyāna would be senseless. If he means by this that the teaching of the Mahāyāna would be senseless because the selflessness of phenomena is the only thing taught in the Mahāyāna sutras, then, according to Chandrakīrti, he is not

correct because the Mahāyāna sutras teach many topics essential for the achievement of Buddhahood. Chandrakīrti says in his autocommentary to his Supplement to the Middle Way:

> The teaching of the Mahāyāna does not teach the selflessness of phenomena alone. Then what [else does it teach]? The Bodhisattva grounds, the perfections, prayers, great compassion, and so forth, complete dedications, the two collections, and the inconceivable reality [of the Truth Body].[99]

The ten Bodhisattva grounds, the practice of the six perfections, the great aspirational prayers and dedications of Bodhisattvas, the means for generating the altruistic aspiration to enlightenment, the two collections of merit and wisdom, and the Three Bodies of a Buddha all must be understood and cultivated in order to achieve Buddhahood and are not set forth in the Hīnayāna scriptural collection. Chandrakīrti cites Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland:

> Since all the aspirations, deeds,
> And dedications of Bodhisattvas
> Were not explained in the Hearers' Vehicle,
> how
> Could one become a Bodhisattva [through
> the Hearer Vehicle]?

> The subjects based on the deeds of Bodhisattvas
> Were not explained in the [Hīnayāna] scriptural collection
> But were explained in the Mahāyāna, therefore
> The wise should hold [it to be Buddha's word].[100]

In the first stanza, Nāgārjuna enumerates some of the practices necessary for becoming a Bodhisattva and progressing to Buddhahood that are only taught in the Mahāyāna and do not appear in Hīnayāna scriptures. One cannot achieve Buddhahood merely by following the teachings of the Hīnayāna. The full path to Buddhahood is presented only in the Mahāyāna, which therefore should be accepted as the word of Buddha, as Nāgārjuna states in the second stanza. Notable by its absence in the list of teachings unique to the Mahāyāna is any mention of the selflessness of phenomena. This lends significant weight to Chandrakīrti's argument, for if Bhāvaviveka were correct in his assertion that only Bodhisattvas realize the selflessness of phenomena in order to achieve Buddhahood and that selflessness is taught only in the Mahāyāna, then Nāgārjuna should have included the selflessness of phenomena among the topics taught only in the Mahāyāna sutras. He does not.

Even if the debate is limited to a consideration of the

teaching of the selflessness of phenomena, Chandrakīrti still finds fault with Bhāvaviveka's assertion. The Prāsaṅgikas hold that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures but it does not necessarily follow from that that the teaching of this selflessness in the Mahāyāna would be purposeless. According to Chandrakīrti, even though the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna scriptural collections, there is purpose in its being taught in the Mahāyāna because, whereas the selflessness of phenomena is taught briefly in the Hīnayāna, it is set forth extensively in the Mahāyāna. The reason for this is that Bodhisattvas take as their main object of abandonment the obstructions to omniscience, they must greatly expand their awareness of suchness (tathatā). Hearers and Solitary Realizers, on the other hand, are able to abandon the afflictive obstructions and attain the state of a Foe Destroyer by meditating on emptiness with abbreviated reasonings. Chandrakīrti says in his autocommentary to his Supplement to the Middle Way:

> It is suitable that the Mahāyāna was taught in order to elucidate the selflessness of phenomena because [Buddha] wished to express the teaching extensively. The selflessness of phenomena is confined merely to a brief illustration in the Hearer vehicle.[101]

Therefore, in the Mahāyāna scriptural collections, the selflessness of phenomena is taught completely, in terms of limitless forms of reasoning because Bodhisattvas must have a vast awareness of emptiness in order to abandon the more subtle obstructions to omniscience and achieve Buddhahood. Nevertheless, it is the position of the Prāsaṅgikas that liberation from suffering cannot be achieved without realizing the subtle emptiness, the lack of inherent existence of persons and phenomena. Therefore, the selflessness of phenomena must be taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures. Thus, according to Chandrakīrti, the selflessness of phenomena is set forth in both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna sutras; there is a difference, however, in the mode in which it is set forth.[102]

Again, Chandrakīrti cites Nāgārjuna for support. His Praise of the Supramundane (Lokātītastava) says:

> You [Buddha] said that without realizing sign-
> lessness
> There is no liberation.
> Therefore, you taught it completely
> In the Mahāyāna.[103]

The first two lines refer to the fact that it is impossible to achieve liberation from cyclic existence without cognizing signlessness—the emptiness of inherent existence. That

emptiness must therefore be taught in the sutras of both vehicles. The last two lines state that Buddha taught signlessness fully in the Mahāyāna; by implication it was not taught fully in the Hīnayāna.[104]

Thus, the selflessness of phenomena is taught completely in the Mahāyāna scriptural collections and meditated on completely in the Mahāyāna path. It is not taught completely on the Hīnayāna scriptural collection nor is it meditated on completely on the Hīnayāna path. What does it mean not to be meditated on completely if Hīnayānists must directly realize the selflessness of phenomena again and again in order to be liberated from cyclic existence?

It might be suggested that in the Mahāyāna the non-inherent existence of all objects of knowledge is realized whereas Hearers and Solitary Realizers cognize the non-inherent existence of only some objects of knowledge. This is not correct because when non-true existence is ascertained with valid cognition in terms of one object, if one engages in analysis of whether or not another object truly exists, one is able to realize its non-true existence in dependence on the reasoning employed before.[105] That is, having realized the emptiness of one object, one can automatically infer the emptiness of any object to which one turns one's mind. Furthermore, it would be impossible for Hīnayānists to realize the emptiness of only a portion of objects of

knowledge because the emptiness of all objects of knowledge is directly realized in meditative equipoise (samāhita) on the path of seeing and beyond.

According to Dzong-ka-ba, the difference between the two vehicles with regard to the selflessness of phenomena is that in the Mahāyāna it is set forth in limitless forms of reasoning and in the Hīnayāna it is set forth in abbreviated reasonings. Further, on the Mahāyāna path the selflessness of phenomena is meditated on using those limitless forms of reasoning whereas Hīnayānists only employ the abbreviated forms in their meditation. Dzong-ka-ba says in his Great Commentary to (Chandrakīrti's) Supplement:

> Although [Hīnayānists] do not generate the wisdom which refutes the true establishment of the person with limitless forms of reasoning, they do completely cultivate the antidote to the seeds of the afflictive emotions; they do not completely cultivate the antidote to the obstructions to omniscience.[106]

Thus, Hīnayānists—those seeking to become Foe Destroyers—do not meditate on the selflessness of phenomena in such a way as to abandon the obstructions to omniscience. They do not meditate on the selflessness of phenomena in terms of limitless forms of reasoning. However, if it is asked whether Hearers and Solitary Realizers fully meditate on the selflessness of phenomena, it must be asserted that they do,

because they abandon completely the conception of a self of phenomena, that phenomena truly exist.[107]

Bhāvaviveka's rejection of Buddhapālita's assertion that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayana scriptural collections and Chandrakīrti's subsequent attack against Bhāvaviveka's position bring into focus several fundamental differences between the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika schools. First, the selflessness of the person is identified by the Svātantrikas as the person's lack of being substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency. The Prāsaṅgikas label this selflessness as coarse and contend that meditation on it is not an antidote to the afflictive obstructions, as the Svātantrikas hold it to be. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the selflessness of persons is the person's emptiness of inherent existence. With respect to the selflessness of phenomena, Bhāvaviveka asserts that it is phenomena's lack of existing from their own side without being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness. This is again labelled as coarse by the Prāsaṅgikas, who assert that a phenomenon's lack of inherent existence is the selflessness of phenomena. Thus, the Svātantrikas present two selflessnesses with two different objects of negation and assert that there is also a difference in subtlety between them, with the selflessness of phenomena being

more difficult to penetrate than that of persons. The Prāsaṅgikas assert that the two selflessnesses are equally subtle and distinguish them by the basis of negation—persons and other phenomena; the object of negation—inherent existence—is the same.

The question of the coarseness and subtlety of the two selflessnesses extends into the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika presentation of the two obstructions. For Bhāvaviveka, the conception of a self of persons is the chief of the obstacles to be overcome in order to gain liberation from cyclic existence and thus is the chief obstruction which Foe Destroyers must eradicate; the more subtle conception of true existence is the chief obstruction to omniscience, overcome by Bodhisattvas. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the conception of self, of both persons and phenomena, equally subtle, is the chief of the obstructions to liberation and is abandoned by all Foe Destroyers. The appearance of phenomena as inherently existent is the obstruction to omniscience.

Since, according to Bhāvaviveka, only Bodhisattvas realize the selflessness of phenomena, he contends that it is only taught in the Mahāyāna scriptural collection. For him, this is the fundamental purpose of Buddha's teaching the Mahāyāna. For the Prāsaṅgikas, everyone who achieves liberation from cyclic existence must realize the subtle selflessness of persons and other phenomena. They assert,

therefore, that the Prāsaṅgika view is found in the Hīnayāna scriptures, that the emptiness of inherent existence of persons and phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna scriptural collections.

In the end, the question of whether the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna revolves around the conception of the root of cyclic existence and of what constitutes liberation. For Bhāvaviveka, the fundamental cause of cyclic existence is the conception of true existence; yet, one can be liberated through realizing the less subtle selflessness of persons. According to the Svātantrikas, the <u>final</u> root of cyclic existence is the conception of a self of phenomena whereas the root of cyclic existence is the conception of a self of persons. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the root of cyclic existence is the subtle conception of self, the conception of persons and phenomena as inherently existent, and it is this which must be overcome in order to be released from suffering. Eliminating the conception of true existence as identified by the Svātantrikas does not cut the root of cyclic existence. Not only do the Prāsaṅgikas assert that both conceptions of self must be eradicated for liberation, they posit a more subtle conception of self as the root of cyclic existence and assert that its antidote is taught in both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna scriptures—briefly in the Hīnayāna and extensively in the Mahāyāna.

The Prāsaṅgikas do not assert that every time the term "selflessness" appears in the Hīnayāna sutras that it means the emptiness of inherent existence. They freely admit that Buddha often taught the coarse selflessness for trainees who temporarily cannot realize the more subtle. Nor do they argue that everyone understood the same thing when Buddha described phenomena as selfless; the differing conceptions of the meaning of that term gave rise, in part, to the various tenet systems. However, they do assert that there are coarse and subtle conceptions of self and coarse and subtle selflessnesses. Because there are two conceptions of self, there are two levels of afflictive emotions induced by those conceptions. According to the Prāsaṅgikas, the conception of the person as substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency is identified by the Svātantrikas who are thus able to abandon the afflictive emotions induced by that conception through realizing the emptiness of such a self. However, from the Prāsaṅgika perspective, the subtle conception of self, the conception of the person as inherently existent is asserted to be a valid form of consciousness by the Svātantrikas; they do not identify it as an erroneous conception.[108]

The Prāsaṅgikas assert that when the understanding of the coarse form of selflessness is present, the more subtle conception of self may operate but when the emptiness of

inherent existence is understood, none of the coarser misconceptions of the nature of the person is possible. Since the Prāsaṅgikas identify the subtle conception of self—the conception of inherent existence—as the root of cyclic existence, they assert that the wisdom of selflessness taught by the Svātantrikas and the other tenet systems are not antidotes to suffering and rebirth. The Prāsaṅgikas thus display a rather strict exclusiveness in their appraisal of the other schools of Buddhist philosophy in that they assert that only be realizing the most subtle selflessness which is only taught in their school can anyone be liberated from cyclic existence. At the same time, they demonstrate a catholicity in their assertion that everyone who is liberated from cyclic, whether they follow the Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna path, must realize the exact same thing, the emptiness of inherent existence.

The Svātantrikas assert that the conception of ultimate existence is the final root of cyclic existence and that Bodhisattvas must realize that phenomena lack ultimate existence in order to achieve Buddhahood. Ultimate existence is thus the object of negation, the conception of which must be identified and destroyed in order to attain highest enlightenment. Although the Svatantrikas assert that ultimate existence has not, does not, and never will exist, the conception of it does, and that conception is the final root of cyclic existence. In order to destroy this conception, one must first identify its referent object—one must understand the meaning of ultimate existence. Shāntideva says in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds:

> Without contacting the imputed existent
> Its non-existence cannot be apprehended.[1]

For the Ge-luk-b̄as, there are two loci classici in the Svātantrika literature which most clearly identify the object of negation. The first appears in Bhāvaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning.

Bhāvaviveka says in the third chapter of his Essence of the Middle Way (III.26):

> Here, earth and so forth
> Are not entities of the elements ultimately

> Because of being produced
> And because of having causes, like a consciousness.[2]

In the autocommentary, the Blaze of Reasoning, he explains what he means by "ultimately":

> Regarding ultimate (paramārtha), with respect to "object" (artha), it is an object because of being that which is to be known; this is synonymous with "that which is to be examined (parīkṣaṇīya)" and "that which is to be understood (pratipādya)." "Highest" (parama) is a word [meaning] supreme. With respect to the compound paramārtha, because it is an object as well as being highest, it is the highest object. Or [it means] the object of the highest (paramasya artha); because it is the object of the highest non-conceptual wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna), it is an object of the highest [consciousness]. Or, it [means] that which accords with the highest object [that is, the highest consciousness]. Since the ultimate exists for a wisdom that accords with a realization of the ultimate, it accords with [that which directly realizes] the highest object.[3]

Thus, Bhāvaviveka interprets the compound paramārtha

(translated here as "ultimate") in three ways. In the first, taking paramārtha as a karmadhāraya compound, both the terms "highest" (parama) and "object" (artha) refer to the object —emptiness—because it is both highest or supreme as well as an object, something which is known. In the second interpretation, he takes paramārtha as a tatpuruṣha compound meaning "object of the highest," with "highest" referring to a Superior's non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise (samāhita) and object referring to emptiness, the object realized by that highest wisdom consciousness. He calls the third type of paramārtha a concordant ultimate, applying both "highest" and "object" to the subject, a wisdom consciousness. Interpreting paramārtha as a bahuvrīhi compound, he designates the wisdom which accords with a Superior's non-conceptual exalted wisdom directly realizing the ultimate with the term "ultimate."[4]

Thus, in Bhāvaviveka's three interpretations of the compound paramārtha, the first two refer to emptiness in that it is both the highest object and the object of the highest consciousness. In the third interpretation, a consciousness is identified with the term paramārtha. It is important to note, however, that Bhāvaviveka does not interpret paramārtha as a simple bahuvrīhi compound, "that which has the highest object," in which case it would refer to all consciousnesses realizing emptiness. He is careful to specify that the wisdom

which accords with the realization of the ultimate is a concordant ultimate because it has the ultimate as its object. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a thus explains the third paramārtha as a wisdom of subsequent attainment of hearing, thinking, or meditation which realizes emptiness. Such a wisdom is similar to or concordant with the ultimate wisdom and thus is posited as the ultimate.[5] By identifying this third type of paramārtha as a wisdom of subsequent attainment (pṛiṣhṭha-ladbdha-jñāna) which is a conceptual consciousness that follows after a direct cognition of emptiness, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a indicates that Bhāvaviveka wishes to restrict the third type of paramārtha to conceptual consciousnesses, excluding non-conceptual wisdom consciousnesses of meditative equipoise from the category. Bhāvaviveka makes this point himself later in the Blaze of Reasoning, in which a hypothetical opponent raises the objection:

> The ultimate is beyond all awareness, but the negation of the entityness of things is an object [expressed] by letters. Therefore, is it not the case that the negation does not exist?[6]

That is, the ultimate is free from all elaborations and cannot be conceived of just as it is by any conceptual consciousness. Therefore, the opponent argues, the presentation of refutations and proofs is not correct in the context of the

ultimate. However, when Bhāvaviveka seeks to refute that earth is an entity of the elements ultimately, he claims that the refutation by reasoning of the entityness of individual things is capable of being explicitly expressed by words which are composed of letters; however, because it is ultimate that entityness cannot be negated by the power of verbal conventions. Therefore, Bhāvaviveka's assertion that earth does not ultimately exist does not refute the entityness of things.[7]

The opponent sees the ultimate and conventional as two unconnected spheres. The ultimate is beyond all elaboration, beyond conception, beyond expression. Bhāvaviveka's hypothetical opponent finds a modern-day supporter in J. W. de Jong, who describes paramārtha in this way:

> But this absolute by its very nature is inaccessible to philosophical thought. One might try to approach it by indirect means, but all one could say or think about it would of necessity be false. It cannot be thought of as being or as nothingness.[8]

If this is the case, how can Bhāvaviveka bring the inconceivable into the conventional realm of his syllogism and assert that earth does not exist "ultimately"?

Bhāvaviveka specifies what he means by ultimate when he refutes ultimate existence:

> The ultimate is of two types. One is a supramundane non-contaminated [consciousness] free from elaborations which operates without activity. The second, possessing conceptual elaborations, is called a pure mundane wisdom which accords with the collections of merit and wisdom and operates with activity. Here [in the context of the passage from the Essence of the Middle Way], this is held as the qualification of the thesis ["does not ultimately exist"]; thus, there is no fault.[9]

That is, ultimate consciousnesses are of two types. The first is a supramundane, non-contaminated meditative equipoise of a Superior which operates without conceptual activity, that is without involvement with any object of thought. The second type of ultimate consciousness (the third type in the discussion above, p. 200) is an exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment which is a conventional mundane subject but which is pure in the sense that it does not come under the power of mistaken appearances. Such a consciousness accords with the trainings in the collection of merit and wisdom and operates with conceptual activity; it is involved with objects of thought. When Bhāvaviveka says that earth does not exist as the entity of the elements ultimately, "does not exist ultimately" in that thesis means not to exist for this latter type of ultimate consciousness. Since the

entityness of phenomena does not exist in the face of such a wisdom consciousness, Bhāvaviveka is justified in saying that they do not ultimately exist, and the fault raised by the opponent is not incurred.[10]

This second type of ultimate consciousness, what Bhāvaviveka calls the concordant ultimate, is not restricted only to exalted wisdoms of subsequent attainment. Kamalashīla says in this Illumination of the Middle Way (Madhyamakāloka):

> All wisdoms arisen from correct hearing, thinking, and meditation are non-mistaken subjects. They are called ultimates because their [object] is the ultimate.[11]

Thus, all wisdom consciousnesses ranging from those of hearing and thinking which analyze suchness through to inferential reasoning consciousnesses in the continuum of a Superior are categorized as concordant ultimates. A wisdom arisen from hearing is produced in dependence on a sign which is generated from remembering the three modes due to hearing the statement of another person. Wisdom arisen from thinking refers to an inferential consciousness which understands the meaning to be inferred in dependence on a correct proof which is arrived at through the power of one's own correct thought without relying on its being set forth by someone else.[12] Thus, here both wisdom arisen from hearing and

thinking are inferential consciousnesses.

To summarize, an opponent challenges Bhāvaviveka's use of the term ultimate. On the one hand, Bhāvaviveka wishes to assert that the ultimate transcends all awareness, that is, that ultimate truths are not within the sphere of any dualistic consciousness. At the same time, he asserts that the meaning of not existing ultimately is not existing in the face of analysis by a dualistic reasoning consciousness, thereby implying that the refutation of a truly established or ultimately existent nature must be accomplished using terms and thought consciousnesses. The opponent finds these two assertions contradictory, entailing the consequence that either the ultimate existence of phenomena cannot be negated because conventional, dualistic consciousnesses are incapable of dealing with the ultimate or that ultimate truths do not stand beyond the sphere of dualistic consciousnesses but rather are the objects of conventional, conceptual, dualistic awarenesses because the refutation of an ultimate entityness is posited in terms of terms and thought consciousnesses.[13]

Bhāvaviveka responds that there are two types of ultimate consciousnesses, one which directly realizes emptiness without taking an image of emptiness as its appearing object (*pratibhāsa-viṣhaya) and which is free from all dualistic appearance, and another than operates conceptually, through the medium of images, and is a mundane or conventional wisdom consciousness. It is this second type of wisdom which refutes

ultimate existence. Thus, for Bhāvaviveka there are two types of reasoning consciousnesses which understand the lack of ultimate existence, conceptual and non-conceptual. A non-conceptual reasoning consciousness, despite the fact that it is not explicitly engaged in the process of reasoning, is so-called because it arises as a result of the process of reasoning. A conceptual or dualistic reasoning consciousness is not able to understand emptiness in the way in which a non-conceptual reasoning consciousness sees emptiness. In this sense ultimate truths—emptinesses—transcend the sphere of dualistic awareness. However, when a conceptual reasoning consciousness properly analyzes the mode of being of an object, it finds that the object does not truly exist. This is the meaning of not existing ultimately according to Bhāvaviveka.[14]

By delineating these two types of ultimate consciousnesses, Bhāvaviveka is able to preserve the unique character of meditative equipoise which realizes emptiness directly in a non-dualistic cognition. However, such a cognition is difficult to understand and does not occur until the path of seeing (darshana-mārga). Also, a non-conceptual reasoning consciousness is not engaged in analysis; it does not refute ultimate existence. Therefore, Bhāvaviveka posits as his third type of ultimate that which accords with realization of the ultimate. Such a consciousness is ultimate (paramārtha), in that, since a conceptual reasoning consciousness

of hearing, thinking, or meditating which realizes emptiness is realizing suchness, it is the highest (parama) and since it is the object sought by those who wish to abandon the obstructions, it is an object (artha).[15]

However, by creating the category of the concordant ultimate and then further specifying that it is the conceptual wisdom consciousness which, through analyzing the mode of being of phenomena, determines whether an object ultimately exists or not, Bhāvaviveka is not indicating that a Superior's meditative equipoise is to be explicitly excluded from determining that phenomena do not ultimately exist.[16] Rather, he is arguing that the understanding of the mode of being of phenomena need not wait for the attainment of the path of seeing. He is indicating that rational thought, a reasoning consciousness, is fully capable of analyzing and investigating the mode of being of an object and is further capable of ascertaining that that object does not exist in the face of that reasoning consciousness, that the object does not ultimately exist. The conceptual reasoning consciousness is what actually carries out analysis of the object and discovers that it does not truly exist. Based on this analysis, direct cognition of the lack of true existence—emptiness—occurs on the path of seeing. Bhāvaviveka thereby emphasizes that the analysis of reality is to be undertaken by ordinary beings and that reasoning and analysis yields an understanding of the fact that things do not exist in and of themselves, but

in fact are empty of ultimate existence. By giving the exalted name "ultimate" to conceptual reasoning consciousnesses in the continuums of common beings, Bhāvaviveka emphatically upholds the place of reasoning and analysis on the path.

Bhāvaviveka's labelling conceptual reasoning consciousnesses as ultimates flies directly in the face of T. R. V. Murti's claim, "Kalpanā is avidyā par excellence,"[17] and that "the viewing of it [emptiness] through thought-forms is avidyā."[18] For Bhāvaviveka, thought (kalpanā) is not ignorance (avidyā). Thought consciousnesses can be ignorant consciousnesses, but a thought consciousness may also be wisdom consciousness, an ultimate consciousness. Emptiness, the lack of ultimate existence, must initially be understood through "thought-forms" before it can be realized directly on the path of seeing. Indeed, according to the Mādhyamika presentation of the Bodhisattva path, the Bodhisattva spends at least one period of countless aeons viewing emptiness through "thought-forms" on the paths of accumulation (sambhāra-mārga) and preparation (prayoga-mārga) before his initial direct realization of emptiness.[19] Thus it is not the assertion of Bhāvaviveka or any Mādhyamika that thought is necessarily a form of ignorance, which is defined as an active misconception of the nature of reality. As Bhāvaviveka makes so clear, conceptual reasoning consciousnesses are the

indispensible tools of the Bodhisattva who is seeking to dispel all forms of ignorance. By designating conceptual reasoning consciousnesses with the term "ultimate," Bhāvaviveka certifies their place in the path.

Like Bhāvaviveka's hypothetical opponent, Murti sees the ultimate, which he calls "the Absolute" as utterly transcendent and totally beyond comprehension by thought and analysis. Bhāvaviveka on the other hand, recognizing the rigidity of such a view, is able to expand the category of the ultimate to include not only emptiness but consciousnesses by which it can be known.

J̄ang-ḡya provides a useful summary of the various meanings of the term ultimate in Svātantrika. He explains that there are ultimates which are objects and ultimates which are subjects and that each of these can be further divided into actual and concordant ultimates.

Emptiness—the lack of true existence—is an actual ultimate in that it is free from the elaborations of true existence as well as the elaborations of dualistic appearance when it is directly realized by a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. When emptiness is realized by a conceptual reasoning consciousness, it is free from the elaborations of true existence but appears dualistically, that is, emptiness and the conceptual consciousness realizing it remain separate. The conceptual consciousness is not directly

realizing emptiness; it understands it through the medium of a generic image or meaning-generality (<u>artha-sāmānya</u>), which is the appearing object of that consciousness. Emptiness is its referent object. When emptiness serves as the referent object of a conceptual consciousness, it is called a concordant ultimate because for that consciousness it is not free from the elaborations of dualistic appearance. Thus, the two types of objective emptiness, actual and concordant, are differentiated from the point of view of the type of consciousness realizing them, non-conceptual and conceptual wisdom consciousnesses respectively.

As is clear from Bhāvaviveka, the two types of consciousnesses realizing emptiness may also be called ultimates. A Superior's non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is capable of eliminating both elaborations of true existence and dualistic appearance when it realizes emptiness. It is, therefore, called an actual ultimate within the ultimates which are subjects. The conceptual reasoning consciousness is able to remove the superimpositions of true existence but still has dualistic appearance. It is, therefore, called an actual ultimate within the ultimates which are subjects. The conceptual reasoning consciousness is able to remove the superimpositions of true existence but still has dualistic appearance. It is therefore called a concordant ultimate.[20] It is important to note that although all of these are called

ultimates, only emptiness is an ultimate truth, and none of the ultimates, nor any other phenomenon for that matter, ultimately exists.

Having identified what Bhāvaviveka means by ultimate, it is now necessary to explore what he means when he says that phenomena do not ultimately exist. To conceive of a phenomenon as ultimately existent is to believe that it is its own mode of being; that it exists in and of itself such that the final nature of the object is the object itself. To conceive of a table as ultimately existent is to conceive that the ultimate or final nature of the table is the table itself.[21] The purpose of reasoning consciousnesses is to discover whether phenomena exist as their own final nature, whether they ultimately exist or not. A reasoning consciousness is searching for the final nature of the object under analysis; it is an awareness which comprehends the mode of being of the object it analyzes; it is an analyzer of the ultimate. Therefore, in order for a phenomenon to be ultimately existent, it must be found by or exist for an inferential reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate. If it does not exist for such a consciousness, it does not ultimately exist because it is the sole purpose of the reasoning consciousness to investigate the final mode of being of that phenomenon. If a table, for example, truly or ultimately exists, the reasoning consciousness will find that the table itself is the

the mode of being of the table.[22] If the table is truly established it must be found to be truly established by a reasoning consciousness because that consciousness analyzes whether phenomena truly exist or not. Through a process of reasoning which will be described in the next chapter, the consciousness searches for the ultimate existence of the object and does not find it; it finds the mere absence of the object's ultimate existence, its emptiness of ultimate or true existence. The consciousness searches for the ultimate existence of the object and finds its non-ultimate existence. This non-ultimate existence of the object is its reality (dharmatā) and its final nature.[23]

Therefore, whatever is ultimately existent must necessarily exist for a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate. Is it also true that whatever exists for a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate is necessarily ultimately existent? No, because emptiness exists for a reasoning consciousness but does not ultimately exist. If the reasoning consciousness turns its light of analysis on the lack of ultimate existence which it has found when searching for ultimate existence, and investigates that lack of ultimate existence in an effort to discover whether it ultimately exists, it will find that the lack of ultimate existence itself does not ultimately exist; emptiness is empty of true existence. Thus, although emptiness—the lack of ultimate existence—

exists in the face of a reasoning consciousness, it does not ultimately exist.

If a phenomenon is truly established, it must be established for a reasoning consciousness. However, whatever is the mode of being of an object and exists for a reasoning consciousness is not necessarily truly established, because the emptiness of a table is both the final mode of being of the table and exists for a reasoning consciousness analyzing the table and is not truly established.[24] Still, it can be said that any phenomenon, including emptiness, which is analyzed by a reasoning consciousness investigating the mode of being of that phenomenon does not exist for that reasoning consciousness. The non-existence of that phenomenon for that consciousness analyzing the ultimate is the reality or final nature of the object.[25] It is, therefore, important to make a distinction between being the object found by a reasoning consciousness and being able to bear analysis by a reasoning consciousness. When such a consciousness analyzes an object in order to determine whether it ultimately exists, that object's lack of ultimate existence is the object found by the reasoning consciousness. This does not imply that the lack of ultimate existence itself ultimately exists. The object found by the reasoning consciousness is what that consciousness understands—which is the non-true existence of the object under scrutiny. Again, if that non-true existence is analyzed,

it also is found to lack ultimate existence; it cannot bear analysis by a reasoning consciousness.[26]

Nothing is able to bear analysis by a reasoning consciousness. Therefore, not existing ultimately is not to be established as capable of bearing analysis by a conceptual reasoning consciousness which properly analyzes the mode of being of phenomena.[27] Due to not recognizing that the object found by a reasoning consciousness cannot itself bear analysis by that consciousness, one may be led to the conclusion that the object found by a reasoning consciousness must truly exist. This was the opinion of the great Tibetan logician Cha-b̄a-chö-ḡyi-s̄eng-gay (Cha-pa-chos-kyi-seng-ges) who asserted that non-true existence is truly established. On the other hand, if one wishes to assert that emptiness—the lack of ultimate existence—is itself empty but also believes that the object found by a reasoning consciousness must ultimately exist, one is forced to assert that emptiness is not found by a reasoning consciousness and hence is not an object of knowledge. According to this view, if emptiness were found by a reasoning consciousness, it would have to exist truly. This was the position of the great translator L̄o-den-s̄hay rap.[28]

The conception that an object is able to withstand analysis by a reasoning consciousness is identified as the artificial conception of true existence by some Tibetan scholars. Such a conception of true existence does not exist

in the continuums of all sentient beings; its cause is the study of wrong tenet systems which propound the ultimate existence of phenomena.[29] The innate conception of true existence, the final root of cyclic existence, for the Svātantrikas is identified in a passage from Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way (Madhyamakāloka):

> An awareness which mistakenly superimposes the opposite onto things which are in reality without entityness is called concealing (saṃvṛiti) because it is obstructed or covered from suchness or it makes suchness obstructed or covered. As it says in [the Descent into Laṅkā] Sutra:
>
> > The production of things [exists] conventionally;
> > Ultimately it is without inherent existence.
> > That which is mistaken about what does not inherently exist
> > Is asserted to be a concealer of reality.
>
> Because they arise from that [conception of true existence], all false things which are seen displayed by that [conception of true existence] are called mere conventionalities. Moreover, that conception [of true existence] arises through the maturation of beginningless predispositions for error, whereby all

> living beings see [phenomena] displayed as if [they had] a true nature in reality. Therefore, all entities of false things [which exist] through the power of their [sentient beings'] thoughts are said to "only exist conventionally."[30]

"An awareness which mistakenly superimposes the opposite onto things which in reality are without entityness" refers to the innate conception of true existence which superimposes ultimate existence onto phenomena which lack ultimate existence. Such an ignorant consciousness—the conception of true existence—is called a concealer (saṃvṛiti) or an obstructor because the ignorant consciousness obstructs other minds from seeing reality—non-true existence—and thus conceals the final mode of being from them. The ignorant consciousness itself is also obstructed from seeing suchness, as an eye obstructed by cataracts is prevented from clearly seeing forms.

"Because they arise from that [conception of true existence], all false things which are seen displayed by that [conception of true existence] are called mere conventionalities." This sentence indicates that due to the conception of true existence, phenomena appear to the thought consciousnesses of sentient beings to be truly existent. This is a false appearance; those phenomena do not truly exist, they exist only conventionally.

It is the opinion of D̄zong-ka-b̄a that the consciousnesses to which the appearance of true existence is displayed are necessarily conceptual consciousnesses and are not sense consciousnesses because, in his view, the object of negation—true existence—does not appear to the sense consciousnesses in the Svātantrika system. There are a number of statements in the works of the Svātantrika masters that support his position, such as Jñānagarbha's comments that, "Just as what is seen by cowherds and above abides as conventional truths . . .,"[31] "When a thing appears, real [that is, truly existent] production and so forth do not,"[32] and "No one has any quarrel concerning the factor which appears to the consciousnesses of the two parties [in a debate]."[33] The first quote implies that everything that common beings, such as cowherds, see is validly established in the way in which it appears. The second indicates that the truly existent production of an object, which is to be negated, does not appear when that object appears to the senses. The third quotation supports the Svātantrika assertion of a commonly appearing subject which appears to the sense direct perceivers of the parties in a debate, those sense consciousnesses being non-mistaken with respect to the subject's existence by way of its character (svalakṣhaṇa-siddha). The fact that the Svātantrikas have no quarrel with the way that the subject appears to the parties in the debate indicates that they do

not assert that the object of negation appears to the sense consciousnesses. This point will be discussed further in the context of the two types of conventional truths (pp. 334-338).

"Moreover, that conception [of true existence] arises through the maturation of beginningless predispositions for error, whereby all living beings see [phenomena] displayed as if [they had] a true nature in reality." This sentence indicates that the conception of true existence which causes objects to appear falsely to thought consciousnesses is the innate conception of true existence which has operated beginninglessly and which causes phenomena to appear falsely to the minds of all sentient beings, regardless of whether their minds have been affected by the study of tenets.

"Therefore, all entities of false things [which exist] through the power of their [sentient beings] thought are said 'only to exist conventionally.'" This last sentence provides Kamalashīla's understanding of the conventional status of phenomena. The entities of those phenomena which appear falsely due to the conception of true existence do validly exist through the power of sentient beings' thoughts. For the Svātantrikas, it is not suitable to posit phenomena as existing through the power of the conception of true existence. There are valid consciousnesses which are not affected by ignorance which can posit the conventional existence of

phenomena. Thus, conventional existence means existence which is posited by the power of appearing to a non-defective mind, the perception and conception of which has not been affected by the power of the conception of true existence. Such a non-defective mind may be non-conceptual or conceptual. Since the object of negation does not appear to the non-conceptual sense consciousnesses, a sense consciousness is non-defective if it has not been affected by one of the superficial causes of error (see p. 82). A thought consciousness is non-defective if it is non-mistaken with respect to its determined or referent object (*<u>adhyavasāya-viṣhaya</u>). For the Svātantrikas, if the object of negation appeared to the sense consciousnesses, they would not be capable of positing the conventional existence of objects.[34]

Thus, it can be inferred from Kamalashīla's statement that true existence or ultimate existence is a mode of subsistence which is established from the object's own side, without being posited through the power of appearing to a non-defective consciousness. What it means to be "posited through the power of appearing to a non-defective awareness" is elucidated with the help of the example of a magician's illusion.

In India it is said that a magician could take an ordinary object such as a pebble or a twig, rub it with a certain salve, and then cast a mantra thereby causing the pebble

or twig to appear as some other object, such as a horse or an elephant. At that time, both the magician and the audience for whom he is performing the trick see a horse where the pebble once was. However, the way in which the magician and the audience see the horse is different. The magician sees the horse but does not believe it to be a real horse, knowing that he has conjured the appearance of a horse from a pebble with the use of the salve and mantra. The audience sees the horse and believes that it is real. A person who arrives after the show has begun will only see the pebble because his eyes have not been affected by the mantra cast by the magician.

For both the audience and the magician, the appearance of the pebble as a horse comes about through the power of the mind affected by the mantra; the appearance is not produced naturally from the pebble without depending on that mind. The magician understands this but for the audience it appears that a real horse is standing in front of them and that this mode of appearance is not posited through the power of the mind.

Since the magician actively intends for the pebble to appear as a horse, the way in which horse appears to him is different from the way in which someone might mistake a coiled rope in a dark corner to be a snake. It is not because the rope is in any way a snake that the rope appears as a snake;

it is merely due to the external condition of darkness which causes the rope to appear in that way. The same can be said about a pebble which has not been conjured with mantra and salve; it is the nature of the pebble not to appear as a horse. However, a pebble which has been affected by mantra and salve is said to gain an additional objective status which is its appearance as a horse. At the time of the magic show, it is as if the pebble becomes the entity of the illusory horse.[35]

J̄ang-ḡya makes this point when he says that for the magician, the pebble is merely posited as a horse through the power of the mind which was affected by the mantra; the pebble does not appear as a horse from its own side, independent of that mind. Nevertheless, there does exist an objective mode of being of the pebble itself which appears as a horse, a mode of being which is posited in dependence upon the awareness affected by the mantra. The appearance of the illusory horse must exist in order for it to be mistaken for a real horse by the audience.[36]

For the Svātantrikas, a consciousness innately conceiving true existence conceives of phenomea as existing from the side of their own objective mode of subsistence, without being posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness. In the same way, the audience at the magic show believes that the horse which they see in front of them is a real horse and is not appearing to them through the force of

their minds which have been affected by the magician's spell. Ordinary beings who have not understood emptiness conceive things to be established from their own side without depending at all on being posited through the power of an awareness.

Someone who has understood emptiness, the lack of ultimate existence, understands that phenomena do not exist exclusively from their own side, that an object's mode of being depends on being posited by the non-defective awareness to which it appears. A person who has understood emptiness is like the magician who sees the appearance of the horse but knows that the horse is not real, that it is appearing through the power of the mind which has been affected by the mantra. The appearance of the horse is not merely a mental projection; it is a mode of subsistence of the pebble affected by the mantra and salve. However, the illusory horse does not exist until the magician or the audience have looked at the pebble. Thus, although there is an objective mode of subsistence, it does not exist until it is perceived by the mistaken sense consciousnesses affected by the mantra. In the same way, the Svātantrikas assert that all phenomena are merely posited through the power of appearing to a non-defective mind, but they do not assert that they are merely posited by the mind. There is an objective mode of subsistence of phenomena which exists from the object's own side and which is established by way of the object's own character. However, just as the

illusory horse does not exist until it is perceived by the mistaken sense consciousnesses, the objective mode of subsistence of objects does not exist without appearing to a non-defective awareness.

Thus, for the Svātantrikas, two factors are essential. The first is the objective mode of subsistence of the object which exists from the object's own side but does not exist independently. If it did, it would be an extreme of permanence. This mode of subsistence is posited by appearing to a non-defective consciousness which is either conceptual or non-conceptual. Phenomena gain their entities through the power of the awarenesses to which they appear. However, such consciousnesses do not subjectively impute those phenomena without any objective basis since that would be an extreme of annihilation. They rather, more passively, posit that which appears to them. As J̄ang-ḡya says:

> According to these Mādhyamikas, the fact that things are posited through the power of an awareness which is not damaged by valid cognition and the fact that the thing's own mode of subsistence which is posited by the power of that [awareness] also exists are not contradictory, just as a basis of conjuring [that is, a pebble] can be posited as appearing as a horse or elephant by the power of an awareness affected by mantra and salve, and there [also] exists a mode of subsistence

> which is the appearance of a horse or elephant even from the side of the basis of conjuring and which is posited through the power of that awareness.[37]

This mode of being which is established from the object's own side but which is posited through the power of appearing to a non-defective consciousness is the conventional mode of being of phenomena in the Svātantrika system. Their final mode of being is their lack of ultimate existence, their emptiness of being established from their own side without depending on being posited by a non-defective awareness. A Superior directly realizing this emptiness perceives only the lack of this ultimate existence; no conventionalities appear to his mind. He is like a latecomer to the magic show who neither sees the illusory horse nor conceives it to be real.[38]

Thus, in the Svātantrika system, when it is said that phenomena do not exist ultimately, there are two types of non-ultimate existence. The first, deriving from Bhāvaviveka's <u>Blaze of Reasoning</u>, is the inability to bear analysis by an ultimate consciousness—a conceptual consciousness of hearing, thinking, or meditating which analyzes suchness. The second type of non-ultimate existence, described in Kamalashīla's <u>Illumination of the Middle Way</u>, is the non-existence of an objective mode of subsistence which is not merely posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness.[39]

For the Svātantrikas, true existence, ultimate existence, real existence, existence which is not posited by the power of an awareness, and existence which is capable of bearing analysis by a reasoning consciousness engaged in ultimate analysis are all objects of negation and do not exist even conventionally. Existence by way of the object's own character, inherent existence, existence by way of the object's own entityness, existence by way of its own entity, and existence capable of withstanding a search for the object designated are asserted by the Svātantrikas as conventionally existent.[40] Bhāvaviveka holds that it is a deprecation of phenomena to refute inherent existence without affixing the qualification "ultimately." That is, for Bhāvaviveka phenomena inherently exist but ultimately they do not inherently exist. In the fifteenth chapter of Bhāvaviveka's Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom", an opponent asks Bhāvaviveka:

> If entityness does not exist, how are there things? If there are things, it is not the case that entityness does not exist. Therefore, [your] thesis has the fault of deprecating that meaning.[41]

In response, Bhāvaviveka says:

> It has been asserted that things have entityness ultimately; it is not [our] thesis that they are just without entityness. Thus, since the meaning of the thesis is not a deprecation, it is not the case that the meaning of the reason is

not established. Therefore, this [thesis] is without fault.[42]

Thus, Bhāvaviveka asserts that he is not deprecating or denying phenomena because he asserts that things are without entityness _ultimately_. It is, therefore, clear that he asserts that if phenomena lacked an entityness in the sense of establishment by way of the object's own entity conventionally, it would be a deprecation.[43] According to the Svātantrikas, phenomena are established by way of their own character and are established from their own side conventionally. Therefore, inherent existence cannot be refuted conventionally. It is only when the qualifications "ultimately" or "truly" are affixed to inherent existence or existence by way of the object's own character that they can be refuted; phenomena exist by way of their own character, they do not exist by way of their own character ultimately.[44]

The Prāsaṅgikas assert that phenomena do not inherently exist even conventionally, and, therefore, when they negate inherent existence or existence from the object's own side, they find it unnecessary, indeed redundant, to add the qualification "ultimately" or "truly" because, according to them, if something exists by way of its own character or inherently exists, it necessarily also truly exists and ultimately exists.[45] Whereas the Svātantrikas assert that phenomena exist by way of their own character, exist from their own side, and inherently exist and negate true existence, ultimate existence, and real existence, the Prāsaṅgikas assert

that existence by way of the object's own character, existence from the object's side, inherent existence, ultimate existence, true existence, and real existence are synonymous and refute them all.[46]

In his Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way," Chandrakīrti attacks the Svātantrika assertion that phenomena exist by way of their own character conventionally, stating four absurd consequences which are entailed by that position:

1 If phenomena did inherently exist, then it would absurdly follow that the meditative equipoise of a Superior would destroy phenomena because if things were established from their own side, they would be established in reality, in which case they would be observed by a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise—the consciousness that directly perceives reality. However, when emptiness is directly cognized, such an inherently existent nature does not appear which means that either it did not exist in the first place or that the exalted wisdom consciousness destroyed it. Since the Svātantrikas assert that phenomena inherently exist, they incur the latter fault.[47]

2 If phenomena did inherently exist, it would absurdly follow that conventional truths would be able to withstand analysis by reasoning because they would ultimately exist.

3 If phenomena did inherently exist, it would absurdly follow that production from the four extremes of self, other, both, and neither would not be refuted because production from other would be findable under analysis and thus would ultimately exist.

4 If phenomena did inherently exist, it would absurdly follow that Buddha was wrong when he said in the Kāshyapa Chapter Sutra (Kāshyapaparivarta) that phenomena are empty of themselves, that is, as being established as their own mode of being.[48]

Thus, the Prāsaṅgikas find it contradictory for the Svātantrikas to assert that phenomena are posited by an awareness on the one hand and are established by way of their own character on the other. Still it can be said that both the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas assert that phenomena are posited by the power of awareness, but there is a great difference between what they mean by that. The Prāsaṅgikas assert that phenomena such as forms are posited by the power of a conceptual awareness which imputes verbal conventions, which designates an object to its basis of designation. Such a designation is completely subjective; the object designated cannot be found in its basis of designation. The mode of subsistence of the object which is posited by the designating consciousness is merely a nominal imputation.

The Svātantrikas assert that phenomena are posited conventionally by the power of appearing to a non-defective consciousness such as a sense direct perceiver. While they hold that there is no mode of subsistence which is not posited by the power of appearing to an awareness, they also assert that this mode of subsistence which is posited by the power of appearing to an awareness is not merely nominally designated. The Prāsaṅgikas find this to be contradictory.[49]

For the Prāsaṅgikas, the awareness by which the object is posited is necessarily a designating thought consciousness which actively imputes the name and qualities of the object. For the Svātantrikas, the awareness which posits the object may be conceptual or non-conceptual as long as it is non-mistaken for its function is to posit the inherently existent object which appears to it. The role of the awareness is more passive in the Svātantrika schema because the awareness posits the entity of that which appears to it. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the analytically unfindable object is merely designated by terms and thoughts; it is utterly nonexistent from its own side. The Svātantrikas cannot conceive of a valid mode of subsistence that is merely designated; for them, if something exists it must exist by way of its own character.

Because the Prāsaṅgikas are able to refute the inherent existence which the Svātantrikas conventionally uphold,

while at the same time maintaining the viability of all phenomena within the emptiness of inherent existence, D̄zong-ka-b̄a considers Prāsaṅgika to be the highest of the Indian schools of Buddhist philosophy.

Buddhism was first transmitted to Tibet in the eighth century during the reign of King Ti-s̄ong-day-d̄zen (Khri-srong-lde-brtsan) who invited Shāntarakṣhita, Padmasambhava, and later Kamalashīla. The transmission was interrupted by the persecution by King L̄ang-dar-ma (Glang-dar-ma) who was assassinated in 842. After a period of dormancy, the Buddhist doctrine was brought to the snowy land of Tibet with renewed vigor during the tenth and eleventh centuries through the efforts of translators such as Rin-chen-sang-b̄o (Rin-chen-bzang-po) and Indian paṇḍitas such as Atīsha. Thus, the picture of Indian Buddhism given to the Tibetans was painted as the development of Buddhist philosophy in India was being completed and not long before Buddhism died out in India completely.

The Tibetan situation stands in sharp contrast to that of the Chinese. Buddhism first came to China sometime around the beginning of the Christian era, during the period of the initial growth of the Mahāyāna in India. The transmission of Buddhism to China was thus necessarily carried out in a piecemeal fashion with sutras and shāstras arriving in China over a period of six centuries. The Chinese were

unable to assimilate all of this literature and were understandably unwilling to re-evaluate completely their understanding of Buddhism as each new text arrived. Furthermore, the Chinese did not have access to all the late Indian shāstras which became the basis for the study of Buddhist philosophy in Tibet, such as Chandrakīrti's Supplement to the Middle Way and Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayālaṃkāra). Finally, the intellectual acme of Chinese Buddhism occurred when schools and systems were still forming in India. Thus, due to the absence of key texts and the absence of late contact with Indian scholars, the Chinese Buddhist tradition is lacking as a source for the understanding of the full scope of Buddhist thought in India.

The Tibetans on the other hand were presented with a unique diachronic perspective from which to study and evaluate Indian Buddhism. This perspective is reflected in the Ge-luk-b̄a tenet (siddhānta, grub mtha') literature. Our interest in this literature is twofold. First, it provides a clear and systematic picture of the various schools of Buddhist philosophy as they existed at the time when Buddhism was transmitted to Tibet. Later Tibetan authors such as Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a and J̄ang-ḡya attempt to provide as accurate an account of the Indian schools as possible, quoting extensively from the texts of the particular school to support their description.

Tibetan Buddhism, however, is not merely a repository for the doctrines of extinct Indian schools. The Tibetans brought their own approach to the study of Buddhist philosophy in that, in addition to cataloging the Indian systems, they ranked them and compared their assertions on the basis, path, and goal establishing a hierarchy the study of which provided a new insight into the various problems and solutions of Indian Buddhist philosophy. The hierarchy established by the Ge-luk-b̄as is as follows:

Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika
Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika
Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika
Chittamātra Following Reasoning
Chittamātra Following Scripture
Sautrāntika Following Reasoning
Sautrāntika Following Scripture
Vaibhāṣhika[50]

From lowest to highest there is an increase in the subtlety of the two extremes identified by the individual schools. The Vaibhāṣhikas abandon the extreme of permanence by asserting that all conditioned phenomena are impermanent and abandon the extreme of annihilation by asserting that past and future are substantial entities (dravya), that is, that the past of an object exists after its present

existence and the future of an object exists before its present existence.[51] The Sautrāntikas abandon the extreme of permanence by asserting that uncaused phenomena are not substantially existent and abandon the extreme of annihilation by asserting that objects' being places of imputing designations and bases of conception by thought is established by way of their own nature. The Chittamātrins abandon the extreme of permanence by asserting an object's being the basis of a conception by thought and a place of imputing designations is not established by way of the object's own character. For example, a table is not established by way of its own character as a basis for the affixing of the name table. They assert that other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are truly established, thereby abandoning the extreme of annihilation. As we have seen, the Svātantrikas abandon the extreme of permanence by asserting that no phenomenon is established from the side of its own objective mode of subsistence without being posited by the power of appearing to a non-defective awareness. They abandon the extreme of annihilation by asserting that all phenomena are established from their own side, that they exist by way of their own character. The Prāsaṅgikas abandon the extreme of permanence by asserting that phenomena are not established from their own side and under their own power and abandon the extreme of annihilation by asserting that

phenomena are imputedly existent, being mere designations by terms and thoughts.

In the progression from Vaibhāṣhika to Prāsaṅgika, the middle way free from extremes of the lower school becomes an extreme to be abandoned by the higher. The Vaibhāṣhikas assert that everything is substantially established (<u>dravya-siddha</u>). The Sautrāntikas refute this by asserting that some phenomena are imputedly existent by which they mean that these phenomena do not exist as a separate substantial entity by their own power but rather are designated to other factors. The Sautrāntikas assert that all phenomena are established by the power of their own particular status as bases of conception by thought and as places for the imputation of designations. The Chittamātrins refute this with reasoning proving that imputations do not truly exist. The Chittamātrins assert that the other-powered and thoroughly established natures are truly established. The Svātantrikas refute this by proving that phenomena lack a mode of subsistence which is not posited by the power of an awareness. Still, the Svātantrikas contend that all phenomena are established from their own side. This is refuted by the Prāsaṅgikas who assert that when the object designated is sought among its bases of designation, there is nothing to be found.[52]

This is not to imply that in the Tibetan schema the

lower systems have no purpose other than to be refuted by the upper, serving as straw men for the upper schools' polemics. The tenets of the lower school are seen as a stepping stone to the higher, as means of understanding the increasingly profound philosophical positions of the upper systems. The structure of Tibetan tenets texts reflects this appreciation in that they begin with the non-Buddhist systems and then proceed to Vaibhāṣhika, Sautrāntika, Chittamātra, Svātantrika, and finally culminating with the presentation of the Prāsaṅgika system. With this approach one is able to see the development and refinement of concepts and terminology which would be imperceptible if one began one's study with Prāsaṅgika.

This approach to the study of Buddhist philosophy allows one to discern a progression away from substantial existence, away from objects' existing in and of themselves, toward imputed existence, toward analytical unfindability. For the Vaibhāṣhikas there are phenomena which substantially exist (dravya-sat) and phenomena which do not substantially exist, such as a table, but all are substantially established (dravya-siddha). For the Sautrāntikas, some phenomena are substantially established and some are not, but all are truly existent. For the Chittamātrins, some phenomena are truly existent and some are not, but all phenomena are inherently established (svabhāva-siddha). The Svātantrikas refute the

true existence of all phenomena but cannot refute their inherent existence, feeling that if phenomena did not inherently exist they would not exist at all. The Prāsaṅgikas refute this inherent existence and assert that all phenomena are merely imputedly existent (prajñāti-sat) and do not cover their bases of designation.[53] Phenomena thus become more and more nominal as one progresses from Vaibhāṣhika to Prāsaṅgika.

There is also a discernible progression in their views on the nature of sense experience. Among the four tenet systems there are two explanations of how a direct perceiver knows a sense object. The Sautrāntikas, Chittamātrins, and Mādhyamikas assert that the object casts an aspect (ākāra) toward the perceiving consciousness. The Vaibhāṣhikas assert that no such aspect exists. According to the other systems, an eye consciousness perceiving a table cognizes that table by being generated into the aspect of the table, as a mirror takes on the aspect of the object reflected in it. This does not mean that the consciousness becomes the object, but it can be said that it becomes like the object. These schools assert that all of the uncommon characteristics of an object, such as its subtle impermanence and its production, abiding, aging, and disintegration, appear to the sense consciousness perceiving it. However, these qualities are not necessarily ascertained by the sense consciousness because

the consciousness was not generated in the aspect of those qualities. In order for an object to be ascertained, the object must appear to the consciousness and the consciousness must also be produced in the aspect of the object. This provides an explanation of how an object could appear but not be seen, as in the case of being deeply absorbed in a conversation while walking and thus being unaware of one's surroundings.[54]

The aspect into which the consciousness is generated is similar to the object but is of the nature of consciousness; the aspect and the consciousness are one entity. A sense consciousness knows an object through an aspect similar to the object being generated in the consciousness.[55]

The Vaibhāṣhikas assert that the eye consciousness and eye sense extend out to the object so that there is no need for the object to be reflected in the consciousness. They do not distinguish between a subjective aspect and the object itself; the appearance of the object is the object itself.[56]

The Buddhist schools' positions on aspected and aspectless sense perception have correlates to the various types of realism elaborated in Western philosophy. Here, realism is taken to mean the view that material objects exist externally and independently of sense perception.[57] In this scheme, the Vaibhāṣhika position represents a form of direct realism, the view that sense perception is a direct,

straightforward, and immediate contact of the consciousness and its object.[58] That the Vaibhāṣhika view does not represent the simplest form of direct realism, naive realism which holds that things exist exactly as they are perceived to, is evidenced by the Vaibhāṣhikas' assertion that all gross objects, things which can be either physically or mentally broken down into parts, are conventional truths. They also assert that all impermanent phenomena with the exception of true paths (mārga-satya) are contaminated in the sense that they can serve as causes of the increase of the afflictive emotions due to being objects of desire or hatred.[59] Thus, although the Vaibhāṣhika position may be classified as one of direct realism, it is not to be assumed that their approach to sense experience is non-analytical.

The Sautrāntikas criticize the Vaibhāṣhika position, arguing that if direct perception were not aspected, either objects could not be perceived at all because there would be no way for the consciousness to perceive the object, or it should be possible to see through walls because a consciousness, being immaterial and going out to its object, would not be obstructed by matter.[60] The Sautrāntika introduction of the aspect into the process of sense perception represents a development away from the Vaibhāṣhika view to what would be classified in the West as a form of indirect realism, specifically representive realism, which states that actual

perception is perception of sensa; to perceive an external object is to perceive the sensa caused by it so that sense perception is technically limited to the perception of sensa, not of the object itself.[61] The Sautrāntikas do indeed distinguish between the object and its aspect, but would balk at the suggestion that for this reason sense perception is somehow indirect. Although they assert that objects exist external to the mind perceiving them and cause the sensa or representations which we perceive, they would not be frightened by the notorious pitfall of representative realism—if sense experience is technically only of sensa and never of external objects, how are the objects to be ascertained? Are material objects not unobserved and thus finally unintelligible?[62] The Sautrāntikas assert that the aspect is similar to the object and thus allows the object to be directly perceived. The aspect is not mistaken for the actual object; it merely allows the object to be perceived. For the Sautrāntikas, a sense direct perceiver is a complete engager (*vidhi-pravṛitti-buddhi), that is, everything that exists in the same substantial entity with the object, all of its specific characteristics, appears directly to a sense consciousness.[63]

Persuaded by the argument from illusion, that the same thing sometimes appears differently to different people, the Chittamātrins sever the relationship between the external

object and its aspect that the Sautrāntikas maintain, asserting instead that external objects are utterly non-existent and that the object is not a cause of the consciousness perceiving it. The Chittamātrins hold that subject and object arise simultaneously, both arising from the same latency (vāsanā) or seed (bīja) that resides in the mental consciousness or mind-basis-of-all (ālayavijñāna). A seed is activated, causing the appearance of the object and the consciousness perceiving it. Subject and object are the same substantial entity, arising from the same cause; there are no objects which are not of the nature of consciousness. Thus, the Chittamātrins maintain that there are sensa without objects external in entity to the perceiving consciousness and that these sensa are of the nature of the mind. In this way, their view comes close to one of idealism or Berkeley's immaterialism, for the Chittamātrins assert that objects composed of material particles do not exist.

The Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas, in the person of Bhāvaviveka, reacted strongly against the Chittamātrin view, holding that external objects do exist as they appear to direct perception although they do not truly exist. The Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas assimilated the Chittamātrin idealism, asserting that subject and object do not exist as separate entities conventionally, but rejected the Chittamātrin contention that consciousness truly exists.[64]

Thus far, the process of perception has originated with the subject—consciousness—as in the assertion of the Chittamātrins and Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas, or with the externally existent object, as in the assertion of the Vaibhāṣhikas, Sautrāntikas, and Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas. The Prāsaṅgikas incorporate elements of both the subjective and objective approaches, at once maintaining factors of realism and skepticism. The Prāsaṅgikas are realists in that they assert that external objects exist as separate entities from the perceiving consciousness. They are skeptics in that they deny the veracity of sense perception in terms of the appearance of inherent existence. From another point of view, they are also not realists in that they do not accept that all of the characteristics of the object which appears to a sense consciousness are true; a sense consciousness correctly perceives the general object and its primary characteristics but misperceives the object as inherently existent. In this way, they go beyond the position of the critical realists who hold that in veridical perception those characters which appear to the senses are the actual characters of the external object; only actual properties of the object are being perceived.[65] The Prāsaṅgikas also are not skeptical in a certain sense in that they do not deny that indubitable information can be gained about the nature of things.[66] For them, external objects exist, but

they do not exist in the way that they appear. Objects appear to exist inherently, and this false appearance is perceived by the non-conceptual sense consciousnesses. There are two factors which appear to the sense consciousness, the appearance of inherent existence and the mere appearance of the imputedly existent object. For common beings these two appearances are mixed.[67] There are thus true and false aspects present in the sensa which ordinarily cannot be distinguished. The Prāsaṅgikas turn to the other valid source of knowledge, inference, to discern and destroy with reasoning the conception of inherent existence by thought and the perception of inherent existence. Reasoning reveals that the object does not exist in and of itself but is empty of inherent existence. By accustoming to this emptiness again and again from the viewpoint of many different reasonings, the false factor in sense perception can be identified and, through developing direct perception of emptiness and accompanying that practice with altruistic deeds, that false appearance can finally be eliminated at Buddhahood.[68]

Thus, in the Prāsaṅgika system, reasoning and analysis provide the means for eliminating the deceptive factor in sense perception. The objects of the senses exist validly as external objects but do not exist in the way that they appear; they appear to exist in and of themselves when in fact they are merely subjectively designated. All of the

lower schools assert that phenomena appear to exist inherently and do exist inherently.[69] The Prāsaṅgikas concur that phenomena do indeed appear to exist in and of themselves but argue that this is a false appearance, unfindable under analysis.

Heretofore the importance of the reasoning consciousness for Bhāvaviveka and for the Mādhyamika school in general has been noted but the specific processes of reasoning have not been delineated. In this chapter, two of the many reasonings employed by the Svātantrikas will be analyzed. The two reasonings are those which receive the greatest emphasis from the founders of the two branches of Svātantrika, Bhāvaviveka and Shāntarakṣhita.

As cited earlier, Bhāvaviveka says in the third chapter of his Essence of the Middle Way (III.26):

> Here, earth and so forth
> Are not entities of the elements ultimately
> Because of being produced
> And because of having causes, like a consciousness.[1]

Bhāvaviveka explains that "earth and so forth" are the subjects (dharmin) of the syllogism. "And so forth" refers to the other three elements—water, fire, and wind. "Are not entities of the elements ultimately" is the predicate (dharma). Bhāvaviveka provides two reasons for the probandum or thesis that earth and so forth are not entities of the elements ultimately, "because of being produced" and "because of having causes." "Like a consciousness" is the example

(drishtānta). Therefore, Bhāvaviveka's statement in syllogistic form is:

> The subjects, earth and so forth, are not entities of the elements ultimately because of being produced, as is the case for example, with a consciousness.

In the Blaze of Reasoning, a hypothetical opponent objects that by asserting that earth is not the entity of the element earth ultimately, Bhāvaviveka contradicts his own acceptance of the categories of phenomena set forth by the Buddha because he is denying their existence.[2] Bhāvaviveka responds that the objection is not applicable because he is not asserting that earth and so forth are not the entities of the elements, but that they are not the entities of the elements ultimately. When the Buddha presented the entities and characteristics of phenomena, he did so conventionally and said that ultimately they lack entityness.[3] Bhāvaviveka thus makes clear that he is denying the ultimate existence of phenomena and is in no way attacking their conventional status.

In order to gain a fuller understanding of Bhāvaviveka's syllogism, it is necessary to place it within the framework of Buddhist logic. Ge-luk-ba literature on the topic of Signs and Reasonings (rTag rigs) sets forth a sixfold division of correct signs, dividing them by way of the entity of

the sign, the predicate of the probandum, the mode of proof, the probandum, the way the sign relates to the similar class, and the party.[4] Greatest attention is paid to the first, the division of correct signs by way of entity. In this division, signs are considered in terms of their relationship to the predicate of the probandum. When divided from the point of view of entity, correct signs are of three types: correct effect signs (samyak-kārya-hetu), correct na-nature signs (samyak-svabhāva-hetu), and correct signs of non-observation (samyak-anupalabdhi-hetu).

Correct effect signs involve a relationship of cause and effect between predicate of the probandum and the sign; an effect is stated as the sign of the syllogism and the cause of that effect is stated as the predicate of the probandum.[5] The most famous example of a correct effect sign in Indian logic is, "On a smoky mountain pass, fire exists because smoke exists," with the effect, smoke, stated as the sign and the cause of that effect, fire, being stated as the predicate of the probandum.

As suggested by the name, a correct nature sign is the same nature as the predicate of the probandum. In the example, "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product," product and impermanent thing are synonyms and thus are of one nature.[6]

For the third type of correct signs when considered from

the point of view of entity, correct non-observation signs, the predicate of the probandum in the proof must be a negative phenomenon (pratishedha).[7] Bhāvaviveka's syllogism falls into this category in that the predicate of his probandum is a negative, "are not entities of the elements ultimately." There are numerous divisions and subdivisions of correct non-observation signs, the first division being into (1) correct non-observation signs of the non-appearing and (2) correct non-observation signs which are non-observations of that which is suitable to appear.[8] The former necessarily involves the special class of supersensory objects and thus is not relevant to the categorization of Bhāvaviveka's reason.

Correct signs which are a non-observation of that which is suitable to appear are of two types: correct signs which are a non-observation of a related object suitable to appear and correct signs which are an observation of a contradictory object suitable to appear. The reason in the syllogism, "On a lake at night, smoke does not exist because of the non-existence of fire," is an example of a correct sign which is a non-observation of a related object. On a dark night smoke is not visible on the surface of a lake. However, it would be suitable for fire, which is related to smoke as its cause, to appear since fire is visible at night. The absence of fire can therefore serve as a correct sign

proving the non-existence of smoke on the lake.[9]

Correct signs which are an observation of a contradictory object suitable to appear are of two types: correct signs which are an observation of an object suitable to appear that is contradictory in the sense of not abiding together and correct signs which are an observation of an object suitable to appear that is contradictory in the sense of mutual exclusion. An example of the first is, "On a place in the east covered by fire, the tangible object cold does not exist because of being a place covered by a large powerful fire."[10] Someone might wonder whether cold is present in an area visible in the distance. The presence of cold cannot be directly perceived without relying on a sign, such as the presence of snow and ice. The absence of cold could be inferred by observing an object which is contradictory with cold and which is also suitable to appear. Because cold and fire are contradictory in the sense that they cannot be present in the same place simultaneously, the presence of fire serves as a correct sign in the proof of the absence of cold in a place covered by a large fire.

An example of a proof statement which employs a correct sign which is an observation of an object suitable to appear that is contradictory in the sense of mutual exclusion is, "The subject, sound, is not a permanent phenomenon because of being a product."[11] Product and permanent phenomenon are

mutually exclusive; whatever is a product is necessarily not a permanent phenomenon and whatever is a permanent phenomenon is necessarily not a product. Thus, the observation of sound as a product, its being produced in dependence on causes and conditions, serves as a correct sign proving that sound is not permanent.

In seeking to discover which type of correct sign Bhāvaviveka employs in his syllogism, "The subjects, earth and so forth, are not entities of the elements ultimately because of being produced," it can first be deduced that the sign is one of non-observation because the predicate of the probandum is a negative phenomenon (pratiṣhedha). In all proofs involving non-observation signs the predicate of the probandum must be a negative phenomenon.[12] Bhāvaviveka says in the Blaze of Reasoning, "'Are not' is a phrase which indicates a negative."[13] Bhāvaviveka goes on to explain that earth and so forth are not entities of the elements ultimately, the negative "are not" is to be taken as a non-affirming negative (prasajya-pratiṣhedha) rather than an affirming negative (paryudāsa-pratiṣhedha). A non-affirming negative does not imply any positive phenomenon or affirming negative in its place but is a mere elimination of the object negated. Therefore, when Bhāvaviveka says that he is merely negating that earth and so forth are entities of the element ultimately; this does not suggest that they are the entities of

something else.[14]

Having ascertained that the sign in Bhāvaviveka's syllogism is a non-observation sign, it must still be determined which type of non-observation sign it is. Since that which is being negated in the predicate, the existence of earth and so forth as entities of the elements ultimately, is not a supersensory object, it cannot be a non-observation sign of the non-appearing, but must be a correct sign which is a non-observation of the suitable to appear. When this type of non-observation sign is divided into correct signs which are a non-observation of a related object suitable to appear and correct signs which are an observation of a contradictory object suitable to appear, the first type of sign is necessarily a non-affirming negative whereas the second is either an affirming negative or positive phenomenon.[15] Because Bhāvaviveka's sign, "being produced," is a positive phenomenon, it can be deduced that it is of the latter type, a correct sign which is an observation of a contradictory object suitable to appear.

Within this category, "being produced" is a correct sign which is an observation of an object suitable to appear that is contradictory in the sense of mutual exclusion because it is Bhāvaviveka's position that to be ultimately existent as the entities of the elements and to be produced from causes and conditions are mutually exclusive; no

phenomenon can be both ultimately existent and a product. The implications of this view will be explored when the establishment of the pervasion is discussed.

In order for Bhāvaviveka's reason to be correct, the three modes must be established, the first of which is the property of the subject (*pakṣhadharma*). The property of the subject is established if the sign, being produced, is a property of the subject, earth and so forth. It is accepted by all four schools of Buddhist tenets that the four elements, earth, water, fire, and wind, are products because they arise in dependence on causes and conditions. The property of the subject is thus easily established.

A similar example (**sadṛiṣhtānta*) is used to facilitate understanding of the second mode of the sign, the forward pervasion (*anvaya-vyāpti*). In Bhāvaviveka's syllogism, the forward pervasion is, "Whatever is a product is necessarily not an entity of the elements ultimately." The similar example is a consciousness. It is generally accepted by all schools of Buddhist tenets that a consciousness is a product because of being produced in dependence on an observed-object-condition (*ālambana-pratyaya*), an empowering condition (*asādhāraṇa-adhipati-pratyaya*), and an immediately preceding condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*). A consciousness is also easily proved to be not the entity of the elements ultimately, the predicate of the probandum, because no one,

Buddhist or non-Buddhist among the Indian schools, asserts that consciousness is any of the four elements. Even the Nihilists (Chārvāka) assert that consciousness is an elemental evolute; they do not assert that it is an entity of the elements.[16] Just as consciousness is a product and is not the entity of the elements ultimately, it is to be understood that other products, even the elements of earth, water, fire, and wind, are not entities of the elements ultimately.

The counterpervasion (vyatireka-vyāpti) in Bhāvaviveka's syllogism would be, "Whatever is the entity of the elements ultimately is necessarily not a product." In order for product to be a correct sign, it must be non-existent in the dissimilar class; it must be just non-existent in the class of that which is an entity of the elements ultimately. In order to clarify the meaning of the dissimilar class, a dissimilar example (*vidṛṣhtānta), a member of the dissimilar class of which the sign may not be a member is often given. A dissimilar example in this case would be something that is an entity of the elements ultimately and is not a product. However, because the dissimilar class, and hence a dissimilar example do not exist, Bhāvaviveka does not prove the counterpervasion and does not state a dissimilar example. There is nothing which is an entity of the elements ultimately. Bhāvaviveka writes in the Blaze of Reasoning:

> Here, from among the three modes of the sign, the mode in which [the sign] is opposed to the dissimilar class is not indicated. Here, only two modes of the reason which I wish to propound are designated. The property of the subject [i.e., that earth and so forth are products] is exhausted in that which exists only in the similar class [not being the entity of the elements ultimately]. With respect to the dissimilar class, not even a minute particle of the other—the existence of entityness—exists. Therefore, the dissimilar class does not exist. Thus, an example and reason of the counter [pervasion] from the dissimilar class is not indicated here.[17]

Bhāvaviveka thus concerns himself with the first two of the three modes, the property of the subject and the forward pervasion. Since the property of the subject, that earth and so forth are products, is accepted by all Buddhist schools, it is clear that Bhāvaviveka's argument hinges on the forward pervasion, that product only exists in the similar class of the predicate of the probandum, or, more simply stated, whatever is a product is necessarily not an entity of the elements ultimately. Bhāvaviveka's assertion that whatever is produced from causes and conditions does not ultimately exist is the pivot of his argument.

For example, in Buddhist literature, earth is defined as that which is hard and obstructive.[18] Bhāvaviveka says that earth is not an entity which is ultimately hard because of being an element, as is the case with wind.[19] His point is that just as wind is not ultimately hard, so earth, which is defined as that which is hard and obstructive, is not ultimately hard due to its being an element. Whatever is an element is necessarily not ultimately hard. If the elements were ultimately hard, they would be hard without depending on their causes in which case even water and wind would have to be hard. If the elements ultimately existed, they would be established from their own side without being posited through the power of an awareness. If that were the case, there could be no valid cognizer which comprehends that earth is hard and water is not hard because earth and water would ultimately exist and would not depend on the valid cognizers which comprehend them as having different qualities. From another perspective, if smoke, for example, were truly established, it would arise without depending on specific causes, in which case it would absurdly either depend on all phenomena in the universe or it would not depend on anything, including fire.[20]

However, the elements do not ultimately exist because they are aggregations of the eight substantial particles—earth, water, fire, wind, form, odor, taste, and tangibility.

If something is ultimately existent, it must not be an aggregation of its parts because it must abide uniquely, without depending on anything. For Bhāvaviveka, things do not ultimately exist because they are produced from the aggregation of their causes and conditions and because they do not arise without those causes and conditions; if they existed ultimately, they would not depend on anything.[21]

Bhāvaviveka thus draws out the absurd implications of ultimate existence. Phenomena sharing the same quality, such as hardness, would be indistinguishable because that hardness would exist in and of itself and would be the final mode of being of that phenomenon. In Bhāvaviveka's system, sentient beings conceive of phenomena as existing ultimately, as existing from the side of their own objective mode of being without depending on being posited through the power of appearing to an awareness. Bhāvaviveka seeks to destroy this conception by pointing out how things would have to exist if they did ultimately exist—they would have to exist in utter independence, without depending on anv cause whatsoever, as if each phenomenon existed in and of itself in its own unique vacuum. Having drawn out the implications of ultimate existence in this way, Bhāvaviveka sees no need to resort to complicated reasonings to refute this ultimate existence. He can prove that earth and so forth are not entities of the elements ultimately merely by stating that

they are products, they are produced by causes and conditions. That fact alone, accepted by all schools of Buddhist tenets, is sufficient to deny their ultimate existence. Being a product and being ultimately existent are contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive; whatever is one cannot be the other. Once earth, or any other impermanent phenomenon is observed to possess a quality which is contradictory to ultimate existence, the possibility of earth being ultimately existent is removed. It is in this sense that Bhāvaviveka's reason is a correct sign which is the observation of a contradictory object in the sense of being mutually exclusive. Anything that is produced from causes cannot ultimately exist. Bhāvaviveka is thus able to point to the fundamental quality of impermanent phenomena, their being products, as a proof of their emptiness of ultimate existence.

In the stanza from the Blaze of Reasoning, Bhāvaviveka provides two reasons why earth and so forth are not entities of the elements ultimately, "because of being produced" and "because of having causes." He explains that this second reason is provided to indicate other forms of the reason such as "because of being a [functioning] thing," "because of being an object of knowledge," and "because of being an object of expression." He says that whatever has causes, or is a thing, an object of knowledge, or an object of

expression is not an entity of the elements ultimately.[22] In other words, nothing is ultimately an entity of the elements or anything else; nothing ultimately exists. Bhāvaviveka employs reasons for which the property of the subject is easily acceptable. Simplicity, however, does not imply that the reasoning is to be dismissed because it is from the simplicity of the reason that the power of his approach derives when the forward pervasion is established.

Shāntarakṣhita's Reasoning of the Lack of Being One or Many

The first stanza of Shāntarakṣhita's *Ornament for the Middle Way* says:

> These things propounded by ourselves and others
> Because of lacking in reality
> A nature of oneness or manyness
> Do not inherently exist, like a reflection.[23]

When put in syllogistic form, Shāntarakṣhita's stanza reads:

> The subjects, these things propounded by our own and other schools, do not inherently exist because of lacking a nature of oneness or manyness in reality, as is the case, for example, with a reflection.

It should be noted that in the thesis, Shāntarakṣhita uses

the term, "do not inherently exist." This is one of the cases referred to by Dzong-ka-ba in which the Svātantrikas speak of phenomena as not existing inherently or not existing by way of their own character. It is Dzong-ka-ba's position that, despite such statements, the Svātantrikas assert that phenomena exist by way of their own character conventionally and inherently exist conventionally but refute that phenomena inherently exist ultimately. Thus, for the sake of clarity, Shāntarakṣhita's syllogism may be restated as:

> The subjects, these things propounded by our own and other schools are not truly established because of not being either truly established unities or pluralities.

Kamalashīla states in his Illumination of the Middle Way (Madhyamakāloka) that Shāntarakṣhita's stanza can be taken as either a consequence or a syllogism.[24] However, there are apparent problems with both approaches.

If the stanza is construed as a consequence, the following consequence might be stated to a Vaibhāṣhika opponent:

> It follows that the subject, a minute partless particle, does not truly exist because of not being a truly existent unity or plurality.

In order for this to be a correct consequence, the sign must be accepted by the opponent, that is, the Vaibhāṣhika must accept that minute partless particles are not truly existent unities or pluralities. However, the Vaibhāṣhikas cannot accept the reason because they assert that partless particles are truly existent and are unities.[25]

This difficulty is acknowledged and answered by Kamalashīla who says in the Illumination of the Middle Way:

> If [this reason is used] to prove a consequence, it is not the case that the reason is not established because, although the opponents have not asserted that things lack being either one or many, since they assert phenomena which are pervaded by that [i.e., the lack of being one or many], they just assert that [things lack being either one or many] implicitly as well.[26]

His point is that even though the opponents do not explicitly accept that the subject is not a truly existent unity or multiplicity, they implicitly accept it such because they are logically forced to that position. The argument is best illustrated with an example.

The theistic Sāṃkhyas assert that the god Īshvara is permanent and unitary, by which they mean that all the factors of Īshvara which exist in the morning also exist in

the evening; there is nothing present in Īshvara in the morning that is absent in the evening. All of the factors of Īshvara are mutually one at all times, and they, therefore, do not explicitly assert that Īshvara is not a truly existent one. However, they also assert that Īshvara creates different situations, in the morning causing some beings to be happy and in the evening causing others to be said. From the Buddhist perspective, anything that creates different effects at different times, that is, whose activities are inconsistent, cannot be permanent and one. The Sāṃkhyas thus assert that Īshvara is a permanent unity but ascribe qualities to him which contradict that assertion.[27] They therefore come to assert implicitly that Īshvara is not a truly existent unity because it is not suitable to produce some effects at one time and not produce them at another.

Kamalashīla argues that the use of the consequence is justified in that the pervader is implicitly asserted because the pervaded is explicitly asserted. To understand what this means it is necessary to examine the consequence in question:

> It follows that the subject, Īshvara, is not a truly existent unity because of creating different effects at different times.

The Sāṃkhyas explicitly assert the reason in this case. In a correct consequence, the pervasion must be validly

established which means, in this case, that whatever creates different effects at different times is necessarily not a truly existent one. The reason, "creating different effects at different times" is the pervaded, and the predicate "not being a truly existent one," is the pervader; whatever is the reason A is pervaded by the predicate B. Thus, the Sāṃkhyas explicitly accept the reason of the above consequence and so explicitly accept the pervaded whereby they are logically forced to accept implicitly the pervader or the predicate, "is not a truly existent unity." Anything that creates different effects at different times is a member of the larger set of those things which are not truly existent unities. The Sāṃkhyas thus implicitly assert that predicate of the consequence which served as the reason of the prior consequence:

> It follows that the subject, Īshvara, does not truly exist because of not being a truly existent one.

The opponent thereby implicitly accepts the reason. In this way, it is suitable to take Shāntarakṣhita's stanza as a consequence despite the fact that the reason is not explicitly accepted by the opponent.

The other qualm that is raised concerns the subjects set forth when Shāntarakṣhita's stanza is put in syllogistic form. In the stanza, Shāntarakṣhita identifies "these

things propounded by ourselves and others" as the subjects of his syllogisms. Some of these things, such as the principal (pradhāna) asserted by the Sāṃkhyas, partless particles asserted by the Vaibhāṣhikas, and the inexpressible person asserted by the Vātsīputrīyas do not exist according to the Mādhyamikas. Consequently, the question is raised as to whether it is possible to have a correct syllogism, the subject of which is a non-existent.

In Tibetan textbooks on Signs and Reasonings, three types of incorrect or facsimile reasons are set forth: contradictory reasons (viruddha-hetu), indefinite reasons (anaikāntika-hetu), and non-established reasons (asiddha-hetu). Facsimile reasons are not correct signs because they are not all three modes of the sign in a particular proof. A contradictory reason in a particular proof is the property of the subject but is not the forward pervasion. It is the perverse forward pervasion which means that the sign exists only in the dissimilar class. "The subject, sound, is a permanent phenomenon because of being a product" is an example of a contradictory reason.[28]

An indefinite reason in a particular proof is the property of the subject but is not the forward pervasion. Unlike the contradictory reason, it is also not the perverse forward pervasion. An example would be, "The subject, the sound of a conch, is arisen from exertion, because of being

impermanent." The sound of a conch is impermanent but the sign exists in both the similar and dissimilar class, that is, there are impermanent things which are arisen from exertion, such as a pot, and which are not arisen from exertion, such as a rock. There are several types of indefinite reasons which need not detain us here.[29]

A non-established reason in a particular proof is not the property of the subject of that proof. Such reasons are of three types: non-established reasons in relation to the fact (artha), in relation to the mind (buddhi), and in relation to the other party (pakṣha). Non-established reasons in relation to the fact are of seven types: non-established reasons due to (1) the non-existence of the entity of the sign, (2) the non-existence of the entity of the subject, (3) the non-difference of the sign and the predicate of the probandum, (4) the non-difference of the basis of debate (subject) and the sign, (5) the non-difference of the basis of debate and the predicate of the probandum, (6) the non-existence of the sign, in accordance with the mode of statement, with the subject sought to be known, and (7) the non-existence in the subject sought to be known of a portion of the reason.[30]

The names of these seven types of non-established reasons in relation to the fact are for the most part self-explanatory. We are concerned with the second type, a non-established reason due to the non-existence of the entity of the sign. An illustration of such a non-established reason

is, "The subject, the horn of a rabbit, is impermanent because of being a product." In this case, the sign is not a property of the subject because the subject does not exist.

Returning to Shāntarakṣhita's syllogism, it would seem that when non-existents such as the principal (pradhāna) or a self of persons (pudgalātman) are stated as subjects which do not truly exist because of not being truly one or many, the sign would be a non-established reason due to the non-existence of the entity of the subject because for Shāntarakṣhita the principal and a self of persons are as equally non-existent as the horns of a rabbit.

However, the fault of a non-established reason due to the non-existence of the entity of the subject is incurred only when the sign and predicate of the probandum are positive phenomena. It is not definite that the reason is not established, despite the fact that the subject is a non-existent, when the sign (the reason) and predicate of the probandum are non-affirming negatives.[31]

Objects of knowledge may be divided into positive phenomena (vidhi) and negative phenomena (pratiṣhedha). Anything that exists is either a positive phenomenon or a negative phenomenon, with the latter being defined as a phenomenon which is an object realized through a mode of explicit elimination of its object of negation by the thought consciousness apprehending it. An example of a negative

phenomenon is non-pot which is realized through the explicit elimination of its object of negation, pot. In contradistinction, a positive phenomenon is a phenomenon which is not an object realized through a mode of explicit elimination of its object of negation by the thought consciousness apprehending it. An example of a positive phenomenon is a pot, which is realized without the thought apprehending it having to resort to a process of explicit elimination.[32]

Negative phenomena are of two types, affirming negatives (paryudāsa-pratiṣhedha) and non-affirming negatives (prasajya-pratiṣhedha). The definition of an affirming negative is a negative that is expressed by a phrase indicating another phenomenon which is either an affirming negative or a positive phenomenon in place of its own object of negation. This means, first of all, that an affirming negative is a negative phenomenon. Secondly, the term that expresses the affirming negative must imply some positive phenomenon which the thought consciousness realizing the affirming negative understands in the place of the object of negation that is explicitly eliminated by the thought consciousness apprehending the affirming negative. A famous example of an affirming negative is expressed by the sentence, "The fat Devadatta does not eat during the day." The negative phenomenon is Devadatta's not eating during the day. The term expressing this implies a positive phenomenon—

Devedatta's eating at night—for the thought consciousness realizing the object of negation—his not eating during the day. Due to the description of Devedatta as fat, the thought realizes that he must eat sometime and therefore, realizes, in place of the fact that he does not eat during the day, the fact that he eats at night.

The definition of a non-affirming negative is a negative which is expressed by a phrase that does not indicate another phenomenon which is either an affirming negative or a positve phenomenon in place of its own object of negation. Thus, a non-affirming negative is a negative phenomenon which does not in any way imply a positive phenomenon in place of its object of negation. An instance is the lack of anything that is both a pot and non-pot. No positive phenomenon is implied.[33]

Non-affirming negatives are of two types, those whose object of negation occurs among objects of knowledge and those whose object of negation does not exist among objects of knowledge. An example of the first is the non-existence of the pot; the object of negation, a pot, occurs among objects of knowledge. An example of the second is the emptiness of true existence; true existence is a non-existent and thus does not occur among objects of knowledge.[34]

The reason and sign of Shāntarakṣhita's syllogism, "The subject, the principal, does not truly exist because of not

being truly one or many," are both non-affirming negatives of the latter type, those whose object of negation does not occur among objects of knowledge because true existence and being a truly existent unity or multiplicity are both non-existents. That something which is a truly existent unity or multiplicity does not exist will be explored in the discussion of the establishment of the property of the subject.

Thus, Shāntarakṣhita's reason is not non-established, even though the subject does not exist, because the sign and predicate of the probandum are non-affirming negatives. However, it would not be accurate to say that if the entity of the subject does not exist and the predicate of the probandum and the sign are not non-affirming negatives that the reason is necessarily not established due to the non-existence of the entity of the subject. For example, in the syllogism, "The subject, the horns of rabbit, are suitable to be expressed by the term 'moon' because of existing among objects of thought," the subject does not exist and the predicate of the probandum and the sign are positive phenomena, yet the reason is correct. Any object that can be thought of is suitable to be designated with any name because names do not inhere in objects, they are bestowed adventitiously.[35] Therefore, whatever exists among objects of thought, whether it exists or not, is suitable to be given the name "moon" or any other name. Because the horns of a

rabbit can be conceived of, even though they do not exist, they can be called "moon." Because the three modes of the sign are established, it is a correct reason despite the fact that the subject does not exist and the predicate of the probandum and the sign are not non-affirming negatives.[36]

It would also be inaccurate to say that if the entity of the subject does not exist and the predicate of the probandum and sign are non-affirming negatives then the reason is necessarily correct. For example, in the syllogism, "The subject, the horns of a rabbit, are the selflessness of phenomena because of being thoroughly established (parinishpanna)," the subject does not exist and the predicate of the probandum and the sign are both non-affirming negatives, but the reason is not established, and thus is not a correct reason. The selflessness of phenomena and the thoroughly established phenomena are synonyms and are both non-affirming negatives because they are the mere absence of true existence, according to Mādhyamika. However, the horns of a rabbit are not the absence of true existence, the final nature of phenomena, and so the reason is incorrect, a facsimile.[37]

It is thus logically careless to assert that whenever the entity of the sign does not exist and the predicate of the probandum and the sign are non-affirming negatives that the reason is automatically correct or that if the subject

does not exist and the predicate of the probandum and the sign are not non-affirming negatives then the reason is automatically a facsimile. The reason why the reason is not non-established in the syllogism concerning the horns of a rabbit being called by the name "moon" is that the predicate of the probandum—being suitable to be expressed by the term "moon"—and the sign—existing among objects of thought—are not necessarily existents; both existents and non-existents are suitable to be expressed by the term "moon" and exist among objects of thought. The reason why the reason is non-established in the latter syllogism concerning the horns of a rabbit being the selflessness of phenomena, despite the fact that the entity of the subject does not exist and the predicate of the probandum and the sign are non-affirming negatives, is because whatever is the predicate of the probandum and the sign must exist; whatever is the selflessness of phenomena and whatever is a thoroughly established phenomenon must exist. Thus, whenever a non-existent is stated as the subject and either the predicate of the probandum or the sign must be existents, the reason will not be correct. When the predicate of the probandum and the sign do not have to be existents, the sign will not be a facsimile.[38]

When Shāntarakṣhita states that, "The subject, the principal, does not truly exist because of not being either

truly one or many," the entity of the subject does not exist and the predicate of the probandum and the sign do not have to be existents; nothing truly exists, whether it exists or not, and nothing is a truly existent unity or multiplicity, neither the horns of a rabbit nor a rabbit.

According to the logical system of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the subjects of syllogisms are of two types, basal subjects (rang rten gyi chos can) and mere subjects (chos can 'ba' zhig ba). In proving to a Sāṃkhya that, "the subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product," sound is a basal subject because the predicate of the probandum, impermanence, is actually based on sound; sound is the actual basis of the syllogism. Basal subjects necessarily exist. When proving to a Sāṃkhya that, "The subject, the principal, does not exist as the substantial cause of the various manifestations because it is not observed as the substantial cause of the various manifestations," the principal is a mere subject or a merely stated subject because one is not proving that the manifestations are not effects in terms of the principal itself because the principal does not exist. A non-existent cannot serve as the basis for even a negative predicate. A mere subject is only stated as the subject; it does not serve as the actual basis of the predicate of the probandum.[39]

If the mere subject does not serve as the basis of the

predicate, what else could serve as the subject in order that the reason can be established and the thesis proven? The mental image or meaning-generality (artha-samanya) of the non-existent subject, in this case the principal, serves as the basis of the predicate of the probandum and sign. It is this mental image, which exists for the Sāṃkhya and which is imagined to be the source of all transformations, which will serve as the actual basis of the syllogism. The Buddhist will seek to prove that the principal is not the substantial cause of the various transformations in an effort to destroy the false conception of the principal in the mind of the opponent. The Buddhist is not seeking to destroy the principal because it is utterly non-existent, it never has and never will exist. He is rather seeking to remove the conception of the principal from the opponent's mind. That false conception, rather than the non-existent principal, acts as the basis of the debate.

One might wonder whether it would not also be the case that the meaning-generality or generic image of sound would be the basal subject in the proof that sound is impermanent because of being a product. Inference, being a form of thought or conceptual consciousness, does not directly perceive impermanent phenomena such as sound but rather understands them through the negative route of meaning-generalities. The appearing object of the thought consciousness

realizing sound is the appearance as opposite from non-sound.[40] Thought is incapable of directly perceiving the subject, sound, and it would therefore seem that the meaning-generality of sound rather than sound itself would serve as the basal subject in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being a product; the generic image of sound is the only subject to which inference has access. However, the meaning-generality of sound is a permanent phenomenon which seems to preclude the possibility of it serving as the subject because it is impossible to prove the predicate of the probandum, impermanence, for a permanent subject.

D̄zong-ka-b̄a addresses these problems in his Notes to (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle Way" (dbU ma rgyan gyi zin bris):

> There are bases which must be impermanent things; [for example] in the proof that sound is impermanent by [reason of being a] product and of fire existing on a [smoky] mountain pass by the sign of smoke, the two [subjects] sound and mountain pass [are impermanent things]. The images which are the appearance to thought as the opposite from these two are the actual bases of refutation and proof. Sound and mountain pass are not the actual bases because they do not actually appear to the thought which makes a refutation or proof. . . . Nevertheless, the bases of the

> appearance of such images are sound and mountain pass. Therefore, the bases [of debate] are necessarily impermanent things.[41]

D̄zong-ka-b̄a is making two important points here. First, in the proof that sound is impermanent because of being a product, the subject, sound, exists and is thus a basal subject. It is also the basis with respect to which the sign of being a product and the predicate of the probandum of being impermanent are established. As D̄zong-ka-b̄a says in the same text:

> When one proves that sound is impermanent by [the sign of being a] product, the mere appearance which is the appearance as opposite from non-sound does not exist as an [impermanent] thing and thus the sign—product—is not established in relation to it; it must be established in relation to the sound which is the [meaning-generality's] basis of appearance. This is due to the fact that [impermanent] things are taken as the sign and predicate.[42]

Thus, sound itself is what is being proven to be impermanent, and it is in this sense that it serves as the basis of the debate.

The second point that D̄zong-ka-b̄a makes is that the

meaning-generality of sound serves as the actual basis for the functioning of the inferential consciousness. The appearance as opposite from non-sound, the appearing object (*pratibhāsa-viṣhaya) of the thought consciousness apprehending sound, is what actually serves as the basis of the proof that sound is impermanent. Inference, as a form of thought, is mistaken with respect to its appearing object in the sense that its appearing object, in this case the meaning-generality of sound, seems to be its object of engagement, sound itself. This does not imply, however, that thought is incapable of understanding its object; inference is an incontrovertible form of knowledge about its object of engagement.[43] Therefore, the inferential consciousness realizing that sound is impermanent because of being a product is not mistakenly thinking that the permanent meaning-generality of sound is impermanent, it is realizing that sound itself is impermanent.

In summary, because inferential consciousnesses are thought consciousnesses, they are incapable of directly perceiving their object of engagement and must operate through the medium of meaning-generalities. Therefore, in all cases of generating an inferential cognizer in dependence on a correct sign, the actual basis with which the conceptual awarenesses that realize the modes of the sign work is a meaning-generality, whether or not the stated subject exists.

As Dharmakīrti says in his Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium on Valid Cognition" (Pramāṇavarttika):

> There are no external bases;
> It is asserted that all proofs and refutations
> Here depend on meaning-generalities.[44]

With this in mind, two types of stated subjects are distinguished, basal subjects and mere subjects. The former necessarily are existents, the latter, non-existents. In either case, however, they must be explicitly stated as the subject of the debate because they are what the opponent wants to know about. Despite the fact that the meaning-generality of the basal or mere subject will appear to the opponent's mind, it would be unsuitable to state the meaning-generality as the basis of the debate. When refuting the assertion of the opponent, the subject must be stated exactly as it is understood by the opponent.[45]

A basal subject exists and is the actual basis of the sign and the predicate of the probandum, although the meaning-generality of the basal subject is the actual basis for the operation of the inferential consciousness which understands the property of the subject and the predicate of the probandum, as Ḏzong-ka-ḇa explained above.

Regarding mere subjects, such as the self of persons or the principal, which are necessarily non-existents, there

is disagreement between D̄zong-ka-b̄a's two foremost disciples as to what serves as the basis of debate. Kay-drup writes that:

> Although [something] is not an established base, there is no contradiction in its being a subject that someone wishes to know about and with respect to which the reason is ascertained.[46]

His position, then, is that even though the self of persons and the principal do not exist, they are to be taken as the subject of the syllogism; their meaning-generalities are not to be taken as the subject. His point is not that such non-existents are the appearing objects of a conceptual consciousness of the opponent because he would concede that the meaning-generality of the principal, for example, would appear to the mind of a Sāṃkhya. Kay-drup is arguing that non-existents can serve as the basis of the sign and the predicate of the probandum.

Gyel-tsap offers another opinion:

> The sign is established by valid cognition in relation to the meaning-of-the-term [i.e., the meaning generality] which is a [mental] appearance. If the self-sufficient person [which does not exist] were not taken as the subject, the self of persons itself would not be refuted. Since the opponent is operating

> within apprehending [the self of persons] and its [generic image] as one, there is no fault that the meaning-of-the-term is unsuitable as the subject. Therefore, with regard to whatever is a correct sign, the subject wanted to be known about is necessarily an established base, but whatever is the subject wanted to be known about of a correct sign is not necessarily an established base.[47]

Gyel-tsap presents a more refined position. He begins by noting the commonly accepted view that the inferential valid cognizer establishes the sign in terms of the meaning-generality of the subject. He also concedes that the non-existent subject, in this case, a self-sufficient person, must be stated as the subject because that is the object of negation of the reasoning. Because the opponent conceives of his mental image of a self-sufficient person to be an actual self of person (which for the Buddhist does not exist), there is no reason why the meaning-generality of the non-existent subject cannot serve as the basis of the debate. He goes on to make the subtle distinction that in terms of the sign or reason, the subject always exists because the property of the subject is ascertained by an inferential consciousness in terms of a meaning-generality. However, the subject wanted to be known about is not necessarily an

existent because there are mere subjects such as the self-sufficient person. It seems therefore that for Kay-drup all subjects are basal subjects because even non-existents can serve as the basis of the qualities of the sign and predicate of the probandum whereas for Gyel-tsap, the distinction between basal subjects and mere subjects is maintained.

Dzong-ka-ba's position is closer to that of Gyel-tsap or perhaps, more properly, Gyel-tsap's position is closer to Dzong-ka-ba's. He says in his Notes to (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle Way":

> Just such [an image] is designated as the subject in relation to which the predicate is posited as its predicate and the subject in relation to which the reason is posited as its property. Thus, there is no fault of the property of the subject not being established due to the mere subject's being refuted. . . . When those bases of appearance are established as being those signs, even though [those bases or subjects] are refuted, the mere appearance [of the meaning-generality of the subject] serves as the subject on which the two qualities—the predicate being proven and the property of the subject—depend.[48]

It has thus been determined that non-existents can

serve as, or more precisely, be stated as the subjects of correct syllogisms as long as the sign and predicate of the probandum are non-affirming negatives and as long as whatever is the sign and the predicate of the probandum need not be existents. The delineation of mere subjects has important implications in the practice of the path in that it allows the objects falsely imagined to exist by ignorance to serve as the bases of reasoning and be refuted. Ultimately existent persons and phenomena, although utterly non-existent, are the objects of negation by reasoning (*yukti-pratiṣhedhya). The mental images of those objects are the actual bases of the logical functions of reasoning. The ultimate goal is to destroy the ignorance which conceives of true existence. These conceptions of true existence, unlike their objects, exist until they are destroyed by reasoning consciousnesses on the paths of seeing and meditation. The conceptions of true existence are thus called objects of negation by the path (mārga-pratiṣhedhya).[49]

Having established the suitability of non-existents' serving as the subjects of syllogisms, the three modes of Shāntarakṣhita's reason may be considered. In establishing the first mode, the property of the subject, Shāntarakṣhita breaks the reason down into two parts. To reiterate, the original syllogism is:

> The subjects, these things propounded by ourselves and others, do not truly exist because of not being truly existent unities or multiplicities.

The reason is divided into two parts. In other words:

> The subjects, these things propounded by ourselves and others, do not truly exist because of (1) not being truly existent unities and (2) not being truly existent multiplicities.

Shāntarakaṣhita considers each part of the reason separately, beginning with a refutation of those subjects which are asserted by non-Buddhist and Buddhist opponents to be truly existent unities. These subjects are included in five categories:

1 the permanent (*nitya*), such as the principal asserted by the Sāṃkhyas and analytical cessations (*pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*) asserted by the Vaibhāṣhikas
2 the person (*pudgala*), specifically the inexpressible person asserted by the Vātsīputrīyas
3 the pervasive (*vyāpaka*), such as space (*ākāsha*) and time (*kāla*) as asserted by the Nayaiyikas and Vaisheṣhikas[50]
4 the gross (*sthūla*), that is, sense objects
5 the subtle, that is, minute particles (*paramāṇu*).

Before considering Shāntarakṣhita's specific refutation of the first and last of these categories (see pp. 567-580) in the translation section for his refutation of the others), his general argument bears consideration. The crux of his position is that nothing exists as a truly existent unity because everything has parts; there is no object of knowledge in the universe which is partless. Even permanent phenomena such as reality and the uncaused space have parts. Reality or emptiness has many parts, such as the emptiness of a table, the emptiness of a chair, the emptiness of a pillar, and the emptiness of a pot. It has the factor which is directly realized by Superiors and the factor which is inferentially realized by common beings. Uncaused space, which is defined as the lack of obstructive contact and which pervades everything, has parts such as that which pervades the inside of a building in the east and that which pervades the inside of a building in the west.[51]

There is also nothing impermanent which does not have parts. Physical particles are not partless as will be seen. Gross objects composed of subtle particles obviously have parts. Consciousnesses are not partless because they have former and later moments. Also, whatever is a consciousness must be established as the factor which is produced from its own cause and the factor which produces its own effect.[52] Every phenomenon has three attributes: its meaning-generality,

its qualities (guṇa), and its factor of being itself.[53]

It might be argued that something could have parts and still be partless but this is impossible because having parts and being partless are mutually exclusive. When something appears to the mind as having parts, the possibility of its appearing to be partless is eliminated and vice versa; there is no awareness to which one thing can appear both to have parts and be partless.[54]

Since all phenomena have parts, each phenomenon exists as a whole in relation to which its components are designated as parts. In the discussion of the reasoning of the lack of being one or many in his Analysis of the First Chapter of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization" (Phar phyin mtha' dpyod skabs dang po), Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a examines the relationship between whole and part to provide a further reason why phenomena do not truly exist. Whole and part appear to be different entities with the whole being one thing and the parts another whereas in terms of their mode of subsistence, whole and part are the same entity; they cannot be separated. If whole and part were different entities in fact in addition to appearing to be different entities, then whole and part would not exist because whole and part are designated in terms of each other. If whole and part appeared to be the same entity in addition to being the same entity in fact, whole and part also would not exist because they

would be indistinguishable. Therefore, whole and part must appear to be different entities but must abide as the same entity. In other words, the way that whole and part appear and the way that they exist do not agree. Whatever appears one way and exists another is false and cannot be truly established. To be truly established means that an object's mode of appearance is established as its mode of being; the object exists in the way that it appears.[55]

Shāntarakṣhita argues that to be truly unitary means to be partless, and he logically proves that nothing is partless. It is easy to understand that phenomena with perceivable parts are not partless; this is evident to direct perception. But those phenomena imputed to be unitary and partless which are inaccessible to direct perception are more difficult to refute. For this reason, Shāntarakṣhita's refutation of permanent unities and partless particles warrants special consideration.

Dharmakīrti's Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium on Valid Cognition says:

> That which has a nature of non-disintegration
> Is called permanent by the wise.[56]

The Sautrāntikas, Chittamātrins, and Svātantrikas assert that a permanent phenomenon is one which has a nature of non-disintegration. These schools assert that the state of

destruction of an object is permanent despite the fact that the state of destruction of a pot, for example, newly comes into being when the pot is smashed. The state of destruction of the pot is permanent in the sense that it does not change moment by moment as impermanent phenomena do.[57] Unlike the lower schools, the Prāsaṅgikas assert that the state of destruction of an object is a functioning thing because it depends on causes and is capable of creating effects.[58]

According to the Vaibhāṣhikas and the non-Buddhist schools of Indian philosophy, if something is permanent, everything about it that exists at one moment must exist at a later moment and vice versa. Those factors which exist at those times are asserted to be one. It is this conception of permanence which Shāntarakṣhita takes as the object of negation when he refutes the permanent and unitary principal asserted by the Sāṃkhyas.[59] The Sāṃkhyas wish to uphold the permanent and unitary nature of the principal while asserting that it also produces various transformations at different times. If it were indeed permanent and unitary in the sense that the Sāṃkhyas define it, the principal could not produce different effects serially but would have to create the same effect constantly. Because the Sāṃkhyas do not assert this, the principal is not truly one because its nature of producing one effect in a former moment ceases when its nature of producing another arises in a later moment.[60]

The Vaibhāṣhikas assert that analytical cessations, the mere absences of a particular afflictive emotion destroyed by wisdom, are permanent and unitary. They hold that analytical cessations are observed by consciousnesses arisen from meditation but that they do not serve as causes of the consciousnesses apprehending them. They assert that unconditioned phenomena (asaṃskṛita-dharma) such as analytical cessations have an unchanging, unitary nature at all times, but they would argue that they avoid the trap fallen into by the Sāṃkhyas because they do not assert that unconditioned phenomena produce effects.[61]

Nevertheless, Shāntarakṣhita is able to prove that unconditioned phenomena do not have a unitary, unchanging nature. The Vaibhāṣhika may be asked whether the analytical cessation which existed at the time when it was observed by an earlier consciousness exists at the time of a later consciousness. Since analytical cessations are permanent, he must say that it does. In that case, does the later consciousness know the analytical cessation at the time of former consciousness? Obviously, it does not. It if does not, then that analytical cessation must have a factor which is the object of knowledge of the former consciousness but not the object of knowledge of the later consciousness. In that case, it would follow that the analytical cessation which exists at the time of the former consciousness is never known

by the later because its nature of not being known by the later consciousness at the earlier time is never lost since whatever is permanent never changes. If the Vaibhāṣhika seeks to avoid these problems by saying that the analytical cessation which serves as the object of knowledge of a former consciousness does not exist at the time of the later consciousness, then it would follow that the permanent cessation would be impermanent and momentary because its former nature does not exist at a later time.[62]

The refutation of partless particles is important because if minute particles are proven to have parts, all physical phenomena will necessarily be proven to have parts since they are composed of minute particles. The Vaibhāṣhikas assert that physical forms (rūpa) are aggregations of minute partless particles. In order to prove that the existence of partless particles is impossible, Shāntarakṣhita takes as his subject a minute particle which is surrounded on all sides by other minute particles. If the minute particle positioned in the middle of ten other particles in the four directions, the four intermediate directions, and above and below did not have parts, it would be impossible for the other particles to be located around it because the central particle would occupy no space. It could not have an eastern surface or a western surface because it would have no parts; all of its sides would be the same. It would absurdly

follow that all ten surrounding particles would contact the central particle in the same place, that is, all ten particles and, by extension, all particles in the universe would occupy the same place in which case physical objects such as the earth would not exist. If it is admitted that the central particle has sides which face the surrounding particles, then it must be accepted that minute particles have parts.[63]

If minute particles are not truly existent unities, the objects composed of them are not truly existent unities. Also, the objects of the five sense consciousnesses are not truly established, the sense consciousnesses themselves are not truly established because they depend on the sense objects for their production; as Bhāvaviveka argued, anything that depends on something else cannot be truly or ultimately established. Therefore, based on the refutation of partless particles, it can be inferred that sense consciousnesses and their objects do not truly exist. However, Shāntarakṣhita goes on in the Ornament for the Middle Way to refute the truly existent unitary consciousnesses propounded by the Mimāmsakas, Sāṃkhyas, Vaisheṣhikas, Jainas, Chārvakas, and Vedāntins among the non-Buddhists, and the Vaibhāṣhikas, Sautrāntikas, and Chittamātrins among the Buddhists.[64]

The pivotal point in establishing that truly existent unities do not exist is that everythinq has parts and Shāntarakṣhita goes to some length to prove this. He shows

that anything that can be asserted by a Buddhist or non-Buddhist can be logically demonstrated to be composed of physical parts such as minute particles or temporal parts such as moments of consciousness. By refuting truly existent unity, that anything is truly one, Shāntarakṣhita is not saying whole and part do not exist conventionally or that the terms "one" and "many" cannot be used. He is proving that there is nothing which is one that ultimately exists.

The proof that there is nothing which is truly many is accomplished more quickly. Shāntarakṣhita says:

> When anything is analyzed
> It is without oneness.
> That which does not have oneness
> Also is without manyness.[65]

If a truly existent unity does not exist, a truly existent multiplicity cannot exist because if one does not exist many cannot exist. A truly existent multiplicity would be composed of many truly existent unities. Therefore, once it can be shown that a truly existent unity does not exist, it is obvious that truly existent multiplicities do not exist. Kamalashīla says in the <u>Illumination of the Middle Way</u>:

> If the lack of unitary entity is established, it is only obvious that the lack of multiplicity is also

> established because a multiplicity is an entity which is a composite of ones.[66]

If there are no trees there can be no forest.[67]

In order to ascertain the other two modes of the sign, the forward pervasion—the existence of the sign only in the similar class—and the counter pervasion—the definite non-existence of the sign in the dissimilar class—three valid cognizers are needed:

1 a valid cognizer which ascertains the instance or entity[68] of the sign,
2 a valid cognizer which ascertains that the predicate of the probandum and the object of negation are a dichotomy,
3 a valid cognizer which refutes that there is a common locus of the sign and the object of negation.[69]

To ascertain the instance or entity of the sign in this context means to ascertain the lack of a truly existent unity or multiplicity. This was accomplished with the establishment of the reason as a property of the subject.

It can be ascertained that the predicate of the probandum—non-true existence—and the object of negation—true existence—are dichotomy by ascertaining that non-existence and existence are a dichotomy; there is nothing which both exists and does not exist. When non-existence is eliminated,

existence is implied and vice versa. It can then be inferred that non-true existence and true existence are a dichotomy.

The third valid cognizer, that which refutes the existence of a common locus of the sign—not being a truly existent unity or multiplicity—and the object of negation—true existence—is perhaps the most important because it is this valid cognizer which realizes that whatever is not truly one or many does not truly exist. If something did truly exist, it would have to exist as either truly one or many because one and many are mutually contradictory and a dichotomy.

In Tibetan textbooks on reasoning, two things are defined as contradictory if they are mutually discordant. In other words, for two things to be contradictory it must be observed that they are different and that there is nothing which is both of them. There are two types of contradictories, those which are mutually contradictory and those which are contradictory in the sense of not abiding together, the former being defined as that which does not abide together in the sense of exclusion and inclusion. Mutual contradictories are divided into two, direct contradictories or dichotomies and indirect contradictories. Dichotomies are defined as that which is both mutually and explicitly discordant.[70]

One and many are mutually contradictory in the sense that the inclusion of one excludes the other and vice versa.

Whatever is one is not many; if it is not many it must be one. Everything is either single or multiple, singular or plural; there is no third possibility. Shāntarakṣhita says in the Ornament for the Middle Way:

> Things which have an aspect
> Other than one or many
> Are not feasible because
> These two are a dichotomy.[71]

If one and many are a dichotomy such that one excludes the other and there is no third category, truly one and truly many are also such a dichotomy. Having ascertained that if something exists, it is either one or many, it can be easily inferred that if something truly exists, it is truly one or truly many. The existence of a common locus of the sign and object of negation is thereby refuted. That is, there is nothing which is not truly one or many and truly exists.

The valid cognizer which ascertains that one and truly many are a dichotomy in combination with the valid cognizer which ascertains the property of the subject establish the forward and counter pervasions. Dzong-ka-ba explains that:

> The valid cognizer which ascertains that being inherently the same and being inherently different are

> a dichotomy based on their being mutually contradictory ascertains the pervasion of the object of negation by the opposite of the sign. [This valid cognizer] in combination with the valid cognizer ascertaining the property of the subject ascertains the sign as opposite from the dissimilar class and the forward pervasion—the existence of the sign in only the similar class.[72]

The valid cognizer which ascertains that truly one and truly many are a dichotomy acts in combination with the valid cognizer which ascertains that the subject is neither truly one or truly many to establish the forward and counterpervasions because they ascertain that the sign—not being truly one or many—exists only in the similar class of that which is not truly existent does not exist in the dissimilar class of that which is truly existent.[73] That is, by knowing that truly one and truly many are a dichotomy in the sense that there is no third category and nothing can be both, and, in addition, ascertaining that the subject of the syllogism is not truly one or many, one can ascertain that not being truly one or many exists only in the class of that which does not truly exist—whatever is not truly one or many necessarily does not truly exist—and that not being truly one or many does not exist in the class of that which truly exists—whatever truly exists is necessarily either truly one

or truly many.

J̄ang-ḡya raises two important objections regarding the establishment of the pervasion in this syllogism. Someone might decide that the sign—not being truly one or many—exists in the dissimilar class of that which truly exists because true existence lacks being truly one or many.

J̄ang-ḡya answers that the mere fact that true existence is not truly one or many (because it does not exist) does not mean that the sign exists in the dissimilar class. Rather, there must exist a common locus or something which is a member of the dissimilar class and is also the sign, that is, there must exist something which both truly exists and is not truly one or many. Because no such thing exists, the sign does not exist in the dissimilar class.[74]

The second objection considered by J̄ang-ḡya is more complicated. When the valid cognizer ascertaining the pervasion realizes that whatever is not truly one or many is necessarily not truly existent, is it specifically realizing that each phenomenon which is not truly one or many does not truly exist? If so, it would be purposeless and redundant for the valid cognizer which subsequently realizes the thesis to ascertain that the subject does not truly exist because the valid cognizer ascertaining the property of the subject would already have realized that the subject is not truly one or many and the valid cognizer ascertaining the pervasion

would have realized that whatever is not truly one or many does not truly exist. In other words, the valid cognizer realizing the thesis would not be understanding anything new; it would merely be confirming what had already been established by the valid cognizer ascertaining the pervasion. If, on the other hand, it is asserted that the valid cognizer ascertaining the pervasion does not realize that all phenomena which are not truly one or many do not truly exist, this is also unsuitable because if it is ascertained that the generality of that which is not truly one or many does not truly exist, it must be asserted that it is ascertained that the particularities of the generality do not truly exist.[75]

Based on statements by D̄zong-ka-b̄a, Kay-drup, and Gyel-tsap, J̄ang-ḡya formulates the following response. The valid cognizer ascertaining the three modes of the signs in the syllogism, "The subject, a table, does not truly exist because of not being truly one or many," does not implicitly or explicitly realize that the table does not truly exist nor does it remove the misconceptions which conceive of the table as truly existent. Thus, it can be said that although the valid cognizer ascertaining the pervasion realizes that all instances of not being truly one or many do not truly exist, it does not realize this <u>specifically</u> in terms of the subject, a table. Rather, the valid cognizer which

ascertains the three modes of the sign sets the stage, as it were, for the realization of the thesis. Having ascertained the three modes, the mind is ready to ascertain the thesis immediately and without further cogitation. Although the valid cognizer ascertaining the three modes does not itself realize the thesis, it is capable of generating an awareness which realizes the thesis without the need for another intervening valid cognizer and without the need to state another reason. In other words, having ascertained the three modes of the sign, one needs merely to turn one's mind to the subject in order to realize the thesis.[76]

The classification of the sign in Shāntarakṣhita's syllogism may now be considered. It will be remembered that the first type of correct sign from among the sixfold division is that of correct signs by way of entity which are of three types: correct effect signs, correct nature signs, and correct signs of non-observation. Because the predicate of the probandum in Shāntarakṣhita's syllogism is a negative phenomenon, the sign falls into the last category. In that the object of negation of the predicate is not a supersensory object, the sign can be further classified as a correct non-observation sign which is a non-observation of that which is suitable to appear. Such signs are of two types: correct signs which are a non-observation of a related object suitable to appear and correct signs which are an observation of a

contradictory object suitable to appear. The sign of Bhāvaviveka's syllogism fell into the latter category; Shāntarakṣhita's falls into the former because being truly one or many is related to true existence and would be suitable to appear if true existence existed, but being truly one or many is not observed.

The definition of a correct sign which is a non-observation of a related object suitable to appear is that which is a common locus of (1) being a correct sign which is a non-observation of the suitable to appear and (2) being a non-affirming negative. Such signs are of four types: correct signs which are a non-observation of (1) a cause suitable to appear, (2) a pervader suitable to appear, (3) a nature suitable to appear, and (4) a direct effect suitable to appear.[77]

The meanings of names of the four types are evident when illustrations of each are considered. An illustration of the first, a correct sign which is a non-observation of a cause suitable to appear is, "With respect to the subject, on a lake at night, smoke does not exist because of the non-existence of fire." The cause of smoke—fire—is not observed. An illustration of a correct sign which is a non-observation of a pervader is "With respect to the subject, on a craggy cliff where trees are not observed by valid cognition, a pine tree does not exist because of the non-existence

of trees." The existence of trees pervades the existence of pine trees. An illustration of the third type, a correct sign which is a non-observation of a nature suitable to appear is, "With respect to the subject, on a place where pot is not observed by valid cognition, pot does not exist because of the non-observation of pot by valid cognition." The existence of pot and the observation of pot by valid cognition are of one nature. An illustration of the fourth type of correct sign which is a non-observation of the suitable to appear, that of a direct effect suitable to appear, is, "With respect to the subject, a walled circle devoid of smoke, the direct cause of smoke does not exist because of the non-existence of the direct effect, smoke."[78]

G̅e-luk-b̅a scholars have classified the reason of the lack of being truly one or many as either a correct sign which is a non-observation of a pervader suitable to appear, or as a correct sign which is a non-observation of a nature suitable to appear, or as both.[79] It would seem valuable to consider the reasoning as both in that each classification has potent implications for the refutation of true existence.

The illustration of a correct sign which is a non-observation of a pervader suitable to appear was "With respect to the subject, on a craggy cliff devoid of trees, a pine tree does not exist because trees to not exist." In this case, the generality tree was stated in the sign and the

particularity pine tree was stated in the predicate of the probandum. The generality, tree, pervades all of its particularities including the subclass of pine trees. Hence, the pervader is not observed, with, in this case, the pervader representing a wider class than the pervaded. However, in order to have a correct sign which is a non-observation of the pervader, it is not necessary that the pervader be the generality and the pervaded the particularity because pervasion also occurs with two coextensive categories. This is the case with the reason of the lack of being truly one or many where being truly one or many pervades true existence in that no third category of true existence could occur which was neither truly one or many. Therefore, the sign is a non-observation of a pervader, the non-observation of being truly one or many. D̄zong-ka-b̄a supports this classification when discussing Chandrakīrti's sevenfold reasoning his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path. He says, "Ascertainment is induced that the pervaded—inherent existence—does not pass beyond the pervader—the seven aspects such as same and different."[80] Classifying the reason of not being truly one or many as a correct sign of the non-observation of a pervader means that being truly one or many pervades all cases of true existence. This has obvious implications for the establishment of the forward and counter-pervasions but it also gives power to the

ascertainment of the property of the subject in which the subject is found not to be truly one or many. Such a classification thus provides conviction to the meditator or debater who is seeking to prove to himself or another that phenomena do not truly exist.

Because whatever truly exists is either truly one or many, it is also suitable to classify the reason—not being truly one or many—as a correct sign which is the non-observation of a nature. Being truly one or many is the very nature of true existence because there is no third category. Therefore, by refuting truly existent unity and multiplicity one can be confident that true existence has been refuted.

Ḡe-luk-b̄a scholars further classify the reason of the lack of being truly one or many according to the third of the original sixfold division of correct signs, that by way of the mode of proof. In this division, correct signs are analyzed according to whether the phenomenon being proved is an expression (usually a definiendum) or a meaning (usually a definition). Correct signs by way of the mode of proof are of five types: those proving the meaning, the expression, only the meaning, only the expression, and both the meaning and the expression.[81]

The reason of the lack of being truly one or many is classified by D̄zong-ka-b̄a as proving only the expression.[82] That is, the predicate of the probandum—non-true existence—

is a definiendum. Furthermore, the sign is proving only the expression or definiendum because the definition has already been ascertained.[83] That the sign proves only an expression is supported by Shāntarakṣhita who says in his autocommentary to the Ornament for the Middle Way, "The reason does not have a thesis in the meaning class because of proving the subjective consciousness, term, and expressions of the object being proved."[84]

When a person has ascertained the property of the subject—that the subject is not truly one or many—and who has ascertained the counter-pervasion—whatever truly exists is either truly one or many—there is no possibility that the person could think that even though the subject is not truly one or many, there is some third type of truly existent subject. In other words, having ascertained the three modes of the sign, the person has fully understood the meaning of non-true existence. The meaning of true existence is derived completely from the sign of not being truly one or many. The person need only turn his mind to the subject to understand that it does not truly exist. The proof of a verbal or mental expression of non-true existence depends entirely on the modes of the sign in terms of the subject.[85]

Thus, by categorizing the sign of not being truly one or many as a sign proving only an expression, Shāntarakṣhita indicates that not being truly one or many is the meaning of

non-true existence. Therefore, by ascertaining the three modes of the sign one gains full understanding of what it means to be empty of true existence. This is a further indication of the capacity which the Svātantrikas find in the reasoning consciousness.

Buddhist philosophical literature enumerates many different ways of dividing and categorizing phenomena. They may be divided into the conditioned (saṃskṛita) and the unconditioned (asaṃskṛita), into positive (vidhi) and negative (pratiṣhedha), into the contaminated (sāsrava) and uncontaminated (anāsrava), into the generally characterized (sāmānyalakṣhaṇa) and the specifically characterized (svalakṣhaṇa) (a category not accepted by the Prāsaṅgikas), into the permanent (nitya) and impermanent (anitya), and into the imaginary (parikalpita), the other-powered (paratantra), and thoroughly established (pariniṣhpanna). All of these categories are accepted by the Mādhyamikas, but the mode of division which they most emphasize is that of the two truths (satyadvaya). Nāgārjuna says in the twenty-fourth chapter of his Treatise on the Middle Way:

> Doctrines taught by the Buddhas
> Entirely depend on the two truths:
> Conventionally worldly truths
> And ultimate truths.
>
> Those who do not comprehend the differences
> Between these two truths
> Do not know the nature
> Of the Buddha's profound doctrine.[1]

Bhāvaviveka echoes Nāgārjuna in his Heart of the Middle Way:

> Relying wholly on the two truths
> The Buddha taught doctrine—
> Worldly conventional truths
> And ultimate truths.[2]

Shāntideva says in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharyāvatāra):

> The Subduer set forth all these branches
> For the purpose of wisdom.
> Therefore, those wishing to pacify sufferings
> Should generate wisdom.
>
> The conventional and the ultimate
> Are asserted as the two truths.[3]

That which is divided into the two truths is objects of knowledge (jñeya).[4] Although "existent" (sat) and "phenomenon" (dharma) are synonyms of "object of knowledge," they are not identified as the basis of division into the two truths in order to emphasize the fact that the two truths are objects which must be known in order to achieve liberation and Buddhahood.[5] It might be thought that "truth" is the basis of division of the two truths, but this is not the case because conventional truths are not truths, as will

be seen. Not only are objects of knowledge the basis of division of the two truths, all objects of knowledge are exhaustively included in the two truths; everything is either a conventional truth or an ultimate truth. This is clearly stated in the Meeting of the Father and Son Sutra (Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra) which says:

> It is thus: the Tathāgata comprehends the two [truths], conventional and ultimate. Furthermore, objects of knowledge are thoroughly exhausted in these conventional and ultimate truths.[6]

There is no third truth because, like one and many, the two truths are a dichotomy and mutually exclusive. Two things are a dichotomy if it can be said that something does not exist if it is not one or the other of them. A dichotomy includes all phenomena such that there is no third category, there is nothing which is both, and there is nothing which is neither.[7] Kamalashīla says in his Illumination of the Middle Way:

> Regarding phenomena which have the character of mutual abandonment, if [something] is refuted as one and is not established as the other, it does not exist. Therefore, even the conception of a class which is neither is infeasible. . . . Those which

> have the character of mutual abandonment pervade all aspects. Those which pervade all aspects eliminate another category, for instance, physical and non-physical, and so forth.[8]

The reason why the two truths are considered a dichotomy is that ultimate truths are truths whereas conventional truths are falsities, truths only for ignorance, as will be explored. If something is identified as a deceptive object, it is impossible that it also be a non-deceptive truth. If something is non-deceptive, it cannot also be a falsity. Therefore, deceptive object and non-deceptive object are mutually exclusive and a dichotomy; every phenomenon is either one or the other.[9] That there are only two truths and not a third is set forth in the sutra which says:

> The Knower of the World, without listening
> to others
> Taught by way of just these two truths.
> The conventional and likewise the ultimate.
> There is no third truth whatsoever.[10]

Ultimate truths (paramārtha-satya) are ultimate (paramārtha) or literally "highest objects" because they are the supreme object which can be known as well as because they are objects of the highest consciousness, the non-contaminated

meditative equipoise of a Superior. They are truths because they are non-deceptive in that they do not appear one way and exist another. Emptinesses exist in the way in which they appear to a mind directly realizing emptiness.[11]

The definition of an ultimate truth according to Jang-gya is an object found by a valid reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate.[12] The reasoning consciousness searching for an object's final nature finds the emptiness of true existence of that object. That emptiness is an ultimate truth. Another well-known definition of an ultimate truth is an object realized by a direct valid cognizer which directly realizes it in a manner of the vanishing of dualistic appearance.[13] When emptiness is directly realized on the path of seeing and above, all forms of dualistic appearance have disappeared.

This latter definition ostensibly presents problems for the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas who assert self-knowers (svasamvedana). The definition of a self-knowing direct perceiver is that which is non-conceptual, non-mistaken, and has the aspect of an apprehender.[14] Self-knowers are a specialized type of conscousness which perform the function of knowing other consciousnesses. The Sautrāntikas, Chittamātrins, and Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas assert self-knowers in order to account for the memory of the subjective aspect of experience. We are able to remember not only what we saw

in the past but our seeing of it. If a self-knower did not experience the consciousness apprehending the seen, memory of that consciousness would not be possible. In the example of an eye consciousness perceiving a patch of blue, the patch of blue is the apprehended (grāhaka), and the eye consciousness is the apprehender (grāhya). The eye consciousness sees the aspect (ākāra) and thus is said to have the aspect of the apprehended. The self-knower directly perceiving the eye consciousness apprehending blue experiences the apprehender and hence is defined as that which has the aspect of an apprehender.[15] When self-knowers experience consciousnesses, the appearance of all objects other than that consciousness vanishes. In this sense it can be said that an eye consciousness perceived by a self-knower valid cognizer is an object realized by a direct valid cognizer which directly realizes it in a manner of the vanishing of dualistic appearance, in which case an eye consciousness would fulfill the latter definition of an ultimate truth. To avoid this fault, the meaning of dualistic appearance must be explored further.

Three types of dualistic appearance are delineated:

1 the appearance as something different from the perceiver
2 the appearance of true existence
3 the appearance of conventionalities.[16]

In the case of a self-knower directly perceiving an eye consciousness, only the first type of dualistic appearance has vanished; the self-knower does not perceive the eye consciousness as if it were a separate entity. Since self-knowers are necessarily non-conceptual and the object of negation does not appear to sense consciousnesses according to the Svātantrikas, it can be speculated that the second type of dualistic appearance does not appear to a self-knower, although it would be misleading to go so far as to say that the appearance of dualistic appearance had vanished. A self-knower directly perceiving an eye consciousness has the third type of dualistic appearance because the eye consciousness is a conventionality; it is not an object found by a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate.

However, a consciousness directly realizing emptiness has none of the three types of dualistic appearance. Emptiness and the mind directly realizing it are indistinguishable for that consciousness, being mixed like pure water poured into pure water.[17] For such a consciousness, all elaborations of true existence have ceased, and so there is no appearance of true existence. There is also no appearance of conventionalities; only emptiness appears. Therefore, the latter definition of an ultimate truth is accurate within the understanding that the phrase "in a manner of the vanishing of dualistic appearance" is understood to include all forms of dualistic

appearance. Describing the wisdom realizing emptiness, Bhāvaviveka says in his <u>Essence of the Middle Way</u>:

> It establishes the negation
> Of all nets of conception,
> Is peaceful, individual knowledge,
> Non-conceptual, and without letters.
>
> It is free from sameness and difference
> And enters without [dualistic] entry
> Into reality, stainless like space.
> It is the wisdom which knows the ultimate.[18]

Despite the fact that emptinesses are the objects of ultimate consciousnesses, they do not ultimately exist. Emptinesses are ultimate truths because they are objects of ultimate consciousnesses and because they exist in the way that they appear. They do not ultimately exist in either of the senses of ultimate existence identified in Chapter Four. The form of ultimate existence identified by Bhāvaviveka takes a conceptual reasoning consciousness of hearing, thinking, or meditating which analyzes the final mode of being of phenomena as the ultimate. A phenomenon which is analyzed by such an ultimate consciousness and exists in the face of it, is able to withstand analysis by it, would ultimately exist. In this case, what is identified as the ultimate, the reasoning consciousness, exists but nothing

ultimately exists because nothing can bear analysis by such a reasoning consciousness. It can be said that emptiness exists for a reasoning conscousness in that it is the object found by a reasoning consciousness. However, because the emptiness of a particular phenomenon under investigation cannot itself bear analysis, it is not contradictory to say that emptiness exists for or in the face of an ultimate consciousness but does not ultimately exist.[19]

The second type of ultimate existence, identified by Kamalashīla, is the existence of an objective mode of subsistence which is not posited by the power of appearing to a non-defective awareness. Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den explains that whatever is established as ultimate in terms of this latter type of ultimate existence is necessarily established for the former because whatever existed by way of its objective mode of subsistence without being posited by the power of appearing to a non-defective consciousness would truly exist and thus would be found by a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate; if something ultimately existed, it would be its own mode of being and that mode of being would be found by a reasoning consciousness investigating the final mode of being of phenomena. Whatever is established for the former type of ultimate is not necessarily established for the latter, that is, whatever is established by or found by a reasoning consciousness does not necessarily ultimately exist because

emptiness—non-true existence—is found by a reasoning consciousness but, like all phenomena, is empty of ultimate existence.[20] Therefore, J̄ang-ḡya says that if this is understood, one can know that it is not contradictory to say on the one hand that nothing exists as its own mode of being or exists ultimately and to say on the other hand that emptiness exists, emptiness is the final mode of being, and emptiness is the ultimate.[21]

Ultimate truths can be divided in two ways: in terms of the bases which are empty and terminologically. In the first type of division, there are various enumerations of twenty-four emptinesses,[22] sixteen emptinesses, four emptinesses, and two emptinesses—the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of other phenomena.[23] A further terminological division of ultimates into subjective and objective ultimates is elaborated in the texts of the Svātantrika masters. Jñānagarbha says in his Two Truths:

> A non-deceptive reasoning
> [Consciousness] is called an ultimate.[24]

Kamalashīla says in his Illumination of the Middle Way:

> All consciousnesses arisen from correct hearing, thinking, and meditating are non-mistaken subjects whereby they are called "ultimate" due to being the ultimate among them [i.e., consciousnesses].[25]

Subjective ultimates are the consciousnesses realizing emptiness and objective ultimates are the objects of those consciousnesses. Subjective ultimates are of two types, actual and concordant. An actual subjective ultimate is a non-conceptual wisdom of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness. Such a consciousness is able to eliminate all elaborations of true existence and all types of dualistic appearance. A concordant subjective ultimate is a conceptual reasoning consciousness of hearing, thinking, or meditation realizing emptiness since it accords in aspect with an actual subjective ultimate. A conceptual consciousness realizing emptiness is able to stop the elaborations of true existence but realizes its object dualistically in the sense that the appearance of subject and object does not disappear as it does in the case of a direct realization. A reasoning consciousness which understands emptiness conceptually also has dualistic appearance in the sense that a conventionality appears to it, namely, the meaning-generality or generic image of emptiness; a conceptual reasoning consciousness understands emptiness which is its apprehended object (grahya) but its appearing object (*pratibhāsa-viṣhaya) is an image of emptiness which is a conventional truth.[26]

Objective ultimates, emptinesses, are also said to be of two types, actual and concordant. An actual objective ultimate is an emptiness which is realized in direct cognition

and thus is an object devoid of the elaborations of true existence and dualistic appearance. A concordant objective ultimate is also an emptiness but is called concordant because it is realized by a concordant subjective ultimate, a conceptual reasoning consciousness. Because such a consciousness is incapable of removing the elaborations of dualistic appearance, that emptiness is realized in a different way from that in which it would be realized by a non-conceptual wisdom of meditative equipoise. Thus, although the object, emptiness, remains the same, two types of objective ultimates are posited in terms of two types of consciousnesses realizing emptiness. Actual and concordant subjective ultimates are designated from the point of view of how they appear to two types of reasoning conscousnesses, non-conceptual and conceptual.[27]

It is important to note that although there are actual and concordant subjective ultimates and actual and concordant objective ultimates, only emptinesses of true existence are ultimate truths; all consciousnesses realizing emptiness are conventional truths.

There is some question as to whether the negative of truly existent production is an ultimate truth or a conventional truth. This must be considered in the context of the works in which it is stated that the non-existence of production ultimately is a conventionality. When Shāntarakṣhita

says in his autocommentary to his Ornament of the Middle Way that the negation of ultimate production is a real conventionality, he means by the term "negation" the reasoning consciousness which refutes ultimate production and the lack of ultimate production which that consciousness understands. When the reasoning consciousness and its object of comprehension are not differentiated, it can be said that the negation of ultimate production is a real conventionality. When subject and object are distinguished, the reasoning consciousness is a real conventionality and its object of comprehension, the non-existence of ultimate production, is an ultimate truth.[28]

When pseudo-Shāntarakṣhita[29] says in his Commentary to (Jñānagarbha's) "Two Truths", "When [emptiness] is analyzed by reasoning, it is just a conventionality,"[30] he means that the emptiness which is the negation of a self of phenomena does not ultimately exist; it, like all phenomena, exists conventionally. He is not asserting that emptiness is a conventional truth.[31]

Finally, that same text refers to the negation of real or ultimate production which appears to the sense consciousnesses. As discussed in an earlier chapter, the Svātantrikas assert that the object of negation does not appear to sense direct perceivers. Jñānagarbha says in the autocommentary to his Two Truths, "Real production and so forth do not

appear."[32] This means that the lack of real or ultimate production appears to sense consciousnesses that directly perceive their objects, such as forms, which lack ultimate production. Thus, the Svātantrikas assert that an eye consciousness directly perceiving a form apprehends all of the qualities which are the same substantial entity as the form, and therefore, the negative of truly existent production which is a quality of that form appears to the eye consciousness. This negation of truly existent production is an affirming negative (paryudāsa-pratiṣhedha) and is not an emptiness, which is necessarily a non-affirming negative (prasajya-pratiṣhedha). Because this affirming negative negates real production, it is a concordant ultimate but because it appears to the sense direct perceivers of common beings and is not a non-affirming negative, it is a conventional truth.[33]

A more difficult question is whether the selflessness of persons (pudgalanairātmya) is an ultimate truth or a conventional truth. It is the position of Kay-drup that the selflessness of persons is not an ultimate truth.[34] If an ultimate truth is defined as an object realized by a direct valid cognizer which directly realizes it in a manner of the vanishing of dualistic appearance, then all three types of dualistic appearance—the appearance of the object as different, the appearance of true existence, and the appearance of

conventionalities—must not appear to a direct perceiver of an ultimate truth. Unlike the Prāsaṅgikas, who assert that there is no difference in subtlety between the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena and that Hīnayānists realize both, the Svātantrikas assert that the selflessness of persons is more easily understood than the selflessness of phenomena and that Hearers only realize the selflessness of persons—the persons lack of being substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency. This selflessness of the person is realized in terms of the four noble truths: true sufferings, true origins, true cessations, and true paths. Each of the four truths has four attributes, with those of true sufferings being impermanence, misery, emptiness, and selflessness. The four aspects of true origins are cause, origin, strong production, and condition and the four aspects of true cessations are cessation, pacification, auspiciousness, and definite emergence. The attributes of the last of the four truths, true paths, are path, knowledge, achievement, and deliverance.[35] On the path of seeing, Hearers directly realize that the four truths are empty of a self-sufficient person.[36] It should be noted that the object of the Hearer's wisdom is only selflessness and not the four truths because an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise of a Hearer's path of seeing is defined a Hearer's manifest realizer of the truth which is in

one-pointed equipoise on the subtle selflessness of the person which is its object.[37] This direct realization of the selflessness of persons may occur in the smallest unit of time in which an object can be accomplished.[38]

Based on the fact that Hearers realize the selflessness of persons in terms of the four truths, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a argues in support of Kay-drup's contention that the selflessness of persons is not an ultimate truth. Taking an object realized in a manner of the vanishing of dualistic appearance by the direct valid cognizer which directly realizes it as the definition of an ultimate truth, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a concedes that the uninterrupted path of a Hearer's path of seeing is a wisdom of meditative equipoise in which subject and object are mixed like poured into water, that is, there is no dualistic appearance of difference. He argues, however, that the third type of dualistic appearance, the appearance of conventionalities is present because Hearers understand the selflessness of persons in terms of the sixteen aspects of the four truths, which are conventionalities. (There is some question as to whether true cessations are ultimate truths in this system, as will be discussed.) He cites two sutras for support, one which explains that an observable perfection of wisdom is one which involves duality and another which states that practices of the sixteen aspects of the four truths involve observation and therefore

are facsimile perfections of wisdom and that in order to practice a real or natural perfection of wisdom, one must take the unobservable emptiness as the object. The sutra states:

> This is a facsimile perfection of wisdom; they are taught, "Form is impermanent." Similarly, they are taught, "[Form is] miserable, selfless, and impure." . . . If it is asked what are not facsimile perfections of wisdom, those taught in this way: Come here, child of good lineage. Cultivate the perfection of wisdom; do not view [all phenomena] from forms to knowers of all aspects (sarvākārajnatā) as miserable, selfless, or ugly. Why? Form is empty of the entityness of form. That which is the entityness of form does not [truly] exist. That which does not [truly] exist is the perfection of wisdom.[39]

Thus, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a concludes that because the Hearer's realization of the selflessness of persons involves the sixteen aspects of the four truths, the Hearer realization entails the observation of conventionalities. Because the appearance of conventionalities does not vanish on the Hearer's path of seeing, dualistic appearance has not disappeared. Hence, the selflessness of persons as cognized by Hearers is not an ultimate truth.[40]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a makes this argument in the first chapter of his textbook on Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayālaṃkāra). In the third chapter of the same text he seems to contradict his position that the selflessness of persons is not an ultimate truth when he says that both the selflessness of phenomena and the selflessness of persons are asserted to be suchnesses (tathatā). He writes that, "Although Hearer and Solitary Realizer Superiors do not realize the selflessness of phenomena, it is asserted that they realize suchness and the emptiness which is the selflessness of persons."[41] Since he asserts that the selflessness of persons is an emptiness and a type of suchness, it would seem that it must also be an ultimate truth. He writes:

> There is no difference in the two selflessnesses in the sphere of reality (dharmadhātu), which is like the sky. However, since there are three different modes of realization, three lineages [that of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattva] are posited. For example, the sky is differentiated into the path of birds, the path of the wind, and the path of the sun.[42]

There is ample support, both from the statements of the Indian Svātantrika masters as well as from D̄zong-ka-b̄a, to support the assertion that the selflessness of persons is

an ultimate truth. Kamalashīla says in his Illumination of the Middle Way:

> The suchnesses which have the character of the selflessness of phenomena and persons, because of possessing reason, are highest (parama). They are also objects (artha) because they are the objects sought for the purpose of realization by those who seek to abandon the obstructions (avaraṇa). Also, they are the meanings, that is, the objects of the unmistaken highest exalted wisdom. Thus, [for these two reasons] they are called the highest objects [or ultimates] (paramārtha).[43]

D̄zong-ka-b̄a says in his Golden Rosary of Good Explanations (Legs bshad gser 'phreng), "The two emptinesses—the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena—are explained in the sixteen emptinesses."[44] It is thus clear that according to Kamalashīla, D̄zong-ka-b̄a, and Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a the selflessness of persons is an emptiness. The question can be raised, however, as to whether it is possible for the selflessness of persons to be an emptiness and not be an ultimate truth. This question seems to be settled by D̄zong-ka-b̄a in a discussion of Svātantrika in his commentary on Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way:

> Therefore, the selflessness of the phenomena of the aggregates and the selflessness of persons—these being the mere elimination of elaborations which are the objects of reasoned negation—are the objects found by the uncontaminated exalted wisdom knowing the mode [of being]. Even elaborations of dualistic appearance of persons and the aggregates are pacified in the face of that [wisdom]. Hence, they are ultimate truths.[45]

D̄zong-ka-b̄a thus concludes that the selflessness of persons is an ultimate truth in the sense that it is an object of a Buddha's omniscient consciousness which knows the final mode of being of phenomena. Because that exalted wisdom is, in terms of its realization of the ultimate, non-dual in all ways in that there is no appearance of the object as different, true existence, or conventionalities to it, the selflessness of phenomena, which is an object of that exalted wisdom, cannot be a conventional truth. However, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's argument that the selflessness of persons is not an ultimate truth was cast in terms of how it is realized by a Hearer on the path of seeing, not in terms of a Buddha's omniscient consciousness. Although both positions are persuasive, it seems that those who assert that the selflessness of persons is not an ultimate truth remain obliged to demonstrate in what way the four noble truths are involved in a Hearer's momentary

cognition of the mere vacuity of a self of persons.

Lo-sang-gön-jok (bLo-bzang-dkon-mchog) argues that Bhāvaviveka explains that the subtle selflessness of the person which is the lack of being substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency is an emptiness but does not assert that it is an ultimate truth. If it were an ultimate truth, it would have to be definitive, but the selflessness of the person must be interpreted otherwise; the final mode of being of the person is not its emptiness of being substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency, but its emptiness of true existence. When Bhāvaviveka debates with lower systems about ultimate existence, he identifies that which is established for a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate as the object of negation, he does not identify a substantially existent person. Bhāvaviveka also freely admits that the selflessness of persons is not the final mode of being when he says that Hearers do not realize the final mode of being but abandon the afflictive emotions, implying with his example of the coiled vine that one can be mistaken about the nature of reality and still be liberated. One is still faced with the statement from Kamalashīla which refers to "the suchnesses which have the character of the selflessness of phenomena and persons," but the selflessness of the person in this context may be taken as referring to the emptiness of true existence of the person

and not to the emptiness of substantial existence.[46]

The path of seeing, whether of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, or Bodhisattvas, can generally be divided into two parts: exalted wisdoms of meditative equipoise (samāhitajñāna) and exalted wisdoms subsequent to meditative equipoise (prịṣhṭalabdha-jñāna). Exalted wisdoms of meditative equipoise are further divided into uninterrupted paths (ānantaryamārga) and paths of release (vimuktimārga). The definition of an uninterrupted path of a Mahāyāna path of seeing is a Mahāyāna clear realizer of the truth that serves as an actual antidote to the artificial conception of true existence which is its corresponding object of abandonment.[47] That is, an uninterrupted path on this level is the wisdom consciousness directly realizing emptiness which destroys the artificial conception of true existence. The uninterrupted path is followed immediately by the path of release which is the state of having abandoned the artificial conception of true existence.[48] Thus, the artificial conception of true existence is actually abandoned by the uninterrupted path; the path of release is state of having abandoned that artificial conception. The second follows directly upon the first, and the two may take place in two of the smallest units of time in which an action can be performed. The object of the Bodhisattva's uninterrupted path is emptiness, the mere absence of true existence. The path of release, as a division

of meditative equipoise, also directly realizes emptiness, but also has as its object a true cessation, the mere absence of the conception of true existence. Are true cessations ultimate truths? Pan-chen S̄ö-nam-drak-b̄a (Pan-chen bSod-nams-grags-pa, 1478-1554), the author of the textbook literature of L̄o-s̄el-l̄ing (bLo-gsal-gling) and Gan-den (dGa'-ldan) colleges, argues that in the Svātantrika system, true cessations are not ultimate truths because they are not emptinesses. His rationale is: The object of negation of an emptiness must necessarily not exist. For example, the object of negation of the emptiness of true existence is true existence, which is utterly non-existent. However, although a true cessation is a non-affirming negative, it is not an ultimate truth because its object of negation—the conception of true existence—exists among objects of knowledge because it is a consciousness.[49]

Kay-drup presents the majority position among Ḡe-luk-b̄a scholars, arguing that true cessations are ultimate truths. The path of release is a consciousness which actualizes the state of having abandoned the respective afflictions, and to actualize the cessation means that the path of release directly realizes that cessation. For Kay-drup, whatever is directly realized by an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise must be an ultimate truth. It would be inappropriate for the object of the two parts of the exalted wisdom of

meditative equipoise to change from an ultimate truth to a conventional truth.[50]

Conventional truths are all objects of knowledge other than emptinesses. To explain the meaning of the term samvṛiti, Kamalashīla cites a passage from the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra:

> The production of things [exists] conventionally;
> Ultimately it is without inherent existence.
> That which is mistaken about what does not inherently exist
> Is asserted to be a concealer (saṃvṛiti) of reality.[51]

A conventional truth (saṃvṛiti-satya) is a truth for a concealer. The concealer is an ignorant consciousness which misapprehends the nature of phenomena. Kamalashīla says in his Illumination of the Middle Way:

> An awareness which mistakenly superimposes the opposite onto things which are in reality without entityness is called concealing (saṃvṛiti) because it is obstructed or covered from suchness or [because] it makes suchness obstructed or covered.[52]

Thus, a concealer is a conscousness which obstructs the understanding of reality and which is itself obstructed from realizing the nature of phenomena. Jñānagarbha's Two Truths says:

> That by which or which is
> Obstructed from the real is asserted to be
> a concealer.
> Thus, all of these are truths;
> They are not truths which are objects of the
> highest [consciousness].[53]

Thus, conventional truths are not truths in the sense that ultimate truths are. Ultimate truths, emptinesses, are truths because they exist in the way in which they appear to a wisdom consciousness. Conventional truths are truths only for a concealer (samantādvaraṇa). They are displayed by the conception of true existence as ultimately existent to ignorant conceptual consciousnesses. These consciousnesses conceive phenomena to exist truly, to exist in the way in which they are displayed by the conception of true existence. In this way, phenomena which appear to exist truly are truths only for ignorance, they do not in fact exist in the way they appear.

Phenomena other than emptinesses do, however, validly exist as is indicated by two other etymologies of saṃvṛiti.

When the Descent into Laṅkā Sutra says above that "The production of things [exists] conventionally," saṃvṛiti does not mean that production exists only for ignorance; rather it means that production exists for worldly convention and interdependently.

In general, there are three meanings of the saṃvṛiti of saṃvṛiti-satya. The first is the ignorant consciousness for which truths for a concealer are true. The second meaning of saṃvṛiti refers to objects which are mutually interdependent (parasparasaṃbhavana). In this sense, one may say that emptiness exists conventionally because emptiness is a dependent arising. T. R. V. Murti correctly identifies this meaning of saṃvṛiti but misunderstands its meaning. He writes:

> It may also mean the mutual dependence of things—their relativity. In this sense it is equated with phenomena, and is in direct contrast with the absolute which is by itself, unrelated.[54]

Here, Murti implies that emptiness—reality—is not a phenomenon (dharma) and that it is unrelated to anything else, that is, is not a dependent arising. In that case emptiness itself would truly exist whereas it is the position of the Mādhyamikas—Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika—that emptiness itself is empty. The third meaning of saṃvṛiti

is "conventions of the world" (loka-vyavahāra).[55] It is this meaning of the term that is used to translate saṃvṛiti-satya as conventional truth, although truth for a concealer is a more evocative translation.

J̄ang-ḡya defines a conventional truth as an object found by a conventional valid cognizer,[56] that is, an object found by a direct perceiver or inferential cognizer which is not affected by an internal or external cause of error. Thus, non-existents such as the horns of a rabbit are not conventional truths because they are not objects of valid cognizers. Emptinesses also are not conventional truths because they are objects only of ultimate consciousnesses: exalted wisdomes of meditative equipoise and reasoning consciousnesses of hearing, thinking, or meditation analyzing the ultimate.

There are two types of conventional truths, real conventional truths (tathyasaṃvṛiti-satya) and unreal conventional truths (mityāsaṃvṛiti-satya). J̄ang-ḡya defines a real conventional truth as a phenomenon that is an object found by a conventional valid cognizer which is able to perform a function in accordance with its appearance to the awareness perceiving it. He defines an unreal conventional truth as an object found by a conventional valid cognizer which is not able to perform a function in accordance with how it appears to the awareness perceiving it. J̄ang-ḡya has clearly based his definitions on this passage from Jñānagarbha's

Differentiation of the Two Truths:

> Since they are able and unable
> To perform functions as they appear,
> The division of real and unreal
> Conventionalities is made.[57]

J̄ang-ḡya notes that it would be incorrect to define a real conventional truth merely as that which is able to perform a function in accordance with its mode of appearance and an unreal conventional truth as that which is unable to do such because the definition must fully convey the meaning of the definiendum. In that case, anyone who established that a particular phenomenon performs a function as it appears would have established for himself the meaning of what it is to be a real conventional truth. However, to establish with valid cognition that something is a conventionality implies that one has previously understood that it does not truly exist; one must refute the true existence of an object before understanding what it means for that phenomenon to be a conventional truth, a truth only for an ignorant consciousness under the influence of the conception of true existence. Therefore, it would absurdly be the case that anyone who understood that a particular object performs a function as it appears would have already understood the emptiness of true existence because that person has understood the meaning

of real conventional truth.[58]

However, there are also problems with the definition of real and unreal conventional truths provided by J̄ang-ḡya, as Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den points out. He argues that the passage cited above from the Two Truths is not intended to provide definitions of the two types of conventional truths but merely to provide illustrations. Water is a real conventional truth because it appears to be able to perform the function of being drinkable and is. A mirage is an unreal conventional truth because it appears to be water but is not. It would be unsuitable, however, to define the two types of conventional truths in terms of their ability or inability to perform functions because in that case unconditioned space would be an unreal conventional truth because it is permanent and thereby unable to perform a function.[59]

It is also important to distinguish between unreal conventionalities and unreal conventional truths. Jñānagarbha says in his Two Truths:

> Those mere things which lack being imputed
> objects
> And [which are] dependently produced
> Should be known as real conventionalities.
> Those which are not real are imputations.[60]

His autocommentary to the stanza says:

> Imputed objects are real production and so forth, the appearance of consciousness [as external objects as asserted by the Chittamātrins], the principal (<u>pradhāna</u>) [asserted by the Sāṃkhyas, the mind] which is an evolute of the elements [asserted by the Charvākas], and so forth. [Real conventionalities] are devoid of [being] those because that which is a mere thing is able to perform a function in the way in which it appears. That which is produced in dependence on causes and conditions should be known as a real conventional truth. For, whatever appears from causes commonly to the consciousnesses of children and above is suitable to be a real conventionality because things abide in accordance with [their] appearance to consciousness.[61]

In addition to its explanation of real and unreal conventionalities, this passage is significant because the last sentence provides further evidence that the Svātantrikas assert that things exist in the way that they appear to sense consciousnesses, that the existence by way of the object's own character which appears to the senses is the conventional mode of being of phenomena, and that the object of negation—true existence—does not appear to the sense consciousnesses. However, returning to the discussion of the

two types of conventional truths, Jñānagarbha in the passage above identifies real production, the principal, and so forth as imputations. These, like the horns of a rabbit, the son of a barren woman, a self of persons, and a self of phenomena are not unreal conventional truths because they do not exist, they are merely unreal conventionalities. Examples of unreal conventional truths would be the reflection of a face in the mirror which appears to an eye consciousness to be a real face but is not and the apprehended or appearing object of a thought consciousness—the meaning-generality or generic image of an object which appears to thought to be the actual object but in fact is the appearance as non-non-object.[62]

Forms, sounds, odors, tastes, objects of touch, the emptiness of true existence which appears to sense consciousnesses and unconditioned space are all real conventionalities. Whatever is a real conventionality is necessarily a real conventional truth.[63]

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den, in his Annotations to Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's Great Exposition of Tenets offers more refined definitions of real and unreal conventionalities. In fact, he provides two sets of definitions, one for the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas and one for the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas. For the former, the definition of a real conventionality is a phenomenon which is renowned in the world

to be a perverse object in terms of how it appears to the conventional consciousness which clearly perceives it. An example is a mirage.

For the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas, the definition of a real conventionality is an object which appears to the conventional consciousness which clearly perceives it and is renowned in the world to be a non-perverse object. An unreal conventionality is defined as an object which appears to a conventional consciousness which clearly perceives it and which is posited by way of being renowned in the world to be a perverse object. The Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas must eliminate the qualification that a real conventionality is an object which exists in the way that it appears to the consciousness perceiving it and the qualification that an unreal conventionality does not exist that way because they assert that external objects—objects which are a different entity from the consciousnesses perceiving them—do not exist. Therefore, for them, no sense object exists in the way that it appears to a sense consciousness. If they maintained that an object must accord with how it appears to the conventional consciousness perceiving it, no form, sound, odor, taste, or object of touch could be a real conventionality because the Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas assert that these objects appear to exist as entities separate from consciousness but do not exist that way. However, because the Sautrāntika-

Svātantrikas assert that external objects exist, they are able to hold that a real conventionality must exist in the way in which it appears to the conventional consciousness to which it appears.[64]

Both sets of definitions mention that the object is "renowned in the world." This does not mean that the object must be known to ordinary beings, otherwise, objects which are inaccessible to direct perception by sentient beings, such as the subtle cause and effect of actions, would be neither real nor unreal conventionalities because they would not be renowned in the world as either perverse or non-perverse objects. Rather, to be "renowned in the world" merely means to be established by a valid cognizer which does not analyze the ultimate.[65]

In the Svātantrika system, only objects are classified as real or unreal conventional truths; all consciousnesses are real conventional truths because they appear to exist by way of their own character and thus, for the Svātantrikas, exist in the way in which they appear.[66]

The fact that the Svātantrikas assert that phenomena are established by way of their own character allows them to define real and unreal conventionalities in terms of whether they exist or do not exist in the way that they appear to consciousnesses. If they did not assert that phenomena are established by way of their own character, they could not

hold, for example, that water is a real conventionality because it can perform the functions that it appears to be able to while a mirage is an unreal conventionality because it cannot perform those functions; water would also have to be an unreal conventionality because it appears to be established by way of its own character but is not.[67]

The Prāsaṅgika presentation of real and unreal conventionalities is very different. The Prāsaṅgikas assert that no conventional phenomenon is established in the way in which it appears and that all conventional consciousnesses are mistaken consciousnesses in that they are mistaken with respect to their appearing objects; objects appear to them to be inherently existent. Therefore, the Prāsaṅgikas do not distinguish between real and unreal conventionalities. For a reasoning consciousness, real conventionalities do not exist because such a consciousness ascertains that real establishment does not exist; in terms of the mode of analysis by a reasoning consciousness, all phenomena are established as falsities. Thus, they cannot differentiate real and unreal conventionalities, as the Svātantrikas do, in terms of whether or not objects exist in the way in which they appear to the consciousnesses perceiving them because all objects appear falsely to the sense consciousnesses of common beings; no sense object exists in the way in which it appears. However, within this false appearance, the Prāsaṅgikas

distinguish real and unreal conventionalities. Chandrakīrti says in his <u>Supplement to the Middle Way</u> (VI.24-25):

> Two aspects of perceivers of the false also
> are asserted:
> [Those with] clear senses and faulty senses.
> Consciousnesses having faulty senses
> Are asserted to be unreal relative to con-
> sciousnesses having good senses.
>
> Objects realized by the world and apprehended
> By the six non-defective senses are true from
> only
> A worldly point of view, the rest are presented
> As unreal from the viewpoint of only the world.[68]

In terms of conventional valid cognizers, subjects which perceive the false—truths for a concealer—are of two types, real subjects and false subjects. The six consciousnesses which depend on the six senses and are not affected by the superficial causes of error are real subjects. The six consciousnesses which depend on the six senses affected by the superificial causes of error are unreal subjects. They are asserted to be real and unreal in relation to each other. The objects of those consciousnesses are also posited as real and unreal. An object of one of the six consciousnesses which has not been damaged by a superficial cause of error is

a real conventionality relative to the sphere of conventional valid cognizers. An object of one of the six consciousnesses which has been affected by a superficial cause of error is an unreal conventionality relative to the sphere of conventional valid cognizers. Thus, the Prāsaṅgikas hold that there are no real conventionalities as understood by the Svātantrikas, but in order to conform with the world, they concede the categories of real and unreal in terms of conventional usage. Water is real, a mirage is not. However, because the Prāsaṅgikas are merely reflecting ordinary experience, such things as a self of persons which is utterly non-existent but which is also accepted by the world to be true is classed as a real conventionality, whereas for the Svātantrikas it is necessarily an unreal conventionality because it does not exist.

The Svātantrika division into real and unreal conventionalities is based on their assertion that phenomena are established by way of their own character. The fact that the Prāsaṅgikas do not make such a distinction even conventionally is based on their rejection and refutation of existence by way of the object's own character. For the Prāsaṅgikas, when forms and so forth are designated as real, that reality is damaged by the reasoning consciousness realizing the emptiness of forms and so forth; there are no real conventionalities for a reasoning consciousness. Thus,

the Prāsaṅgikas do not distinguish between real and unreal in terms of a reasoning consciousness; for them, it is only suitable to make such a distinction in terms of a conventional consciousness. For a reasoning consciousness, there is no difference in truth or falsity between an illusory horse and a real horse; both are false in that they appear to exist truly to the consciousness perceiving them but do not. It is, however, suitable to use the convention "truth" for the real horse and "falsity" for the illusory horse in terms of conventional consciousnesses.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den provides a story illustrating the Prāsaṅgika position. Two villagers went to a temple to look at the paintings of deities on the walls. One of the villagers said, "The deity with the trident in his hand is Narayana and the one with a wheel in his hand is Maheshvara." The other villager said that it was the other way around and they began to argue. They asked a wandering holy man nearby to settle their dispute. The mendicant knew that the paintings were not the real deities, and thus, from that perspective, there was no difference in the truth or falsity of the villagers' claims. However, he also knew that in conformity with their minds, he could say that one was right and the wrong, thereby fulfilling their wish to know without having told a lie.

Thus, when the Prāsaṅgikas say that in the Mādhyamikas'

own system, real and unreal conventionalities are not asserted despite their asserting that there is a difference of real and unreal in terms of a worldly consciousness, the meanings of "real" in those two contexts are very different. The first refers to existence by way of object's own character. The second refers to an object which is suitable to be called "true" in terms of ordinary worldly thought.[69]

Finally, the relationship of the two truths bears consideration. It is the position of the Mādhyamikas—both the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas—that the two truths are neither exactly the same nor completely different.

Four reasonings which refute the position that the two truths are different entities are set forth in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought. If conventional truths and ultimate truths were different entities, then the reasoning consciousness realizing the final mode of being of an object could not eliminate an ignorant consciousness conceiving that object to be truly existent because the final nature of the object—an ultimate truth—and the object itself—a conventional truth—would be different entities such that the emptiness of the object could not be the final mode of being of the object itself. In other words, understanding the final nature of the object—its emptiness—would have nothing to do with understanding the object itself, whereby it would be possible to understand the object's final nature while

conceiving the object to be truly existent. It would thus be impossible to overcome the conception of true existence and highest enlightenment would be impossible. The *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* says:

> If the nature of conditioned things and the nature of the ultimate were different, then even those who see the truth would not be free from the signs of [the true existence of] conditioned things. Due to not being free from the signs of conditioned things, seeing the truth would not release them from the bonds of signs. If they were not released from the bonds of signs, they would not be released from the bonds of assuming bad states. If they were not released from those two bonds, those who see the truth also would not achieve the nirvana which is the unsurpassed establishment of bliss. They would also not become completely purified in the unsurpassed perfect complete enlightenment.[70]

The second consequence of the two truths being different entities is that an object's emptiness of true existence would not be the object's final mode of being; the emptiness would be one thing and the final mode of being of the object would be another, just as a pot is not the mode of being of a piece of cloth. The sutra says:

> Also, if the natures of conditioned things and the nature of the ultimate were different, then the nature of the ultimate would not be the general nature of all conditioned natures.[71]

An elaboration of the first two consequences is the third consequence that if the two truths were different entities, then the mere elimination of true existence with respect to the object would not be the reality of the object because the absence of true existence—an ultimate truth—and the reality of the object would be unrelated. The sutra says:

> If the natures of conditioned things and the nature of the ultimate were different, then the mere selflessness and entitynessless of conditioned things would not be the ultimate nature.[72]

Finally, the fourth consequence of the two truths being different entities is that the conception of true existence and the wisdom realizing non-true existence would exist simultaneously in the mental continuum of a Buddha because realizing the emptiness of true existence of phenomena would in no way have eliminated the conception of those objects as truly existent. Thus, a Buddha would have both wisdom consciousnesses and ignorant consciousnesses. The sutra says:

> Also, thoroughly afflicted natures and very pure natures would be established as different natures at the same time [in the continuum of a Buddha].[73]

All four of these consequences are intended to suggest that the two truths are not different entities. If they are not different entities, are they exactly the same? The Sutra Unravelling the Thought puts forth four more consequences which would be entailed if the ultimate truths and conventional truths were exactly the same.

If an object and its final nature, its emptiness of true existence were exactly the same, then anyone who perceived the object would perceive emptiness; directly perceiving a tree would be a direct cognition of emptiness. Thus, everyone would be liberated from cyclic existence. The sutra says:

> If the natures of conditioned things and the nature of the ultimate were not different, then all childish common beings would see the truth. As only common beings, they would attain the nirvana which is unsurpassed enlightenment and bliss. They would become completely purified in the unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment.[74]

Second, if the two truths were exactly the same, it would follow that ultimate truths would be the objects of

afflictive emotions such as desire and hatred. Pleasant forms, for example, are often objects of desire, and if the emptiness of that form were exactly the same as the form, the emptiness would also be an object of desire in which case the observation of emptiness would not be an antidote to suffering but a cause of suffering. The sutra says:

> If the natures of conditioned things and the nature of the ultimate were not different, then just as the natures of conditioned things are included in thoroughly afflicted natures, the nature of the ultimate would also be included in thoroughly afflicted natures.[75]

The third consequence of the two truths being exactly the same is that the different varieties of conventionalities would not exist because there are not different types of emptinesses; since all ultimate truths are similar, conventional truths would also have to be similar. The sutra says:

> If the natures of conditioned things and the nature of the ultimate were not different, then just as the nature of the ultimate is without particularities in all conditioned things, so all natures of conditioned things would be without particularities.[76]

Finally, a corollary of the first consequence is the fourth consequence that if the two truths were not different it would be unnecessary to seek the truth; there would be no truth beyond what appears to the senses. The sutra says:

> Yogis would not seek an ultimate higher than how conditioned things are seen, how they are heard, how they are differentiated, and how they are known.[77]

Thus, the sutra presents four absurd consequences which would be entailed if the two truths were different and four absurd consequences which would be entailed if the two truths were not different. Gyel-tsap notes that all eight of these are consequences which imply the opposite. Thus, the first four imply that the two truths are not different and the last imply that they are different. Is this one of the so-called "paradoxes" which allegedly abound in Buddhist literature, leaving us exactly where we started? The sutra has explained why the two truths must be the same and why they cannot be exactly the same. According to the Ḡe-luk-b̄as, the relationship of the two truths is one of being the same entity but different reverses.[78] The two truths are the same entity in that an ultimate truth, the emptiness of true existence, is the final nature of the object which is empty. At the same time, a phenomenon and its emptiness are

different reverses; non-non-conventional truth is different from non-non-ultimate truth. That is, they are different for thought; one can appear without the other appearing. They are the same entity but are different in that they are not exactly the same. According to another description, there difference is a negation of oneness (<u>gcig bkag ba'i tha dad</u>).[79] There is a mode of being beyond the appearance of conventional truths, and that mode of being is, for the Mādhyamikas, the final nature of reality which when understood brings an end to suffering. That the two truths are the same entity means that reality is present as the very nature of the objects of ordinary experience.

An Overview of the Svātantrika System

This chapter will present a summary of the essential positions of the Svātantrika school as perceived by the author of the best known Tibetan tenet text, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a. The root text of his Great Exposition of Tenets (Grub mtha' chen mo) presents in poetry the systems of Indian philosophy, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. He then expands on the stanzas in the body of the text, providing copious quotations from primary materials to support his presentation. There are two excellent commentaries to the root text of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's Tenets, one by the Mongolian scholar Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (Ngag-dbang-dbal-ldan)[1] and the other by the Amdo scholar L̄o-sang-ḡön-chok (bLo-bzang-dkon-mchog).[2] Their commentaries to the Svātantrika chapter of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's Tenets provide the basis of this chapter. Most of the points discussed have been considered in detail in the preceding chapters. Others, such as Bhāvaviveka's refutation of Chittamātra, are dealt with at length in the translation of J̄ang-ḡya's Tenets that follows. Still others, such as the interpretation of scripture and the structure of the path to enlightenment, which are considered topics unto themselves in the Ḡe-luk-b̄a curriculum, are touched on in the translation section and will be discussed briefly here but must await further studies for their full exposition.

THE MEANING OF SVĀTANTRIKA

An autonomous sign (*svatantra-liṅga), a sign which is established by way of its own power (*svairīsiddha-liṅga), and a sign which is established from its own side (*svarūpa-siddha-liṅga) are synonyms. A Svātantrika is a Mādhyamika who asserts that signs proving the probandum (sādhya) are stated from the viewpoint of the three modes—the property of the position (pakṣhadharma), the forward pervasion (anvayavyāpti), and the counterpervasion (vyatirekavyāpti)—and the subject (dharmin) which are established by way of their own power as they commonly appear to the awareness of the two parties in the debate.[3]

DIVISIONS OF SVĀTANTRIKA

Svātantrika is divided into two: Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika and Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. The former prove the existence of external objects and the latter refute the existence of external objects.[4]

SAUTRĀNTIKA-SVĀTANTRIKA

The Three Natures

The Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas assert that the three natures

(*trisvabhāva*) are established by way of their own character. However, they assert that impermanent things which are the bases of the emptiness of true existence are other-powered natures (*paratantra-svabhāva*) because they are not produced by their own power but are produced by the power of other causes and conditions. The factor of true existence which is imputed to other-powered natures is an imaginary nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*) because it is merely a superimposition (*āropa*). Other-powered natures' emptiness of the imputed true existence it the thoroughly established nature (*parinishpanna-svabhāva*) because it is the final mode of being. Each of the three natures lacks entityness (*svabhavatā*). Impermanent things which are the bases of emptiness are produced from others and are not produced by their own power ultimately. Thus, other-powered natures lack the entityness of production. The factor which is the imputation of true establishment to forms and so forth is a superimposition which is not the actual mode of being of those phenomena and is a character which is ultimately thoroughly imagined. Therefore, imaginary natures lack the entityness of character. The reality which is the emptiness of true establishment is thoroughly established without being a superimposition, is the mode of being, is the object of the highest reasoning consciousness, and lacks the entityness of true establishment. Thus, thoroughly established natures are the ultimate

and without entityness.[5]

The Selflessness of Phenomena is Not Taught in Hīnayāna Scriptures

The selflessness of phenomena is not explicitly taught in the Hīnayāna scriptural collections (piṭaka) because, if it were, there would have been no purpose in Buddha teaching the Mahāyāna scriptures. Furthermore, it is not necessary for Hīnayānists to realize the selflessness of phenomena—the emptiness of true existence—in order to be liberated from cyclic existence even though the conception of true existence is the final root of cyclic existence. For example, the fear that arises from seeing a coiled rope and thinking that it is a snake can be removed by being told that it is not a snake but a coiled vine. In the same way, one who has realized and cultivated the selflessness of persons can destroy the afflictive obstructions (kleshāvaraṇa) and be liberated from cyclic existence. It is therefore unnecessary to realize the final nature of phenomena—the emptiness of true existence—in order to abandon the afflictive obstructions and achieve liberation.[6]

Refutation of Chittamātra

There are numerous statements in Mahāyāna sutras which seem to teach that external objects do not exist and that

everything is of the entity of consciousness. Bhāvaviveka argues emphatically that such statements do not indicate the non-existence of external objects. The statement in sutra, "External objects do not exist," is interpreted to mean external objects do not exist ultimately. The statements by the Buddha, "I propound mind only," and "These three realms are mind only," refute that there is a permanent self or that there is a performer of actions which is other than the mind; the meaning of these sutras is not that there are no external objects.[7]

Bhāvaviveka refutes the Chittamātrin assertion that subject and object are produced from the same seed (_bīja_) and are thus simultaneous by arguing that objects and their apprehenders are in a relationship of cause and effect and are thus produced sequentially. Therefore, an object is a separate entity from the consciousness which perceives it.[8]

The Chittamātrins argue that there are no external objects because the minute particles (_paramāṇu_) of which such objects are said to be composed are too subtle to be perceived by the sense consciousnesses and because aggregations of minute particles are not suitable as the objects of sense consciousnesses because they do not substantially exist. Bhāvaviveka counters the argument by drawing a distinction between aggregations (_saṃghata_) and composites (_saṃchita_). An aggregation is a collection of many entities of dissimilar

type such as a forest or an army and does not substantially exist. Individual particles as well as many particles of similar type which exist on one base are composites and substantially exist. Bhāvaviveka asserts that the minute particles of a composite can serve as the observed-object-condition (_ālambana-pratyaya_) of a sense consciousness.[9]

The Chittamātrins also point to the fact that objects which do not exist, such as a double moon, appear to the sense consciousnesses to support their claim that all appearances of external objects are false. Bhāvaviveka responds that the appearance of a double moon is false appearance to a consciousness that misperceives a single moon and a single moon exists. Thus, consciousnesses depend on objects for their production; if there were no external objects, apprehending subjects could not be produced. If there were no external objects, direct perception (_pratyakṣha_) would be denied.[10]

Bhāvaviveka denies the existence of a self-knowing awareness (_svasamvedana_) which perceives an apprehending consciousness, saying that an ordinary consciousness cannot appear without its object appearing in which case a self-knower which perceives only the consciousness and not its object does not exist.[11]

<u>The Reasoning Consciousness</u>

Whatever is truly established must exist for a reasoning consciousness which analyzes the ultimate because the reasoning consciousness is that which seeks to discover whether an object is truly established or not; what it is seeking is true establishment. However, whatever exists for a reasoning consciousness is not necessarily truly established; reality—emptiness—is found by a reasoning consciousness but does not truly exist. Although there is an object, namely emptiness, which is found by a reasoning consciousness but which does not truly exist, if something is capable of bearing analysis by a reasoning consciousness, it must be truly established. Being able to bear analysis by a reasoning consciousness is the meaning of true existence and is the object of negation.[12]

Because it is easy to prove a similar example which possesses both the sign and the predicate of the probandum (<u>sādhya-dharma</u>), Bhāvaviveka, in his <u>Essence of the Middle Way</u> (<u>Madhyamakahṛidaya</u>) and <u>Blaze of Reasoning</u> (<u>Tarkajvālā</u>), for the most part states syllogisms with negative signs, specifically, signs which are observations of a contradictory object. For example, he states, "The subject, an eye sense, does not ultimately see forms because of being a sense, as is the case, for example, with a nose sense."[13]

The Two Truths

Objects of knowledge (jñeya) are the basis of division into ultimate truths (paramārtha-satya) and conventional truths (saṃvṛiti-satya). In the term "ultimate truth" (literally, "highest object truth"), "highest" refers to a Superior's uncontaminated wisdom of meditative equipoise (samāhita) realizing non-true existence. "Object" refers to the object found by that awareness, emptiness. It is a "truth" because of existing as it appears; it appears undeceivingly.

Conventional phenomena, phenomena other than emptiness, are truths for a concealer. The concealer is the ignorance which conceives of true existence and which is so-called because it conceals or obstructs reality. Conventionalities are of two types: (1) phenomena renowned in the world, illustrated by those which are able to perform functions in accordance with their appearance to a mind to which they appear clearly, these being real conventional truths (tathyasaṃvṛiti-satya) and (2) objects posited from the viewpoint of being renowned in the world as unreal, illustrated by those which are unable to perform a function in accordance with how they appear, these being unreal conventionalities (mityāsaṃvṛiti). Real and unreal conventionalities are differentiated in terms of their truth or falsity within the conventional. Real conventional truths are things such as forms and sounds. Unreal conventionalities are, for

example, reflections, the self of persons (pudgalātman), the self of phenomena (dharmātman), and the principal (pradhāna) asserted by the Sāṃkhyas.[14]

Valid Cognizers

Like all Buddhist schools, the Svātantrikas assert that there are two valid cognizers (pramāṇa), direct perceivers (pratyakṣha) and inferential consciousnesses (anumāna). The Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas assert that there are three types of direct perceivers: sense direct perceivers (indriya-pratyakṣha), mental direct perceivers (manasa-pratyakṣha), and yogic direct perceivers (yogi-pratyakṣha). The Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas add a fourth type which is rejected by the Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas, self-knowing direct perceivers, making a total of four in their system.[15]

The Paths and Fruits

A person definite in the Mahāyāna lineage exhausts the two obstructions—the predispositions (vāsanā) of the afflictive emotions (klesha) and the conception of true existence—and achieves complete Buddhahood simultaneously. The afflictive obstructions are abandoned on the first seven Bodhisattva grounds (bhūmi).

The three bodies of truth (Dharmakāya), enjoyment (Saṃbhogakāya), and emanation (Nirmāṇakāya), the three

secrecies of body, speech, and mind, the three hundred unshared qualities of a Buddha, and so forth are qualities of the fruit of Buddhahood.

Regarding the objects of abandonment, the three poisons of desire, hatred, and ignorance are the afflictive obstructions and the nine cycles of the conception of true existence are the obstructions to omniscience (jñeyāvaraṇa).

The paths of Hearers (Shrāvaka) and Solitary Realizers (Pratyekabuddha) are similar in that both realize the selflessness of persons. They differ in the length of time needed to complete the path; it may take a Hearer three lifetimes to complete the path whereas a Solitary Realizer may take one hundred eons. They also differ in that Hearers rely on the instructions of a teacher in their last lifetime whereas Solitary Realizers do not. Solitary Realizers attain a similitude of a Buddha's major and minor physical marks; Hearers do not. Hearers teach others using sounds whereas Solitary Realizers may not.[16]

YOGĀCHĀRA-SVĀTANTRIKA-MĀDHYAMIKA

True and False Aspectarians

There are two schools of Yogāchāra-Svātantrika, those who accord with the True Aspectarians (Satyākāravādin) and those

who accord with the False Aspectarians (<u>Alīkākāravādin</u>). The former, who include Shāntarakṣhita and Kamalashīla, assert that the aspect of blue, for example, which is the factor experienced as blue by an eye consciousness apprehending blue is a functioning thing and a real conventionality. The Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas who accord with the False Aspectarians, such as Haribhadra, assert that the nature of the aspect of blue does not exist as a functioning thing as it appears. Both the true and false aspectarians agree that the factor of blue which appears to be an external object is false; they disagree on the status of the mere appearance of blue as blue with the former asserting that it is true and the former that it is false.

The False Aspectarians are further divided into those who assert that the entity of the mind is tainted and those who assert that it is untainted. Among the Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas, Jetāri accords with the tainted False Aspectarians and Kambala and accords with the untainted False Aspectarians.[17]

Scriptural Interpretation

Faced with the vast corpus of sutras, the four schools of Buddhist tenets were faced with the problem of reconciling conflicting doctrines set forth in different sutras and internal inconsistencies within sutras. The Hīnayāna schools

who, for the most part, did not accept the Mahāyāna sutras as the word of Buddha, accepted the teachings of their smaller canon as definitive.[18] The Chittamātrins and Mādhyamikas, accepting a far larger body of literature as authentic, developed a system of hermeneutics by which sutras were divided into the definitive (nitārtha) and interpretable (neyārtha) and the literal (yathāruta) and non-literal. They looked chiefly to two sutras for their criteria, the Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Saṃdhinirmochana) and the Sutra Taught by Akṣhyamati (Akṣhyamatinirdeshasūtra).[19]

In the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, Buddha explains to Paramārthasamudgata that he turned the wheel of doctrine three times. The first turning of the wheel of doctrine took place in the deer park in Vārāṇasī where Buddha taught the doctrine of the four truths to followers of the Hearer Vehicle (Shrāvakayāna). Buddha states that the doctrines taught in the first turning of the wheel are interpretable.

In the second turning of the wheel of doctrine, Buddha taught the doctrine of emptiness to those who had entered the Mahāyāna, explaining that all phenomena are without entityness. The teachings of the second wheel are also identified as interpretable in this sutra.

In the third and final turning of the wheel of doctrine, Buddha explained to those of all vehicles what he meant when

he said that all phenomena are without entityness in the second turning of the wheel. He distinguished three types of entitynessless in terms of the three natures: thoroughly established natures are without an entityness of character, other-powered natures are without an entityness of production, and thoroughly established natures are without an entityness and are ultimates. Imaginaries are not established by way of their own character. Other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are. This doctrine of the third wheel is said to be definitive.[20]

The Sutra Set Forth by Akṣhyamati also divides sutras into the definitive and interpretable but uses different criteria. Sutras which teach conventionalities require interpretation to arrive at the final mode of being of the phenomena taught. Sutras which teach ultimates are definitive because emptiness, the final mode of being, is definite; there is nothing to be interpreted beyond that.[21]

The Chittamātrins base their interpretation of scripture on the Sutra Unravelling the Thought classifying Hīnayāna sutras—first wheel sutras—and Mahāyāna sutras such as the Perfection of Wisdom sutras—middle wheel sutras—as interpretable. For the Chittamātrins, the division into definitive and interpretable is made in terms of how the doctrine is expressed; if a particular sutra can be taken literally it is definitive, if its meaning must be explained it is

interpretable.[22]

The Mādhyamikas accept the differentiation of the three turnings of the wheel of doctrine but do not classify the sutras of the middle wheel as interpretable. They draw the distinction between definitive and interpretable not in terms of how the doctrine is expressed but in terms of what the doctrine is, taking their lead from the Sutra Taught by Akṣhyamati. If the sutra teaches emptiness it is definitive, if it does not it is interpretable. They do not equate being literal with being definitive and being non-literal with being interpretable as do the Chittamātrins. The definitive is the true—ultimate truths—and the interpretable is the false—conventional truths.[23]

Within this rubric, the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas differ slightly. For the Svātantrikas, for a sutra to be definitive, it must both teach emptiness and be able to be taken literally. Therefore, the statement in the Heart Sutra (Prajñāpāramitāhṛidayasūtra) that "Form does not exist," although it teaches emptiness, is interpretable because it cannot be taken literally. The meaning of the sutra is not that form does not exist but that form does not truly exist. Other Perfection of Wisdom Sutras which teach that phenomena do not ultimately exist are definitive because they teach emptiness and can be taken literally.

The Prāsaṅgikas are not concerned with whether the sutra

is literal or not; if it teaches ultimate truths it is definitive; if it teaches conventional truths it is interpretable.[24]

Bhāvaviveka accepts sutras of the final wheel, such as the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, as definitive but rejects the Chittamātrin interpretation of those sutras. For example, he accepts the doctrine of the three entitynesslesses but gives it his own Mādhyamika interpretation, as explained above. The Prāsaṅgikas classify sutras of the final wheel as interpretable, accepting that they are intended for Chittamātrin trainees.[25]

The Object of Negation and Reasoning Consciousness

Both branches of Svatantrika agree that the object of negation (pratiṣhedhya) is existence by way of the object's own mode of subsistence without being posited through the force of appearing to an awareness. This awareness is one which is not damaged by another valid cognizer in terms of its perception of existence by way of the object's own character.

In the autocommentary to his Ornament for the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṃkāra), Shāntarakṣhita states the reasoning of the lack of being one or many, citing the Descent into Laṅkā (Laṅkāvatārasūtra) and the Meeting of Father and Son Sutra (Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra) as scriptural sources. An example of a syllogism using that reasoning is, "The subjects,

things such as forms, do not truly exist because of lacking being a truly established unity or a truly established multiplicity, as is the case, for example, with a reflection." The pervasion is established because whatever is truly established must be ascertained as being truly one or truly many. The property of the position is established because form and so forth are not truly established unities because of having parts; they are not truly established multiplicities because a truly established unity does not exist. In addition to the reasoning of the lack of being one and many, the Svātantrikas prove non-true existence mainly using the diamond slivers, the refutation of production of the existent and non-existent, the refutation of production by the four alternatives, and the sign or dependent arising.[26]

The Two Truths

The presentation of the selflessness of the person is shared by both branches of Svātantrika. The positing of the basis of division of the two truths, their definitions, and divisions are also common.[27]

The Path

The Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas assert that the obstructions to omniscience are of two types, coarse and subtle. The coarse obstructions are the conception of subject and object as

being different substantial entities together with the seeds of that conception. The subtle obstructions to omniscience are the conception of true existence and its seeds. The afflictive obstructions are the three poisons. The subtle obstructions to omniscience are the main object of abandonment by the Mahāyāna, the coarse obstructions to omniscience are the chief object of abandonment of the Solitary Realizer Vehicle, and the afflictive obstructions, the chief object of abandonment of the Hearer Vehicle. Thus, the three vehicles have different types of realization, with Hearers realizing the sixteen aspects of the four truths, Solitary Realizers understanding the emptiness of duality of subject and object, and Mahāyānists realizing the emptiness of true existence.

Both the Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas and Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas assert that the path of seeing (darshana-marga) and the path of meditation (bhāvanā-marga) are divided into periods of meditative equipoise and subsequent realization.[28]

"The Svātantrika-Mādhyamika Tenet System"

from

<u>Presentation of Tenets</u>

by

J̄ang-ḡya Rol-b̄ay-dor-jay

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Translator's Preface 365

Part I: Mādhyamika

1 The Life and Works of Nāgārjuna 368

2 Mādhyamika Schools in India 380

3 History of Mādhyamika in Tibet 390

4 The Middle Way 413

5 Scriptural Interpretation 428

6 The Practice of the Path 443

7 Svātantrika 450

Part II: Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika

8 Refutation of Chittamātra 456

9 The Meaning of Ultimate Existence 484

10 The Refutation of Ultimate Existence 496

11 The Two Truths 503

12 Presentation of the Path 528

Part III: Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika

13 Integration of Mind-Only 535

14 The Meaning of True Existence 542

15 The Lack of Being One or Many 554

16 The Two Truths 597

17 The Paths and Fruits 602

J̄ang-ḡya Rol-b̄ay-dor-jay (lCang-skya Rol-pa'i rdo-rje), also known as the Second J̄ang-ḡya Hu-tuk-tu (Hu-thog-thu) was born in Sansu, Mongolia in 1717. In 1721 he was recognized as the incarnation of J̄ang-ḡya Nga-w̄ang-l̄o-sang-chö-den (Ngag-dbang-blo-bzang-chos-ldan). He was taken to China at the age of nine, where he began his monastic studies and the study of Manchu, Chinese, and Mongolian. During this period, one of his fellow students was the fourth son of the Yung-cheng Emperor who would later become Emperor Ch'ien-lung. In 1735, J̄ang-ḡya went to Tibet where he studied under the Seventh Dali Lama and took his final monastic vows from the Second Panchen Lama. Upon his return to China in 1736, his friend, now emperor Ch'ien-lung, appointed him Lama of the Seal, the highest Tibetan Buddhist post in China. With Imperial encouragement, J̄ang-ḡya began to compile an extensive Tibetan-Mongol dictionary. Upon its completion, he oversaw the translation and revision of the Mongolian edition of the Indian treatises (bsTan-gyur). Completed in 1749, the translation into Mongolian numbers 108,016 folios. In 1744, the Emperor and J̄ang-ḡya established the Gan-den Jin-chak-l̄ing (dGa'-ldan Byin-chags-gling) in Peking, a teaching monastery modeled after the Ḡe-luk-b̄a monastic universities of Tibet. Between 1736 and 1746 he composed his best known work, the Presentation of Tenets (Grub mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa). Between 1772 and 1779 J̄ang-ḡya supervised the translation of

the entire Word of Buddha (bKa' 'gyur) into Manchu. J̄ang-ḡya died in 1786.[1]

J̄ang-ḡya was a prolific author, his collected works filling seven volumes. In addition to the Presentation of Tenets, his other well-known works include the Song on the View (lTa ba'i mgur), his commentary to the Deeds of Samantabhadra (Bhadracharī), and his commentary to D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Praise of Dependent Arising (rTen-'brel-bstod-pa).

There are two available editions of the Presentation of Tenets, one published by the Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press in Sarnath, India in 1970 and the other edited by Lokesh Chandra and published by Sharada Rani in New Delhi in 1977. Both editions have been used in the translation of the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika chapter which follows. An edited Tibetan text of the Sarnath version appears at the end of the translation.

Numbers in the upper left hand corner indicate the page and line number of the Tibetan text.

PART ONE

MĀDHYAMIKA

The System of the Mādhyamikas, the Proponents of Non-entityness

This section has two parts, the texts on which they rely and a presentation of the tenets which appear in those texts.

THE TEXTS ON WHICH THEY RELY

As was explained earlier [in a section not translated here], the founder of the Mahāyāna in general is the protector Nāgārjuna. Thus, the Descent into Lañkā Sutra (*Lañkāvatārasūtra*) says:

> If the vehicle of individual knowledge
> Is not accessible to logicians,
> I beseech you to explain who will bear [this teaching]
> After the Protector has passed away.[1]

That is, the object of the exalted wisdom, known by individual meditative equipoise (*samāhita*), is itself the vehicle which pacifies all terminological and conceptual elaborations (*prapañcha*). Since it is very profound, it is asked who will bear [this profound vehicle] after the Teacher has passed into nirvana. In answer to this question, the Teacher said:

> Mahāmati, you should know that
> After Sugata has passed away
> There will appear after some time
> One who will uphold the ways.
> In the south, in the land of Veda
> A monk renowned as Shrīmān,
> Called by the name of Nāga,

Will destroy the positions of existence and
non-existence.
He will fully explain to the world
My vehicle, the unsurpassed Mahāyāna.
He will then achieve the Joyful Ground
And go to the Land of Bliss.[2]

Hence it was clearly prophesied that just this master [Nāgārjuna] would comment accurately on the vehicle of definitive meaning, free from the extremes of [true] existence and [utter] non-existence. He is similarly prophesied in the Great Cloud Sutra in Twelve Thousand Stanzas (Dvādashasāhasrikāmahāmeghasūtra), the Action Tantra Mañjushrī Root Tantra (Mañjushrīmūlatantra), and the Great Drum Sutra (Mahābherīhārakaparivartasūtra).

In some sutras it is explained that this master is a first ground Bohisattva and in some, a seventh ground Bodhisattva. [However] the glorious Chandrakīrti states in his Brilliant Lamp Commentary (Pradīpoddyotana) that this master actualized the state of Vajradhara in that same lifetime by means of the Mantra path. [Still,] it is explained in the Great Cloud Sutra and the Great Drum Sutra that in the future Nāgārjuna will become the Conqueror called Jñānākarāloka. Although there are many such disparate explanations, they are not contradictory. For example, many

different presentations appear in sutras regarding the time that our Teacher generated the mind of enlightenment, became fully enlightened, and so forth because [such presentations] were made in terms of common and uncommon modes of appearance and actuality. This was stated by the foremost great being D̄zong-ka-b̄a (Tsong-kha-pa).

Regarding [the life of] this master [Nāgārjuna], four hundred years after the Buddha passed away, in the southern country of Vedarbha a wealthy childless brahmin received a prophecy from a deity in a dream that if he invited one hundred brahmins to teach religion, he would have a child. He did so, and through his prayers, in the tenth month a child was born. The child was shown to an astrologer who said that, although the signs were good, he would not live more than seven days. The parents asked him if there was anything that would help and were told that if they invited one hundred brahmins to teach religion, the child would live for seven months; if they invited one hundred [Buddhist] monks to teach religion, he would be able to live for seven years. Beyond this there was nothing that could be done. This was done and as the seventh year approached, the father and mother could not bear to see their child's corpse and so sent him to wander accompanied by a servant.

Eventually, they arrived before the doors of glorious Nālandā. There the child recited hymns from the Sāma Veda

which were heard by the great brahmin Saraha, who was living there. He was taken inside where he explained his situation. The master [Saraha] said that if he were able to go forth [from the household life, that is, become a monk] there was a means for prolonging his life. Thus, he became a monk. He was given instruction concerning the protector Amitāyus [the Buddha of long life] and, having practiced, became free from the Lord of Death.

There [at Nālandā] he heard many instructions on Mantra from that same master [Sahara], was ordained by the abbot of Nālandā, Rāhulabhadra, and was known as the monk Shrīmān. (This is in accordance with Bu-dön's (Bu-ston) History. A different name for this abbot appears in the statements of some scholars.) Acting as the steward of Nālandā's spiritual community (saṃgha), he transmuted [iron into] gold and relieved the misery of the spiritual community. Shortly thereafter, a monk named Shaṃkara wrote a text called Ornament of Reasoning (Nyāyālaṃkāra) of twelve hundred thousand stanzas[3] refuting everyone, but this master defeated him.

When he was teaching the doctrine, two children came to listen, and since he had seen them go under the ground, he asked them who they were. They replied that they were nāgas. The master asked them to bring him some yakṣha clay [which is apparently ideal for building temples and stūpas], and they reported his request to the king of the nāgas. The king

replied that if he would come [to the land of the nāgas], he would offer [him the clay]. Thus, knowing that it would be useful, he went to the land of the nāgas. He taught the doctrine to many nāgas and brought much nāga clay and the Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Stanzas (Shatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra) and so forth to the world of humans. Therefore, he is renowned as Nāgārjuna.

He benefited many beings in such countries as Puṇḍravardhana and Paṭavesa. He also went to the northern continent of Kuru where he brought limitless benefits to migrators through performing miracles, teaching the doctrine, and so forth. He also erected many stupas and temples. [In Bodhgayā] he encircled the vajra seat with a railing having a latticework of vajras and also established and erected the glorious Dhyānakaṭaka stupa.[4] Through the imprint of such activities he gave inconceivable aid to the teaching. In particular, he completely restored the declined teaching of the Mahāyāna and spread the teaching of the Conqueror Buddha with a kindness comparable to that of the Conqueror himself.

Some Chinese histories which were translated from an Indian language explain that this master also brought the Garland Sutra (Avataṃsakasūtra) from the land of the nāgas. Since Indian texts and ancient Tibetan treatises refer to [his bringing] "the Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred

Thousand Stanzas and so forth," it is clear that the Mahāyāna sūtras which this master brought from the land of the *nāgas* were not confined to the Perfection of Wisdom class.

Although there are many different modes of explanation concerning how long he lived in the world of humans, [the explanation] that he lived for six hundred years accords with the scriptural prophecies. It is also taken to be the correct position by the omniscient Bu-d̄ön and the omniscient D̄zong-ka-b̄a.

It is explained that this great master made great proclamations of the doctrine three times, but a clear explanation of what the three great proclamations of the doctrine were does not appear in the early texts nor in the statements of D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his spiritual sons. Some scholars of another sect explain that the first proclamation of doctrine refers to his defeat of some Hearer sectarians such as the monk Shaṃkara, that the second proclamation refers to his composition of treatises which teach the profound emptiness, such as the Six Collections of Reasoning, and that the third proclamation of doctrine refers to such texts as the *Praise of the Element of Qualities* (*Dharmadhātustrota*) which, relying on sutras such as the *Great Drum*, teach that a permanent element of [Superior] qualities—the Sugata essence (*sugatagarbha*)—pervades all

sentient beings. This explanation [of the three proclamations of doctrine] appears to be based on several statements in the Great Cloud and the Great Drum sutras. The excellent venerable Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄ay-dor-jay ('Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa'i-rdo-rje) takes this mode [of explanation] to be the correct position and explains that although the last two proclamations of doctrine accord in being topics of the middle wheel [of doctrine, that of the Perfection of Wisdom sutras], the third proclamation is distinguished from the second by the fact that the third proclamation extensively teaches that a Buddha is permanent in the sense of his continuum [lasting forever] and that in fact he did not pass into nirvana.

This great being wrote many treatises setting forth the common and uncommon sciences. There are Tibetan translations of medical treatises such as the Hundred Applications (Yogashataka) and treatises on political ethics (nītishāstra): Drop for Supporting the People (Janapoṣhaṇabindu) and the Hundred Wisdoms (Prajñāshataka). In addition, there are works on the interpretation of omens, the preparation of incense, alchemy, etc. Regarding the Buddhist sciences, there are many commentaries on sutras such as the Rice Seedling Sutra (Shālistambusūtra) and the Sutra on Dependent Arising (Pratītyasamutpādasūtra). In particular, there is the Compendium of Sutra (Sūtrasamuchchaya)

which proves through scripture the profound path of the middle way—the final definitive meaning. For the proof [of the middle way] through reasoning, there are six works: the Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakashāstra), the Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness (Shūnyatāsaptatikārikā), the Refutation of Objections (Vigrahavyāvartanīkārikā), the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktiṣhaṣhṭikākārikā), the Treatise Called "The Finely Woven" (Vaidalyasūtranāma) and the Precious Garland of Advice for the King (Rājaparikathāratnāvalī).

Although it is renowned that there were eight commentaries to the Treatise on the Middle Way in India, [only] four of them were translated into Tibetan: the Akutobhayā (Mūlamadhyamakavṛitti-akutobhayā)[5], the Commentary by Buddhapālita (Buddhapālitamūlamadhyamakavṛitti), Bhāvaviveka's commentary Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom" (Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛitti), and the glorious Chandrakīrti's commentary Clear Words (Mūlamadhyamakavṛittiprasannapadā). In addition, there is the work by Avalokitavrata (Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā) which is an explanatory commentary to Bhāvaviveka's Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom". The contention that the Akutobhayā is an autocommentary [by Nāgārjuna] is not correct according to the foremost great being D̄zong-ka-b̄a.

There are autocommentaries to the Seventy Stanzas on

Emptiness, the Refutation of Objections, and the Treatise Called "The Finely Woven". Chandrakīrti wrote a commentary to the Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning (Yuktiṣhaṣhṭikavṛitti) and paṇḍiṭa Parahitabhadra wrote a commentary to the Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness (Shūnyatāsaptativṛitti).[6] It was asserted by many in the past that the Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment (Bodhichittavivaraṇa) written by this great master [Nāgārjuna] is instructions on the perfections, but Ḡzong-ka-ḡa and his spiritual sons assert that it is a supplement to the text of the Guhyasamāja Tantra (Guhyasamājatantra). [He composed] many texts on Secret Mantra such as the Five Stages (Pañchakrama), but I will not elaborate on them here.

With respect to the followers of this great being, the master Āryadeva wrote several short works on Mādhyamika such as the Compendium on the Essence of Exalted Wisdom (Jñānagarbhasamuchchaya), the Establishment of the Reasoning and Logic Refuting Error (Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi), and the Length of a Forearm (Hastavālaprakaraṇakārikā). However, his Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas (Bodhisattvayogacharyāchatuḥshatakashāstrakārikā) has all the topics. There is also a commentary to this by the glorious Chandrakīrti (Bodhisattvayogacharyāchatuḥshatakaṭīkā).

Buddhapālita's commentary on the Treatise on the Middle

Way has already been mentioned. Although he is known to have written many treatises, others do not appear in Tibetan translation.

The two independent works by Bhāvaviveka [in the sense that they are not commentaries on Nāgārjuna] are the Essence of the Middle Way (Madhyamakahṛdaya) and its autocommentary the Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvālā). Many features of non-Buddhist and Buddhist tenets appear in these texts, and the essential points of Mādhyamika view, meditation, and behavior are given at length. For this reason, the incomparable great master Atīsha lectured on the Blaze of Reasoning on many occasions in India and Tibet. The Precious Lamp for the Middle Way (Madhyamakaratnapradīpa) was written by one known as Bhāvaviveka the Lesser and is not a work by this master.

The great master Chandrakīrti's independent work, the Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra) together with its autocommentary are very famous as excellent good explanations. The master Jñānagarbha wrote the Discrimination of the Two Truths (Satyadvayavibhaṅga) with an autocommentary; the explanatory commentary (Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā) attributed to Shāntarakṣhita is a case of someone borrowing his name [and is not by the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika Shāntarakṣhita].

The master Shāntarakṣhita wrote the Ornament for the

Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṃkāra) and its autocommentary. With reference to this, that which is known as the autocommentary is a composition of alternating poetry and prose and is the actual treatise—the Ornament for the Middle Way. That which is known as the root text is the poetry within that set apart; it is not a case of two treatises with the root text written earlier and the commentary added later. This is the position of the foremost omniscient being Ḏzong-ka-Ḇa. The Commentary on the Difficult Points of the "Ornament for the Middle Way" (Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā) which is attributed to Kamalashīla is a fabrication according to Kay-drup-jay (mKhas-grub-rje). There are several mistakes in the Commentary on the Difficult Points; however, since the master Dharmamitra holds that Kamalashīla is the author, it must be assessed as to whether or not it was written at a time when the master's mind had not yet matured. This point is made by the foremost precious Ḏzong-ka-Ḇa in his Notes on the Ornament for the Middle Way (dbU ma rgyan zin bris). The master Dharmamitra wrote an explanatory commentary to the Ornament for the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṃkaraṭīkā).

The master Kamalashīla wrote the Illumination of the Middle Way (Madhyamakāloka) in which he very clearly sets forth the uncommon systems of the great charioteers of Mādhyamika and Chittamātra. His points of reasoning are very subtle, and the foremost great being Ḏzong-ka-Ḇa valued them

highly. Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way, Jñānagarbha's Differentiation of the Two Truths of the Mādhyamika, and Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way are renowned as the three books illuminating Svātantrika (rang rgyud shar gsum).

In addition, there are many explanations of reasonings delineating the [Mādhyamika] view scattered in Mantra treatises written by these masters, but I will not mention them here.

The great master Shāntideva's Compendium of Trainings (Shikṣhāsamuchchaya) and Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharyāvatāra) are superior works of Mādhyamika. The texts of the masters Shūra [Ashvaghoṣha], Nāgabodhi, Āryavimuktisena, Haribhadra, Buddhajñānapāda, and Abhayākāragupta are also included in the Mādhyamika class. Most of the accomplished great beings such as the lord of adepts Lūhipāda, Ghaṇḍāpāda, Kṛiṣhṇachārin, Nāropa, and the lord Maitrīpāda are only followers of the master, the Superior Nāgārjuna. I will explain briefly at a later point which of them are Prāsaṅgikas and which are Svātantrikas. This has been brief; it can be known in its entirety from [consulting] other [texts].

The presentation of the tenets which appear in those texts has four parts: the etymology, divisions, definition, and assertions of the Mādhyamikas.

ETYMOLOGY OF MĀDHYAMIKA

The master Bhāvaviveka says, "It is the middle (*madhya*) because it is similar to a center which is free from the two extremes. It is the very center or *madhyama*, [the *ma* being] a *tadhita* affix [which indicates just] that meaning." Thus, the very center which is free from the extremes of existence and non-existence is the middle. And because they express that [middle way], a treatise on the middle way, tenets of the middle way, and persons who propound the tenets of the middle way acquire the name "Madhyamaka." That same master says, "Because of teaching and proclaiming the path of the middle way, '*ka*' [is added]. In terms [of *ka* being] the verbal root [for 'proclaiming'], a treatise or one who has the name 'Madhyamaka' is a Madhyamaka. Or again, because of being expressed by the name 'ka' it is called Madhyamaka, that is, a tenet of the Madhyamaka."[1]

DIVISIONS OF MĀDHYAMIKA

This section has two parts, the actual divisions and, ancillarily, the history.

Actual Divisions

Among the students of the glorious Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva is held to be valid like the master himself by the others, such as Buddhapālita. Therefore, earlier scholars gave the designation "Mādhyamikas of the Model Texts" to the two, the father [Nāgārjuna] and the son [Āryadeva], and "Partisan Mādhyamikas" to the others. Dzong-ka-ba and his spiritual sons also assert that this is correct.

The reason for designating them as Models and Partisans is this: although the final thought of the father and son rests in the Prāsaṅgika system, in terms of what is taught in their texts, there is no clearly delineated presentation of whether they assert that things conventionally exist by way of their own character (svalakṣhaṇa), whether they assert the existence of external objects, whether it is possible to generate an inferential consciousness in another party from the viewpoint of what is merely renowned to others, and so forth. Therefore, since they abide as a generality [common] to both the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika factions, they are called "Models." Although a brief refutation of Chittamātra appears in Nāgārjuna's Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment, there is no detailed explanation of whether or not he asserts external objects in his own system.

The great master Buddhapālita, in his Buddhapālita, Commentary on the "Treatise on the Middle Way" stated many

consequences (prasaṅga) in commenting on the meaning of the reasonings set forth in the Treatise on the Middle Way and did not use autonomous reasons (*svatantrahetu). After that, the master Bhāvaviveka found many faults in Buddhapālita's commentary and explained many reasons why autonomous reasons must be stated. Thus, he founded the system of commenting [on the thought of Nāgārjuna] as Svātantrika. Later the glorious Chandrakīrti explained that the faults [ascribed] to Buddhapālita did not apply, did much damage to the assertion of autonomous signs, and put forth many proofs of the unsuitability of asserting [autonomous reasons], thus founding the system of commenting on the thought of the Superior Nāgārjuna as Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika. Therefore, these [masters —Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Chandrakīrti]—are known as Partisan Mādhyamikas.

Kay-drup-jay's Thousand Doses, Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate (sTong thun skal bsang mig 'byed)[2] says, "Later, the master Buddhapālita wrote a commentary on the Treatise on the Middle Way which interprets the thought of the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva] in the manner of consequences (prasaṅga)." Some scholars of our own [Ge-luk-ba] sect say that this means that Buddhapālita is the founder of Prāsaṅgika. However, this is not the opinion of the foremost great being Dzong-ka-ba. Although Buddhapālita did not use autonomous reasons and commented on the meaning

of the text only through consequences, this alone is not sufficient to make him the founder of Prāsaṅgika. For in order to be designated as the founder of this or that system, one must clearly delineate proofs for the correctness of that system and [prove] why interpretation in any other way is unsuitable. For at the point of identifying founders in general, Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bshad snying po) says:

> One must seek out the thought of the scriptures of definitive meaning (nītārtha), following one who has delineated their meaning well with reasoning damaging interpretation in any other way and reasoning proving that that meaning is certain, it being impossible to be interpreted otherwise.[3]

That mode [of delineating a distinct system] is similar here as well. Similarly, Gyel-tsap's (rGyal-tshab-dar-ma-rin-chen) Heart Ornament, An Explanation of the Root Text and Commentary of the "Ornament for Clear Realizations" (mNgon rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi rtsa ba 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rnam bshad snying po'i rgyan)[4] and Kay-drup's Thousand Doses explain the meaning of founding a system in that [same] way, but fearing excessive length I will not write [about their explanations]. If the

meaning of founding a system is identified in this way, it is easy to understand that the venerable Maitreya should not be assigned as the founder of the Mādhyamika, and that only the protector Nāgārjuna is the founder of Mādhyamika.

Furthermore, if Buddhapālita were the founder of Prāsaṅgika, there would be no reason whatsoever for Bhāvaviveka's asserting that there is no difference between himself and Buddhapālita in terms of their being Svātantrikas. If it asked how it is evident that Bhāvaviveka asserted such, the foremost great being Ḍzong-ka-ḃa clearly speaks to this in his Essence of the Good Explanations:

> Even Bhāvaviveka did not think that there was disagreement between Buddhapālita and himself regarding the assertion or non-assertion of autonomous syllogisms (svatantraprayoga); [Buddhapālita's] system appears to [Bhāvaviveka] as one in which the use of autonomous syllogisms is unavoidable. Due to this fact, he did not assert that there is a difference between himself and Buddhapālita regarding the object of negation (pratiṣhedya) in the inherent existence (svabhāva) of phenomena and persons."[5]

Thus, what could one say that would be more senseless than

that the master Bhāvaviveka asserted that the founder of Prāsaṅgika was a Svātantrika!

That the founder of Prāsaṅgika is the glorious Chandrakīrti is stated very clearly by the foremost great being D̄zong-ka-b̄a:

> In the Clear Words [Chandrakīrti] showed that Buddhapālita did not assert autonomous syllogisms and set forth many proofs that it is unsuitable for a Mādhyamika to use autonomous syllogisms and he did much damage to the opposite position, thereby founding [Prāsaṅgika].[6]

With respect to this, some have said that the meaning of this passage is that Chandrakīrti showed the damage [to the opposite position], but Buddhapālita is the founder. It is easy for those with intelligence to understand that this is totally meaningless.

Question: Then what is the meaning of the statement in Kay-drup's Thousand Doses that Buddhapālita wrote a commentary on the Treatise on the Middle Way which comments on the thought of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] in the manner of consequences?

Answer: As was explained before, this refers to his not using autonomous reasons when explaining the meaning of the text, but rather commenting on the meaning of the text

only through consequences. [Kay-drup] is not explaining that [Buddhapālita] is the founder of Prāsaṅgika.

The king Indrabhuti and the great brahmin Saraha were holders of the Mādhyamika view who came before Nāgārjuna, and even though they composed texts which set forth the final view, they are not designated as the founders of Mādhyamika. Also, prior to Bhāvaviveka there was the master Devasharma who held the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika view, and prior to the master Shāntarakṣhita there were masters who held the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika view, such as Āryavimuktisena, who, even though they wrote texts [on the view], are not designated as the founders of those systems. Please think well about the reason for this.

The great scholar and adept Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a made an explanation that accords with the earlier statements [about Buddhapālita being the founder] in some places, but it is definite that in his own mind he held that just Chandrakīrti is the founder of Prāsaṅgika. The root text of his Tenets (Grub mtha' chen mo) says, "Chandrakīrti refuted [Bhāvaviveka] well and established [the Prāsaṅgika system] as uncommon"[7]; the commentary explains that only the glorious Chandrakīrti clearly distinguished the uncommon Prāsaṅgika system.[8]

The glorious Shūra, Nāgabodhi, and so forth are also clearly Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas as can be known through Shūra's Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment

(Paramārthabodhichittabhāvanākramavarnasaṃgraha) and Nāgabodhi's Ordered Stages of the Means of Achieving Guhyasamāja (Samājasādhanavyavasthāli), and so forth. The foremost great being Dzong-ka-ba says that the great Child of the Conqueror, Shāntideva, accords with the glorious Chandrakīrti. That the peerless great elder Atīsha is a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika can be known from the root text and commentary of his Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhipathapradīpa) and the root text and commentary of his Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way (Madhyamakopedesha), and [the fact that he is a Prāsaṅgika] is explained not just once by Dzong-ka-ba and his sons.

The divisions of Mādhyamika are definite as two from the point of view of their assertions on conventionalities—those who assert and do not assert external objects. The former are Bhāvaviveka and the glorious Chandrakīrti together with their followers. The latter are Shāntarakṣhita, his spiritual son [Kamalashīla], and so forth. If [Mādhyamika] is divided from the viewpoint of how the view ascertaining the ultimate—emptiness—is generated in one's continuum, [the divisions] are definite as two—Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. Svātantrika has two divisions, Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika and Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. The former [includes] the father Bhāvaviveka and his spiritual sons, and the latter, the father Shāntarakṣhita and his

spiritual sons. The difference between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika will be explained later.

Some earlier Tibetan scholars designated two Mādhyamikas: those who propound an establishment of illusion through a reasoning consciousness (*mayayuktisiddha) who assert that a composite of appearance and emptiness is an ultimate truth and the proponents of thorough non-abiding who assert that the mere elimination of elaborations with respect to appearance is an ultimate truth. The great translator L̄o-den-s̄hay-rap of N̄gok (rNgog bLo-ldan-shes-rab) refutes this in his letter Drop of Ambrosia (bDud rtsi'i thigs pa), saying that positing [Mādhyamika] as twofold from the point of view of their assertions on the ultimate is an obscured presentation producing amazement. The foremost great being D̄zong-ka-b̄a also says, "This statement by the great translator from N̄gok is very good because there is no Mādhyamika whatsoever who asserts that merely the object comprehended by an inferential reasoning consciousness is an ultimate truth." However, the foremost great being is explaining that it is incorrect to assert the meaning of propounding a reasoned establishment of illusion in that way; he is not asserting that the mere designations "reasoned establishment of illusion" and "thoroughly non-abiding" are incorrect for Mādhyamika because such designations are clearly used by the master Shūra in his letter Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind

of Enlightenment. This was stated by the great scholar and adept Nor-sang-gya-tso (Nor-bsang-rgya-mtsho) and I think that it is probably good. There are many reasons for these [points] yet to be explained, but I will leave [the topic] for the time being.

Question: In the Snowy Land [of Tibet] are these great path systems of the chariots of Mādhyamika and Chittamātra confined to just those divisions explained above or are there many presentations of divisions other than those? The first option is not correct because in the Land of Snow Mountains there are many names of schools of tenets which were not mentioned here. The second option is not correct because if [the Tibetan tenet systems] were explained in a manner other than these [Indian systems], it would not be suitable for them to proponents of Mahāyāna tenets; yet, if they are not explained in some other manner, the use of other names of tenet systems would be meaningless.

Answer: I will explain this briefly. Many different names of schools of tenets in Tibet appear to have been designated by way of area or the name of a master, as was the case with the eighteen Vaibhāṣhika subschools. Also, some received certain instructions for an Indian scholar-adept (paṇḍitasiddha) and primarily practiced those [instructions], due to which it appears that they were designated as separate schools with the names of those systems of instruction. Therefore, it does not seem definite that the names of the schools were designated only through view, as was the case with the schools of Mahāyāna tenets in the Land of Superiors [India]. For example, there are many cases of designating a name from the viewpoint of area, such as S̄a-ḡya-b̄a (Sa-skya-pa)

and Dri-gung-b̄a ('Bri-gung-pa) [a Ḡa-gyu school], from the viewpoint of a master, such as Karma-b̄a (Karma-pa), and from the viewpoint of a system of instruction, such as the Great Completion (rDzogs-chen-pa) and the Great Seal (Phyag-chen-pa, *Mahamūdrika).

However, this is an occasion for analyzing the differences in view only. That being the case, with regard to the time of the earlier dissemination of the doctrine in Tibet, the greatest dissemination of the complete explanation and achievement of the Conqueror's entire system occurred around the time of the mighty god [King] Tri-s̄ong-day-d̄zen (Khri-srong-lde-btsan). At that time many great Indian scholars and adepts such as the great master Padmasambhava, the mantra-bearer Dharmakīrti, Vimālamitra, and Buddhaguhya came [to Tibet]. However, the one who bore the burden of explaining the excellent doctrine, from discipline (vinaya) through Mādhyamika, and who spread the system of lecturing on and listening to the doctrine was the great master Shāntarakṣhita. This appears clearly in the ancient records.

The great master Padmasambhava subdued the gods and demons of Tibet and gave initiation and instruction in Secret Mantra to a small group which included the king and his children, and it appears that Dharmakīrti also bestowed initiation in the Vajradhātu mandala of Yoga [Tantra].

However, accounts do not appear of their doing such things as explaining the great philosophical texts, and since they were very strict at that time regarding the Mantra class, it appears that they did not disseminate Secret Mantra widely.

Regarding view and behavior, it is explained [in the early histories] that by order of the king a law was proclaimed that in view and practice one must act in accordance with the system of the Bodhisattva Abbot [Shāntarakṣhita]. Thus, since it is indisputable that the abbot Shāntarakṣhita was a great charioteer following the Superior Nāgārjuna, the view at that time was none other than that of Nāgārjuna's system. In Purifying Forgetfulness of the View (lTa ba'i brjed byang) by the great translator Ye-shay-day (Ye-shes-sde), who was a student of both the master [Padmasambhava] and the abbot [Shāntarakṣhita], the system of Nāgārjuna is mainly followed, and in that [text the view] also appears to accord with the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika system.

Later, after the master [Padmasambhava] had left and the great abbot [Shāntarakṣhita] had passed away, a Chinese abbot named Hva-shang Mahāyāna spread his own system, composing many treatises which primarily taught the view of not applying the mind to anything. Thereby many of the people of Tibet, such as Queen Dro-sang-jang-chup ('Bro-bzang-byang-chub), entered his religious system. The king then saw that this system which deprecated the factor of method (upāya) was not

a pure religious system because it did not accord with the system of the former abbot [Shāntarakṣhita] and was a cause of indolence in the Tibetan people in the practice of virtue. In accordance with the last will of the abbot, he invited the great master Kamalashīla who defeated the Chinese abbot well with scripture and reasoning. Kamalashīla composed many treatises such as the three _Stages of Meditation in Mādhyamika_ (_Bhāvanākrama_) which praise analytical wisdom, and he spread the stainless system of lecturing and listening. At this time it also appears that the king proclaimed that thenceforth the view must accord with the system of the master Nāgārjuna and that views which accorded with the system of Hva-shang would be eliminated through punishment.

Therefore, although in the earlier dissemination of the teaching, a few _paṇḍitas_ who bore the Chittamātra system came [to Tibet], the main system was that of Shāntarakṣhita and Kamalashīla, and thus it appears that only the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika view was widespread.

It is explained [in the histories] that in the later dissemination of the teaching, the great translator Rin-chen-sang-b̄o (_Rin-chen-bzang-po_, 958-1055) relied on many great scholars and adepts, studied the doctrines of Mantra and philosophy a great deal, and translated much of the word [of Buddha] as well as treatises (_shāstra_). He delineated [the doctrine] through hearing and explanation, and his view

was that of a Thoroughly Non-Abiding Mādhyamika. This great translator subdued [the demon] nāga Ḡar-gyal (sKar-rgyal), put an end to mistaken Mantra practices, and with great kindness filled the people of the snowy mountains with the pure teaching.

The divine lamas Ye-s̄hay-ö (Ye-shes-'od) and Jang-chup-ö (Byang-chub-'od) could not tolerate the pollution of the teaching by coarse Tibetan practitioners of Mantra and invited the glorious, incomparable, great elder Dīpaṅkara Shrījñāna [Atīsha] (982-1054). Because they entreated him to purify the teaching, he wrote texts such as the Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment and spread the teaching of the Conqueror with a kindness comparable to that of the Conqueror himself. This incomparable, great elder held the view of the system of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika:

> Through whom should one realize emptiness?
> Chandrakīrti, Nāgārjuna's student,
> Prophesied by the Tathāgata,
> And who saw the true reality.
> One should realize the true reality
> From instructions transmitted from him.

Thus, he held the system of Chandrakīrti to be primary.

When the Foremost Elder [Atīsha] came to Tibet, the Tibetan teachers offered him their own understanding of the

view, but the Elder was not pleased and said, "No matter what your view is, cultivate the altruistic aspiration to enlightenment." Later, the Elder was pleased when Drom-dön ('Brom-ston) presented his realization of the view of the master Chandrakīrti to him. He joined his hands at his heart and said, "Amazing! Now, to the east of India, only this view is to be held."

Thus, in the expositions of the stages of the path and in the statements of those renowned as the three brothers—the spiritual friend Bo-do-wa (Po-to-ba) and so forth—which appear in the final, pure biographies of the Ga-dam-bas (bKa'-gdams-pa) stemming from the Great Elder, the Mādhyamika view is for the most part in accord with the system of Chandrakīrti.

Regarding the great translator from Ngok [Lo-den-shay-rap] and his spiritual sons, despite the fact that many citations from the works of Bhāvaviveka and Chandrakīrti are found [in their writings], it appears that their mode of sustaining the view [in meditation] accords for the most part with that of Shāntarakṣhita and his spiritual son [Kamalashīla].

The development of the view in several mind-training texts deriving from Dharmakīrti of Suvarnadvīpa [present-day Sumatra] appears to accord with the system of the False Aspectarian (alīkākāravāda) Chittamātrins.[1] However, it was rare for any of the followers to know how to explain the

Indian texts without mixing their meaning [with that of other systems].

The originator of the view known as Jo-mo-nang-b̄a (*Jo-mo-nang-pa*) is renowned to be the great adept Yu-mo (*Yu-mo*) who was born in the vicinity of Gang-d̄ay-s̄ay (*Gangs-te-se*), who had a little meditative stabilization (*samādhi*) and clairvoyance (*abhijñā*), and who wrote some textbooks on Kālachakra. The disseminator of the system was the omniscient Shay-rap-gyal-tshen (*Shes-rab-rgyal-mtshan*) of Dol-b̄o (*Dol-po*); later there arose many who held the lineage, such as Jo-nang Ḡun-ga-dröl-chok (*Jo-nang Kun-dga'-grol-mchog*). With regard to the system's view, they assert that the ultimate truth is positive, permanent, and independent, and they assert that an element (*dhātu*) which is the Sugata-essence [Buddha nature] that is permanent, stable, eternal, and adorned with the thirty-two marks, naturally exists in the continuum of all sentient beings. This [assertion] stands outside the system of all the Mādhyamika and Chittamātra charioteers and is refuted with hundreds of scriptures and reasonings by the preeminent scholars of the Snowy Land, such as Rin-chen-d̄ok (*Rin-chen-tog*) of Yar-drok (*Yar-'brog*), the foremost Ren-da-wa (*Red-mda'-ba*), and the foremost great being D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his spiritual sons.

The great, omniscient being of the age of disputation,

the all-knowing Bu-dön (Bu-ston, 1290-1364) was an unrivalled scholar who studied all of the systems of tenets; the view as explained in his own system accords greatly with the Ga-dam-bas, and he takes the texts of Chandrakīrti to be chief.

Also, at an earlier time, the great translator Ba-tsap-nyi-ma-drak (Pa-tshab-nyi-ma-grags) studied in Kashmir for twenty-three years and invited the great paṇḍita Kanakavarman to Tibet. He translated many Mādhyamika treatises and listened and lectured. Many students came [to study with him], such as those renowned as the four sons of Ba-tsap, and they appear to have spread the explanation of the Mādhyamika system of the master Chandrakīrti more widely in Tibet than he [Ba-tsap] did.

Gö-rin-bo-chay Kuk-ba-hlay-dzay ('Gos-rin-po-che Khug-pa-lhas-btsas) went to India twelve times, met with seventy-two scholar-adepts, and appears to have given many explanations of tantras. He also held the Mādhyamika view to be chief, but from his statements it is difficult to determine whether he was Prāsaṅgika or Svātantrika. Since many great translators, such as the translator Kay-gay-kor-lo-drak (Khe-gad-'khor-lo-grags) appear to have been students of the great scholar Abhayākaragupta, one wonders whether they relied on him for their view; there does not appear to be a clear explanation. Similarly, the majority of the great

translators, such as the three Ra (Rva Do-rje-grags), Dro ('Bro Shes-rab-grags), and N̄yen (gNyan Dar-ma-grags), appear only to have declared themselves to be Mādhyamika; it seems difficult to decide such things as whether they were Prāsaṅgikas or Svātantrikas.

Drok-mi Shākya-ye-s̄hay ('Brok-mi Shakya-ye-shes, 992-1072) went to India and heard the three Hevajra tantras together with their branches, etc., from the master Vīravajra, an actual student of the master called Durjayachandra who held the lineage of Ḍombiheruka, student of the master Virūpa. He stayed in India for twelve years. Returning to Tibet, he disseminated Mantra doctrines. Later, he met the paṇḍita Gayādhara and studied the Mother Tantra cycles. Many S̄a-ḡya-b̄a doctrines derive from him. The view of their system of path and effect (lam 'bras) is explained as being that of the great Mādhyamika [Prāsaṅgika], but their manner of identifying the view appears to be slightly different from that of other systems in that it is related to Mantra precepts; it is renowned as the view of the union of manifestation and emptiness. Nonetheless, since it is the thought of the great adept Virūpa, it does not pass beyond Prāsaṅgika, although the followers' mode of explanation is not unequivocal.

Regarding the great paṇḍita, skilled in the five sciences, Jam-ȳang-ḡun-ga-gyel-tsen ('Jam-dbyangs-kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan,

1182-1251) [known as Sa-gya Paṇḍiṭa], his view [when explaining] the Mantra class [of texts] appears to be just that [of the union of manifestation and emptiness], and his explanations of the view for the Sutra class greatly praise the Thoroughly Non-Abiding Mādhyamika. A later Sa-gya, the great venerable Ren-da-wa (Red-mda'-ba), who completed the path, gained supreme ascertainment of the system of the honorable Chandrakīrti, and his commentary to Chandrakīrti's Supplement and instruction manuals on the view accord in essence with the foremost great being Dzong-ka-ba.

The view of that renowned as the Shi-jay (Zhi-byed) system stems from the protector of migrators, Paramapitṛibuddha. This Paramapitṛibuddha is generally renowned as having been an actual student of the protector Nāgārjuna, and in the history surrounding that teaching, it is explained that Parama listened to the doctrine relying on eighty male and female adepts [as teachers]. When they enumerate the lamas of their lineage, they begin with the master Nāgārjuna and go through the students of Nāropa and Maitripāda. Although some widely renowned scholars who wrote histories of doctrine give accounts which agree with the earlier histories, it seems difficult to be certain.

Some explain that Parama and the great Kashmiri paṇḍiṭa Shākyashrī were the same person, but no reasons for this are evident. Be that as it may, it is probably true that he was

an actual student of the protector Nāgārjuna because this appears to accord with several Chinese histories. The source for the Shi-jay system's view meets back to the sutras of the Perfection of Wisdom class, and in their essays of instructions, Nāgārjuna is held to be valid. In addition, the statements of Ma-j̄i-lap-drön (Ma-cig-lab-sgron) are in great agreement with the Prāsaṅgika position, although since then, the bearers of the instructions seem to a large extent to be confusing fish and turnips.

The great bearer of the practice lineage in the Snowy Range, Mar-b̄a-chö-gyi-l̄o-drö of Hlo-drak (Lho-brag Mar-pa-chos-kyi-blo-gros, 1012-1096) went to India three times and Nepal four times. He met with one hundred and eight gurus who were scholars and adepts, such as the great paṇḍita Nāropa, the lord Maitripāda, the glorious Jñānagarbha, and the great adept Shāntibhadra. He studied in detail the explanation, instructions, and practices of the majority of the father and mother [Highest] Yoga Tantras, such as the glorious Guhyasāmaja. After his return to Tibet, there were many bearers of the lineage, such as the "four students of the transmission," and since his activities of Secret Mantra were extremely vast, many lineages of his precepts have continued to spread, even to the present. With respect to the view of the Foremost One himself [Mar-ba], there appear to be many lineages of Mādhyamika and Chittamātra instructions because

he listened to many gurus who were scholars and adepts. However, the Foremost One himself says in a song that the teacher who destroyed superimpositions (āropa) in the view was just Maitripāda. Also, whenever he explained view, meditation, behavior, or tantra, he took Nāropa and Maitripāda as his principal [sources]. Not only was the lord Maitripāda a Mādhyamika, he took only the system of the glorious Chandrakīrti to be chief. He says in his Ten Chapters on Suchness (Tattvadashaka):

> Not Aspectarians, not Non-Aspectarians,
> Even Mādhyamikas who are not adorned
> With the guru's speech are only middling.

Thus, both True [Aspectarian, satyākaravāda] and False Aspectarian (alīkāravāda) Chittamātrins do not realize the meaning of suchness (tathatā), and even among Mādhyamikas, those who are not adorned with the quintessential instructions of the guru are said to be middling Mādhyamikas. The paṇḍita Sahajavajra, an actual student of [Maitripāda] himself, says in a commentary that the instructions of the guru are only the instructions of the glorious Chandrakīrti.

The great paṇḍita Nāropa also holds only the system of the glorious Chandrakīrti because he says in his commentary to the continuation [that is, the eighteenth chapter] of the Guhyasāmaja Tantra:

> This commentary on the continuation of the tantra
> Following the Brilliant Lamp of Chandrakīrti
> Describes Nāgārjuna's quintessential instructions.

And:

> Relying on the stages of instruction
> Of the masters Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva,
> Nāgabodhi, Shākyamitra,
> Chandrakīrti, and so forth. . . .

Also his description of the view appears to be like that [of Chandrakīrti] alone. Therefore, the statement of some earlier and later logicians that Maitripāda was a Chittamātrin because he was a student of Ratnākārashānti is just to be discarded since it is like a stone thrown too late.

Thus, the view of the king of adepts Mar-ba is unquestionably that of the Great Mādhyamika—Prāsaṅgika. Nevertheless, in the instructions on the view deriving from Mar-ba, there are systems using terminology in accordance with the Chittamātra system as well. However, regarding this, as was explained before, the foremost Mar-ba had many gurus who were scholars and adepts and also had many instructions transmitted from them. Therefore, it is not necessary that all the instructions deriving from the lama Mar-ba be of the Mādhyamika system.

In the Hundred Thousand Songs (mGur 'bum) of the venerable Mi-la-re-b̄a (Mi-la-ras-pa, 1040-1123) as well, the type of statements on the view which appear in the teaching to Tse-ring-ma (Tshe-ring-ma) are in accordance with the Prāsaṅgika view. The foremost great being D̄zong-ka-b̄a also said that the meaning of that song accords with Mādhyamika. Furthermore, in some songs the four yogas are identified, and even these can be suitably explained as either [belonging to] the Mādhyamika or Chittamātra view. Since these are not treatises designed as presentations of the general teaching, but are statements of a particular view, meditation, or behavior appropriate for a particular questioner, even someone with dull faculties can understand that it would be meaningless if these [teachers] had to explain everything they knew to that person. So although the terminology of the four yogas comes from the master Ratnākarashānti's Ornament of the Chittamātra (Chittamātrālaṃkāra), it does not appear that the four yogas of the Ḡa-gyu (bKa' rgyud) have to be those of the Chittamātra system.

The person who widely spread the name "Great Seal" (Mahāmudrā) in instructions [on the view] was the incomparable Gam-b̄o-b̄a (sGam-po-pa, 1079-1153). The identification of the view in his statements appears in both the Perfection Vehicle system and Mantra system, and for both he uses the name "instructions on the Great Seal." He wrote treatises which

prove, citing many sutra passages, that emptiness is called the Great Seal in the Perfection Vehicle system. Pa-mō-drup-dor-jay-gyel-b̄o (Phak-mo-grub-rdo-rje-gyal-po) and Dri-kung-gyu-ra-rin-b̄o-jay ('Bri-gung-skyu-ra-rin-po-che) appear to have been his followers. They also seem to have a system which values dependent arising in the class of appearance and does not discard investigation by the wisdom of individual analysis. However, their collected works are fraught with many contradictory notes added by many wise and unwise students and thus are unreliable.

The term Ḡar-b̄o-tsik-tup (dKar-po-tshig-thub) was not disseminated widely after Shang-tsel-b̄a (Zhang-tshal-pa) who wrote a treatise which is concerned mainly with Gar-bo-tsik-tup. It appears that his was the main object refuted by Mañjunātha S̄a-ḡya Paṇḍiṭa. Later, many of our own and other [sects] made many refutation of this position. If Shang-tsel-ba's own assertion rests in the position that the mind is not to be directed to anything, then these refutations are accurate; I do not wish to elaborate on it in detail.

Thus, I have written the foregoing explanations having sought out sources for the individual systems of tenets. Generally speaking, although the Tibetan translators met with impeccable Indian scholars, it does not seem to be certain that they sought to discover those scholars' assertions on the view. Even [when they] sought to discover

[their positions], these scholars and adepts taught an essential point concerning view or meditation which was appropriate for the mind of the questioner; it is doubtful that they explained everything they knew to that person. This is the procedure of the good spiritual guides of the Mahāyāna. They are not like the lecturers of today who, when offered a piece of dried meat, will bore you with all they know.

Therefore, with the exceptions of the Jo-nang system and, later, the system of the view of the translator D̄ak-tsang S̄hay-rap-rin-chen (sTag-tshang Shes-rab-rin-chen, 1405-?), the instructions on the view of the majority of the early scholars and adepts had some Indian scholar or adept as their source. However, among their followers, some had a little experience but did not know reasoning, others had studied a little but did not differentiate tenet systems, a few wanted to repeat what had been said before but did not even know how to repeat the words, and the majority mixed all the teachings they saw into those of their own system. It would be difficult to express [all the ways that they made mistakes].

The Jo-nang-b̄a view is one which appeared adventitiously from its own place; it has no source whatsoever in a scholar or adept. D̄ak-tsang divided [the path] into the three stages of the unanalyzed, the slightly analyzed, and the very

analyzed and then explained a view in which the former states are negated by the latter. [This explanation] is amazing because, instead of another opponent needing to set out contradictions to his system, he himself destroys his own presentation of the two truths. Those who, despite having such a nature, tire themselves trying to contradict the undisputed great charioteers are only objects of the supreme compassion of the excellent.

Also, from [consulting] the ocean-like scriptures of the foremost father D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his spiritual sons one can see the many mistakes made regarding the essentials of the view in earlier times, even by those who claimed to be Mādhyamika scholars, such as Tang-sak-b̄a of Shang (Zhang Thang-sag-pa). The many who claim to be followers of the Great Seal, Amanasikāroddesha, and Chittapakṣha [?] are only [followers of] the system of the Chinese abbot Hva-shang, which denegrates the factor of method. There appear to have been many who denegrated the class of method in all ways, or who said that the class of behavior was necessary but discarded individual analysis when seeking the view, or who said that analysis with wisdom was needed when initially seeking [the view] but discarded analysis when sustaining the actual session, and so forth. None of these pass beyond the system of Hva-shang. Since these wrong views spread widely, they appear to have mingled with the systems

explained above.

My brief expression of the different views in the Snowy Land [above] is not motivated by the wish to develop something which is different from others, nor by partisanship, nor from a wish for fame. My intention is to benefit the many wise and unwise [persons] who deprecate things which are not to be deprecated and who stain the stainless texts by mixing together all the terminology of many discordant systems. Specifically, I have set this forth in order to delight greatly those who have non-artificial faith, induced by the path of reasoning, in this unconfused differentiation of the system of the great charioteers, free from all stains of error, by the foremost lama D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his spiritual sons. And [I put this forth] in order to make known to those with good predispositions that the stainless, supreme path is this very system of the foremost second Conqueror D̄zong-ka-b̄a. Otherwise, what intelligent scholar would take great joy in putting the profound talk about scripture and reasoning in the ears of these migrators who [believe that they] have manifested the state of freedom from attachment thinking that the refined gold of good explanations and a pile of glass trinkets of wrong explanations are exactly the same!

Now, I will say this. There was one who completely filled all the areas of the earth with the faultless

Conqueror's teaching until the end of time through expanding the force of [his] wish to bear the excellent doctrine of the Conqueror—[that wish being made] in the presence of the Conquerors not one time [but many times]—by proclaiming the great lion's roar of the proper mode of dependent arising, the profound middle path free from all extremes of existence and non-existence, the essence of the teaching. Our excellent leader whose name is difficult to express, the venerable all-knowing one, the glorious L̄o-sang-drak-b̄a (bLo-bzang-grags-pa) [known as D̄zong-ka-b̄a] whose banner of fame flies over the three worlds was that very person. Regarding which great charioteer the venerable one [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] himself followed, it appears thus in the statements of the protector [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] himself [from his Praise of Dependent Arising (rTen 'grel bstod pa)]:

> The mode of your [Buddha's] unsurpassed vehicle
> Abandoning the extremes of existence and
>   non-existence
> Was explained just as it is in the texts
> Of the prophesied Nāgārjuna, a garden of jasmine.
>
> The vast sphere of stainless wisdom is the cause of
> Non-obstruction in the sky of scriptures,
> Removing the darkness of the heart of extreme
>   conceptions,

Outshining the lustre of the constellations of
wrong propositions.

[The definitive meaning[2]] is illuminated by the
rosary of white light
Of the good explanations of the glorious moon
[Chandrakīrti]
When, by the kindness of my lama,
I saw this, my mind attained rest.

As it says, he saw that just the tradition of the glorious protector—the Superior Nāgārjuna—and Chandrakīrti was supreme, and he himself illuminated the unmistaken path for the fortunate. Therefore, the intelligent should know that although there are inconceivable common and uncommon biographical facts concerning this venerable great being, from among them all, the chief is this alone: he filled the world with the kindness of the complete fulfillment of the Subduer's precious teaching by ascertaining and teaching to others the meaning of the thought of all the Conqueror's scriptures of sutra and tantra, without even the tiniest error, by way of stainless scripture and reasoning without confusing the distinctions made by the great charioteers.

Thus, from the fine points of the practice of discipline up to the great tenet systems and, in Mantra, from the fine points of rites and practices of mandalas up

to the great commentaries on the tantras, this venerable one [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] analyzed and gave certainty to everything with many scriptural citations and reasonings for every subtle point. He was never polluted with the fault of oversimplification or fabrication, he went back to the thought of each of the founding scholars and adepts and, in addition, went back well to the word of the Conqueror. In this way he arranged all of the teachings as causal factors in one person's [path to] becoming completely enlightened so that each one [of the teachings] becomes supportive to another, without contradiction. He thereby upheld and spread both the explanation and practice of the teaching.

It is established by stainless reasoning that not only is there no such biography among the prior scholars and adepts of the Snowy Land, but also there is no way that even the biography of Nāgārjuna, for instance, in the Land of Superiors could surpass it. How could there be a chance of this [biography] being similar to the biography of someone which is taken to be authentic merely upon the prophecy of another, "The being who was prophesied by so and so."

More than the fact that he saw the faces of many personal deities (yi dam gyi lha), gained many meditative stabilizations and clairvoyances, and so forth, the chief biographical fact is what was just explained. As the venerable lama himself says:

In the beginning, I strove for vast hearing.
In the middle, all the systems of texts appeared as instructions [for practice].
In the end, I practiced day and night.
All was dedicated for the sake of spreading the teaching.

Thus, at the very beginning he strove for detailed, vast hearing—without being rough or partial—of the word of the Conqueror and all the textual systems of the great charioteers which explain his thought. In dependence on that, all the sutras and treatises from Guṇaprabha's Stanzas on Discipline (Vinayakārikā) to the glorious Guhyasamāja Tantra—all the textual systems—appeared as practical instructions in the sense that they were included as either principal aspects or branches of the path to one person's becoming completely enlightened. In dependence on practicing the complete corpus of the path which had appeared in this way with constant, earnest achieving, the power of experience through stainless reasoning induced ascertainment of the essentials of the path. Thus, the proof [literally, "correct effect sign," *samyak-kārya-hetu] that he thereby drove the nail of non-confusion is generally his knowledge of how to uphold all the teachings without contradiction and specifically, the foremost being's scriptures on sutra and

mantra. For, no matter how much these texts are analyzed, direct perception establishes that there is not even an iota of a place to find blame for [his texts being] disjointed, redundant, contradictory, or overstepping the valid [Indian] texts.

Therefore:

> Though I have heard many textual systems on
> the path of reasoning,
> Understanding comes through much exertion.
> My collection of qualities is not worse that
> [that of] many
> But even though I make effort, I remain without
> realization.
> Having seen this well through the kindness of lama
> Mañjunātha [D̄zong-ka-b̄a],
> I have explained this with merciful intentions.

This is only an expression of the truth.

DEFINITION OF A MĀDHYAMIKA

A member of one of our own [Buddhist] schools who refutes well the extreme of existence—that all phenomena are ultimately established (paramārthasiddha)—and the extreme of annihilation—that phenomena do not exist even conventionally—and who asserts that [phenomena] are not truly established (satyasiddha) is a Mādhyamika. Regarding the extremes, Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way [XV.10] says:

> "Existence" is the conception of permanence.
> "Non-existence" is the view of annihilation.
> Therefore, the wise do not abide
> In existence or non-existence.

Thus, there are two, the extreme of existence and the extreme of non-existence. Extreme of existence (astyanta), extreme of permanence (shashvatānta), and extreme of superimposition (āropānta) are synonyms. Extreme of non-existence (nāstyanta), extreme of annihilation (uchchhedānta), and extreme of denial (apavādānta) are synonyms. Extreme (anta) and holding to an extreme are not the same because an extreme must be something that does not exist whereas holding to an extreme must be something that does exist.

Other [that is, non-Buddhist] schools never assert that any person or phenomenon is a dependent arising, a mere

conditionality (idampratyayatā) arising in dependence on causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya) and assert that these are only truly established. All of our own schools assert that they have fallen into the abyss of the views of permanence and annihilation.

Our two Hearer (Shrāvaka) schools [Vaibhāṣhika and Sautrāntika] assert the dependent arising of conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛita) which arise in dependence on causes and conditions and assert that they thereby abandon the two extremes. They refute the extremes of permanence, such as an agent who is unchanging in nature, and the extreme of annihilation which [according to them] is the assertion that cause and effect, the four truths, and so forth are utterly incorrect.

The Proponents of Awareness Only (Vijñaptimātravādin) delineate a suchness (tathatā) which is the non-duality of object and subject, and they assert that they abandon the extreme of permanence, such as the true existence of imaginaries (parikalpita), and abandon the extreme of annihilation which [for them] is the assertion that the other two natures [the other powered (paratantra) and the thoroughly established (pariniṣhpanna)] are utterly non-existent as was explained earlier [in the Chittamātra chapter not translated here].

The wise Mādhyamikas assert that dependent arising means

being empty of true existence, and they assert that emptiness of true existence means dependent arising; it does not mean a non-thing which lacks the ability to perform a function. Therefore, two separate reasons are not needed to refute the two extremes, and all presentations [of cyclic existence and nirvana] are possible in the context of those very bases upon which a nature of true existence is refuted. Thus, the reason "[because of being] a dependent arising" alone refutes the extremes of permanence [because whatever is a dependent arising does not truly exist] and annihilation [because whatever is a dependent arising conventionally exists].

Therefore, since among our own schools, the Chittamātrins and below [that is, the Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣhikas] assert that phenomena have a truly existent nature, they come to have the view of permanence even though they do not propound that [things] are permanent. Also, since they assert that something which truly existed at an earlier time is destroyed in the next moment, even though they do not assert that its continuum is severed, they nevertheless come to have a view of annihilation. Therefore, once it is asserted that things have a nature of true existence, one never passes beyond the extremes of permanence and annihilation.

Specifically, the Yogāchārins assert that they abandon the view of non-existence because mentally arisen

other-powered phenomena (paratantra) truly exist [as the same entity as the consciousness perceiving them] and they abandon the view of permanence because other-powered phenomena do not have an imaginary nature (parikalpita) [which is a different entity from the perceiving consciousness. Thereby] they deny the conventional existence of subject and object in terms of external objects, and they superimpose [true existence] onto other-powered phenomena which do not truly exist. Therefore, they fall to the extremes of both permanence and annihilation.

Hence, only the Mādhyamika view does not fall to the extremes of existence and non-existence and is free from the faults of permanence and annihilation; the others are not. This mode [appears in] Chandrakīrti's Clear Words which says:

> According to those who assert that other-powered phenomena are merely things which are minds (chitta) and mental factors (chaitta) and that these do not have an imaginary entity [that is, a difference of entity between subject and object], they thereby abandon the view of existence [according to them]. And through the fact that these other-powered things which are causes of the thoroughly afflicted (saṃklishṭa) and the completely pure (vaiyavadānika) do exist, [they say] that they abandon the view of non-existence. But

because, [according to them] the imaginary does not exist and other-powered phenomena do exist, they come to have both views of existence and non-existence. Therefore, how could they abandon the two extremes?[1]

Also:

Thus, in that way it should be known that only the Mādhyamika view lacks the consequences of being views of existence and non-existence and that the view of others, such as the Vijñānavādins are not [free of the consequences of holding the two extremes].[2]

The protector Nāgārjuna says [in his Precious Garland]:

> Ask the worldly ones, the Sāṃkhyas, the son
> of Uluka,[3]
> And the Nirgranthas who propound that the person
> And the aggregates [substantially exist[4]]
> If they assert what passes beyond existence
> and non-existence.
>
> Thus, the ambrosia of Buddha's teaching
> Explains what is called "the profound"
> Passed beyond existence and non-existence.
> Know that it is an uncommon doctrine.[5]

Therefore, if one wishes to be free from the views of permanence and annihilation, one should assert that all the dependent arisings of persons and phenomena have the meaning of [their] emptiness of true existence, like a moon in water [that is, not truly existent but not utterly non-existent, for a moon in water does not exist as a moon but does exist as a reflection]. Nāgārjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says:

> Those who assert that dependent things
> Are like a moon in water,
> Not real and not unreal
> Are not captivated by [wrong] views.[6]

Objection: The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutras (Samādhirāja) says:

> Both existence and non-existence are extremes.
> Pure and impure are extremes as well.
> Therefore, having abandoned both extremes
> The wise do not abide even in the center.

Also, the revered Maitreya says in his Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayālaṃkāra) [III.1]:

> Because of not abiding here or there
> Or even abiding in their center,

> And knowing the equality of the times
> It is asserted that wisdom has gone beyond.

Do these passages not reject abiding even in a middle which is an abandonment of the two extremes?

Answer: Many mistaken statements, such as that the Mādhyamika system has no assertions, have arisen through this wrong idea; therefore, I will discuss it. These passages teach that one should not, like the Proponents of True Existence, abandon trifling extremes and, apprehending a middle free from them which is conceived to be truly existent, abide there. How could these [passages] teach that there is no middle free from the extremes!

Vasubandhu's Reasonings for Explanation (Vyākhyāyukti) says:

> Anta means completion, last part,
> Nearness, direction, and lowness.

Thus, anta [extreme] has many usages, but with regard to its meaning in this context, the master Kamalashīla says [in his Illumination of the Middle Way]:

> If in Mādhyamika there were anything ultimate which was the nature of the mind's own entity, then how could the conceptions, "this is permanent" or "this is impermanent" be extremes? It is not

reasonable to say that proper mental application which accords with the suchness of things is a case of falling [to an extreme].

Thus, anta here is a place that one falls into, just as in the world, a rocky abyss is called anta and falling into that is called falling into an anta.

Since real existence (*samyaksat) does not exist even conventionally, non-real existence must exist conventionally. Therefore, [to hold that phenomena] do not ultimately exist is not a case of holding an extreme of non-existence, and making the refutation "does not not ultimately exist" is not a refutation of the extreme of non-existence [but is an extreme of existence]. Still, conceiving that the non-existence which is the negation of the object of negation really exists [that is, to believe that the negation which is emptiness truly exists] is a case of falling to the extreme of non-existence. Hence, refuting that is a refutation of the extreme of non-existence. Therefore, that is a superimpositional extreme of non-existence [superimposing true existence on emptiness] whereas [holding that] such things as actions and their effects do not exist conventionally is a deprecational extreme of non-existence [denying conventional existence]. When phenomena are conceived to exist ultimately, those [ultimately existent]

objects are extremes of superimposition, and the subjects conceiving such are [consciousnesses] conceiving of the extreme of superimposition. Because those who profess to be Mādhyamikas must know these things, I have explained them briefly. They should be known in detail from the statements of the foremost omniscient being Dzong-ka-ba.[7]

Thus, in order to lead those trainees who temporarily are unable to realize the profound path of the middle way, the Supramundane Victor (Bhagavan) taught some that a self of persons (pudgalātman) exists. To others he gave teachings stemming [from the view that] a self of persons does not exist but subjects and objects exist. To some having the Mahāyāna lineage (gotra) he said that a non-duality which is an emptiness of the duality of subject and object exists. To those of ripened faculties and surpassing intelligence he taught the middle path free from the two extremes and having the essence of emptiness and compassion. Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland says:

> Just as grammarians
> [Begin with reading the alphabet,
> So the Buddha teaches doctrines
> Which trainees can bear.

To some, he teaches doctrines
For the reversal of sins.
To some, for the sake of achieving merit.
To some, (doctrines) based on duality.

To some, (he teaches doctrines) based on non-duality.
To some, the profound, frightening to the fearful,
Having an essence of emptiness and compassion,
The means of achieving (highest) enlightenment.][8]

Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:

[Buddha] taught existence, non-existence
Both existence and non-existence, and neither.
Is it not that due to the illness
All [of these] become medicine?

The Four Hundred also says,

In the beginning non-merit is overcome.
In the middle self is overcome.
In the end all [bad] views are overcome.
Those who understand this are wise.

Thus, that which is called the Mādhyamika view must be a combination of the two: (1) the non-existence of even the smallest particle of a truly established nature in all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena and (2) the

compatibility of asserting all presentations of cyclic existence and nirvana, such as produced (utpādya) and producer (utpatti) and negative (pratiṣheda) and positive (vidhi) [phenomena] within that [non-true existence]. If one wishes to analyze whether the views of the many Tibetan systems are the Mādhyamika view, it must be analyzed from this very viewpoint alone. This mode [of assertion] is the fundamental tenet of both Mādhyamikas—Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika—of the Land of Superiors. The Superior Nāgārjuna says [in his Treatise on the Middle Way, XXIV 18-19]:

> We explain dependent arising
> As emptiness.
> That is dependent imputation,
> That is the middle way.
>
> Because there are no phenomena
> That are not dependent arisings,
> There are no phenomena
> That are not empty.

Even those Mādhyamikas [the Svātantrikas] who assert existence by way of its own character (svalakṣhaṇa) conventionally do not, in any way, assert that phenomena are truly established. Therefore, they explain the synonymity of dependent arising and emptiness which was explained above

[in the quotation from Nāgārjuna]. Bhāvaviveka's Lamp for [Nāgārjuna's] "Wisdom" says:

> The emptiness which is called "dependent arising" is dependently imputed. The convention is asserted for the mundane and the supramundane. Therefore, it is imputation in dependence on appropriation. It itself is the middle path because the middle is the abandonment of the extremes of production and non-production and existence and non-existence.

When one has gained certainty with respect to this unmistaken mode of settling the view of the basis in this way, then, at the time of path, the unmistaken essential of the inseparability of method (upāya)and wisdom (prajñā) will come easily. One is then able to generate in one's continuum the unmistaken causes of the fruit—the two bodies [the Truth Body (Dharmakāya) and the Form Body (Rūpakāya)]. Therefore, one must seek to ascertain this Mādhyamika view which is extremely important on all occasions of the basis, path, and fruit in the Mahāyāna.

Now, this [qualm] must be analyzed: If, in order to be posited as a Mādhyamika, one's view has to be a realization of the meaning of the subtle dependent arising which is free

from all extremes, then it would not be suitable for the Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas to be Mādhyamikas because they do not refute the subtle extreme of existence by way of [the object's] own character (svalakṣhaṇa) since upon searching with reasoning for persons and phenomena—the objects designated—they posit a particular base of designation as this or that particular [phenomenon]. If a Mādhyamika were posited not [because of] refuting all extremes regarding phenomena, but through asserting a middle way which destroys all extremes in terms of his own [mind], then it would [absurdly] follow that the Proponents of True Existence [the non-Mādhyamika schools] would be Mādhyamikas because they assert their own view as the middle path from the point of view of their refutation of the two extremes.

This must be explained. In general, [if] a mode of emptiness—the refutation of an object of negation in terms of [a false system's] tenets—is posited as the mode of being of phenomena, despite the fact that phenomena do not abide in that way, such is a mentally fabricated emptiness; it is not the meaning of the middle way. [On the other hand,] although a phenomenon abides in the way that it is determined to be empty of an object of negation, [if] that mode of emptiness does not apply to all subjects, such is a trifling emptiness; therefore, it is not suitable to be the element of [Superior] qualities (dharmadhātu), suchness

(_tathatā_).

Regarding that, the emptiness of forms being established as distant and cut off from the consciousness apprehending them or the emptiness [of forms] naturally being bases of conception for the thought consciousness apprehending them in the system of the [Chittamātrin] Proponents of True Existence does not apply to all phenomena. Therefore, through those modes of emptiness one cannot realize the synonymity of dependent arising and emptiness for all phenomena, nor do those modes of emptiness apply to all phenomena. Therefore, they do not know how to posit well a refutation of the two extremes for all phenomena, nor [do they know how to posit] the compatibility of appearance and emptiness.

The Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas assert existence by way of its own character because [they say] that if existence by way of its own character is refuted conventionally, it is impossible to posit the conventional existence of an object. However, they do not assert that all phenomena are established by way of a mode of subsistence which does not depend on a non-defective awareness, and they refute [such a mode of subsistence] with numerous reasons. Because it is not the case that this type of emptiness which is such a negation [of a mode of subsistence that does not depend on a non-defective awareness] is inaccurate, it is not mentally

fabricated. Also, because it applies to all conditioned and unconditioned things, it is not a trifling emptiness. Therefore, since that type of emptiness can be realized to be synonymous with dependent arising, this abandonment of the two extremes with respect to all objects is far more subtle than that of the Chittamātrins. Thus, Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas are fit to be called Mādhyamikas whereas the term Mādhyamika is not applicable to Chittamātrins. The foremost great being Dzong-ka-ba said, "These scholars also refuted the tenet of true existence of phenomena through many doors of reasoning and asserted non-true existence well. Hence, they are Mādhyamikas." It should be understood in this way. Avalokitavrata says:

> The knowledge that external and internal dependent arisings conventionally exist as mere illusions capable of performing functions and ultimately are without entityness is the mode of the perfection of wisdom taught by the proponents of the middle path, the Superior [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], Bhāvaviveka, Buddhapālita, and so forth.

However, those who realize the very subtle meaning of dependent arisings are only the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas.

The presentation of the tenets of the Mādhyamikas has two parts: (1) the division of definitive sutras and those requiring interpretation by Nāgārjuna and his spiritual sons and (2) the actual explanation of their tenets.

THE DIVISION INTO DEFINITIVE SUTRAS AND THOSE REQUIRING INTERPRETATION BY NĀGĀRJUNA AND HIS SPIRITUAL SONS

The section has two parts: citing what is said in the sutras and an explanation of the meaning of those [statements].

Setting Forth Statements from Sutras

An explicit statement by the protector Nāgārjuna [identifying] a sutra source in dependence on which he divided scriptures into the definitive (nītārtha) and those requiring interpretation (nēyartha) does not appear in the Superior's own works, such as the "Collections of Reasoning" and the Compendium of Sutra. However, an implicit indication exists in the way he explains the meaning of sutras. The glorious Chandrakīrti establishes [the division of scriptures] citing the Sutra Set Forth by Akṣhyamati (Akṣhyamatinirdeshasūtra). Avalokitavrata also explains [the division] in that way in his explanatory commentary to Bhavaviveka's Lamp for [Nāgārjuna's] "Wisdom". In addition, the master Kamalashīla in his Illumination of the Middle Way uses that same sutra as

the source for the division into definitive sutras and those requiring interpretation. Thus, just the Sutra Set Forth by Akṣhyamati is the source for the division into the definitive and that requiring interpretation.

This is what the sutra itself says:

> If it is asked, "What is a sutra of definitive meaning? What is a sutra whose meaning requires interpretation?" Sutras which teach the establishment of conventionalities are called [sutras] whose meaning requires interpretation. Those sutras which teach the establishment of ultimates are called [sutras] of definitive meaning. Sutras which teach by way of various words and letters are called [sutras] whose meaning requires interpretation. Those sutras which teach the profound—difficult to see and difficult to realize—are called [sutras] of definitive meaning. Sutras which teach, for instance, a [truly existent] owner when there is no [truly existent] owner, with [the owner] being described with various terms [such as] self, sentient being, life, nourisher, being, person, born of Manu, child of Manu, agent, and experiencer are called [sutras] whose meaning requires interpretation. Those sutras which teach the doors of liberation—the emptiness of things, no [truly existent] signs, no [truly existent] wishes, no [truly

> existent] composition, no [truly existent] production, no [truly existent] birth, no [truly existent sentient beings, no [truly existent] living beings, no [truly existent] persons, and no [truly existent] owner—are called [sutras] of definitive meaning. This is called relying on sutras of definitive meaning and not relying on sutras whose meaning requires interpretation.

The Purpose of the Master's [Nāgārjuna's] Division Into the Definitive and the Interpretable

From among the doctrines taught by the Supramundane Victor (*Bhagavan*) in many forms—existence and non-existence, truth and falsity, and so forth—some [persons] become doubtful as to which have true meanings and which have false meanings and some have mistaken ideas who, because of their own low intelligence, mistake the interpretable for the definitive and similarly mistake the definitive for the other [the interpretable. Nāgārjuna] clearly made the distinction between the interpretable and the definitive for them with the intention of fulfilling their purposes. The glorious Chandrakīrti says [in his *Clear Words*]:

> Some have the doubt, "Here, what is the teaching which has the meaning of suchness? Here, what is that which has a special intention?" Also, some

due to having a weak intellect, think that interpretable teachings are definitive. In order to eliminate with reasoning and scripture the doubt and misunderstanding of both of those [types of people], the master [Nāgārjuna] composed this [Treatise on the Middle Way].

Regarding the way in which [Nāgārjuna] differentiated the definitive and interpretable, he stated all qualms that the meaning of definitive sutras should be interpreted in another way and refuted [those qualms] well, bestowing highest certainty with respect to the path of purification from the point of view of many reasonings. He also established that meaning [of definitive sutras] by way of scripture, that is, with the word of the Supramundane Victor as witness. Thus, at the end of the passage [quoted above], the glorious Chandrakīrti says:

> Regarding that, reasonings are stated by [Nāgārjuna's] saying such things as:
>
> From themselves, other,
> [Both, or causelessly
> Things are never produced
> At all, anywhere].
>
> Statements of scripture are such [stanzas] as:

The Supramundane Victor said that
deceptive
[Phenomena are falsities.
All products have the quality of
deception.
Therefore, they are falsities].

With respect to the actual meaning of [the passage quoted from] the Sutra Set Forth by Akṣhyamati, the first two sentences which begin, "Sutras which teach the establishment of conventionalities . . ." differentiate definitive and interpretable sutras from the point of view of their object of expression; they are not posited from the point of view of such things as the place and time [of the teaching. Those sentences] also briefly indicate that sutras which mainly teach conventionalities are categorized as interpretable and sutras which mainly teach ultimates are categorized as definitive. The next two sentences which begin, "Sutras which teach by various words and letters . . ." identify sutras which teach conventionalities and sutras which teach ultimates. Teachings of a variety of different objects with a variety of different words and letters are categorized as the former [sutras which teach conventionalities] and teachings of the meaning which is difficult to realize and which is of one taste [in the sense of being] an elimination of elaborations are categorized as the latter [sutras which teach

ultimates]. The last two sentences which begin, "Sutras which teach, for instance, a [truly existent] owner . . ." indicate the mode of teaching of conventionalities by which [a sutra] comes to set forth conventionalities and the mode of teaching ultimates by which [a sutra] comes to set forth ultimates.

[The part of the sentence] from "for instance, a [truly existent] owner" through "experiencer" taken literally gives only synonyms for "person" but in fact does not refer only to persons; it must refer to all teachings of things which are objects and means related to that agent as existent. For example, the chapter which is an analysis of coming and going [chapter II] and the chapter which is an analysis of action [chapter VII] in Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way refutes all qualms that, if the goer who comes here from another worldly life and goes from this one to another exists, then the person must truly exist and [the qualm that] if the agent of virtuous and non-virtuous actions exists, then the person must truly exist. Therefore, although [these chapters] teach both agent and action, they must be taken as chapters which principally delineate the selflessness of persons [since agent and actions are phenomena directly related to the person]. In the same way, this [passage from the sutra] must be taken as having individual parts which teach both phenomena and persons. The second sentence, from "emptiness"

through "no [truly existent] birth" principally indicates the mode of the selflessness of phenomena (dharmanairātmya). "No [truly existent] sentient beings" through "no [truly existent] owner" principally teach the mode of the selflessness of persons (pudgalanairātmya).

The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra says:

> Instances of definitive sutras are known
> To accord with the Sugata's teaching of emptiness.
> All doctrines teaching sentient being, person, or being
> Are to be known as requiring interpretation.

With respect to that, "interpetation" [literally: drawing or leading] in the sense of an interpretable scripture does not refer merely to teachings for the sake of leading trainees. Either (1) the meaning of the sutra is not suitable to be held in the way in which it is set forth and through explaining the [basis in Buddha's] thought, must still be interpreted otherwise, or (2) even though [the meaning of the sutra] is suitable to be taken literally, still, it alone is not the mode of being—the suchness—of those [phenomena discussed], due to which their suchness must be sought elsewhere. Thus, their meaning is interpretable—the meaning requires interpretation.

An example of the first is [the statement in the

Descent into Laṅkā Sutra] "Father and mother are to be killed." Since the literal meaning of the statement to kill one's father and mother is not suitable to be taken as it is, it must be interpreted otherwise—[that one should destroy] the existence (bhava) [the tenth link in the chain of dependent arising, the fully potentialized state of] karma and attachment (ṭṛiṣhṇa) [the eighth link]. Such an interpretation is still interpretable in the latter sense [because the final mode of being of existence and attachment —their emptiness—still has not been set forth]. An example of the second is the teaching that resources arise from giving, despite the fact that its meaning is suitable to be taken literally. Someone might say that the production of resources through giving is the mode of being of that [giving] and that a mode of being of giving which is other than that does not exist. [In response to that qualm, one would] explain that the mode of being of giving is not merely that; its suchness must be sought elsewhere.

Definitive meanings are taught in the manner of eliminating elaborations of self, [truly existent] production, etc. with respect to phenomena and persons. Since the explicit meaning itself is the final mode of being, (1) it cannot be interpreted beyond that, (2) it is not suitable to be interpreted as something other than that by another person, and (3) it also has valid proofs. Therefore, its meaning is

definite—it is a definitive meaning. Although there are valid proofs for a statement such as that a sprout is produced from a seed, its meaning requires interpretation since [the statement] does not deal with the ultimate.

Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way says, "What is the definitive meaning? It is that which has validity and is explained in terms of the ultimate because it cannot be interpreted otherwise by another." Thus, he says that a definitive meaning must be a combination of that which has valid proofs and which teaches the ultimate. If the definitive and the interpretable referred merely to the existence or non-existence of a meaning which accords with how it is taught, having validity alone would be sufficient and it would not be necessary [for Kamalashīla] to add the qualification "in terms of the ultimate." Thus, one must carefully distinguish the presence of special implications in portions of the statements of the great charioteers.

When the categorization into the definitive and interpretable is divided from the point of view of the means of expression, since the categorization must be made in terms of whether or not the meaning of a scripture must be interpreted in another way, only scriptures are to be taken as illustrations of the definitive or interpretable. Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way says, "Therefore, it is to be understood that only that which expresses the

ultimate is definitive and the opposite of that is interpretable." Also [he says],"The non-[true] existence of production, etc. are set forth in the [Sutra] Set Forth by Akṣhyamati," thus, it is definitive.

When the definitive and interpretable are divided in terms of the object of expression, then the object itself which must or must not be interpreted otherwise has to be categorized as definitive or interpretable. Therefore, conventional truths (saṃvṛitisatya) are categorized as interpretable, and ultimate truths (paramārthasatya) are categorized as definitive. The Ornament Illuminating the Wisdom Engaging the Sphere of All Buddhas Sutra (Sarvabuddhaviṣhayāvatārajñānālokālaṃkārasūtra) which says, "That which is definitive is the ultimate," and the passage from the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra cited earlier [page 434] establish this.

Kamalashīla's second Stages of Meditation says, "All of the words of the Supramundane Victor were spoken well because they directly or indirectly clarify suchness or flow to suchness." As he says, [all] doctrines whatsoever spoken by the Conqueror are for the purpose of attaining liberation. This is contingent on knowing that liberation cannot be attained through familiarity with conventional truths alone and that liberation must be attained through the force of meditation, having interpreted [conventional truths] and sought out

suchness.

Qualm: Statements such as those in a Mother Sutra [a Perfection of Wisdom sutra] that "Form does not exist, the production of form does not exist," are not sutras of definitive meaning because they are not suitable to be taken literally.

Answer: These are not non-literal sutras because the Extensive Mother Sutra [the Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Stanzas (Shatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra)] affixes a qualification to the object of negation, saying "This is for the conventions of the world, not ultimately." The qualification of the object of negation in that way in one context applies to statements in other places in that Perfection of Wisdom text in which the qualification is not affixed. Therefore, although [the qualification "ultimately"] is not explicitly stated in this context [of saying that form does not exist], that does not make it non-literal.

With respect to this, according to the Svātantrikas, statements within sutras such as the Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Stanzas which explicitly apply the qualification "ultimately" to the object of negation are definitive and literal. [Statements] without words which clearly affix the qualification "truly" [or "ultimately"] to the object of negation in sutras such as the Heart of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (Prajñāpāramitāhṛidaya) cannot be

taken literally and therefore are asserted to be interpretable, requiring interpretation in another way. Therefore, they assert that the statement in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Saṃdhinirmochanasūtra) that the middle wheel [of Buddha's teaching, the teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom sutras] requires interpretation is not saying that all [sutras] of the middle wheel [require interpretation].

The Prāsaṅgikas assert that the Heart of the Perfection of Wisdom and so forth are sutras of the middle wheel which do not explicitly affix the qualification "ultimately" to the object of negation. However, since they are similar in type to sutras which clearly affix the qualification "ultimately," such as the Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Stanzas, the qualification is implicitly affixed to the object of negation in those [sutras] as well. Therefore, they are only literal and definitive. That the words of the sutra, "Form does not exist, sound does not exist," and so forth teach that forms, sounds, etc., are utterly non-existent is not suitable even to be taken literally. Therefore, the words of a sutra, "Form does not exist," are necessarily not words of a sutra teaching that forms do not exist.

Thus, the protector Nāgārjuna set forth many faults, such as that dependence on causes and conditions is contradictory when internal and external causes and effects have a nature of true existence, and he established with many proofs

that all presentations of bondange (bandha) and liberation (mokṣha) are feasible within their lacking a truly existent nature. [He thereby] proved that sutras which teach suchness, like the Mother Sutras, are definitive and sutras teaching what does not accord with those are interpretable. Therefore, Nāgārjuna's "Collections of Reasoning" such as the Treatise on the Middle Way open the way for distinguishing the definitive and interpretable. Furthermore, the fact that this mode of distinguishing the definitive and the interpretable relies on the Sutra Set Forth by Akṣhyamati can be known through Nāgārjuna's own mode of explanation.

Question: How does one interpret the statement in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought that if other-powered natures are seen as not truly existent, it produces a view deprecating all three natures?

Answer: That statement is made in terms of the thoughts of trainees who, though having the Mahāyāna lineage, do not have the supreme mind which realizes suchness, because for trainees who possess the supreme mind which realizes suchness, the very realization that other-powered phenomena do not truly exist serves as a method of refuting the view of deprecation [because it aids realization of the conventional existence of phenomena].

Thus, in general, sutras of the middle wheel such as the Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Stanzas are

definitive and sutras of the last wheel such as the Sutra Unravelling the Thought are interpretable. However, it is not contradictory that in terms of those trainees [who have not realized suchness], the final wheel becomes definitive and the middle wheel requires interpretation. For example, generally between the teachings of self and selflessness, the latter is better, but it is not contradictory that the former is better for trainees who are temporarily not suitable vessels for the teaching of selflessness. Thus, as long as those trainees cannot understand the non-contradiction of the non-existence of even a particle of true establishment (*satyasiddhi) and the suitability of making all presentations [of phenomena] within that [non-true existence], they must be taught doctrines which divide phenomena with some being true [that is, truly established] and some being untrue. This is because they must be led in stages, being taught a portion of selflessness, and because the selflessness taught to them is not positable for their minds if the basis in relation to which it is posited does not truly exist.

Therefore, this is the reason for statements refuting inherent existence (svabhāva) in the person but not refuting it in the aggregates and statements refuting a difference of substantial entity (dravya) between object and subject but not refuting the inherent existence of the emptiness of duality [of subject and object].

There are many points based on these which should be explained in detail, and knowing these well appears to be a supreme door for those with intelligence to generate firm, non-artificial faith in the word of the Conqueror and the valid treatises commenting on his thought.

ACTUAL EXPLANATION OF THE MĀDHYAMIKAS' ASSERTION OF TENETS

In general, the Mādhyamikas who are followers of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] assert a Mahāyāna presentation of the basis, path, and fruit as follows. With respect to the basis, they have, first, a way of making a presentation of the two truths, which are:

1 the non-existence of even a particle of a true nature in any person or phenomenon
2 and the suitability of positing all conventional presentations within that [non-true existence] without the slightest discrepancy.

With respect to the path, [they make a presentation of] a path of inseparable method and wisdom which is a mutual union of:

1 the stages of the profound path which is the unmistaken view—for a mind realizing suchness—of the non-existence of even a particle of that which is pointed to by a [consciousness mis-]apprehending signs [of true existence]
2 and the stages of the vast paths which are included in (a) the non-artificial altruistic aspiration to highest enlightenment induced by love and compassion, preceded by training in the contemplations of beings of small and middling capacity,[1] (b) the deeds of the six perfections,[2] as well as (c) the four ways of gathering students.[3]

[With respect to the fruit] in dependence on training in such a complete path, the fruit of the enlightenment which does not abide in either of the extremes of cyclic existence (saṃsāra) or [solitary] peace is actualized, with the two aspects of the Form Body (Rūpakāya) [the Complete Enjoyment Body (Sambhogakāya) and the Emanation Body (Nirmanakāya)] effecting, as is appropriate, the welfare of trainees having the three lineages [the Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Mahāyāna lineages]. This [assertion of the basis, path, and fruit] comprises the general tenets [of Mādhyamika].

The [Sautrāntika] Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas assert that those of the Hearer and Solitary Realizer lineages attain their enlightenment through accustoming to just the selflessness of persons in conjunction with factors of methods for three lifetimes [for Hearers], one hundred eons [for Solitary Realizers] and so forth. However, the master Buddhapālita, who became an adept, the glorious Chandrakīrti, and the venerable Shāntideva assert that those [Hīnayānists] also realize the selflessness of phenomena.

Question: What features must be complete in a person of sharp faculties having the Mahāyāna lineage who begins the path of three periods of countless eons?

Answer: Regarding the general structure of the path, the venerable Maitreya says [in his Ornament for the Mahāyāna Sutras (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra)]:

Faith observing the Buddha, and so forth
Effort in the sphere of giving and so forth,
Mindfulness which is the marvelous contemplation,
Non-conceptual meditative stabilization,
And the wisdom knowing phenomena in all ways
Are the five aspects.

Faith (shraddhā) in this context is faith in everything included within the causes and effects of the Three Jewels, illustrated [in the stanza] by the faith observing the ethics and so forth of the Buddhas of the three times [past, present, and future]. Since such faith includes all the doctrines of the causes and effects of the Mahāyāna as its objects, when such faith is generated, one is said to be skilled in faith. Regarding mindfulness, the chief of the marvelous contemplations is the generation of the altruistic aspiration to enlightenment (bodhichittotpāda) and all paths of the three vehicles become objects of that mindfulness. Therefore, when such mindfulness arises, one is said to be skilled in mindfulness. Regarding effort (vīrya), if having generated the aspiration to enlightenment, one lacks the earnestness to train in the deeds [of the perfections], enlightenment will not be achieved. Therefore, earnestness is to be generated for the deeds in general through armor-like effort. When such effort arises, one is said

to be skilled in effort. Meditative stabilization (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā) [in the stanza] indicate the mode of training specifically in the last two perfections. The cultivation of the uncommon Mahāyāna calm abiding (shamatha) and special insight (vipashyanā) is called being skilled in meditative stabilization and wisdom in this context.

Thus, one goes to the uncommon Mahāyāna refuge by way of having previously trained in the contemplations of beings of small and middling capacity. Then, through strongly seeking the welfare of others and [highest] enlightenment, one generates the aspiration [to enlightenment]—the basis of the [Bodhisattva] deeds—and trains in the powerful deeds of the Conqueror's Children. One becomes skilled in the general structure of such a path, and then, in accordance with, "thoroughly giving without signs, and so forth,"[4] one removes well, through hearing and thinking, superimpositions with respect to all types of clear realization (abhisamaya)—the twenty-one divisions of non-contaminated wisdom (anāsravajñāna) which when divided extensively has one hundred forty-four divisions. When, through having cultivated them, one initially generates well-developed experience with respect to all [of these factors], one is said to have entered the beginning of the path to complete enlightenment in three periods of countless eons.

The development of experience with respect to emptiness

through the wisdom arisen from meditation (bhāvanāmayīprajñā) occurs at the time of the path of preparation (prayogamārga). However, there undoubtedly must be familiarization and so forth [with emptiness] by the wisdom arising from thinking (chintāmayīprajñā) at this time. It is said that until the attainment of the Mahāyāna path of seeing (darshanamārga), those who have entered the path must cultivate intense familiarization with the types of clear realizations which are transcended through viewing them with knowledge at the time of the path of seeing. Therefore, one must make effort at meditation on the topics ranging from the importance of leisure and fortune[5] and the difficulty of finding it, through to the sixteen aspects of the four truths,[6] conjoining them with the uncommon [Mahāyāna] path. Even at the time of attaining a ground (bhūmi), one must perform both analytical and stabilizing meditation with respect to all types of clear realizations through a union of calm abiding and special insight. That is practiced by way of thirty-seven harmonies of enlightenment (bodhipakṣha)[7] and so forth.

In brief, there are no stages of practice other than sustaining any of the six perfections in states of meditative equipoise (samāhita) and subsequent attainment (pṛiṣhṭhalabdha). Therefore, one must gain ascertainment with respect to the statement by the excellent regent [Maitreya] that the six

perfections are a great compendium of practice.

This is the general system of the great Mādhyamikas; the way for a beginner to take to mind the stages of the path, the way to enhance the path, remove obstacles, and so forth, and the way to identify and stop deviations from the path should be known in detail from one who has trained in the great systems of the path [presented by] the incomparable, great elder [Atīsha] and the foremost great being [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] which illuminate well the quintessential instructions transmitted from the two charioteers [Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, those instructions being] the final thought of the Conqueror. These should be known from the instructions on the stages of the path of the perfections written down by the foremost father D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his spiritual sons [Gyel-tsap and Kay-drup] as well as a succession of excellent beings bearing their lineage. [The instructions should also be learned] by associating for a long time with a skilled spiritual guide who has mastered that system.

Differences appear in the texts of the great followers of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] regarding the presentations delineating the two selflessnesses—the mode of generating in one's continuum the stages of the profound path, the view realizing suchness. Due to these, there are also slight differences in the presentations of the states of the paths and fruits. These [differences] should be known in very

extensive form from the statements of the foremost father D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his spiritual sons. I also wish to explain them elsewhere relying on their statements, but I have given just a brief summary here.

Explanation of the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika system has three parts: definition, divisions, and assertions.

DEFINITION

Amarasinha's Treasury (Amarakosha) says, "Own continuum [means] own power and self-power." Thus own continuum (svātantra), own power (svairi), and own nature (svabhāva) are synonyms. Bhāvaviveka's Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) Wisdom, in commenting on the thirteenth chapter of Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way says:

> The thirteenth chapter was composed for the purpose of setting forth the non-entityness of conditioned phenomena in terms of another aspect, through the force of answers to the refutations [by opponents] and own-powered inferences.

Therefore, autonomous (svatantra) means that an inferential consciousness (anumāṇa) realizing the thesis (pratijñā) is generated without taking the lead merely from the opponent's assertions, but by his having ascertained the establishment of the modes of the sign (liṅga) with respect to a subject that is established as appearing commonly to non-mistaken valid cognizers (pramāṇa) of both parties in the debate through the force of an objective mode of subsistence from the side of its basis of designation. Mādhyamikas who assert

the correctness of the necessity for such are Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas.

In the Svātantrika system, non-defective sense consciousnesses are conventionally not mistaken with respect to their appearing objects (*pratibhāsa-vishaya). The reason why they are not mistaken in that way rests on the fact that forms and so forth appear to non-defective consciousnesses to be established by way of their own entity, and they assert that forms and so forth are established by way of their own entity. Thinking of this, Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Byang chub lam rim chen mo) says:

> The reason why they assert autonomous signs (svatantra-liṅga) in their system is this conventional existence of own-character (svalakṣhaṇa), that is, establishment by way of [the object's] own entity conventionally. Therefore, the [Svātantrikas'] positing and the [Prāsaṅgikas'] not positing of autonomous signs in their own systems meets back to this very subtle object of negation.

Therefore, a Mādhyamika who asserts that the three modes of the sign proving non-true existence are established from their own side is the definition of a Svātantrika-Mādhyamika.

DIVISIONS

The Svātantrikas are definite as two, the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas[1] and the Yogāchāra-Mādhyamikas. Regarding the reason why the first are called Sautrāntikas, since they assert that the observed-object-conditions (ālambana-pratyaya) of sense consciousnesses are external objects which are composites of subtle particles, their conventional assertion of observed-object-conditions accords with the Sautrāntikas conventionally. Therefore, they are designated in that way.

Regarding the reason why the second are called Yogāchārins, the master Shāntarakṣhita's autocommentary to his Ornament for the Middle Way says:

According to others:

> [Phenomena] which are causes and effects
> Are solely [the entity of] consciousness alone
> [Because] that which is established by it
> [consciousness]
> Abides as [the entity of] consciousness.[2]

Also, "Hence, we accord with everything that appears in the Sutra on the Heavily Adorned (Ghanavyūhasūtra) and the Sutra Unravelling the Thought Sutra."[3] Thus, since they conventionally make assertions in accordance with the mode of Mere Knowledge (Vijñaptimātratā) which is an emptiness of external

objects, they are called Yogāchāra-Mādhyamikas. Therefore, Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations says:

> Thus, it is good to [take it] in accordance with the assertion of the master Ye-shay-day that although such a system appeared here and there [prior to Shāntarakṣhita], the master Shāntarakṣhita extensively composed texts and founded the system of Mādhyamika tenets [teaching] the mode of the non-existence of external objects conventionally.

Objection: That etymology of Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika is incorrect, for Kay-drup's Thousand Doses says:

> Neither the master Bhāvaviveka nor Jñānagarbha accord with the Sautrāntikas in the presentation of conventionalities because there are many points of great disagreement, such as their not asserting self-knowers (svasamvedana), and because if accordance is posited due to agreement on one position, then it would [absurdly] follow that everyone agrees with the tenets of everyone else.

Answer: There is no fault because this [statement by Kay-drup] is merely putting forth a point which refutes an etymology by earlier Tibetans that whatever the Sautrāntikas

assert ultimately, these [Sautrāntika-Svātantrika] Mādhyamikas assert conventionally; he is not saying that in general it is unsuitable to etymologize Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika from the viewpoint of according with the Sautrāntikas on one position. Also, there are many cases of an etymology or mere usage not having to contain all characteristics [of the object in question]. Furthermore, the glorious Chandrakīrti, in his commentary to Āryadeva's Four Hundred, explains that Bhāvaviveka's mode of positing sense powers (indriya) and objects (viṣhaya) in accordance with the Sautrāntikas is not correct. Also, that Bhāvaviveka asserts such is explained clearly in his commentary to his Essence of the Middle Way. Furthermore, Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path and Kay-drup's Thousand Doses both explain [his position] as just that when they explain Bhāvaviveka's assertions.

PART TWO

SAUTRĀNTIKA-SVĀTANTRIKA-MĀDHYAMIKA

The presentation of the Svātantrikas assertions has two parts: the assertions of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas and the assertions of the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas. The first has two parts: a refutation of the system of the Proponents of True Existence and a presentation of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas' own system.

The refutation of the Proponents of True Existence has two parts: a demonstration of incorrectness of their explanation presenting the three natures and a demonstration of the incorrectness of their explanation that external objects do not exist.

THE INCORRECTNESS OF THE [CHITTAMĀTRIN] EXPLANATION OF THE THREE NATURES

Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.8-9] says:

> All the words of the Tathāgathas
> Explained here are valid for us,
> For they are believable, valid scriptures.
> The good assert that [these] are established.
>
> Others who have doubt and wrong ideas
> From other scriptures do not accept them.
> Therefore, in order to engage in proving them
> The rational procedure should be sought.[1]

This explains that since the Vijñaptikas [Chittamātrins] ascribe faults to the Mādhyamikas which are not valid and [since] the [Mādhyamikas'] own system is valid, all the cases in which the Chittamātrins take the Mādhyamikas as the opponent should be refuted.

Regarding the mode of refutation, that same text says [V.10], "Non-dualistic things [are not reasonable]. . . ." This refutes the true establishment of consciousnesses which are empty of duality [of subject and object] and indicates the unreasonableness of refuting external objects. Bhāvaviveka also refutes the Chittamātrin presentation of the three natures with statements such as [at V.55], "The imaginary does not exist. . . ."

With respect to that, the Chittamātrins say:

> The subject, imaginary natures, lack entityness (svabhāvatā) in the sense of lacking their own character (lakṣhaṇa) because of being entities which are completely superimposed, as is the case, for example, with imagining a rope to be a snake.

[Bhāvaviveka says] that this is not correct because of the indefiniteness of the reason. Does the reason, "because of being entities which are completely superimposed," mean that an own-character (svalakṣhaṇa) of an imaginary entity is utterly non-existent, like a snake which is imputed to a rope? Or does it mean that because [imaginary natures] are objects of expression by terms and thought consciousnesses, the own-character of imaginary entities, like the entity of

the rope, does exist? If you say that even the rope is not established by way of its own character, that [position] is damaged by worldly renown, because in the world it is renowned that there exists an entityness of rope which is water and hemp twisted with the exertion of human hands. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.55] says:

> It is not asserted that "the imaginary does
> not exist
> Because of being imputed, like a snake [to
> a rope]"
> Due to indefiniteness concerning the entity
> of the rope.
> Or [if you say that the rope does not exist
> by way of its own character, your position]
> is damaged by [worldly] renown.[2]

Furthermore, in the example, the factor of wrong imputation—the snake—and the basis of imputation, the rope which exists by way of its own character, both exist. Similarly, in the case of the meaning [that is exemplified], the mistaken factor—the imputer—and the non-mistaken factor of the imputed entity, the basis of imputation, must both exist because, in the example, "like imputing a snake to a rope" stated by you, there are mistaken and unmistaken factors

in the basis of imputation and the imputation, and there must be similarity between the example and the exemplified. However, you are not able to accept that [both exist] because you assert that entities of imputation do not exist by way of their own character, and since entities of imputation do not exist by way of their own character, they must not exist. Even incurring that fault, it is not correct that objects which are imputed as entities and attributes do not have an entityness of their own character because objects which are imputed as entities and attributes exist by way of an entityness of their own character conventionally. Thinking of this, Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.56ab] says:

> That [imputed entity] is not mistaken
> Because [the example] is seen to have many
> factors [erroneous and not erroneous].[3]

Furthermore, your explanation that entities of imputation are mistaken in all ways is not correct because, if that were the case, conventional phenomena would be denied, and because if conventionalities did not exist, it would be impossible also to realize ultimate entities—the objects of individual knowledge (pratyātmavedya)—as well. Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.56cd] says:

> You deprecate things because
> You refute objects in all ways.[4]

Also, Bhāvaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning says:

> If you say that things which are not literal entities are hardly like the objects of individual knowledge, it would still be contradictory with the presentation of conventional truths because sutra says, "It is impossible to realize the ultimate without conventional phenomena."[5]

The Chittamātrins also say:

> Although external objects do not exist, the appearance of the signs of [external] objects occurs in dependence on names and terminology. Since all conceptions are produced from that, it is correct that the imputations do not have an entityness of own-character.

[Bhāvaviveka responds that] this is also incorrect because animals such as birds and deer who do not know names, letters, etymologies, and terminology are seen to generate great afflictions (kleśha). Thus, external objects such as forms which are the objects [in relation to which]

these afflictions are produced only exist. To explain this the Essence of the Middle Way [V.57] says:

> Even without names there are afflictions;
> It is not the case that objects appear from
> using names
> Because of the production of afflictions
> Even in animals who do not know speech.[6]

Also, the commentary following the stanza says, "It should be known that forms and so forth in dependence on which the afflictions are produced are only externally existent objects."[7]

Furthermore, you Chittamātrins' proving to us that other-powered phenomena exist by way of their own character is meaningless because if you are proving [that they exist that way] conventionally, you would be proving what is already established, since we also assert that other-powered phenomena are established by way of their own nature conventionally. If you are proving that they exist by way of their own character ultimately, then that is even more incorrect because an example which has the sign [reason] and predicate of the proof that other-powered phenomena ultimately exist cannot be found.

The reason stated by you, "Things do not have entityness because of lacking a nature of expression" has

the fallacy of being contradictory because the sign—lacking a nature of expression—eliminates that the subject—things—ultimately exist. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.71] says:

> To say that other-powered phenomena exist
> conventionally
> Would be to prove what is [already]
> established [for us].
> If [you say that they exist] ultimately,
> There is no example and the reason is
> contradictory.[8]

This is also clearly explained in the commentary following this [stanza],[9] but fearing excess, I will not cite it.

Also, your assertion that the thoroughly established nature—the suchness which is the emptiness of duality [of subject and object]—is ultimately existent is not correct because if thoroughly established entities exist ultimately, freedom from the extreme of superimposition would not be possible, since they ultimately exist, and if the entity which is non-ultimate existence [itself] ultimately exists, one is not free from the extreme of deprecation. Furthermore, if thoroughly established natures are ultimately established, it would follow that the exalted wisdom perceiving the modes (yathāvajjñāna) would have

observation [of signs of true existence], and [it would follow that] complete, perfect enlightenment (samyaksaṃbodhi) would lack equality [since it would perceive both ultimate and non-ultimate existence]. In order to explain these fallacies, Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.95,97] says:

> If an entity of the nature of existence
> and non-existence
> Were ultimate,
> How are you free
> From the extremes of superimposition and
> deprecation?[10]
>
> The Teacher would not be without observation
> [of true existence]
> Because he would observe [a truly existent]
> reality.
> Enlightenment would not be equal
> Because different natures would appear to it.[11]

The commentary following this says:

> If the observation [of the true existence] of the reality which is the thoroughly established entity exists, then the Teacher—the Supramundane Victorious Buddha—would not be without

observation [of true existence] because of observing [an ultimately existent] reality. Hence, [your assertion] contradicts such scriptures as that which says:

> The Buddha has the character of space
> Space also has no character.
> Homage to you who is without observation,
> Free from illustration and definition.

The enlightenment of the Teacher would also be unequal. Why? Because the two—the reality called the thoroughly established entity and the exalted wisdom which perceives it—would be different. If they were two in that way, how could clear realization of the two entities be equal?[12]

[Bhāvaviveka's mode of] flinging the fallacy of the consequence that enlightenment would be unequal not only damages the Chittamātrins' assertion that thoroughly established natures are truly established, but also damages their assertion that there manifestly exists a self-knower (svasamvedana) which directly realizes the exalted wisdom at the time of meditative equipoise on such within the vanishing of dualistic appearance:

Also, you Chittamātrins assert that:

> The various appearances of objects, sense powers, and consciousnesses are established merely through the force of their respective potencies being deposited on the mind-basis-of-all (ālayavijñāna).

[Bhāvaviveka counters that] in that case, the generation of an awareness observing suchness in the continuum of common beings (pṛithagjana) would be very contradictory [that is, impossible] because the potency for a mind observing suchness could never have been placed on the mind-basis-of-all in the continuums of those common beings earlier [without their actually having realized reality directly, in which case they would not be common beings, but Superiors (Ārya)]. If there is such production without that potency, then, in your system, the mind observing suchness would be causeless like an awareness perceiving a flower in the sky. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.98] says:

> How can an awareness observing suchness
> Arise without the depositing of a potency?
> It is as infeasible as a mind seeing a sky-flower
> Without the depositing of its potency.[13]

Also, the commentary following that says:

> It is not feasible that a potency which was never deposited before on the mind-basis-of-all could be posited later. It is like the infeasibility of an awareness being produced which [actually] sees a flower in the sky.[14]

Regarding these reasonings, the opponents [Chittamātrins] assert that external objects do not exist but the appearance of objects arises only from the power of potencies on the internal basis-of-all, and they assert that the potencies are truly established as well. Therefore, [although] there is no fault within the context of conventionalities, within true establishment reasoning entails that once a potency was not deposited [in the past], it cannot be deposited later. This is probably [Bhāvaviveka's position], for this discussion in the Blaze of Reasoning is prior to these passages where it says, "It [the thoroughly established nature] is in all ways inexpressible because of being empty of entityness. Such an entity [i.e., a thoroughly established nature] is treated as ultimate."[15] Also, the root text, the Essence of the Middle Way [V.95], says: "If an entity of the nature of existence and non-existence / Were ultimate."

These very extensive statements—in the root text and commentary of the Essence of the Middle Way—of the master Bhāvaviveka's refutation of the Chittamātrin presentation of

the three natures do not seem to have been explained clearly by anyone. Since they are extremely subtle points of reasoning by a great charioteer, I have written what could be figured out with small intelligence hoping that this might serve as a cause for the intelligent to look at these texts. Thus, I ask them to look at length at the texts themselves.

This master [Bhāvaviveka] also set forth a brief refutation of the Chittamātrin presentation of the three natures in his commentary of Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way, the Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom", which is kindly explained in the foremost great being Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's Essence of the Good Explanations. I want to explain that elsewhere.

THE INCORRECTNESS OF THE [CHITTAMĀTRIN] EXPLANATION THAT EXTERNAL OBJECTS DO NOT EXIST

Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.15] says:

> If [you say] the awareness [perceiving] forms
> is not correct
> Because [you] assert that it perceives [them]
> as [external] objects,
> Then your reason is mistaken
> And your thesis falls apart.[16]

The commentary preceding that says:

> [The Chittamātrins] assert that any awareness which lacks the conception of object and subject accords with the fact in reality, but an awareness [apprehending] forms and so forth, although non-conceptual, is not correct because of perceiving [them as external] objects, as is the case with an awareness seeing the appearance of a double moon.[17]

With regard to the meaning of this, the reason stated by the Chittamātrins [is as follows]:

> The subject, a direct perceiver (pratyakṣha) [that is, a directly perceiving consciousness] apprehending blue which perceives blue as of a different nature from itself [that is, the awareness], is not non-mistaken as to what it perceives because of being a knower which perceives an object as other [than it is, i.e., as an external object], as is the case, for example, with a sense consciousness perceiving a double moon.

[In the quotation from Bhāvaviveka's commentary above], "although non-conceptual" indicates that the subject (dharmin) is a direct perceiver; "is not correct" indicates the probandum (sādhya)—mistaken with respect to appearance—,

and "because of perceiving [them as external] objects" indicates the reason (hetu).

With respect to [how Bhāvaviveka] expresses the fallacy in this [position], it is not a correct reason (samyak-hetu) because the subject—an awareness [apprehending] forms—and the reason—a perceiver of objects—are not different because when the meaning of the reason is established, the entity of the subject is already established as false [because the establishment of the subject must be separate from the establishment of the reason]. The commentary following [the stanza] says:

> For, an awareness [apprehending] forms does not have an entity separate from a perceiver of apprehended objects, whereby a correct inference of [it as] a perceiver of apprehended objects is eliminated. Thus, since the entity of the subject is established as incorrect, it is contradictory [to your own theories of logic].[18]

Furthermore, the assertion of mind only, without external objects is not correct because of being damaged through contradiction with [the Chittamātrins' own] assertion and through [worldly] renown. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.17] says:

If only mind is observed
And forms and so forth are not apprehended,
Your thesis is damaged
Through assertion and renown.[19]

The way that [their own] assertion is contradicted is that [the non-existence of external objects] contradicts [their] acceptance of the scripture which says, "An eye consciousness arises in dependence on the eye and form." The damage done by renown is that it is renowned in the world that without an object, such as a form, eye consciousnesses and so forth which apprehend them are not produced.

Also, the Chittamātrins say:

> Objects do not exist, but consciousnesses are produced, as is the case, for example, with a dream consciousness.

This is also incorrect. Even in dreams forms are seen by a conscious eye which is affected by beginningless predispositions (vāsanā) for objects and subjects. Therefore, even a dream consciousness has an object of observation (ālambana), like a consciousness remembering the blue seen before. Thus, the example is not similar [to the exemplified]. In addition, because [the Chittamātrins] abandon objective things, such as forms, they also deprecate objects. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way

[V.18-19] says:

> Thus, because appearances are produced,
> Like the awareness of forms and so forth in dreams,
> Consciousness lacks [external] objects such as forms.
> Saying such is unsuitable.
>
> Since consciousnesses in dreams and so forth
> Observe phenomena,
> Even an example does not exist
> And objects are deprecated.[20]

Though the commentary to this states, "with a conscious eye"[21] rather than "dream consciousness," it is not being asserted that sense consciousnesses are present in dreams, but rather it is being explained that, in general, consciousnesses which see dream forms have objects of observation.

Also, the Chittamātrins say:

> The existence of external objects is not feasible because it is incorrect if you assert that a single minute particle is an object [of a sense consciousness], and it is also incorrect if you assert that an aggregation of many minute particles

is an object [of a sense consciousness]. The first [part of reason] is established [since] a single minute particle is not an object of sense consciousnesses because of not appearing as a thing which is an object of a sense consciousness, as is the case, for example, with the physical sense powers (indriya) [which are subtle matter and hence invisible to the senses]. The second [part of the reason] is established [since] an aggregation of many minute particles is not an object of a sense consciousness because of not being substantially established (dravya-siddha), as is the case, for example, with the appearance of a double moon.

[Reporting the Chittamātrin position] in that way, Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.32-33] says:

> Regarding that, a single particle
> Is not an object of operation of an awareness
> of form
> Because of not appearing to it
> Just as a physical sense power is not an
> object of operation [of a sense conscious-
> ness].

Many minute [particles of] form
Are not held to be objects of operation of
the mind
Because of not being substantially existent
Like, for example, a double moon.[22]

In answering this, [Bhāvaviveka says that] if you are proving that an individual minute particle, that is, a single minute particle which has not aggregated with [other particles] of a similar type, is not the object of a sense consciousness, then you are proving what is already established [for us], because we also do not assert that it is the object of a sense consciousness. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.34] says:

Regarding that, if the opponent
Is proving that a non-composite form
Is not the object of operation of a mind,
Then he would be proving what is already
established.[23]

If you are proving that a form which is a composite of minute particles of a similar type is not an object of operation of a sense consciousness because of not being substantially established, then that reason is not established for us because we assert that a composite of

conjoined minute particles is a substantially existent thing. We assert that such a composite object is an object of observation of a sense consciousness because it produces the sense consciousness apprehending it into having its aspect (<u>ākāra</u>). To explain this, Bhāvaviveka's <u>Essence of of the Middle Way</u> [V.35-36] says:

> [If (you say that objects do not exist
> because of being) composite forms,
> The reason would not be established]
> Because a composite of other [particles
> of] form
> Produces an awareness which perceives it.
>
> We assert that [composite] as the object
> of observation
> Because it serves as the cause of the
> awareness perceiving it,
> As is the case with desire. Therefore
> Your thesis is damaged by inference.[24]

Regarding the reason for this, the autocommentary says:

> A form which is a composite of minute particles of a similar type is asserted to be the object of observation itself. Why? Because such a composite of minute particles serves as the very

> thing which causes the awareness perceiving that composite form. That which serves as a cause for the awareness perceiving it is observed to be a composite, just as it is asserted, for example, that desire which has the character of attachment to an object observes just the composite of the form of a woman, and so forth. Therefore, your thesis, "A form which is a composite is not an object of observation," is damaged by this inference.[25]

[The Chittamātrin thesis is] contradictory to scripture [because] it contradicts the scripture which says that the abodes [sense powers] and objects of observation of the five collections of consciousness are composites.

If you [Chittamātrins] are proving that an aggregation of minute particles is not an object of observation of a sense consciousness, then we incur no fault because we also do not assert that an aggregation of minute particles is an object of observation of a sense consciousness. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.38cd] says:

> Since we do not hold the thesis that an
> aggregation [is an object of a sense
> consciousness],
> Your refutation of that does not damage [us].[26]

What is the difference between the two, a composite (saṃchita, bsags pa) and an aggregation (saṃghata, 'dus pa)? A collection of minute particles of a similar type with the same basis is called a composite. A pot, for example, is composed through combining many minute particles of a similar type which are its basis of composition. A collection in one place of minute particles of dissimilar types of substances with many bases, such as an army, a forest, or a rosary, is called an aggregation.

In addition, many [topics] are set forth, such as a refutation of the observed-object-condition (ālambanapratyaya) as explained in Dignāga's Analysis of the Object of Observation (Ālambanaparikṣhā) and an analysis of whether minds (chitta) and mental factors (chaitta) are the same or different substantial entities (dravya). I will not elaborate on these here.

THIS MASTER'S REFUTATION OF SELF-KNOWERS (SVASAMVEDANA)

The Chittamātrins say:

> When a consciousness meets an object, it is produced as an entity with two parts: an appearance having the aspect of the object apprehended and an appearance having the aspect of the apprehending subject.

[According to Bhāvaviveka] this is incorrect because, apart from the appearance in the aspect of the object, there is no appearance in the aspect of the subject itself. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.20cd] says:

> Except for the appearance as the object
> What other entity of the mind is there?[27]

[In answer] to this, [the Chittamātrins] say:

> It is not established that another [part] does not exist because the consciousness itself abides in its own entity and because it is produced as having the aspect of another object, as is the case, for example, with a crystal jewel.

This means that when a lump of crystal is placed near an object, such as [something] blue, the crystal's own entity is clear, but through the power of being near that object it also possesses an aspect such as blue. Similarly, [the Chittamātrins] assert that when perceiving an object, a consciousness also has two aspects: an aspect of the apprehended which is the appearance as the object and the aspect of the apprehender which is the appearance as itself.

[Bhāvaviveka asserts] that this is not correct because the example is not similar to what is being proved. When a lump of crystal is placed close to an object, such as

[something] blue, through the power of the object it looses the undefiled clarity of its own entity and comes to have an aspect such as blue. However, that which is a former moment of that clear crystal does not come to have the aspect, such as blue, because it has already ceased. Thus, the former moment of the clear crystal ceases by the power of being placed near the object and its later moments are produced so as to have the aspect of blue. Thus, to think that it is just the crystal of the former moment [that becomes blue] is mistaken. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [V.21-22ab] says:

> We do not assert that, like a crystal,
> The two [object and subject] appear because
> [the subject] is produced like the other
> [the object].
> For it is produced as that [object]
> Due to being placed nearby and is not the
> [former] moment of the crystal.
>
> We assert that, since it has ceased, it is
> wrong to think
> That it is produced as the other [the
> object].[28]

Furthermore, the aspects of apprehended and apprehender

do not exist because the clarity of consciousness having an entity of self-illumination, which like the crystal when it is not close to but is separated from an object like blue, is never apprehendable in utter isolation.

Also, although it is suitable that a lump of crystal appears as having the aspect of blue when it is placed near a color such as blue, in no way is the crystal itself transformed into the entity of the color, such as blue, nor is the color transformed into the entity of the crystal. Otherwise, it would absurdly follow that the lump of crystal was the color or that the color was the lump of crystal. Similarly, when a consciousness is near a form, such as earth, the consciousness is produced as having the aspect of earth, but neither is consciousness itself transformed into the entity of form nor is the form itself transformed into the entity of consciousness. Otherwise, it would absurdly follow that earth and so forth would be sentient or that even mind would be mindless like earth and so forth. These [arguments] are stated in Bhāvaviveka's <u>Blaze of Reasoning</u>, but fearing excessive length I will not cite the sources.[29]

After that, he refutes the Chittamātrins' sign of the definiteness of simultaneous observation and refutes the Chittamātrin presentation of valid cognition (<u>pramāṇa</u>) and its effect. One should look there [in the <u>Blaze of Reasoning</u>]

for an extensive treatment.

[REFUTATION THAT MIND-ONLY IS TAUGHT IN SUTRA]

The Chittamātrins say:

> Your refutation of mind-only is not correct because it is stated in a scripture of the Supramundane Victor [the Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Dashabhūmika)], "These three realms are mind only."

There is no fault because, regarding the meaning of this scripture, such was said in order to refute the existence of an agent or enjoyer which is other than the mind, such as that imputed by the Forders (Tīrthika) [non-Buddhists]; it was not so stated in order to refute external objects. In this way, the Sutra on the Ten Grounds says:

> A Bodhisattva on the sixth Bodhisattva ground viewing dependent arising in forward and reverse order thinks, "These mere aggregates of suffering, devoid of an agent or experiencer, arise from the twelve branches, ignorance and so forth, and the tree of suffering is manifestly established." O Children of the Conqueror, because it is definite that way, it is thus: the three realms are

> mind only, they are completely composed and written by mind; there is no agent or experiencer whatsoever other than mind.

Thus, the meaning of the passage is not a refutation of external objects.

Also, the Chittamātrins say that the emptiness of external objects is the thought of sutra because the "Questions of Maitreya Chapter" (Maitreyaparipṛichchā) of the Perfection of Wisdom in Twenty-Five Thousand Stanzas (Panchaviṃshatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra) says:

> What is the form of reality? It is that which is the permanent non-entityness of imaginary forms [imaginary natures] in imputed forms [other-powered phenomena]; [it is] the selflessness of phenomena itself, the limit of reality, and so forth. It is not substantially existent and not non-substantially existent because the emptiness of superimposed objectivity and consciousness exist.

With regard to the meaning of this passage, [Bhāvaviveka replies] that it is a proof of the consciousness which perceives the emptiness of that which is superimposed; it is not establishing a consciousness without an object, because

the object which is the form of reality—the object of a Tathāgata's individual knowledge—exists. Thus, since objects which are not superimpositions are not refuted, consciousness is in no way empty of objects which are a different substantial from it. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka's <u>Essence of the Middle Way</u> [V.29] says:

> If, due to the emptiness of superimposed
> objectivity,
> You are proving consciousness [devoid of
> external objects],
> Since objects which are not superimpositions
> exist
> It is not the case that objects do not exist.[30]

The meaning of that is to be taken as explained above. I do not think that the thought of the passage is to be interpreted that, ". . . because if the object—the form of reality—which is the object of the individual knowledge truly exists, an object which is not a superimposition exists," for this master [Bhāvaviveka] asserts external objects but does not assert truly existent objects. Also, the statement in the autocommentary, "The object that is the form of reality exists," proves that an object which is a different substantial entity from consciousness exists but in no way proves that reality is an external object, nor is

it asserting that it [reality] truly exists. The statement in the autocommentary that, "Since that which is the thing that is not a literal entityness exists, [a non-imputed object exists]"[31] refers to the existence of an object which is empty of a superimposed entity; it should not be taken as an inexpressible thing as asserted by the Chittamātrins.

The presentation of Bhāvaviveka's own system has four parts: an identification of the object of reasoned negation, the reasoning which refutes that, a presentation of the two truths delineated [by reasoning], and a brief presentation of the paths and fruits.

THE OBJECT OF NEGATION

In commenting on the passage from the Essence of the Middle Way [III.26] which says, "Earth and so forth are not elements ultimately (paramārthataḥ) [literally "for the highest (parama) object (artha)], Bhāvaviveka sets forth three ways of positing the highest object (paramārtha) in answer to what paramārtha refers to in that passage:

> With respect to object (artha), it is an object because of being that which is to be known; this is synonymous with "that which is to be examined (parīkṣhaṇīya)" and "that which is to be understood (pratipādya)." Highest (parama) is a word [meaning] supreme. With respect to the compound paramārtha, because it is an object as well as being highest, it is the highest object. Or [it means] the object of the highest (paramasya artha); because it is the object of the highest non-conceptual wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna), it is an

> object of the highest [consciousness]. Or, it [means] that which accords with the highest object [that is, the highest consciousness]. Since the ultimate exists for a wisdom that accords with a realization of the ultimate, it accords with [that which directly realizes] the highest object.[1]

From among these, the first [explanation of paramārtha] goes from "With respect to object (artha)" to "because [it is an object] as well as being highest, it is the highest object." This explains paramārtha applying both "highest" (parama) and "object" (artha) to the object [emptiness].

The second [begins], "Or [it means] the object of the highest." "Highest" refers to the uncontaminated non-conceptual wisdom, and "object" refers to its object [emptiness]. The two, object and highest, are treated separately as object [emptiness] and subject [non-conceptual wisdom].

The third [begins], "Or [it means] that which accords with the highest object." A wisdom of hearing, thinking, or above which analyzes suchness (tathatā) is a wisdom according with direct realization of suchness. This is taken as the highest object. In this case, both object and highest apply to the subject [that is, the consciousness realizing

emptiness].

Question: To what does the paramārtha which is to be refuted in this context [of the passage from the Essence of the Middle Way above] refer?

Answer: Bhāvaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning says:

> Ultimate (paramārtha) [consciousnesses] are of two types. One is a supramundane non-contaminated [meditative equipoise] free from elaborations which operates without [conceptual] activity. The second, possessing conceptual elaborations is called a pure mundane wisdom [of subsequent attainment] which accords with the collections of merit and wisdom and operates with [conceptual] activity. Since here [in the context of the passage from the Essence of the Middle Way] this [latter type of ultimate] is held as the qualification of the thesis ["does not ultimately exist"], there is no fault.[2]

Therefore, in this context, that which exists for an inferential reasoning consciousness, that is, a concordant ultimate—the third paramārtha of the earlier explanation—is said to be ultimately existent, and that which is non-existent for that is said not to ultimately exist.

Therefore, if a sprout is truly established, it must

be truly established for a reasoning consciousness analyzing suchness, because if a sprout is truly established, just that [sprout] must be established as the mode of subsistence of the sprout and because just that reasoning consciousness is a mind which comprehends the mode of subsistence.

Objection: If that is the case, then it follows that the final nature of a sprout is ultimately established — because it exists for a reasoning consciousness and because it is established as the mode of subsistence of the sprout.

Answer: There is no fallacy [in my position], for although whatever is truly established must be established as the mode of subsistence and must be established for a reasoning consciousness, whatever is established as a mode of subsistence and is established for a reasoning consciousness does not have to be truly established. The reason for this is that if a sprout were truly established, a reasoning consciousness must find the sprout as truly established, because just a reasoning consciousness analyzes whether or not true establishment exists. Although a reasoning consciousness finds that a sprout does not truly exist, such a finding is a case of analyzing whether the sprout truly exists and finding that it does not truly exist. It is not a case of analyzing whether or not the non-true existence of a sprout truly exists and finding that it does.

This is a difficult point in this system. The foremost

great being D̄zong-ka-b̄a said that due to not making this distinction well many mistakes have arisen, such as the earlier great scholars the translator from N̄gok (rNog bLo-ldan-shes rab) and his spiritual sons' assertion that an ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge and the lord of reasoning Cha-b̄a-chö-gyi-s̄eng-gay's (Cha-pa-chos-kyi-seng-ge) assertion that non-true existence is truly established.

In D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Essence of the Good Explanations and Great Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement" ('Jug pa'i rnam bshad chen mo) he says that a clearer identification of the object of negation than what was explained before [concerning the three meanings of paramārtha] is not set forth in [other] texts by Bhāvaviveka, in Jñānagarbha's Two Truths, or in Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way together with its autocommentary[3] and that since the existence which is the opposite of the mode of conventional existence explained in Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way is the mode of true existence, it must be explained in that way.

Regarding this statement, a member of another sect[4] says:

> The foremost lama D̄zong-ka-b̄a said this thinking that the mode of ultimate establishment is not

taught at all in the texts of Bhāvaviveka and so forth, but this is not correct. For Jñānagarbha's Differentiation of the Two Truths says:

> Only these appearances to the mind
> Are conventional. The other is the
> other one [i.e., ultimate].

> [Jñānagarbha] thereby indicates both the measure of conventional establishment and the measure of ultimate establishment.

The statement even by some earlier scholars of our own [Ge-luk-ba] sect that this appears to be true is just the noise of not having analyzed well either the statement of the foremost lama D̄zong-ka-b̄a or the meaning of the text.

To refute this, the great scholar and adept Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄ay-dor-jay ('Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa'i-rdo-rje) says:

> [The wrong position is: "Only these appearances to the mind / Are] conventional" explains that what is conventionally established are only these appearances to the minds of cowherds and above, and the rest ["the other is the other one"] indicates that the measure of ultimate establishment does not appear to cowherds and so forth because the former part is established by the commentary

> and explanatory commentary and it is established by reasoning that they [cowherds] do not perceive the other.
>
> [Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a refutes this interpretation:] Therefore, according to you, it [absurdly] follows that cowherds and so forth are already liberated because no phenomenon whatsoever appears to them as truly established. It [absurdly] follows that they have already found the Mādhyamika view because all phenomena appear to them as conventionally established. Therefore, that passage does not indicate the measure of conventional and ultimate establishment, but [rather] is a passage which identifies the two truths.[5]

Since this is the statement of a great scholar who mastered the great texts, it is very good, but I wonder whether it would be good to explain it as follows.

In general, there are two ultimates in the use of the qualification "ultimately" with respect to the object of negation:

1 a reasoning consciousness of hearing, thinking, or meditation is the ultimate and, as was explained earlier, being established by that is ultimate establishment

2 the existence of an objective mode of subsistence without

being posited by the force of a non-defective awareness is designated as ultimately existing.

The mode of apprehending [phenomena] as true by the innate consciousness conceiving true existence, [that conception being] the opposite of the reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate is a conception of the latter [type]. Therefore, the main object of negation of signs proving non-true existence is just the latter true establishment. Due to this, when those ascertaining the view of this system initially identify the conception of true existence in their continuums, they must identify the latter mode of the conception of true establishment.

Therefore, the foremost great being D̄zong-ka-b̄a himself clearly explains that the former mode of true establishment is described extensively in the root text and commentary of Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way as well as the root text and commentary of Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way, etc. Thus, what chance could there be that the foremost lama D̄zong-ka-b̄a asserts that that [former] mode of ultimate existence is not explained clearly in any reliable Svātantrika text except for Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way? If a clear description of ultimate existence in terms of the second mode of interpretation occurs in these texts, please show it and I will help [you].

Objection: The passage which you cited from Jñānagarbha's Two Truths indicates ultimate establishment in terms of the second mode of interpretation.

Answer: Show by which words it is indicated.

Objector: It is indicated by "the other is the other one."

Answer: Then it [absurdly] follows that there exists no phenomenon which is established in accordance with the mode of establishment explained by those words because the ultimate of the second mode of interpretation must refer to true establishment and there is no Mādhyamika who asserts the existence of true establishment.

Objector: I accept [that there are no phenomena which exist in accordance with the mode of ultimate establishment explained by the passage].

Answer: Then it [absurdly] follows that ultimate truths do not exist because the ultimate which is indicated at that point in the passage which says, "The other is the other one" is that [ultimate truths].

Objector: The reason is not established [that is, the passage does not indicate ultimate truths].

Answer: Then, indicate the meaning of the statement from pseudo-Shāntarakṣhita's explanatory commentary which says, "'The other' is other than how [phenomena] appear. Therefore, this indicates that what is so for reasoning is

the ultimate truth"! If you assert true establishment as the ultimate truth, you do not even have the scent of a Mādhyamika.

Thus, regarding the meaning of the passage from Jñānagarbha's Two Truths, "Only these as they appear / Are conventional" [indicates] that only these [phenomena] as they appear to and are seen by conventional valid cognizers in accordance with how the objects exist are conventional truths. The first part indicates the definition and the second part indicates the definiendum. Moreover, taking the meaning of "appear" as "be seen by," it is explaining that in just the way that phenomena seen by both those whose mind have and have not been affected by tenets, from cowherds on up, abide objectively, so they abide as conventional truths; it is not explaining that objects which are established in reality [truly existent objects] are conventional truths. The term "only" eliminates that [these are] found by a reasoning consciousness.

"The other is the other one" indicates that an object which is found or established by a reasoning consciousness and is other than those [conventional valid cognizers] is the definition of ultimate truth; "The other" indicates the definition [of an ultimate truth] and "the other one" indicates the definiendum. Thinking of this, Gyel-tsap-jay says:

> The commentary following this line says that just as objects which are found by conventional valid cognizers are posited as conventional truths, so only objects found by a reasoning consciousness are ultimate truths.

Since the autocommentary and the explanatory commentary clearly mention ultimate truths, what person having a mind would propound that his passage indicates the measure of true existence that is the object of reasoned negation! Therefore, how could there be any fault in the statement of the foremost lama D̄zong-ka-b̄a!

If [the passage] is explained in this way, it is in complete accord with the thought of the text, because the foremost lama D̄zong-ka-b̄a's opinion is that between the two modes of positing the ultimate, the ascertainment of the latter is extremely important for settling the view and that the mode of the latter ultimate establishment does not appear clearly in any text other than Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way. He made this statement [cited earlier, page 488] with this in mind. Also, the meaning of the passage from the Two Truths cannot be interpreted in any way other than what was just explained.

Question: How does a consciousness innately conceiving true existence conceive phenomena to be true, and what is

the hypothetical measure of true existence in this context?

Answer: I will explain this in the section on the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas [pp. 542-553].

Thus, both the ultimate in which the reasoning consciousness is referred to as the ultimate and something which is established for that [ultimate consciousness, such as emptiness] exist, but neither the ultimate of the latter mode of interpretation nor something existing in that way exist. Due to not making these distinctions there arose the wrong ideas that just as the Chittamātrins assert that the immutable thoroughly established natures are ultimate and whatever is that is ultimately established, so in this system also if the emptiness of true existence is the ultimate, it must be ultimately established and whatever does not ultimately exist cannot be the ultimate. If this is known well, one will come to know the essential points that (1) saying that nothing exists as its own mode of being or exists ultimately and (2) asserting that reality exists and propounding that just that [reality] is the mode of being and the ultimate are not contradictory.

THE REASONING REFUTING THAT [OBJECT OF NEGATION]

In general, the five great reasons[1] are asserted in this system because most of them are stated in Bhāvaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning and because the refutation of the four alternatives of production is emphasized in the root text and commentary of Jñānagarbha's Two Truths. However, in the interest of ease in proving the sign and similar example (*sadṛiṣhtanta), they primarily use a reasoning of parallelism in which the reason is shared.

In the root text and commentary of Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way, [all phenomena] are included in the five aggregates (skandha), the twelve sources (āyatana), and the eighteen elements (dhātu), and from among those, going from coarse to subtle, he first analyzes the form aggregate (rūpaskandha), and within that, the elements (bhūta). Bhāvaviveka's Essence of the Middle Way [III.26] says:

> Here, earth and so forth
> Are not entities of the elements ultimately
> Because of being produced
> And because of having causes, like a consciousness.[2]

"Earth and so forth" identifies the specific subjects (dharmin)

and the term "and so forth" identifies water, fire, and wind [also] as bases of debate. "Are not entities of the elements ultimately" indicates the predicate (dharma). "Ultimately" indicates that the conventional entities [of the elements] are not refuted, and that an existence by way of the object's own mode of subsistence without being posited by the power of the awareness to which it appears is refuted. "Are not entities" indicates that between negative phenomena (pratiṣhedha) and positive phenomena (vidhi), a negative phenomenon is held as the predicate, and that from among negative phenomena, only a non-affirming negative (prasajya-pratiṣhedha). The commentary says, "Here, the negative 'is not' is taken to mean a non-affirming negative and is not taken to mean an affirming negative (paryudāsapratiṣhedha)."[3] The combination of the predicate and the subject is the position (pakṣha). "Because of being produced" indicates the reason (hetu).

Regarding the elimination of fallacies [ascribed to Bhāvaviveka's] position, [the following objection might be raised].

> Objection: Your proof that earth and so forth are not entities of the elements is not correct because of contradicting [your own] assertions, contradicting direct perception (pratyakṣha), and

contradicting [worldly] renown.

The first [reason, that your position contradicts your own assertions] is established because a scripture of the Teacher says, "Brahmins, 'all' are [included in] the five aggregates, the twelve sources, and the eighteen constituents," and "Similarly, the definition of form is that which is suitable as form." Such statements set forth phenomena such as the aggregates as well as their definitions, whereas you refute these phenomena while asserting those scriptures to be valid.

The second [reason, that your position contradicts direct perception] is established because, when one engages in ascertaining the specific character of objects, a sense (indriya) is renowned as a direct perceiver (pratyakṣha), and there is no valid cognizer (pramāṇa) which surpasses its perception and while you yourself perform actions such as seeing and apprehending with the eyes the shapes of the elements, forms, and so forth, you refute those [elements] and disavow direct perception.

The third [reason, that your position contradicts renown] is established because earth and so forth as well as its hardness are renowned

> to everyone in the world, from the lowest class on up.

Answer: None of these three fallacies exists because we have affixed the qualification "ultimately" to the thesis. Furthermore, the first fallacy does not exist because the presentations of the entities and characters of phenomena were made by the Supramundane Victor in terms of the conventional and are said not to have entityness ultimately. *The Perfection of Wisdom* says:

> Kaushika, all phenomena lack entityness. That which is the lack of entityness in all phenomena is non-true existence. That which is non-true existence is the perfection of wisdom.

The second fallacy also does not exist because the sense consciousnesses are stupid with respect to seeking the nature [of phenomena] and because, although a person with cataracts does not have a capacity for [true] seeing and so forth, he perceives falling hairs.

The third fallacy does not exist because worldly persons are incapable of investigating the nature [of phenomena] due to being under the influence of obscuration whereas this is a case of analyzing the ultimate.

Regarding the meaning of the reason, "because of being

a product," "product" is that which is established by causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya). With respect to the statement of concomitance with the similar class (sapakṣha), just whatever is a product is not an entity of the elements ultimately, as is the case, for example, with a consciousness. Here, an example and reason for a proof [of product] as just not existing in the dissimilar class (vipakṣha) are not indicated because there does not exist even the smallest particle of a thing which has entityness and is [a member of] the dissimilar class in the proof of that.

"Because of having causes and so forth" indicates other forms of reasons, such as having causes, being a [functioning] thing (bhāva), being an object of knowledge (jñeya), and being an object of expression (vākya).

Here, the important point is that if something ultimately existed, it would have to exist by the power of the object's own mode of subsistence without being posited by the power of the awareness to which it appears. Thus, since it would have to exist under its own power, it could not depend on anything else. Therefore, as they are similar in being products, there would be no valid cognizer that could make the distinction that consciousness is not an element and that earth and so forth are elements [ultimately]. Thinking of this [Bhāvaviveka] set forth a reasoning of parallelism in which the reason is shared, as [explained]

before. Hence, this must be understood well.

Furthermore, in Bhāvaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning, the progression of reasoning is the same in setting forth many analyses such as of instances of the elements, the other aggregates, the sources, the constituents, definitions (lakṣhana), illustrations (lakṣhya), the functioning of production (utpatti) and disintegration (vināsha), and bondage (bandha) and liberation (mokṣha).

Regarding the proof [that these do not ultimately exist] from the point of view of scripture, the Supramundane Victor said:

> Those which are internal earth constituents and those which are external earth constituents are for the Tathāgata non-dualistic objects, are non-dual, not to be treated as dualistic. For he is perfectly and completely enlightened with respect to no-character and sameness of character.

And:

> When analyzed with awareness,
> Forms do not actually exist.
> Therefore, I say that the elements do not exist
> And true existence does not exist.

The reasoning of the lack of being one or many is also

stated; Bhāvaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning says:

> Even the Tathāgata does not ultimately exist because of not being observed to be the same as or different from his body, like self, sentient being, person, and so forth.

Regarding the scriptures which prove that [phenomena] exist like illusions conventionally, such statements are made in sutras as:

> The Tathāgata is a reflection
> Of uncontaminated virtuous qualities.
> Though there is no reality or Tathāgata in
>   these,
> An image appears to all the world.

The presentation of the two truths delineated [by reasoning] has two parts: the actual presentation and derivative topics.

ACTUAL PRESENTATION

The basis of division of the two truths is objects of knowledge (jñeya). The divisions are two, conventional truths (saṃvṛiti-satya) and ultimate truths (paramārtha-satya). With regard to their sameness or difference, it is asserted here, as it is stated in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, that [the position that the two truths are] different entities is damaged by four reasonings and [the position that the two truths] are the same reverse (*eka-vyatireka) [i.e., exactly the same] is damaged by four reasonings.

Regarding that, the four reasonings refuting that [the two truths] are different entities are that:

1 it would absurdly follow that by realizing the mode of being of a sprout, superimpositions of the conception of true existence with respect to the sprout would not be eliminated,
2 it would absurdly follow that the reality of a sprout would not be the sprout's final mode of subsistence,
3 it would absurdly follow that the mere elimination of true existence with respect to a sprout would not be the reality of the sprout,

3 it would absurdly follow that the conception of true existence and the wisdom realizing non-true existence would operate simultaneously even in the mental continuum of a Buddha.

[These fallacies would be incurred] if the sprout and the reality of the sprout were different entities. All four of these consequences (prasaṅga) are consequences implying the the opposite [that is, that the two truths are not different entities and thus, by extension, that they are the same entity].

The four reasonings refuting that [the two truths] are the same reverse [i.e., exactly the same] are that:

1 it would absurdly follow that even common beings would directly realize ultimate truths,
2 it would absurdly follow that reality would be an object of observation of an affliction (klesha),
3 it would absurdly follow that there would be no need to seek the path of Superiors (āryamārga),
4 it would absurdly follow that the varieties of different divisions of conventionalities would not exist.

[These fallacies would be incurred] if a form and its reality were exactly the same reverse. All four are consequences which imply the opposite [that is, that the two truths are not

the same reverse and thus different reverses].

With respect to the definitions of the two truths, an object found by a conventional valid cognizer is the definition of a conventional truth, and an object found by a valid reasoning consciousness distinguishing the ultimate is the definition of an ultimate truth.

Here [in this system], two ultimates are explained, actual and concordant ultimate truths. Jñānagarbha's Two Truths says:

> Since the negation of production and so forth
> Accords with the real
> We assert it to be ultimate.

Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way says:

> Thus, since this non-production accords with the ultimate, it is called an "ultimate"; it is not actually [an ultimate] because the actual ultimate is passed beyond all elaborations.

In addition, Jñānagarbha's Two Truths says:

> A non-deceptive reasoning
> [Consciousness] is called an ultimate.

Also, Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way says:

> Those statements that "production does not exist ultimately" and so forth are asserted to mean the following: All consciousnesses arisen from correct hearing, thinking, and meditating are non-mistaken subjects whereby they are called "ultimate" due to being the ultimate among them [i.e., consciousnesses].

Thus, reality—the object—is explained as the ultimate, and the reasoning consciousness—the subject—is explained as the ultimate, and each of them has two types. Emptiness —the object—is the actual ultimate which is free from both the elaborations of dualistic appearance and the elaborations of true existence for an uncontaminated exalted wisdom (<u>anāsravajñāna</u>) of meditative equipoise (<u>samāhita</u>). For a conceptual reasoning consciousness, [emptiness] is free from the elaborations of true existence but is not free from the elaborations of dualistic appearance; therefore, it is free from only one portion of elaborations. Hence, an emptiness—an object—is, in general, an ultimate although for a conceptual reasoning consciousness it is not the ultimate which is free from both [types of] elaborations. These are two ways of positing the ultimate which is an object.

When a Superior's non-conceptual exalted wisdom (<u>nirvikalpakajñāna</u>) of meditative equipoise is absorbed in

suchness (tathatā), it is able to eliminate both elaborations with respect to its object. Therefore, it is the actual ultimate. The conceptual reasoning consciousness which comprehends suchness in dependence on a sign (liṅga) is able to remove elaborations of true existence with respect to its object but is not able to eliminate elaborations of dualistic appearance. Therefore, it is a concordant ultimate which is posited as ultimate due to merely according in aspect with the former [non-conceptual wisdom consciousness]. These are two ways of positing the ultimate which is a subject.

In summary, one should know that reality—the object—is an actual ultimate truth and that the consciousness—the subject—is not an actual ultimate truth but in terms of what is explained in the text, is also explained as an ultimate. One should also know that there are presentations of actual and concordant [types] for each of those [objective and subjective ultimates] as well [as given above].

The emptiness which is an affirming negative (paryudāsa-pratiṣhedha)—the negation of ultimate production and so forth with respect to the aggregates and so forth—is an imputed ultimate and an actual conventionality because that mode of emptiness appears only dualistically for an awareness which sees it directly; it in no way appears free from dualistic appearance. That is the case because that mode of emptiness must appear even to conventional valid cognizers

such as eye consciousnesses which directly perceive those bases which are empty. Through this one can know that a Buddha's exalted wisdom which knows the varieties (yāvajjñāna) and a learner Superior's exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment (prishthalabdhajñāna) are comprehenders of illusory-like objects which are affirming negatives and that even these objects which are composites of appearance and emptiness are metaphoric ultimates; they are not actual ultimates.

Furthermore, Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way says:

> The suchnesses which have the character of the selflessness of phenomena and persons, because of possessing reason are highest (parama). They are also objects (artha) because they are the objects sought for the purpose of realization by those who seek to abandon the obstructions (avarana). Also they are the meanings, that is, the objects, of the unmistaken highest exalted wisdom. Thus, [for those two reasons] they are called the highest objects (paramārtha).

In this way, he explains that the selflessness of persons and phenomena are ultimate truths. Also, the foremost great being Dzong-ka-ba says in his Great Commentary to

(Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental (Treatise on the Middle Way Called) Wisdom" (rTsa she tik chen) in the context of Svātantrika:

> Therefore, the selflessness of the phenomena of the aggregates and the selflessness of persons—these being the mere elimination of elaborations which are the object of reasoned negation—are the objects found by the uncontaminated exalted wisdom knowing the mode [of being]. Even elaborations of dualistic appearance of persons and the aggregates are pacified in the face of that [wisdom]. Hence, they are ultimate truths.

Thus, he says that this system asserts that even the selflessness of persons is an ultimate truth. His Essence of the Good Explanations also explains that the passage from Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way [cited above] indicates that both selflessnesses are actual ultimates. The omniscient Gyel-tsap also similarly explains in his commentary to Jñānagarbha's Two Truths that both selflessnesses are ultimate truths.

In addition, it is well renowned that in this system, an object realized by a direct valid cognizer which directly realizes it in a manner of the vanishing of dualistic appearance is taken as the definition of an ultimate truth, and an object realized by an awareness which directly

realizes it in a manner having dualistic appearance is taken as the definition of a conventional truth. In that case, since an uninterrupted path (ānantaryamārga) in the continuum of a Superior directly realizing the selflessness of persons does not pass beyond a meditative equipoise involving the vanishing of dualistic appearance with respect to its object, like water poured in water, it must be asserted that the selflessness of persons is an ultimate truth.

Others say:

> Dualistic appearance is explained as having three types:
>
> 1 the appearance of something different from itself,
>
> 2 the appearance of true existence,
>
> 3 the appearance of conventionalities.
>
> Although [in meditative equipoise on the selflessness of persons] the first [two] do not exist, the last does. Therefore, it is not contradictory that [the wisdom consciousness realizing the selflessness of persons] has dualistic appearance [of the third type, despite the fact that dualistic appearance of the first type has vanished]. A Perfection of Wisdom Sutra says that the teaching of the selflessness of form is said to be a

> facsimile perfection, and that when one actually practices the perfections, one must practice the unobservable emptiness. Therefore, even the exalted knower directly realizing selflessness in the continuum of a Superior of the lower vehicles does not pass beyond a perfection of wisdom of the observable, whereby it is posited as having dualistic appearance.

Also, Kay-drup's Thousand Doses says:

> The Chittamātrins and Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas do not assert that the selflessness of persons is an ultimate truth, and they assert that the reasoning refuting a self of persons is a reasoning analyzing a conventionality.

Regarding this, according to the former position [that the selflessness of persons is an ultimate truth], it is still to be proven that there is no appearance of conventionalities for the uninterrupted path in the continuum of a Superior; [the absence of dualistic appearance of subject and object] is not suitable as a reason [proving that conventional appearance has vanished]. Also, it appears to be suitable to explain the meaning of the passages [cited to support the position that the selflessness of persons is an ultimate

truth] in another way.

Positing an object realized by a direct valid cognizer which directly realizes it in a manner of the vanishing of dualistic appearance as the definition of an ultimate truth must still be analyzed with respect to the Svātantrikas who assert self-knowers [see pp. 306-308].

Furthermore, is the reasoning which settles that the self-sufficient person is empty because of lacking sameness with and difference from the aggregates a reasoning which analyzes the mode of subsistence of an object when one is not satisfied by being merely posited through the power of appearing to a non-defective awareness? If it is, does [something become] a reasoning which analyzes the ultimate merely by that [i.e., analyzing whether a self-sufficient person is empty of being the same as or different from the aggregates] or not? Though something does become [a reasoning] analyzing the ultimate, is the finding of such a self-sufficient person as non-existent by that reasoning necessarily a finding by a reasoning consciousness that analyzes the ultimate or not? With respect to that, are two factors—being the actual ultimate found by a reasoning consciousness or not—to be distinguished relative to the awareness [which realizes them]? Such [problems] are to be analyzed well.

If, having arranged the statements of the three—the father [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] and his sons [Gyel-tsap and Kay-drup]—

one knows a system for dispelling objections, it appears that it will be speech pleasing to scholars. However, it is not suitable to be easily satisfied by those who, from seeing only one portion of the scriptures, discard other portions and do whatever they can to make up their own interpretations.

Bhāvaviveka's Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom" commenting on the eighteenth chapter of the Treatise on the Middle Way where it says [XVIII.1ab], "If the self were the aggregates / It would have production and disintegration," says:

> Here the syllogism is: Ultimately the elements, the aggregation of the elements, the sense powers, the aggregation of the sense powers, consciousness, the body together with the senses, and the body together with consciousness are not the self because of just having the quality of production and disintegration, as is the case, for example, with the external elements.

Thus, he affixes the qualification "ultimately" to each reasoning proving the selflessness of persons.

At the point of commenting on [XVIII.4]:

> When [the view of] I and mine is extinguished
> With respect to the internal and external

> Grasping ceases and through
> Extinguishing it, birth is extinguished.

[Bhāvaviveka says]:

> That liberation [i.e., the extinguishment of birth] is for Hearer and Solitary Realizer Superiors through their seeing the selflessness of persons. Those who proceed by the Buddha Vehicle achieve [liberation] by abandoning the afflictive obstructions (kleshāvaraṇa) and the obstructions to omniscience (jñeyāvaraṇa). The methods for abandoning the afflictive obstructions are those which are indicated [in the chapter].

Thus, he says that the reasonings described in that chapter are objects of meditation for those who have the Hīnayāna lineage as well, and he describes that mode of emptiness of the self of persons as the meaning of emptiness. The commentary preceding the passage just explained says, "Thus, the yogis who make effort to realize the suchness of internal and external sources realize that those are empty." The "Introduction to the Reality of the Hearers" (Shravakatattvāvatāra) chapter of Bhāvaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning speaks frequently in the same vein; I will not elaborate on it here.

Due to these facts it is indubitable [that the selflessness of persons is an emptiness] in Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, but which of the two truths the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas assert the suchness which is the lack of duality of subject and object to be should be analyzed.

The statements in Kay-drup's Thousand Doses damaging also the position that in the Svātantrika system true cessations (nirodhasatya) are asserted to be conventional truths appear to be overwhelmingly accurate. Specifically, he argues that it must be asserted without question that the path of release (vimuktimārga) of the path of seeing (darshanamārga) actualizes the cessation (nirodha) which is a state of having abandoned the objects to be abandoned on the path of seeing. Thus, the meaning of a cessation being actualized by a path of release is not suitable as anything other than that it is directly realized [by that path of release], and an object directly realized by that path must be asserted as an ultimate truth. Furthermore, when the eight forbearances (kṣhanti) and the eight knowledges (jñāna) of the sixteen moments of forbearance and knowledge are posited as the non-interrupted path (ānantaryamārga) and path of release [respectively]—without interruption by another consciousness—the eight knowledges are the entities of the path of release which attain a stainless true

cessation—a separation from adventitious defilements (akasik-mala). If the generation [of those eight knowledges] did not actualize [or bring about] the quality which is the state of having abandoned the discordant class [artificial conceptions of true existence], they would not differ in any way from the eight forbearances. Also, it would be meaningless to say that a true cessation is actualized in the state of subsequent attainment (pṛṣhṭhalabdha) when one rises from that [path of release]. Therefore, [if true cessations were not ultimate truths] the cessation which is the state of having abandoned the objects to be abandoned on the path of seeing would never be actualized.

There are many points to be analyzed with this reasoning with regard to the Nature Body (Svabhāvikakāya) [of a Buddha] as well. Therefore, the intelligent and meek should analyze this further.

Divisions of Conventional Truths

Jñānagarbha's Two Truths says:

> Those mere things which lack being imputed
> objects
> And [which are] dependently produced
> Should be known as real conventionalities.

Also [the same text says]:

Those which are not real are imputations.

Thus, he mentions two, real conventional truths (tathyasaṃvṛitisatya) and unreal conventional truths (mityāsaṃvṛitisatya).

Their definitions are indicated by a statement [from the same text]:

Since they are able and unable
To perform functions as they appear,
The division of real and unreal
Conventionalities is made.

With regard to that, in general, those things which are not established by valid cognition (pramāṇa) such as a double moon and such as the principal (pradhāna) imputed by other schools [such as Sāṃkhya] are merely unreal conventionalities; they are not unreal conventional truths because they are not established bases (gzhi grub). Therefore, the previous passage from Jñānagarbha's Two Truths [above] does not indicate that such things as ultimate production are unreal conventional truths.

It is not correct to assert merely that that which is able to perform a function in accordance with its mode of appearance is the definition of a real conventional truth and that which is not able to perform a function in

accordance with its mode of appearance is the definition of an unreal conventional truth because there are many cases of establishing with valid cognition that a base (ashraya) is able to perform a function in accordance with its mode of appearance without establishing with valid cognition the meaning of real conventionality. Otherwise, it would absurdly follow that even common beings whose minds have not been affected by tenets refute with valid cognition the meaning of true existence with respect to earth and so forth because they establish with valid cognition that these are conventionalities and it must be asserted that conventionality is taken to mean falsity [therefore, it would absurdly follow that common beings would have understood emptiness because they understand falsities, i.e., conventionalities].

Thus, it should be known that a phenomenon that is an object found by a conventional valid cognizer which is able to perform a function in accordance with its appearance to the awareness perceiving it is the definition of a real conventional truth, and a phenomenon which is an object found by a conventional valid cognizer which is not able to perform a function in accordance with how it appears to the awareness perceiving it is the definition of an unreal conventional truth.

The divisions of real conventional truths are easy to understand. Regarding unreal conventionalities, the

reflection of a face in a mirror which appears to a non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) consciousness, the apprehended object (grāhyaviṣhaya) of a thought consciousness (kalpanā), and so forth are both unreal conventionalities and conventional truths. The self of persons (pudgalātman) and the self of phenomena (dharmātman), etc. which are imputed by [false] tenet systems are unreal conventionalities but are not held to be unreal conventional truths because they are refuted by valid cognition.

Objection: Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way says:

> These things which some authors of treatises, in passing beyond renown, impute as real—imaginaries and so forth—are said to exist as unreal conventionalities because they do not even exist in renown. Those which are thoroughly imputed in accordance with dependent arising, such as, for instance, "Here self or sentient being does not exist. These phenomena are caused," exist as real conventionalities.

Does this statement not indicate that the two selves and so forth are unreal conventional truths?

Answer: It is not so because that [passage] is indicating that objects which are imputed only through the power

of [false] tenets exist as unreal conventionalities; it is not indicating that they are conventional truths. Otherwise, it would contradict the statement, "They do not even exist in renown."

Except for objects, this system does not make the distinction of real and unreal with respect to subjects, based on the fact that they assert that own-character (svalakṣhana) is established by valid cognition. If they did not assert own-character, then within the context that apprehended objects are similar in appearing clearly to sense consciousnesses, it would not be correct to assert that water and so forth are real conventionalities which are able to perform functions as they appear and that a double moon, the appearance of a double moon, and so forth are unreal conventionalities which are not able to perform functions as they appear because, in that case, since water appears to the sense consciousness apprehending water to be established by way of its own character, it would [absurdly] irreversibly follow that [water] would be an unreal conventionality which was not able to perform a function as it appeared [see pp. 334-335].

Furthermore, it would [absurdly] follow that the establishment of form by way of its own character is asserted [in the Svātantrika system] as the quality of the object of negation—the opposite of non-true existence—because

existence by way of its own character would be the object of negation of the reasoning consciousness analyzing the final [nature of phenomena]. If you accept that [existence by way of its own character is the object of negation], then it [absurdly] follows that the object of negation appears to sense consciousnesses because existence by way of its own character is present in the apprehended objects of sense consciousnesses. You cannot accept that [the object of negation appears to sense consciousnesses] because Jñānagarbha's Two Truths explains that truly established production and so forth do not appear to sense consciousnesses and explains that appearances to sense consciousnesses are never refuted. [For a discussion of this argument, see pp. 93-98, 331-335].

Objection: Regarding the explanation in Jñānagarbha's Two Truths that the object of negation—true existence—does not appear to sense consciousnesses, the reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate [i.e., emptiness] is [taken as the referent of] the ultimate [in the term "ultimate establishment"] and being established for that [reasoning consciousness] is explained as ultimate establishment. That [ultimate establishment] is explained as not appearing to sense consciousnesses; true establishment [or ultimate establishment, that is, being established by way of the object's own mode of subsistence without being posited

through the force of appearing to a non-defective consciousness] is not being referred to.

Answer: Such a statement is not a good explanation because in Jñānagarbha's Two Truths and its commentary, the fact that truly established production, the principal (pradhāna) imputed by the Sāṃkhyas, the [mind which is an] evolute of the elements imputed by the Chārvākas, partless moments of consciousness, and so forth do not appear to direct perceivers is stated as a reason why it is correct to refute [those things] thoroughly imputed by others as really existent. Also, as a reason why it is incorrect to refute the appearances [to sense consciousnesses], it is stated that the refutation of appearances to sense consciousnesses which are not imputed to be true [that is, appearances which are not falsely imagined to be truly existent] would only damage us. The reason for that rests on the fact that, since the objects of non-conceptual sense consciousnesses are real conventional truths, if those [objects] appeared to be truly established to them [the senses], it would [absurdly] follow that true establishment itself would be a conventional truth. Furthermore, he explains that within the context of the truly established things asserted by others—Proponents of True Existence—conventionalities in accordance with the actual entities of the objects are not feasible, and the fact that not even a particle of true establishment

appears to sense consciousnesses is stated [by Jñānagarbha] as a reason why factually concordant conventionalities are not feasible within true establishment. Therefore, the omniscient Gyel-tsap also states that this system asserts that true establishment does not appear to sense consciousnesses.

It is similar to Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika because the foremost great being Dzong-ka-ba says in his Great Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement" at the point of explaining the assertions of the father Shāntarakṣhita and spiritual son [Kamalashīla]:

> The perceivers of the displays as truly existent by the conception of true existence are thought consciousnesses, not sense consciousnesses because the explanation in Jñānagarbha's commentary on his Two Truths that the object of negation does not appear to the sense consciousnesses is similarly [applicable] here.

If it is not taken that way, [but rather that Jñānagarbha] is referring to what is ultimate for a reasoning consciousness, it is difficult to explain the meaning of the "displays as truly existent by the conception of true existence." [See pp. 543-544.]

There are many points to be explained, such as how illusions are used as example, but I will leave these for the time being.

Derivative Topics

The Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas are similar [to other Buddhist schools] in asserting that there are two valid cognizers which ascertain the two truths: direct valid cognizers (pratyaksha-pramāṇa) and inferential valid cognizers (anumāna-pramāṇa). The divisions of signs which are the bases of inference and so forth are also for the most part similar to the former [schools of Buddhist tenets]. Regarding direct perceivers, since it was already explained earlier why they do not assert self-knowing direct perceivers (svasaṃvedana-pratyaksha), the number of [direct perceivers] is definitely three: sense direct perceivers (indriya-pratyaksha), mental direct perceivers (mānasa-pratyaksha), and yogic direct perceivers (yogi-pratyaksha).

Their presentation of the effect of valid cognition accords neither with the Chittamātrins nor with the Sautāntrikas Following Reasoning because they [the Sautāntrika-Svātantrikas] do not assert self-knowers.

Their presentation of the three conditions of a sense consciousness also does not accord with the Chittamātrins because they assert that each of the minute particles in a

composite are causes of a sense consciousness. They also assert that minute particles are substantially existent (dravya-sat) because minute particles are established objectively and are posited in the context of being found at the end of searching for the imputed object.

The omniscient Kay-drup states in his Thousand Doses, his Great Commentary Illuminating the Principles, and so forth that Mādhyamikas who assert non-true existence never assert partless things. Therefore, the meaning of the statement in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path at the point of expressing the assertions of Bhāvaviveka that, "Since he appears to assert final minute particles, he asserts partless particles as observed-object-conditions," does not refer to a partlessness in which there is utterly no divisibility no matter how much it is analyzed by reasoning. Rather, [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] has in mind minute particles a smaller part of which cannot be seen by a sense consciousness without relying on a reasoning consciousness. If [the meaning of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's statement] is taken that way, it seems to fit together [with Kay-drup's assertion], but it should still be examined.

The glorious Chandrakīrti's Supplement to the Middle Way says:

> Some say that whatever the Sautrāntika system

> propounds as ultimate, Mādhyamika propounds as conventional. It should be known that this is propounded by those who do not understand the suchness [explained in Nāgārjuna's] Treatise on the Middle Way.

Also, Chandrakīrti's commentary to Āryadeva's Four Hundred says, "Those of our own schools who, like the Vaisheṣhikas, assert substantial minute particles are not correct." These statements appear to be denegrating this [Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika] system.

Although the Prāsaṅgikas assert external objects, their way of positing them is not similar to that [of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas]. I will explain this briefly [in the Prāsaṅgika chapter]; it should be known in detail elsewhere.

Furthermore, it also should be analyzed whether or not [the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika assertion on] mental direct perceivers accords with that of the Prāmāṇikas. I think that they also differ slightly from the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas [on this point].

It is easy to understand that they do not assert a basis-of-all (ālaya) and an afflicted mind (kliṣhtamanas).

These [Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas] assert that the non-existence of external objects is not the thought of

any sutra whatsoever, due to which they also do not assert that there exists a yogic direct perceiver which realizes the suchness that is the emptiness of duality [of subject and object]. Therefore, it appears that this master's [i.e., Bhāvaviveka's] system must also differ from other schools with respect to how to comment on the thought of Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization.

This school does not assert a difference in the entity [or nature] of the paths of Hearers (Shrāvaka) and Solitary Realizers (Pratyekabuddha), but does assert that they are differentiated in terms of the length of cultivation [of the path] and the effect [they achieve]. With regard to Solitary Realizers, they make presentations of the great and small Congregators (Vargachārin) and the Rhinoceros-like (Khaṅgaviṣhāṇakalpa). Because they assert that the selflessness of phenomena is not taught in the Hīnayāna, Hearers and Solitary Realizers who are definite in the lineage of their own path do not realize the selflessness of phenomena.

Objection: It must be asserted that there exists someone who, having entered the Mahāyāna, ascertains the selflessness of phenomena well and later falls to become a Hearer or Solitary Realizer. If that is so, then there must be an actualization of the selflessness of phenomena [on the path of seeing] by such a person through meditation and an accustoming [on the path of meditation] to what was seen. If you accept that, then, since you must accept that he abandons the artificial conception (*parikalpita-grāha) of true existence on the path of seeing and abandons the innate (sahaja) [conception of true existence] on the path of meditation, the presentations that the conception of true existence is asserted as the obstructions to omniscience and

that Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not abandon [those obstructions] are not correct.

Answer: There is no fallacy. Such a person relying on such a path could merely temporarily suppress the manifest conceptions of true existence but could not abandon the seeds of either the artificial or innate conceptions of true existence. Therefore, these cases of directly seeing the selflessness of phenomena and accustoming to what was seen are not posited as the path of seeing and path of meditation which realize the subtle suchness. The reason for this is that in order to abandon the seeds of the conception of true existence, meditation on selflessness alone is insufficient; it must be accompanied by the limitless collections. Therefore, the generation of the wisdom realizing non-true existence into the entity of an uninterrupted path which is the antidote (pratipakṣha) abandoning objects of abandonment depends on the power of the special method, and even at the time of the uninterrupted path itself, [the wisdom] must be related with the power of special types of method. By this reasoning, at the very time of the uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum [as a sentient being before achieving Buddhahood], with the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise there must exist a complete capacity definitely to manifest in the next moment all the conventional and ultimate uncontaminated qualities of a Conqueror. Nevertheless,

conventional aspects do not have to be manifest in that exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise.

This is a difficult point in the Perfection Vehicle (Pāramitāyāna). It is one essential [reason why] one must definitely add the Mantra path to the end of the Perfection Vehicle path in order to become fully enlightened.

This way of dispelling objections is similar in Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika as well, and this process of reasoning is very important in the context of Prāsaṅgika also. These too are unrivalled, great features of the good explanation by the foremost great being Dzong-ka-ba, and I have spoken relying on the statements of the Foremost One himself. How could the likes of me explain these difficult points on his own?

Objection: Since the honorable master Bhāvaviveka stated that if the selflessness of phenomena were taught in the Hearer scriptural collection (Shrāvakapiṭaka), the teachings of the Mahāyāna would be purposeless, then a Hīnayāna Superior could not possibly have realized the selflessness of phenomena because, otherwise, the teaching of the selflessness of phenomena would not be the only distinguishing feature of the Mahāyāna.

Answer: There is no fallacy. The wisdom realizing the subtle suchness is the antidote to the conception of the true existence of phenomena, and since the conception of true

existence is an obstruction to omniscience, the teaching of the selflessness of phenomena was set forth for the purpose of abandoning the obstructions to omniscience. Therefore, if the selflessness of phenomena were taught in the scriptural collection of Hearers, Hīnayānists would have to abandon the obstructions to omniscience. If that were the case, then, since the antidote for abandoning the obstructions to omniscience would have to be fully taught in that scriptural collection, [Bhāvaviveka] says that it would [absurdly] follow that the Mahāyāna scriptural collection would be purposeless. He is not asserting that the Mahāyāna has no distinguishing features apart from the selflessness of phenomena.

They [the two branches of Svātantrika] are similar in asserting that the obstructions—the objects of abandonment—are two: the afflictive obstructions (_kleshāvaraṇa_) and the obstructions to omniscience (_jñeyāvaraṇa_). Since it is explained in Bhāvaviveka's _Blaze of Reasoning_ that when a person definite in the Mahāyāna lineage attains the eighth ground (_bhūmi_), the afflictive obstructions are consumed, he does not assert, as do the other Svātantrikas, that the two obstructions are abandoned simultaneously by the vajra-like meditative stabilization (_vajropamasamādhi_) [at the end of the tenth ground]. However, he also does not assert, as do the Prāsaṅgikas, that one does not begin to abandon the

obstructions to omniscience until the afflictive obstructions have been consumed.

The four doctrinal forbearances (dharma-kṣhānti) of the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing are divided from the perspective of its comprehending the reality of the four truths, and the four subsequent forbearances (*anukṣhānti) are posited from the perspective of realizing [the reality] of the four subjects [observing the four doctrinal forbearances]. The foremost Gyel-tsap asserts this procedure of the higher knowledge [texts, such as Asaṅga's Compendium of Knowledge (Abhidharmasamuchchaya)] regarding the way of making such distinctions with respect to the eight knowledges is similar for all Mādhyamikas—Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas.

All Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas agree that the reasoning consciousness directly realizing non-true existence does not establish the existence of non-true existence, but the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas assert that the self-knower experiencing the reasoning consciousness which realizes non-true existence establishes the existence of non-true existence implicitly from its explicit realization of the reasoning consciousness. The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas assert that the subsequent cognizer (*parichchhinna-jñāna) induced by the non-conceptual reasoning consciousness establishes the existence of non-true existence, and they assert that conceptual subsequent cognizers (*kalpanā-parichchhinna-jñāna)

and direct valid cognizers (pratyaksha-pramāṇa) are not mutually exclusive. For the Svātantrikas of this [Sautrāntika-Svātantrika] system, positing either of those two is not feasible, nor does the reasoning consciousness implicitly realize the existence of non-true existence because the explicit object of the reasoning consciousness is a non-affirming negative. Thus, how [the existence of the emptiness of true existence] is certified is to be reflected upon. Beginning with these, there are many points to be talked about, but I will leave them for the time being.

Such presentations as those of the Three Bodies (Trikāya) of the state of the effect [Buddhahood] agree for the most part with the other Mādhyamikas. Although there are many different modes of explanation in the texts, they constitute differences only in form; they are not discordant systems.

PART THREE

YOGĀCHĀRA-SVĀTANTRIKA-MĀDHYAMIKA

This section has two parts: a general explanation and a detailed explanation.

GENERAL EXPLANATION

Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way says:

> The non-existence of external objects should be known
> Through relying on mind-only.
> [Then] relying on this [Mādhyamika] mode, it should be known
> That this [mind] too is completely selfless.[1]

The commentary following that says:

> Through relying on mind-only, things which are asserted to be external to the mind, such as I and mine, subject and object, etc.,[2] are just effortlessly realized to be without a nature [of a difference of entity between subject and object].[3]

Thus, this indicates two presentations: initially, one ascertains the selflessness of persons and then ascertains the suchness which is the emptiness of duality [of subject and object]. The same text also says:

> Regarding this mode [mentioned in the stanza above], though one has realized that the mind is without a nature [of a difference of entity

> between subject and object] because it is not self-arisen, to realize the middle path which is an abandonment of all extremes one thoroughly realizes the absence of a nature [of true existence] due to [the mind's] being devoid of a nature of one or many.[4]

Thus, three stages of ascertaining suchness are explained. After the first two stages [of ascertaining the selflessness of persons and the emptiness of duality of subject and object], when those with very great intelligence and effort analyze whether that mind is inherently one or many, they see that not even a particle of ultimate establishment (*paramārtha-siddhi*) exists. They thereby realize the middle path which is an abandonment of all extremes.

Proof that this is the Thought of Sutras

A sutra [the *Chapter on the Supramundane* (*Lokottaraparivarta*)] says:

> Furthermore, O Children of the Conqueror, having realized that the three realms are mind only, realize that the three times [past, present, and future] are similar to mind as well. Understand that mind is also without extremes and middle.[5]

The Compendium of Doctrine (Dharmasaṃgiti) says, "Supramundane Victor, all phenomena are imaginary in essence. They are exhausted in mind only, without substance, like illusions, rootless."[6] The Descent into Lāṅka Sūtra says:

> Through relying on mind-only
> One does not conceive of external objects.
> Abiding in correct observation
> One passes beyond mind-only as well.
>
> Having passed beyond mind-only
> One passes beyond non-appearance [of true existence temporarily].
> A yogi who abides in non-appearance
> Sees the Mahāyāna.[7]

[The Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas] assert that such statements are teachings which present the ascertainment of the modes of suchness in the stages explained above.

Thus, it is asserted that the Mahāyāna is attained by way of two modes:

1 of consciousness only which is an emptiness of external objects conventionally,
2 of the non-existence of the entityness of all phenomena ultimately.

Shāntarakṣhita's <u>Ornament for the Middle Way</u> says:

> Those who, having mounted the chariot of
>   the two modes,
> Grasp the reins of reasoning
> Thereby attain the state of a Mahāyānist
> Exactly as it is.[8]

The attainment of the Mahāyāna through these two modes is also the thought of the Conqueror because the autocommentary [to this stanza] says:

> The <u>Descent into Laṅka Sūtra</u> says that the brief teaching of the Mahāyāna is included into two modes as follows:
>
> > All of the Mahāyāna is included in
> > The five phenomena,[9] nature,
> > The eight collections of consciousness
> > And the existence of the two selflessnesses.[10]

Nevertheless, the Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas do not assert, as do the Chittamātrins, that consciousness is truly established, or that the suchness which is the emptiness of duality [of subject and object] is truly established even conventionally. The Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas also do not assert a mind-basis-of-all (<u>ālaya-vijñāna</u>) which is a

separate entity from the six consciousnesses, and from this it can be understood that they also do not assert an afflicted mind (kliṣhṭa-manas).

Question: Is this mind-only mode of the non-existence of external objects an assertion of the protector Nāgārjuna or not? If it is [his assertion], you must say which texts of the protector Nāgārjuna indicate this [mind-only] mode.

Answer: This is shown by his Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning where it says:

> Those explained as the great elements and so forth
> Are completely included within consciousness.
> Knowing that, if they lack [true existence],
> Are they not wrongly imagined?

The first two lines indicate that the elements (bhūta) and elemental evolutes do not exist as separate objects from consciousness and that they are posited just as the appearance of consciousness in the aspect of those [objects], whereby they are included in consciousness.

The commentary following the stanza in Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way which beings, "Those who, having mounted the chariot of the two modes," says:

> Those engaged in inference that works by the power of things realize that all things are without

> inherent existence through the Mahāyāna which is included within the expression of the two modes and by which the Tathāgatas go and will go. Like those mounted on great chariots grasping the reins well, they thoroughly attain the "meaningful Mahāyāna."[11]

Thus, he says that Bodhisattvas mount the chariot of the two modes—the mode of mind-only conventionally and the mode of the middle way of non-inherent existence ultimately —and grasping the reins of stainless reasoning, attain possession of the Mahāyāna which has the meaning of suchness.

Although in the system of these Svātantrikas there are many minor divisions which have different modes of assertion among themselves, all are similar in asserting the corpus of the presentation for ascertaining suchness as just explained. In Āryavimuktisena's Illumination of the ("Perfection of Wisdom in) Twenty-Five Thousand Stanzas" (Panchaviṃshatisāhasrikālokā), Haribhadra's Illumination of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka), Eight Chapters (Le'u brgyad ma),[12] Commentary for Easy Understanding on the Difficult Points of the Condensed (Perfection of Wisdom Sutra) (Sañchayagāthāpañjikā-subodhinī), Buddhajñānapāda's texts on the perfection [of wisdom], and Abhayākaragupta's Moonbeams of Essentials (Marmakaumudī) and Ornament for the

Thought of the Subduer (Munimatālaṃkara) the mode of ascertaining the view is done in just this way. The foremost omniscient one, Ḏzong-ka-ḇa, asserts that although a few who asserted the system of these Svātantrikas appeared prior to Shāntarakṣhita and his spiritual son [Kamalashīla], such as Āryavimuktisena, the founder of the Mādhyamika tenet system of the mode of the non-existence of external objects is the master Shāntarakṣhita.

The detailed explanation has four parts: an identification of the object of reasoned negation, an explanation of the reasoning refuting that, a presentation of the two truths delineated [by reasoning], and a brief presentation of the paths and fruits.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE OBJECT OF REASONED NEGATION

The three modes of positing the ultimate and the difference between positing or not positing what is established as those [three modes] as ultimately established was explained earlier [pp. 484-488]. Therefore, here I will discuss briefly the mode of identifying the measure of true existence—the object of reasoned negation.

Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way says:

> An awareness which mistakenly superimposes the opposite onto things which are in reality without entityness is called conealing (saṃvṛiti) because it is obstructed or covered from suchness or it makes suchness obstructed or covered. As it says in [the Descent into Laṅkā] Sutra:
>
> > The production of things [exists] conventionally;
> > Ultimately it is without inherent existence.

> Ultimately it is without inherent existence.
> That which is mistaken about what does
> not inherently exist
> Is asserted to be a concealer of reality.

> Because they arise from that [conception of true existence], all false things which are seen displayed by that [conception of true existence] are called mere conventionalities. Moreover, that [conception of true existence] arises through the maturation of beginningless predispositions for error, whereby all living beings see [phenomena] displayed as if [they had] a true nature in reality. Therefore, all entities of false things [which exist] through the power of their [that is, sentient beings'] thoughts are said "only to exist conventionally."

Thus, the existence that is the opposite of the mode of conventional existence set forth [in the passage above] is the measure of true existence—the object of reasoned negation.

Regarding this, [the part of the passage] that reads, "An awareness which mistakenly superimposes the opposite onto things which in reality are without entityness" indicates the mistaken mode of superimposing ultimate existence

onto that which ultimately does not inherently exist. "Is called concealing because it is obstructed or covered from suchness or it makes suchness obstructed or covered" explains (saṃvṛiti) as [meaning] concealer in terms of the original Sanskrit; it is obstructed from seeing the mode of being of reality. "Because they arise from that, all false things which are seen displayed by that are called mere conventionalities" indicates that because of arising from that conception of true existence, all false things which are seen displayed as truly existent by the conception of true existence exist only as conventionalities. The seer in this context is a thought consciousness, not a sense consciousness [because] the foremost omniscient being D̄zong-ka-b̄a said, "This system asserts that the object of negation—true existence—does not appear to the sense consciousnesses" and it was clearly explained earlier [pp. 520-523] that both Svātantrika systems are similar [regarding this point].

"Moreover, that arises through the maturation of beginningless predispositions for error" indicates that such a conception of true existence is the innate (sahaja) conception of true existence which has operated beginninglessly. The "thought" of "by the power of their thought" is explained as having both conceptual and non-conceptual [forms]. Therefore, the assertion by some that it is only a non-conceptual consciousness is not correct because there

are many phenomena which do not appear to a non-conceptual consciousness of a common being which must be posited only through a conceptual consciousness and those [phenomena] are also asserted to be established by way of their own character in this [system]. Dzong-ka-ba's Great Commentary to (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement" says, "It is not a conceptual consciousness only but refers also to non-conceptual consciousnesses." The terms "only" and "also" clearly indicate the existence of both conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses. Do not hold that this passage indicates that conceptual awarenesses do not exist [in the referents of "thought" in Kamalashīla's statement]!

It is incorrect to think that these words of [Dzong-ka-ba's] statement that thought in this context can be a non-conceptual consciousness probably explains that the object of negation—true existence—appears to the sense consciousnesses. For this passage is indicating the mode by which things are posited as existing by the power of conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses, and it is indicating that these [phenomena are established by way of their] own character within being merely posited through the power of those two [types of consciousness], implicitly eliminating ultimate existence. Also, [phenomena which are established by way of their] own character within being merely posited through power of those two are conventional

truths and are not the object of reasoned negation. Dzong-ka-ba's Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement" clearly says:

> That false things which do not exist ultimately but are posited as existing by the power of those two exist only conventionally is the meaning [of the verse from the Descent into Laṅkā Sutra], "The production of things [exists] conventionally"; it does not mean that these exist for the concealer which is the consciousness conceiving of true existence.

Therefore, to say that this statement which indicates the manner of positing conventionalities [instead] indicates the measure of true existence—the object of negation—is not to speak well.

Question: If this system conventionally asserts that things [have] an own-character which is posited by the power of an awareness and asserts that establishment as an objective self-characterized mode of subsistence which does not depend on being posited by the power of an awareness is the measure of true existence—the object of reasoned negation—what does it mean to be posited or not be posited by the power of an awareness?

Answer: I will explain this. When a magician conjures

such things as a pebble or stick into a horse or elephant, the magician perceives the pebble, stick and so forth as a horse or an elephant, but he does not conceive of them as [being a real] horse or elephant. The audience whose eyes have been affected by the mantra and salve[1] have both the appearance of the basis of conjuring [the pebble or stick] as a horse or elephant and the conception of such [that is, they both see the horse or elephant and believe it to be real]. A person who arrives at the place late and whose eyes are not affected by the mantra and salve has neither the appearance of the basis of conjuring as a horse or elephant nor the conception of such.

For the magician, the basis for conjuring the illusion is merely posited as a horse or elephant through the power of an awareness affected by the mantra and salve; it does not appear as a horse or elephant from the side of the pebble or stick's own mode of subsistence without depending on such an awareness. Nonetheless, there must exist some mode of subsistence which is the appearance as a horse or elephant from the side of the pebble or stick itself and which is posited by the power of the awareness affected by the mantra and salve. Otherwise, if it were said that [a pebble or stick] merely appears as a horse or elephant just for a mistaken consciousness (<u>bhrānti-jñāna</u>) and that, in general, the basis of conjuring does not appear as a horse or elephant

then an awareness which was mistaken with respect to appearance would not occur, because in general even the mere appearance of a pebble or stick as a horse or elephant would not occur.

Therefore, although the basis of conjuring can be posited as appearing as a horse or elephant, it is posited in that way by the power of appearing to a mistaken awareness; it is not posited by the power of the mode of subsistence of the basis of conjuring. Like that example, according to these Mādhyamikas, the fact that things are posited through the power of awareness which is not damaged by valid cognition and the fact that the thing's own mode of subsistence which is posited by the power of that [awareness] also exists are not contradictory, just as a basis of conjuring can be posited as appearing as a horse or elephant by the power of an awareness affected by mantra and salve and there [also] exists a mode of subsistence which is the appearance of a horse or elephant even from the side of the basis of conjuring and which is posited through the power of that awareness. Therefore, positing—through the power of an awareness—the production of a sprout from a seed and the sprout's being produced from the seed from its [the sprout's] own side are not contradictory. This should be known regarding all [cases of] positing conventional existence in this system.

For the audience whose eyes have been affected by the

mantra and salve, the appearance [of the pebble or stick] as a horse or elephant is not perceived as [having] a mode of subsistence which is posited through the power of an internal awareness; they apprehend from the start a real horse or elephant standing there covering the spot. In the same way, ordinary sentient beings apprehend things as established from the side of the object's own mode of subsistence without depending at all on being posited through the power of an internal awareness. That is the mode of apprehension by the innate conception of true existence. They [the Svātantrikas] assert that establishment in accordance with apprehension by that mode of conceiving [true existence] is negated by reasons such as the lack of being one or many, but a mere mode of subsistence which is posited through the power of awareness is not negated by those reasonings.

Thus, in this way one can know the point at which [a consciousness] becomes an analyzer of suchness for this system. If one is not satisfied with the mere name and designation, "In general, a sprout is produced from a seed," and merely analyzes whether or not a sprout is produced from a seed from its own side, this does not make [that investigation] an analysis of suchness. However, when one analyzes whether or not that production of a sprout is produced from the side of the object's own mode of subsistence

without depending on being posited through the power of an awareness, this is put as analyzing suchness. In the Prāsaṅgika system, even the former type of analysis [into whether the sprout is produced from the seed] qualifies as an analysis of suchness, and the conception of existence by way of [the object's] mode of subsistence without depending on being posited by an awareness is not the subtle innate conception of true existence.

Although the Proponents of True Existence posit objects of comprehension (prameya)—the two, specifically characterized phenomena (svalakṣhaṇa) and generally characterized phenomena (sāmanyalakṣhaṇa)—through the power of the two valid cognizers [direct and inferential valid cognizers], they assert that valid cognizers realize phenomena which exist as an objective mode of subsistence. They do not assert that what is posited subjectively through the power of appearing to a valid cognizer is the mode of subsistence of that object. Therefore, this is totally different in meaning from being posited through the power of an awareness in this [Svātantrika] system.

Dzong-ka-ba's Great Commentary on (Chandrakirti's) "Supplement" says:

> With regard to the illusory appearance [created by a magician], according to the Yogāchāra-Mādhyamikas

> it is established [i.e., certified as existing] by a self-knowing direct perceiver (*svasamvedana-pratyakṣha*), whereas according to the Svātantrikas who assert external objects, it is established by the sense direct perceiver (*indriya-pratakṣha*) which apprehends the base such as the area or space [where the illusion appears].

According to the Yogāchāra-Mādhyamikas, since the illusory horse or elephant is merely a mental appearance, it is realized implicitly by the self-knowing awareness which comprehends it, and according to the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas, since the illusory horse or elephant is an external object and imaginary form-source (*parikalpita-rūpa-āyatana*), it is established by the sense direct perceiver which apprehends either the area or the space. That this is the thought [of D̄zong-ka-b̄a] is stated by the great scholar and adept Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄ay-dor-jay.

A person whose eyes have not been affected [by the mantra] has neither the appearance of a pebble or stick as a horse or elephant nor the conception of that. Similarly, when the non-conceptual exalted wisdom (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) is generated from analyzing well with properly contemplated reasoning and cultivating it in meditation, all dualistic appearances are completely pacified in the face of that

exalted wisdom, whereby there is neither the appearance nor conception of true existence.

In summary, the Svātantrika system asserts that things are posited through the power of awareness and that these are posited by thought, but they do not assert that being posited by an awareness [means] necessarily to be posited only by a thought consciousness because they assert that positing by an awareness also includes being posited by a non-conceptual consciousness. Nevertheless, they do not assert that everything which is posited by any awareness conventionally exists. Therefore, [for something to exist it] must be posited through the power of an awareness which is not damaged by valid cognition. In that way, phenomena such as forms, from the appearance side, are established in a mode of subsistence which is merely posited through the power of appearing to a non-defective awareness and, from the emptiness side, are empty of being established from the side of the object's own mode of subsistence without being posited by an awareness. There must be a composite of these two [appearance and emptiness]. The term "merely" in the statement "merely posited through the power of awareness" eliminates establishment by way of an uncommon mode of subsistence; it does not eliminate the existence of a mode of subsistence which is not just posited by names and terminology.

If these [points] are known well, one will be able to

delineate accurately the ways in which the Svātantrikas' way of positing the two truths is subtler than that of the Proponents of True Existence and coarser than that of the Prāsaṅgikas. Furthermore, having analyzed in detail the statements of the foremost father D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his spiritual sons, [one's mind] will turn into an arrowhead of Dharma.

THE REASONING REFUTING TRUE EXISTENCE

In his Ornament for the Middle Way, the master Shāntarakṣhita exhaustively explains just the reasoning of the lack of being one or many which is an analysis of the entity [of objects]. In doing so, he is explaining the thought of such sutras as:

> When phenomena are mentally broken up
> An entity is not apprehended.
> Therefore, these are explained to be without
> expression
> And also without entityness. . . .

Also, the Meeting of Father and Son Sutra (Pitāputrasamāgama-sūtra) says:

> These phenomena [such as] trees should be known
> To be like the appearance of a reflection
> Which does not inherently exist
> [Appearing] in a very clear mirror.
> My explanation of "emptiness of inherent existence"
> Should [itself] also be viewed as empty.

And the Descent into Laṅkā Sutra says:

> The entities of things are like
> Appearances [of things] in a mirror

> Which do not exist there
> Because of lacking oneness or otherness. . . .

In his Illumination of the Middle Way, the great master Kamalashīla set forth many ways in which the Chittamātrins oppose the Mādhyamikas, and in explaining answers to those [objections] he used many scriptures and reasonings. In terms of reasonings, he extensively set forth the diamond slivers, the refutation of production from the existent and non-existent, the refutation of the four extremes of production, the lack of being one or many, and the reason of dependent arising. Here, I will speak briefly just about the reason of the lack of being one or many.

Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way says:

> These things propounded by ourselves and others
> Because of the lack in reality
> Of a nature of oneness or manyness
> Do not inherently exist, like a reflection.[1]

Thus, he states the sign, and with respect to proving the modes (rūpa), there are two parts: the proof of the property of the position (pakṣhadharma) and the proof of the pervasion (vyāpti). The first of these has two parts: the proof of the lack of true oneness and the proof of the lack of true manyness. The first of these has two parts: the refutation of true pervasive oneness—the refutation of

true oneness in permanent phenomena and impermanent things imputed by our own and other schools and the refutation of the true oneness of the person imputed by the Vātsīputrīyas—and the refutation of true non-pervasive oneness—the refutation of external objects which are composed of partless particles and the refutation of the true oneness of consciousness imputed by the two Proponents of [External] Objects [the Vaibhāṣhikas and Sautrāntikas].

For the proof of the lack of true manyness, the non-existence of the true oneness itself is stated as the sign. The proof of the pervasion is done just by proving that one and many are explicitly contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive.

If this were explained extensively in connection with the texts, it would indeed be good but would be far too much. Therefore, I will explain just the essence of the meaning.

Here, regarding what is held as the subject (dharmin), just things that are imputed by our own and other schools, such as the principal (pradhāna) and a self-sufficient person are permissible because it was explained in the Sautrāntika chapter [not translated here[2]] that it is permissible to hold a non-established base [a non-existent] as the subject when the sign (liṅga) and predicate (dharma) being proven are mere eliminations [non-affirming negatives]. Also, from among the three types of non-established [reasons] (asiddha-hetu)

in relation to a fact (artha), in relation to an awareness (buddhi), and in relation to [another] party (pakṣha)—the explanation of the five types of non-established signs with respect to the first [those in relation to the fact], such as the reason's not being established due to the non-existence of the entity of the subject, refers to when the sign and predicate being proven have a positive aspect; it is not definite [that the reason is not established] when the sign and predicate being proven are non-affirming negatives. Specifically regarding this point, the master Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way says:

> For one who does not wish to prove a phenomenon which is a thing as an existent entity but wishes to express a mere proof of an elimination of a phenomenon which is a superimposition, the expression of faults such as not being established does not require, even conventionally a subject which is a thing because it [the reason] is not a quality of it [the subject] and because [the subject] is not feasible as the possessor of the quality which is based on that [subject]. Even though it is not established [as such], a reason which has [the relationship] of, if [the predicate of] the probandum (sādhyadharma) did not exist it

would not occur, is not prevented from establishing the meaning being sought.

Thus, it is clearly stated that a subject which is an actuality is not necessary when the sign and the predicate being proved are mere eliminations. However, it was already analyzed earlier [in the Sautrāntika chapter] whether or not when generating an inferential ocgnizer, the meaning-of-the-term (shabdha-artha) [generic image] of a mere subject is needed as the basis for establishing pervasion for the mind of the other party.

Objection: If the sign and the predicate of the probandum of this syllogism of the lack of being one or many are only non-affirming negatives, then it is not feasible that the probandum is proved because the entities of the sign and the predicate of the probandum themselves do not exist, and if they do not exist, then it is not feasible that they are the same entity in which case, there is no relationship of one essence [between them] whereby it is not suitable that they be the object understood and the means of understanding. If you say that the sign and the predicate of the probandum are affirming negatives, that is also not feasible because, if that were the case, there would have to exist an actuality (bhāva) which is the lack of the nature of oneness of manyness, and the Mādhyamikas do not assert

that [these reasons are such].

Answer: There is no fallacy because, since the relationship of one essence is not just for [impermanent] things, non-[impermanent] things also have it [and in this reasoning the predicate of the probandum and the sign are non-affirming negatives, permanent phenomena]. Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way says, "Here, [one] essence is another way of saying that [two things] lack being different entities, and even these [two] non-entities [the sign and the predicate] are also similar [in being] selflessnesses." His idea is that if a difference of entity is refuted with respect to existents (sat), they become the same entity, and, since it is also refuted that in general they [the sign—not being a truly existent one or many—and the predicate of the probandum—not ultimately existing] are one, they have the relationship of one essence in the sense of being different within being one entity, and since the sign [not being a truly existent one or many] and the predicate of the probandum [not ultimately existing] are both similar in being entities of selflessness, it is not contradictory that although they are non-affirming negatives, [the predicate of the probandum] is the object understood and [the sign] is the means of understanding. Also, Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way says:

> That is not correct because [one] essence is another way of saying non-difference [of entity], and because those non-entitynesses are similar [in being] selfless, [such] is just non-contradictory.

Also:

> In the same way, when things are, in reality, in opposition to being a nature of one or many [i.e., the sign], like a reflection, it is definite that they are also in opposition to being ultimate entities [the predicate of the probandum]. Therefore, [the reason and the predicate of the probandum] are different in relation to [different] particulars of opposition, whereby [the predicate of the probandum and the sign] can serve as those things which are the object understood and the means of understanding.

Regarding this point, earlier Tibetan scholars have said that when the <u>appearance</u> of non-true existence is proved through the <u>appearance</u> of the lack of being one or many, an affirming negative is proved, and when the lack of being one or many proves the emptiness of the suitability of applying the verbal designation "ultimate thing," a non-affirming

negative is proved. Such statements are due to their not having understood these points and due to their not thinking that it is a fundamental tenet of Nāgārjuna and his spiritual sons to hold that the predicate of probandum in the proof of non-true existence is only an elimination.

It is stated in Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way that the reasoning set forth by the statement, "These things propounded by ourselves and others . . ." [see p. 555] in Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way may be taken either as a statement of refutation—a consequence (prasaṅga)—or as a statement of proof—a syllogism (prayoga).

Objection: If it is taken as a consequence, it is not suitable to state, "Because of lacking, in reality, / A nature of oneness or manyness" as a reason for the lack of being either a truly existent one or many because in a consequence an assertion of the opponent is stated as the sign, and then a consequence must be thrown which is not wanted by the opponent [but in this case, the sign is not asserted by the opponent].

Answer: This is no fallacy because although the sign, the lack of being a truly existent one or many, is not explicitly asserted by the opponent, it is implicitly asserted. This is because the opponent explicitly asserts an object of pervasion by that sign and because, if he

explicitly asserts the object pervaded, he comes to assert implicitly the pervader as well. As Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way says:

> Regarding this, if [this reason is used] to prove a consequence, it is not the case that the reason is not established because, although the opponents have not asserted that things lack being either one or many, since they assert phenomena which are pervaded by that, they just assert that implicitly as well.

Objection: It is not correct that, since the pervaded is explicitly asserted, the pervader is implicitly asserted because otherwise, even the Nihilists would come to assert former and later lifetimes and omniscience. This is because this life's consciousness is asserted by the Nihilists and it is pervaded by being preceded by the consciousnesses of previous lifetimes. Also, they assert that the four elements exist, and their existence is pervaded by being seen by an omniscient consciousness. If you say that you are not propounding that those parties assert these but that they come to assert them implicitly, that is also incorrect because, if that were the case, when one phenomenon was expressed, that term would implicitly express all phenomena

which exist as pervaders of that [phenomenon] and the awareness which is induced by that term would implicitly ascertain those [phenomena].

Answer: I will discuss this. Here, if the way in which the pervader is implicitly asserted due to explicitly asserting the pervaded were merely a case of generally having to assert the pervader implicitly when the pervaded is asserted, then it is true that those faults would be incurred. However, the meaning of [Kamalashīla's] text is stated in that way considering the opponent's explicit assertion of a special object pervaded by not being a truly existent one, which is asserted implicitly. Thus, there is not fault.

This is illustrated with the example of a permanent Īshvara asserted by the opponent. Regarding their mode of assertion that Īshvara is permanent, they assert that everything about Īshvara himself which exists in the morning also exists in the evening. Therefore, they do not assert that some of Īshvara's factors that exist in the morning exist in the evening, but other factors do not exist in the evening; they assert that all the factors that exist at the earlier time exist at the later time and that there are no factors that exist at the later time which did not exist at the earlier time. Thus, their not asserting that the factors of being Īshvara are mutually different is the way they assert that Īshvara is permanent and one. Therefore, that is the

reason for saying that they do not explicitly assert that Īshvara lacks a nature of oneness.

Also, they assert many phases of such an Īshvara, producing effects such as happiness in the morning and suffering in the evening. One who asserts such a serial creation of effects implicitly asserts that [Īshvara] is not a truly exist one because, since there must be a serial existence of the Īshvaras at many different times of producing pleasure and pain, Īshvara must have many stages and these Īshvaras are partless ones. In this way, one can understand the manner in which an object pervaded by not being a truly established one is also asserted with respect to other bases, such as the principal [of Sāṃkhya] (pradhāna), time [of Vaisheṣhika] (kāla), and so forth.

Regarding these points, although a pot is posited as an illustration of one in our own system and in asserted to exist in both the morning and the evening, the pot of the morning is not asserted to be one with the pot of the evening, and those two are posited as illustrations of many. Also, blue is asserted as one, and it serially produces many earlier and later consciousnesses apprehending blue. One must know the reasons why these fallacies [adduced to the opponent above] do not apply [to our own position].

These [points] are the meaning of [this statement from] Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way:

> Regarding this, those who imagine Īshvara and so forth to be a permanent and single entity assert [that Īshvara has] the quality of creating the arising of their effects serially. Therefore, they implicitly assert [that Īshvara] lacks an entityness of oneness because [if Ishvara were] one entity, due to Īshvara's not being different from the state of non-production, it is not suitable [for Īshvara] to be a producer at a later time, as he was not at a former time. If he is a producer [at a later time], since Īshvara would be an entity which is of a discordant character from the earlier state [of non-production], oneness falls apart.

Permanent and single [phenomena] which are imputed by the non-Buddhist Proponents of Permanence—such as the person (puruṣha), principal (pradhāna), time (kāla), and Brahmā as well as the three unconditioned phenomena (asaṃskṛita) which are propounded to be permanent things (*nitya-bhāva) by the Vaibhāṣhikas among our own schools [those three being space (ākāsha), analytical cessations (pratisaṃkhyānirodha), and non-analytical cessations (apratisaṃkhyānirodha)], the inexpressible person propounded by the Vātīsputrīyas, and the

consciousness which is imputed to be a truly existent entity by the Chittamātrins are set forth extensively in that text [the Illumination of the Middle Way] in terms of their respective modes of asserting [some sort of] non-oneness—the object pervaded which is [used as] the reason [why they implicitly assert] the lack of truly existent oneness.

There are many different subtleties in logically forcing our own and other schools to assert implicitly the lack of truly existent oneness. Also, with regard to our own schools, there are many subtle differences in how the demonstration of logical damage applies to the opponent's assertion for the system of the two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects [the Vaibhāshikas and Sautrāntikas] and the Vijñaptikas [Chittamātrins]. These should be known in detail.

If one investigates by striving for many causal collections such as not being satisfied with detailed analysis of the texts of the great charioteers until one's intelligence is [as sharp] as the point [of a blade] of kusha grass as well as properly relying on a skillful spiritual guide, one will find the essential points of the subtle path of reasoning of the great charioteers. Although one studies over months and years until the flesh is wasted at merely arranging statements which reveal nothing to oneself other than training the mouth to speak, it appears to be difficult to understand

[the essentials].

I will briefly explain how the modes of the sign of this reasoning are proved when it is treated as an autonomous [syllogism] and whether [this sign] proves a meaning or an expression. The proof of the modes has two parts, the proof that the reason is a property of the subject[3] and the proof of the pervasion. The first [that the reason is a property of the subject] has two parts, the proof of the lack of being a truly existent one and the lack of being [a truly existent] many.

The Proof of the Lack of Being a Truly Existent One

The subjects, the principal (pradhāna) and so forth, are not established as a truly existent one because of being involved in many series of assistance to many former and later series of effects. If one thinks that there is no fallacy because there are many different potencies which create many different former and later effects, then it follows that the subjects [the principal, etc.] are not truly permanent and unitary because, due to having a series of effects, their former and later natures arise and disintegrate. To explain this, Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way says:

> Because of being involved in series of effects
> The permanent does not have a nature of oneness.
> If there are different [potencies] for each of
> the effects,
> Then their permanence would disintegrate.[4]

With regard to the refutation of the assertion by others of our own [Buddhist] schools that the three unconditioned phenomena which are objects known by a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise arisen from meditation (bhāvanāmayī) are truly existent ones, the subjects, the three unconditioned phenomena, are not truly one, because of being in the relationship of subject and object with many series of former and later consciousnesses arisen from meditation. To explain this, Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way says:

> Also, for a system which propounds that
> The three unconditioned phenomena
> Are objects which are known by a consciousness
> arisen from meditation,
> Those are not one because of being related with
> series of consciousnesses.[5]

If you say that it is not contradictory for these objects to exist as truly existent ones even though they are related to

series of consciousnesses, then, if the object of knowledge which is the object of a former consciousness exists at the time of a later consciousness, the former consciousness must also exist at that [later] time because object and subject are simultaneous. If you accept that, then it [absurdly] follows that the former and later consciousnesses arisen from meditation are disordered.

If you say that the object of the former consciousness is not present at the time of the later consciousness, then it follows that the subjects, those unconditioned phenomena, are momentary because of being things whose former nature does not occur at a later occasion and whose later nature does not occur at a former occasion, like a consciousness arisen from meditation.

Or, the subjects, the later [moments of these] unconditioned phenomena, are not unconditioned phenomena because of arising in dependence on the power of the earlier unconditioned phenomena, as is the case, for example, with the minds and mental factors arisen from meditation. If you say that the reason is not established, then it follows that these subjects arise under their own power because of arising without depending on other causes. If you accept that, then it follows that [these unconditioned phenomena] either exist permanently or are utterly non-existent because of being things which do not follow from causes. In explanation,

Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way says:

> If the nature of the objects known
> By the former consciousness follows later,
> The former consciousness would become later
> And the later would similarly become former.
>
> If their entities do not arise
> At the former and later times,
> It should be known that the unconditioned,
> Like consciousness, would be momentary.
>
> Since they arise through the power
> Of earlier moments
> They would not be unconditioned,
> Like minds and mental factors.
>
> If you assert that [the unconditioned]
> Arise by their own power in these moments,
> Then, since they do not rely on another
> They exist permanently or do not exist.[6]

Concerning these modes of refuting the truly existent permanent ones asserted by our own and other schools, it is essential that one know well the way in which the opponent asserts [phenomena] as one due to which they have the burden of the fallacy. Otherwise, if one refutes mere oneness and

mere permanence with those reasonings, all the fallacies stated about the others will undeniably apply equally to oneself, whereby it will be difficult to explain the texts of the great charioteers without error.

Refutation of the Truly Existent Unitary Person Asserted by the Vātsīputrīyas

It follows that the subject, the person, lacks being a truly existent one or many because of being inexpressible as permanent or impermanent, like a flower in the sky. It follows [that it is inexpressible as permanent or impermanent] because if it were momentary, it would have a plural nature, and if it were not momentary, it would be suitable as a single entity, but since [according to the Vātsīputrīyas] it is inexpressible as either [momentary or non-momentary], there is no difficulty in establishing that it is empty of nature of one or many. To explain this, Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way says:

> Since it is unsuitable [according to the
> Vātsīputrīyas] to indicate that the person
> Is momentary or non-momentary,
> It is clearly known that it lacks
> A nature of being one or many.[7]

Refutation of a Truly Existent Pervasive One

The subjects, space (ākāsha), time (kāla), and so forth are not truly existent ones, because of being related with a composite of directional parts, such as east, and temporal parts, such as the past. To explain this, Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way says:

> Because of being related with different
> directions,
> How can pervasives be one?[8]

The Refutation of Truly Existent Gross [Objects Which Are] One

The subjects, gross objects such as pots, are not truly existent ones because of involving conjunctions of contradictions in terms of substance such as being obstructed and not obstructed, in terms of activity such as moving and not moving, and in terms of quality such as being colored or not colored. To explain this, Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way says:

> Because of factors such as being obstructed
> and not being obstructed,
> Gross phenomena also are not one.[9]

Refutation of Minute Particles Which Are Truly Existent Ones

It follows that the subject, a minute particle that dwells in the middle of particles in the ten directions, does not have a different location from the eastern particle and the remaining nine particles because its side which faces the east and its sides which face the other nine directions are the same. If you accept that, then it follows that gross objects such as earth could not be formed [because they would have no extension]. If you assert that there are individual sides which face the ten directions, then it follows that the subject, that minute particle, is not a partless one because of having many sides which face particles in the ten directions. To explain this, Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way says:

> [Particles] either abide in contact,
> Circling, or without interstice.
> What is the nature of the central particle
> Which faces an [other] particle?
>
> If you say that that which faces other particles
> Is the same [side of the central particle],
> How would earth, water, and so forth
> Become extensive?[10]

If the side facing another particle
Is asserted to be other [than other sides]
How could a particle
Be a partless unit?[11]

Since partless minute particles are not established in that way, one can know that the ten physical constituents (dhātu) [the five sense powers (indriya), and the five sense objects] propounded by our own schools and the substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), action (karma), generality (sāmānya), particularity (vishesha), and inherence (samavāya), and so forth imputed by other schools are not truly established. Specifically, if one knows that the ten physical constituents propounded by our own schools do not truly exist, one knows that the five constituents which are consciousnesses also do not truly exist because they are produced in dependence upon the physical constituents. If the five constituents which are consciousnesses do not truly exist, it is not correct that the mental consciousness (mano-vijñāna) which is established through [their] acting as [its] immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya) is truly established. If the six collections of consciousness are not truly established, it is not feasible that the mental constituent which [is comprised of] those consciousnesses just passed truly exists. If main minds (chitta) do not exist in that

way, mental factors (chaitta) such as feeling (vedanā), discrimination (samjñā), and intention (chetanā) which are non-different in establishment and abiding with that [main mind] are easily established as not truly existing. Therefore, non-associated compositional factors (viprayukta-saṃskāra) and non-revelatory forms (avijñāptirūpa) which are propounded as established through the great elements (mahābhūta) acting as causes can be known as not established as a truly existent one. Also, unconditioned phenomena (asaṃskṛita) such as space have been refuted earlier.

Therefore, the autocommentary to the Ornament for the Middle Way states that it is easy to realize that all eighteen constituents are not established as truly existent ones. That is how to apply the reasoning refuting objects which are truly existent ones to the refutation of subjects as well.

With respect to the specific reasoning which refutes a truly existent one with respect to consciousness, the root text and commentary of the Ornament for the Middle Way extensively explain the reasoning proving the lack of truly existent oneness from the viewpoint of three modes of refutation and so forth in terms of the refutation of the Vaibhāṣhika system which asserts consciousness as aspectless (anākāra), the refutation of the systems of the Non-Pluralists, Half-Eggists, and Proponents of an Equal Number of Subjects and Objects in the Sautrāntika system. With respect to the

refutation of the non-Buddhist systems there are refutations of the Vaisheṣhika and Naiyāyika systems, the Kṣhayaṃkara [Jaina] system, the Chārvāka system, the Sāṃkhya system, and the Guhyavedānta system. The Chittamātra system is refuted from the viewpoint of the refutation of the True Aspectarians (Satyākāravādin) and the False Aspectarians (Alīkākaravādin), and with regard to the former [the True Aspectarians], by way of how they assert aspect (ākāra).

Regarding [these modes of refutation], it appears that the tradition of explaining and listening to the three texts illuminating Svātantrika [Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way, Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way, and Jñānagarbha's Two Truths] was very widespread in the Land of Snow Mountains at the time of the earlier dissemination of the teaching as well as at the time of such [figures] as the great translator from N̄gok (Lo-den-shay-rap) and his spiritual sons during the later dissemination. Because of this the tradition of explaining and listening to [these texts] was still widespread at the time of the foremost D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his spiritual sons. Hence, this is the reason why, with the exception of a few essential points of reasoning which have not been dealt with by earlier [scholars], they [D̄zong-ka-b̄a, Gyel-tsap, and Kay-drup] did not extensively explain each type of reasoning, aligning it with the Svātantrika texts. That this is the case can be known from

some remarks of the foremost Dzong-ka-ba and from Kay-drup-ma-way-nyi-ma's Thousand Doses.

Nowadays it is as if the tradition of explaining and listening within the framework of these texts has disappeared. On the occasion of explaining the expression of worship of Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization with Haribhadra's Clear Meaning Commentary (Sphuṭārthā) when the phrase "because of lacking an entity of one or man" comes up, people only repeat, like counting [om] mani [padme hum] whether beginning and end are complete or not, [what] appears in the arrangements of words by earlier scholars, explaining a little of the presentation of the lack of being one or many. Through this, their pride fancying that they know well the reason of the lack of being one or many becomes firm. Aside from that, it appears to be rare for anyone to direct his mind to how to expand the reasonings, how to seek understanding, and so forth in comparison with the basic texts.

The foremost great being Dzong-ka-ba's Differentiation of the Interpretable and Definitive (Drang nges rnam 'byed) [also known as the Essence of the Good Explanations] says:

> It indicates that in whatever is asserted by our own and other schools, there does not exist anything partless which does not have many parts such as temporal series, or parts of the object, or aspects

of an object of consciousness.

"Temporal series" [indicates] the principal, the person, Īshvara, a permanent self, and so forth as well as the three permanent unconditioned things propounded by the Vaibhāṣhikas. "Parts of the object" [indicates] gross objects, such as pots, and partless particles. "Aspects of objects of consciousness" [indicates] consciousness in accordance with the five non-Buddhist systems, the two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects [the Vaibhāṣhikas and Sautrāntikas], and the two Chittamātrin systems [True and False Aspectarians]. Dzong-ka-ba is saying that one needs to know the adaptations of the reasoning proving that [these phenomena] individually have many parts.

After that, Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations says:

> When [phenomena] are established as having many parts, it is not contradictory for one phenomenon to exist as an entity of many parts, within conventionalities. However, damage is done to ultimate establishment [due to the fact that] if parts and whole are different entities, they would be unrelated and if they are the same entity, the parts would become one [because the whole is one] or the whole would become many [because the parts

are many].

This indicates the need to know how the adaptations of the reasoning refuting truly existent one or many apply to the individual assertions of those phenomena by our own and other schools and the need to know the modes of refuting true existence with that [reasoning]. Furthermore, when refuting [them] one should affix the qualification "truly" [or "ultimately"] in relation to the thought of the opponent, and because in general [there are cases when the opponent's position] must be refuted in terms of both truths [ultimate and conventional], there are some cases in which it is not necessary to affix the qualification "truly." However, in most cases, the qualification "truly" must be affixed.
Once either their [the opponents'] system asserts a permanent partlessness, or even though they do not explicitly assert such, they are logically forced such that it is impossible for them not to assert partlessness, one demonstrates logical damage upon putting together [their] contradictions with the general non-occurrence of the partless. There are many such distinctions.

These are the ways to refute the object of negation imputed by our own and other schools, but in order also to refute the object of the innate conception of true existence, one must know well how damage is done by these reasonings.

For, if phenomena were established in the way that they are held to be by the conception of true existence, they would have to be established as the object's mode of subsistence, and that would be a mode of subsistence which did not rely on an awareness. Although I am capable of expounding in detail on the specifics of these, since I fear the burden of too many words, let us leave it just at that.

The Proof of the Lack of Being a Truly Existent Plurality

The subjects, those things propounded by ourselves and others, are not established as a truly existent plurality because of the lack of a truly existent one. [If there is no truly existent one, a truly existent plurality cannot be established] because a plurality has the character of a composite of ones. To explain this, Shāntarakṣhita's *Ornament for the Middle Way* says:

> When anything is analyzed
> It is without oneness.
> That which does not have oneness
> Also is without manyness.[12]

And the commentary following that says:

> For a plurality has the character of a composite of ones. If one does not exist, [multiplicity]

also does not exist, just as if trees and so forth do not exist, forests and so forth do not exist.[13]

The Proof of Pervasion

In general, in order to ascertain the existence of the sign in the similar class (sapaksha) and the non-existence [of the sign] in the dissimilar class (vipaksha), three valid cognizers (pramāṇa) are necessary:

1 a valid cognizer which ascertains the instance (lakshya) of the sign [in this proof],
2 a valid cognizer which refutes [that there is] a common locus of the sign and the object of negation (pratishedhya) and
3 a valid cognizer which ascertains that the predicate of the probandum (sādhyadharma) and the object of negation are a dichotomy.

With respect to the first, the valid cognizer which ascertains the lack of a truly existent one or many has already been explained here. With respect to the other two, regarding the valid cognizer which ascertains that true existence and non-true existence are a dichotomy, since it is ascertained that existence and non-existence are a dichotomy such that by the

exclusion of one the other is included, one eliminates the superimposition that a third category might occur with respect to true existence and non-true existence whereby, through merely turning one's mind [to them], one can ascertain that [true existence and non-true existence] are a dichotomy.

Objection: Since true existence lacks being a truly existent one or many, does the sign not occur in the dissimilar class?

Answer: That alone does not constitute the occurrence of the sign in the dissimilar class; in order for the sign to occur in the dissimilar class, a common locus which is both the object of negation and the sign must occur, and since a common locus which both truly exists and lacks being a truly existent one or many does not occur, there is no fault.

Regarding the ascertainment with valid cognition that a common locus of those two does not occur, the valid cognizer which ascertains that one and many are a dichotomy such that if one is excluded the other is included eliminates superimpositions of a third category which is both one and many or neither [one nor many] with respect to mere existence. Having through that also with respect to true existence eliminated superimpositions [that there is] a third category which is both a truly existent one and many or neither [a

truly existent one nor many], one can ascertain that a common locus of the lack of being a truly existent one or many and true existence does not occur merely by turning one's mind to it. This was stated by the omniscient Kay-drup.

Also, Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way says:

> Things which have an aspect
> Other than one or many
> Are not feasible because
> These two are mutually exclusive.[14]

The commentary following that says at the point of proving the pervasion of this reason, "Since a nature of oneness and a nature of manyness are characteristics which abide in mutual exclusivity [as a dichotomy], another category is eliminated."[15] Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way says:

> Those which pervade all aspects are eliminators of another category, for example, particularities such as physical and non-physical. One and many are like that. Through eliminating the pervader [i.e., one and many], it is definite that the pervaded [true existence] is eliminated whereby there is no doubt that the reason [i.e., not being one or many] is eliminated from the discordant class [true existence] because another category does not occur.

Objection: Does the valid cognizer which ascertains the pervasion in the proof of the person as not truly existent by the sign of lacking being either a truly existent one or many ascertain the pervasion of the emptiness of true existence with respect to all divisions of instances of the lack of being a truly existent one or many? If it does ascertain [it with respect to everything], then it follows that the inferential cognizer which comprehends the probandum in the proof of that does not newly eliminate superimpositions. If you say that it does not ascertain [that pervasion with respect to all phenomena], that is not correct because if the emptiness of the generality (sāmānya) is ascertained, the emptiness of the particularities (vishesha) is necessarily ascertained.

Answer: Kay-drup-ma-way-nyi-ma says:

> The valid cognizer which comprehends that the permanent is empty of [being a] product does not ascertain the non-occurrence of [being a] product with respect to all divisions of the instances of the permanent, but it does eliminate the superimpositions of conceiving [the permanent] as being [products such that] at a later time, through merely turning the mind to a specific permanent phenomenon, the ascertainment of its emptiness of

[being a] product is induced without relying on another valid cognizer.

Objection: Then, the valid cognizer which ascertains the forward pervasion (anvaya-vyāpti) would have to be able to eliminate the superimpositions of apprehending that all divisions of instances of products are not necessarily impermanent in which case it would [absurdly] follow that when the forward pervasion is ascertained, superimpositions with respect to the probandum are necessarily eliminated.

Answer: This is not similar because although there is pervasion by the generality, there is not necessarily pervasion by its particulars and when the generality is negated, the particulars are necessarily also negated.

It is asserted that here it is the same.

Gyel-tsap-rin-b̄o-chay says:

Although one might allow that the valid cognizer which ascertains that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent ascertains, in relation to product, sound's emptiness of being permanent, it does not ascertain the emptiness of being permanent in the context of taking sound as the

> as the substratum. Thus, there is no fault. The valid cognizer which ascertains that all divisions of the instances of products are necessarily impermanent does not ascertain that whatever is sound's productness is necessarily impermanent; rather, the probandum must be established when having turned the mind to sound's productness, the assemblage of impermanence in all divisions of the instances of products becomes the object of a valid cognizer. Hence, one does not incur the fault of the [absurd] consequence that the valid cognizer which comprehends the modes proving that [sound is impermanent] establishes the probandum.

Both the former [Kay-drup's] and latter [Gyel-tsap's] assertions seem for the most part to agree in their position and the Great Table of Contents [?] (Sa bchad chen mo) speaks similarly to the matter.

When the assertions of the two sons are arranged in accordance with the thought of the foremost D̄zong-ka-b̄a; [the position is as follows]. The valid cognizer which ascertains the three modes in the proof of sound as impermanent neither implicitly realizes that sound is impermanent nor does it remove the superimpositions of apprehending that sound is

permanent. When the valid cognizer which ascertains the three modes is generated, it can generate an awareness the mode of apprehension of which explicitly contradicts the superimpositions which conceive sound to be permanent in dependence on its [the awareness'] force without the need for an intervening valid cognizer. Therefore, there is no fault that the probandum is established when the pervasion is ascertained. Also, between those [the valid cognizer ascertaining the three modes and the inferential consciousness realizing the probandum] there is no need to state another sign which generates the inferential cognizer.

This appears to be the fundamental thought of all three, the foremost omniscient D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his sons Gyel-tsap and Kay-drup. Also, I think that it also accords with the thought of the [Indian] texts and that the mode is similar here in this context [of the reasoning of the lack of being one or many] as well.

Regarding this, it seems good that some later scholars have used the term "realization through the power of reasoning" which is neither explicit realization nor implicit realization, but it is not suitable for "realization" here to refer to realization by that valid cognizer [which ascertains the three modes] because when statements in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's <u>Great Commentary to (Nāgārjuna's) Treatise on the Middle Way</u> and Kay-drup's <u>Thousand Doses</u> are compared it

seems that they assert that the inferential cognizer which realizes that sound is impermanent is merely capable of being produced in dependence on the power of that valid cognizer without interruption by another awareness.

Now I will analyze whether this reason of the lack of being one or many proves a meaning (artha) or an expression (vyavahāra). With regard to this, it is stated in Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way and Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way that this sign is a sign which is a non-observation of a pervader (vyāpaka-anupalabdhi), but it is also explained in several statements of the foremost Dzong-ka-ba and his sons that it is [a sign] which is a non-observation of a nature (svabhāva-anupalabdhi). Also, Kay-drup's Thousand Doses says, "It proves a mere expression. Therefore, whatever is a proof of a mere expression is not necessarily a sign which is a non-observation of a nature."

Some authors of textbooks on Dharmakīrti's Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium on Valid Cognition" (Pramaṇa-varttika) say that whatever is a reason which is a non-observation of a cause (karāṇa-anupalabdhi) or non-observation of a pervader must be a sign proving both a meaning and an expression because the great paṇḍiṭa Dharmottara says:

> With respect to [cases when] the perceivability
> of effect or pervaded is unsuitable, the

non-observation of a cause and a pervader cause understanding of the actual non-existence of fire and the expression of the actual non-existence of fire.

However, it is not certain that that is the meaning of the passage.

Thus, there are many presentations such as just what proofs of expressions which are effect, nature, and non-observation signs are and how mere expressions are proved, but because they would interfere with the topic at hand, I will not elaborate on them here.

Regarding what is relevant here, generally two modes of positing meaning and expression appear in the statements of scholars. In the first, meaning refers to the definition (lakṣhaṇa) and expression refers to the definiendum (lakṣhya), and in the second, meaning refers to the meaning-reverse (*artha-vyatireka) of the predicate of the probandum and expression refers to its three conventions. The three conventions are verbal, mental, and physical conventions. Regarding this, some scholars of our own [Ge-luk-ƀa] sect] assert that this reason [of the lack of being one or many] is a sign proving a meaning, but since the omniscient Kay-drup asserts that it is a sign proving a mere expression and the foremost Gyel-tsap says in his Great Purification of

Forgetfulness (brJed byang chen mo) that it proves a mere expression, this is the actual thought of the foremost D̄zong-ka-b̄a.

Jam-ȳang-lek-b̄a-chö-jor-wa ('Jam-dbyangs-legs-pa-chos-'byor-wa) raises these qualms:

> One might think that the reason for their asserting that this is a sign proving a mere expression is that if something has the full meaning of being truly established, then it must be true as either one or many, whereby the lack of being truly one or many is a correct sign proving a mere expression because having already proven the meaning of non-true existence—the lack of being truly one or many—one is only proving the mere expression, "not truly existent."
>
> However, this is not correct, for if sound fulfilled the meaning of permanence, it would have to be a non-product whereby product would [absurdly] become [a sign] proving a mere expression in the proof of sound as impermanent.
>
> Also, if [you think] that the awareness which comprehends the presence of the reason in the subject of that sign must be asserted as a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate

> [because you say that it is a sign proving a mere expression], this is also incorrect because the mere non-establishment of the person as being truly the same as or different from the aggregates is not an ultimate truth.

There appear to be many presentations of others' answers to him. However, it appears that they have not clearly distinguished whether or not the mere way in which Jam-ȳang-lek-b̄a-chö-jor interprets the ideas of Kay-drup-rin-b̄o-chay constitutes the assertion of [his] opponent. [In other words, they mistakenly think that Jam-ȳang-lek-b̄a-chö-jor has accurately represented Kay-drup's ideas.]

That this sign is a proof of a mere designation is not only the thought of the foremost D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his sons, it also is that of the master Shāntarakṣhita because his autocommentary to the Ornament for the Middle Way says, "This reason does not have a thesis in the meaning class because of proving the subjective consciousness, terms, and expressions of the object being proved."[16] He thus clearly states that it proves a mere expression.

Regarding how [this reason] becomes [a reason] proving an expression, a person who has ascertained with valid cognition the lack of true oneness and manyness in terms of the subject and who has ascertained with valid cognition that

whatever truly exists is necessarily either truly one or many would not willfully generate a superimposing awareness logically proving the meaning of true existence with respect to the subject, and while not forgetting those modes, there is no chance for the superimposition of some third category to be produced. However, in order to have an awareness which thinks about non-true existence in terms of the subject or in order to actually use the term "non-true existence" [with respect to the subject], such becomes ascertained as an object of expression in dependence on the functioning of the earlier mindfulness of the three modes in a situation of unfrazzled awareness. For example, an immature small child sees a small ox and sees that it is a composite of hump and dewlap and that the expression "ox" is used for it such that later, when he sees a large ox, he is not able to use the mental convention thinking, "This is an ox" or [such] a verbal convention due to the fact of not having known it before. [However], at that time he ascertains that it is an ox through mindfulness of the three modes, such as "This is an ox because of being an entity which is a composite of a dewlap and so forth." That must be posited as a case of proving a mere expression.

This is also stated clearly by the great <u>paṇḍita</u> Shāntarakṣhita. His autocommentary to the <u>Ornament for the Middle Way</u> says:

[The subject] has already been shown to lack a nature of being one or many through the aforementioned logic, which is like, for example, "This is an ox because of being an entity which is a collection of dewlap and so forth." However, [non-true existence] is established as an object of consciousness, terms, and expressions for those (1) who cannot conceive nor express the definite lack of inherent existence which pervades all things in reality because error—having been transmitted from one [lifetime] to another from beginningless cyclic existence and having thoroughly increased adherence to the true existence [of things]—is difficult to abandon since one has not become accustomed [to the truth] through proper mental application and (2) who, despite wishing to generate ascertainment [of the truth] in others as well, cannot use the expressions. It is like [proving that something] does not exist because of not being observed, whereas it has the character of being observable [if it were present].[17]

The master Dharmottara also sets forth the meaning of establishing a mere expression in this way but I will not

elaborate on it here. Thus, it should be known that the explanation of the assertion of the great abbot Shāntarakṣhita by the foremost D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his sons accords with the texts and has great meaning.

Kay-drup's Thousand Doses says:

> With respect to any phenomenon, without superimposing that it is either a truly existent one or many, there is no way that a superimposition [of true existence] which would be the superimposition of a third category could be generated. Therefore, [the reasoning of the lack of being one or many] establishes a mere expression.

This means that, at that time, there is no chance that the person could generate the superimposing consciousness which thinks that although the person does not exist as truly the same as the aggregates and does not exist as truly different from the aggregates, there is such and such a type of true existence of the person. Also, something that can be shown to be a third type of true establishment cannot be found. At that time, the proof by that person of a verbal or mental expression of non-true existence in dependence on the modes of the sign within holding the person as the substratum [or subject] is the way in which that sign is a proof of an expression. That is what [Kay-drup] said; he did not say

that since, in general, that [person] has already realized the meaning of non-true existence of the person, that sign proves a mere expression. Nor did he assert that the awareness which comprehends the presence of the reason in the subject with respect to that sign is an awareness which comprehends the non-true existence of the person. Nor did he assert that the mere non-establishment of the person as either truly one or many with respect to the aggregates is an ultimate truth.

If it is explained in this way, the qualms stated [earlier] by Jam-ȳang-lek-b̄a-chö-jor are removed, and the meaning of the text is also interpreted well. However, to say such things as, "It follows that the non-establishment of the person as truly one with the aggregates is the mode of being of the person because the non-establishment of a truly existent one is the mode of being of one," not only is not helpful in removing the qualms of that king of scholars; it is only a senseless answer.

The non-establishment of the person as truly one or many, and so forth, in the sight of a Superior's meditative equipoise is the mode of being of the person, but it need not be the case that, in general, the non-establishment of the person as truly one or many has to be the mode of being of the person, just as the non-existence of the aggregates and so forth in the sight of a Superior's meditative equipoise

is the mode of being of the aggregates and so forth, but in general the non-existence of the aggregates and so forth does not have to be the mode of being of the aggregates.

Beginning from these [points] there are still a great many topics to discuss, but let us leave it here for now. D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Differentiation of the Interpretable and Definitive says, "These are great paths of reasoning of the followers of the protector Nāgārjuna, and those who wish to extend their minds in reasoning should train in them." Therefore, knowing the essentials of these reasonings is very important, and if they are known well, even if only the reason of the lack of being one or many is cultivated, one will not be bereft of something on which to meditate. Therefore, even if those who claim to view their own mind as the natural face of a Truth Body (Dharmakāya) train in only this reasoning and straighten their bodies [in meditation], it would seem to be good.

The basis of division of the two truths, the divisions, the difference between real and unreal conventional truths, the oneness and difference of the two truths and so forth are similar to what was explained in the context of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas.

With regard to the valid cognizers which ascertain the two truths, there are two [types of Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas] in terms of the mode of assertion of aspects (ākāra). Āryavimuktisena, the master Shāntarakṣhita, the king of scholars Kamalashīla, and so forth are Madhyamikas who are like the True Aspectarians (Satyākāravādin) conventionally. Dzong-ka-ba's Differentiation of the Interpretable and Definitive says:

> This system asserts that the aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are things. Since the assertions of Dharmakīrti are also laid out that way, they are Mādhyamikas who make assertions in accordance with the True Aspectarians conventionally.

Furthermore, they make assertions in a way similar to the Non-Pluralist True Aspectarians.

The great scholar and adept Den-ba-dar-gyay (bsTan-pa-dar-rgyas), Jam-yang-shay-ba, and so forth said that although the great master Haribhadra is a follower of Shāntarakṣhita,

he is similar to a False Aspectarian because he clearly explains a false aspect at points such as [this statement] in his Clear Meaning Commentary (Sphuṭārthā):

> Those who definitely think that if apprehended objects do not exist, apprehenders do not exist refute the character of an aspect of an apprehender which is mere knowing, and ascertain that this non-dual exalted wisdom alone is an entity which exists in reality.

Paṇḍiṭa Sahajavajra explains in his Commentary on the "Ten Chapters on Suchness" (Tattvadashakaṭika) that the great master Kambalapāda (La-ba-ba) is a Mādhyamika who makes assertions in accordance with the False Aspectarians conventionally, and the fact that the master Jetāri also is a False Aspectarian is known from his commentary to his Sugata Treatise (Sugatamata-vibhaṅgakārikā).

There were many scholars and adepts who were followers of these masters and they are for the most part similar in presenting an assertion of self-knower awarenesses and in not asserting a basis-of-all which is a different entity from the six collections of consciousness. In general, in the Land of Superiors (Āryavarsha) [India] a few paṇḍiṭas who claimed to be Mādhyamikas asserted both self-knowers and a basis-of-all (alaya), and there also were a couple who

asserted meditative equipoise with appearance—holding that the explicit object of the non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is a composite of emptiness and appearance. However, merely because of that, the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika system does not come to assert that a Superior's non-contaminated exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise has illusion-like appearance, etc. Such Indian paṇḍitas are merely cases [of people] putting the faults of their own minds into the tenet systems without having arrived at the thought of the great charioteers; they do not make presentations having ascertained the mode of their own tenet system. For example, it must be said that the many incorrect presentations made by those who claim to be Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas in Tibet are faults of their minds and that theirs is not the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika system. Therefore, Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path says,

> Although in general a few Indian and Tibetan masters who claim to be Mādhyamikas asserted such, I will delineate the system of the great Mādhyamikas who follow the master Nāgārjuna. Who could explain the minor ones?

Thus, the foremost, omniscient one asserts that he will primarily delineate the thought of the indisputable great

charioteers who validly commented on the thought of the Conqueror. This appears to be a statement of his displeasure with merely amassing many enumerations, drawing together in one place the many systems of all those who are called "paṇḍita" and all those who were said to have become "adepts" (siddha).

Although a basis-of-all which is a different entity from the six collections of consciousness is not asserted, the indication of certain subtle factors with the term basis-of-all upon dividing the sixth—the mental consciousness—into parts was set forth even by some great Mādhyamikas. This appears frequently, particularly in texts of the Mantra category.

In dependence on these ways of delineating non-true existence and the ways of presenting conventionalities, there are many distinctions with regard to how they comment on the meaning of interpretable and definitive sutras. They assert that Mother Sutras and so forth are indicated as being sutras of definitive meaning through the teaching in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, of [Buddha's] thought [when he taught] the three types of non-entityness. Their system's presentation of the three natures, which is unlike the presentation of the three natures as posited by the Chittamātrins, is asserted to be the main meaning of those sutras. However, the Chittamātrins' system of categorizing

the three natures is put as a meaning of the sutra in relation to the thought of those trainees who temporarily are unable to realize emptiness and must be led gradually.

Also, with respect to the middle wheel [sutras], those passages which explicitly or implicitly affix the qualification "ultimately" to the object of negation are asserted to be literal and definitive. In those [middle wheel] sutras, those which teach with [statements] such as "Form does not exist," without clearly affixing the qualification "ultimately" or "truly" are asserted to be interpretable and not suitable to be taken literally. These should be known in detail from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Essence of the Good Explanations, and I wish to explain them elsewhere as well.

They assert that Hearers and Solitary Realizers have differences in abandonment [of obstructions] and realization [of selflessness]; Hearers abandon the afflictive obstructions (kleshāvaraṇa) and Solitary Realizers abandon the coarse obstructions to omniscience (sthaulya-jñeyāvaraṇa)—the conception apprehending objects as entities other [than the perceiving consciousness]. The paths are respectively the path realizing the mere selflessness of the person and the path realizing, in addition to that, the suchness which is the emptiness of duality.

Earlier [scholars] asserted that the four levels of yoga treated in the chapter on peak application (mūrdhaprayoga) in Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization are to be related with four levels of faculties, but the opinion of the foremost Dzong-ka-ba and his sons is that it is not feasible that there is a level of person who has refuted that blue is a different entity from the consciousness perceiving blue but has not refuted that the consciousness perceiving blue is a different entity from blue. Therefore, the teaching of those as if they were stages refers to stages of explanation; they are not individual stages of vehicles.

Thus in this system, only three stages of vehicles based on the view are set forth: the small realizing the common selflessness, the middling realizing emptiness of

subject and object as different substantial entities, and the great realizing that all phenomena are without true existence.

A person of sharp faculties (tīkṣhṇendriya) who has the Mahāyāna lineage in the beginning searches for suchness—reality—and having ascertained suchness well, generates special compassion for other migrators (gati) whose continuums are completely disturbed by wrong views. Having generated the heroic aspiration to highest enlightenment in order to accomplish the welfare of all migrators by himself alone, he trains in the special deeds of method and wisdom. Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way says:

> Having first sought knowledge of reality
> They thoroughly ascertain the ultimate,
> And having completely generated compassion
> For the world abiding in the darkness of wrong
> views,
>
> The wise, whose minds have spread toward
> enlightenment,
> Heroic in accomplishing the purposes of migrators,
> Train thoroughly in the discipline of the Subduer
> Adorned with awareness and compassion.[1]

A person of dull faculties (mṛidvindriya) having the Mahāyāna

lineage meditates again and again on the aspects of the four truths such as impermanence and suffering. When experience is well developed, he realizes that other sentient beings also travel in cyclic existence, which has a nature of suffering, and realizes dependent arising—that an effect which is a mere phenomenon arises from a cause which is a mere phenomenon. In dependence on this, he generates the aspiration to enlightenment induced by great compassion, and after that, from the time of training in the [Bodhisattva] deeds he makes effort at searching for knowledge of suchness. Thus, Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way says:

> The followers of pure faith
> Generate the aspiration to complete enlightenment,
> Take up the Subduer's discipline
> And then strive for knowledge of reality.[2]

Having generated the mind of enlightenment in that way, he strives at the training in the six perfections. Due to that, and in dependence on many causal collections such as external conditions—a spiritual guide—and internal conditions—correct mental application, he generates the wisdom arisen from meditation which observes the suchness of all phenomena. At that time he attains the path of preparation.

Then from among the four similitudes with a portion of definite discrimination (nirvedhabhāgīya), at the time of

heat (ushman) and peak (mūrdhan), the ability to abandon the conception of true existence with respect to objects increases higher and higher. Then, at the time of generating forbearance (kshānti), the coarse potency of the innate manifest conception of true existence with respect to objects diminishes, and at the time of supreme mundane quality (laukikāgradharma), the potency of the manifest conception of true existence with respect to subjects diminishes. Then, through the increase of the potency of the antidote class and the decrease of the vibrancy of the class of objects of abandonment, at the time of eventually generating the uninterrupted path of doctrinal forbearance with respect to suffering on the Mahāyāna path of seeing, the seeds to be abandoned by the path of seeing—the actual objects damaged—cease, and when, through the imprint of that antidote, these come to have the quality of its being impossible for them to be produced, an analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyānirodha) is attained whereby a path of release is posited.

The explanation that the path of seeing is one moment is not the one moment which is the smallest unit of time but one session of meditative equipoise on emptiness. Also, one moment of clear realization (abhisamaya) of the truth is generated as the nature of the sixteen moments of forbearance (kshānti) and knowledge (jñāna). That is in terms of meditative equipoise (samāhita); in general, the period up to

entering direct meditative equipoise on emptiness for the purpose of actually destroying the seeds of the innate obstructions to omniscience (sahajajñeyāvaraṇa) is included in the path of seeing.

During the path of seeing, the seeds of the one hundred twelve artificial afflictive obstructions (parikalpita-kleshāvaraṇa) included in the levels of the three realms [the Desire, Form, and Formless Realms] and the seeds of the one hundred eight artificial obstructions to omniscience (parikalpita-jñeyāvaraṇa) are destroyed. The nine levels of the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga) are said to abandon gradually the seeds of the sixteen afflictions to be abandoned on the path of meditation and the seeds of the one hundred eight obstructions to omniscience to be abandoned on the path of meditation. It is said that the vajra-like meditative stabilization (vajropamasamādhi) at the end [of the continuum of being a sentient being] simultaneously abandons the subtle afflictive obstructions and the subtle obstructions to omniscience, and in the second moment the Truth Body (Dharmakāya) is actualized. These are presentations [of the path] for those definite in the Mahāyāna lineage.

Such a Truth Body is free from the level of predispositions (vāsanā) of ignorance, non-contaminated actions which arise from elaborations of signs, a body of the nature of mind, and inconceivable thoroughly transforming transmigrations.

Therefore, [the Buddha] has the transcendence of purity, excellent self, bliss, and permanence.

Nevertheless, through the fulfillment of the power of his earlier highly developed great compassion [wishing] to establish all migrators in unsurpassed bliss, a Complete Enjoyment Body (Sambhogakāya)—a wish-granting jewel—which is an aggregation of subtle particles of uncontaminated wisdom (anāsrava-jñāna) having the utmost of all factors of method and wisdom, abides in the Highest Pure Land (Akaniṣhṭha), achieving the welfare of all migrators through Emanation Bodies (Nirmāṇakāya) as long as there is cyclic existence. Shāntarakṣhita's Ornament for the Middle Way says:

> The body which is an aggregation of subtle particles of the wisdom and compassion supreme in all ways, free from all the aggregations of the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience, supreme in all ways, abides as long as there is cyclic existence.[3]

Some of the features of the paths and fruits which were not explained here can be known from the explanation in the chapter on the former Svātantrikas [pp. 528-533] and from what will be explained in the chapter on the Prāsaṅgikas. The presentation of the stages of the path of the system of

these Svātantrikas which is set forth so extensively in the commentaries and explanatory commentaries to Maitreya's <u>Ornament for Clear Realization</u> accords with what is widely renowned in all quarters nowadays.

Edited Tibetan Text

of

"The Svātantrika-Mādhyamika Tenet System"

from J̄ang-ḡya's *Presentation of Tenets*

(*Grub mtha'i rnam bzhad*)

༄༅། །གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའི་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ་གསལ་བར་བཤད་པ་ཐུབ་བ སྟན་ལྷུན་པོ འི་མཛེས་རྒྱན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལས་སྡེ་ཚན་བཞི་པ་བཞུགས་སོ། །

ང

༄༅། །གཉིས་པ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པར་སྨྲ་བ་དབུ་མ་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་གཉིས། གང་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་གཞུང་དང་། དེ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་གྲུབ་མཐའི་རྣམ་གཞག་གོ། དང་པོ་ལ། སྔར་བཤད་པ་ལྟར་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་སྤྱིའི་ཤིང་རྟའི་སྲོལ་འབྱེད་ནི་མགོན་པོ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ཡང་འཕགས་པ་ལང་ཀར་གཤེགས་པ་ལས། །སོ་སོ་རང་རིག་ཐེག་པ་ནི། །རྟོག་གེ་པ་ཡི་སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་མིན། །མགོན་པོ་འདས་པའི་འོག་ཏུ་ནི། །འཛིན་པར་སུ་འགྱུར་བཤད་དུ་གསོལ། ཞེས་མཉམ་གཞག་སོ་སོ་རང་གིས་རིག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི[1]་ཡུལ་ལྟ་རྟོག་གེ་སྤྱོད་པ་ཞི་བའི་ཐེག་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཟབ་པས་ན་སྟོན་པ་མྱ་ངན་ལས་འདས་པའི་འོག་ཏུ་སུ་ཞིག་གིས་འཛིན་པར་འགྱུར་ཞེས་ཞུས་པའི་ལན་དུ་སྟོན་པས། བདེར་གཤེགས་མྱ་ངན་འདས་པའི་འོག །ཚུལ་རྣམས་འཛིན་པར་འགྱུར་བ་དེ། །དུས་དག་འདས་ནས་འབྱུང་བ་ནི། །བློ་གྲོས་ཆེན་པོ་ཁྱོད་ཤེས་གྱིས། །ལྷོ་ཕྱོགས་བེ[2]་དའི་ཡུལ་དུ་ནི། དགེ་སློང་དཔལ་ལྡན་ཆེར་གྲགས་པ། །དེ་མིང་ཀླུ་ཞེས་འབོད་པ་སྟེ། །ཡོད་དང་མེད་པའི་ཕྱོགས་འཇིག་པ། །ང་ཡི་ཐེག་པ་འཇིག་རྟེན་དུ། །བླ་མེད་ཐེག་ཆེན་རབ་བཤད་ནས། །རབ་ཏུ་དགའ་བའི་ས་བསྒྲུབས་ཏེ།། བདེ་བ་ཅན་དུ་དེ་འགྲོ་འོ། །ཞེས་ངེས་པའི་དོན་གྱི་ཐེག་པ་ཡོད་མེད་ཀྱི་མཐའ་གཉིས་དང་བྲལ་བ་ནི་སློབ་དཔོན་འདི་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཚུལ་བཞིན་དུ་འགྲེལ་བར་གསལ་བར་ལུང་བསྟན་ཏོ། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ་སྤྲིན་ཆེན་པོ་སྟོང་ཕྲག་བཅུ་གཉིས་པ་དང་། ཟླ་བའི་རྒྱུད་འཇམ་དཔལ་རྩ་བའི་རྟོག[3]་པ་དང་། རྔ་བོ་ཆེའི་མདོ་རྣམས་ལས་ཀྱང་ལུང་བསྟན་ལ། དེ་ཡང་མདོ་འགའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་སློབ་དཔོན་འདི་ས་དང་པོ་པར་བཤད་པ་དང་། ཁ་ཅིག་ཏུ་ས་བདུན་པ་པར་བཤད་པ་དང་། དཔལ་ལྡན་ཟླ་བས་འགྲེལ་པ་སྒྲོན་གསལ་ལས་སློབ་དཔོན་འདི་སྔགས་ཀྱི་ལམ་གྱིས་སྐུ་ཚེ་དེ་ཉིད་ལ་རྡོ་རྗེ་འཆང་གི་གོ་འཕང་མངོན་དུ་མཛད་

པར་གསུངས་པ་དང་། སྨིན་ཆེན་དང་ཇོ་བོ་ཆེ་ལས་མ་འོངས་པ་ན་ཡེ་ཤེས་འབྱུང་·
གནས་འོད་ཅེས་བྱ་བའི་རྒྱལ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་སོགས་བཤད་ཚུལ་མི་མཐུན་པ་མང་ཡང་མི་···
འགལ་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་བདག་ཅག་གི་སྟོན་པ་འདི་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་བསྐྱེད་པའི་དུས་ཚིགས་
དང་འཚང་རྒྱ་ཚུལ་སོགས་ལ་མི་འདྲ་བའི་རྣམ་གཞག་དུ་མ་ཞིག་མདོ་ལས་འབྱུང་བ་བཞིན་
སྣང་ཚོད་དང་གནས་ཚོད་ཐུན་མོང་དང་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་····
ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་གསུངས་སོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་འདི་ནི་སངས་རྒྱས་
འདས་ནས་ལོ་བཞི་བརྒྱ་ལོན་པ་ན་ལྷོ་ཕྱོགས་བེ་དརྦྷའི་ཡུལ་དུ་བྲམ་ཟེ་ཕྱུག་ཕུན་ཚོགས་པ་
ཞིག་ལ་བུ་མེད་པ་ལ་རྨི་ལམ་དུ་བྲམ་ཟེ་བརྒྱ་ལ་ཆོས་ ཟན་བྲངས་ན་བུ་སྐྱེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ··
ཞེས་ལྟས་ལུང་བསྟན་ཏོ། །དེས་དེ་ལྟར་བྱས་ཏེ་གསོལ་བ་བཏབ་པས་ཟླ་བ་ངོ་བཅུ་ན
ཧྲིཙ་ཞིག་བཙས་ཏེ་མཚན་མཁན་ལ་བསྟན་པས་མཚན་མཁན་ན་རེ། མཚན་བཟང་མོད་
ཀྱི་ཞག་བདུན་གྱི་ཚེ་ལས་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ། །དེ་ལ་ཅི་ཕན་དྲིས་པས་བྲམ་ཟེ་བརྒྱ་
ལ་ཆོས་སྟོན་དྲངས་ན་ཞག་བདུན་དང་དགེ་སློང་བརྒྱ་ལ་ཆོས་སྟོན་དྲངས་ན་ལོ་བདུན་ཐུབ།
དེ་ནས་ཐབས་མེད་ཟེར་རོ། །དེ་ནས་དེ་བཞིན་བྱས་ཏེ་ལོ་བདུན་དུ་ཉེ་བ་ན་བུའི་རོ་པ་
མས་མཐོང་བ་མི་བཟོད་པས་གཡོག་དང་བཅས་ཏེ་འཁྲམ་དུ་བཏང་ངོ་། །དེ་ནས་རིམ་
[4]གྱིས་སོང་སོང་སྟེ་དཔལ་ན་ལེནྡྲའི་སྒོ་དྲུང་དུ་སླེབ་པ་ན་སྙན་དངགས་ཀྱི་རིག་[5]བྱེད་དག······
བསྒྲགས་པས་[6]དེར་བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆེན་པོ་ས་ར་ཧ་བཞུགས་པས་གསན་ནས། ནང་དུ་འཁྲིད་
ནས་ཇི་ལྟར་བྱུང་བའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་བཤད་པས་སློབ་དཔོན་ན་རེ། རབ་ཏུ་འབྱུང་ནུས་ན་[7]ཐབས་
ཡོད་གསུངས་པས་རབ་ཏུ་བྱུང་། མགོན་པོ་ཚེ་དཔག་མེད་ཀྱི་སྒོ་ནས་གདམས་པ་
གནང་བས་ཉམས་སུ་བླངས་ཏེ་འཆི་བདག་ལས་ཐར་བར་གྱུར་ཏོ། །དེར་སློབ་དཔོན་
དེ་ཉིད་ལས་ཐུགས་ཀྱི་གདམས་པ་མང་དུ་གསན། ན་[8]ལེནྡྲའི་མཁན་པོ་སྒྲ་གཅན་འཛིན་

ང

བཟང་པོ་ལས་བསྙེན་པར་རྫོགས་ཏེ་དགེ་སློང་དཔལ་ལྡན་ཞེས་གྲགས་སོ། །འདི་ནི་བྲམ་
སྟོན་ཆོས་འབྱུང་དུ་བཤད་པ་བཞིན་ཡིན་ལ་མཁས་པ་འགའ་ཞིག་གི་གསུང་ལས་མཁན…
པོ་འི་མཚན་འདི་དྲན་[9]མི་འདྲ་བར་བྱུང་ངོ། །དེ་ནས་ནཱ་ལེནྡྲའི་དགེ་འདུན་གྱི་ཞལ་དུ[10]
བ་མཛད་དེ་གསེར་འགྱུར་བྱས་ནས་དགེ་འདུན་གྱི་གདུགས་ཚད་སྦྱར་རོ། །རེ་ཞིག་ན་
དགེ་སློང་བདེ་བྱེད་ཅེས་བྱ་བས་རིག་པའི་རྒྱན་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་གཞུང་འབུམ་ཕྲག་བཅུ་གཉིས་
པ་བྱས་ནས་ཐམས་ཅད་སྨྲན་བྱུང་པ་སློབ་དཔོན་འདོས་ཚར་བཅད། ཆོས་གསུང་པའི་[11]
ཆེ་བྱིས་པ་གཉིས་ཆོས་མཉན་དུ་འོངས་ཤིང་ས་འོག་ཏུ་འགྲོ་བ་གཟིགས་པས་ཀླུ་ཡིན་[12]དྲིས་
པ་ན་ཀླུ་ཡིན་ཟེར། དེར་སློབ་དཔོན་གྱིས་གནོད་སྦྱིན་གྱི་འདམ་ཁྲིད་ལ་ཞོག་གསུངས་
པས་དེ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་གདམ་དེ་ཀླུའི་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལ་སྨྲས། ཀླུའི་རྒྱལ་པོ་ན་རེ་སློབ་དཔོན་སྤྱན་
འདྲེན་ན་འབུལ་ཞེས་ཟེར་བས་དོན་དུ་འགྱུར་བར་མཁྱེན་ནས་ཀླུ་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱོན། ཀླུ་
མང་པོ་ལ་ཆོས་བཤད་[13]ཅིང་ཀླུའི་འདམ་མང་པོ་དང་ཤེར་ཕྱིན་འབུམ་པ་སོགས་མིའི་ཡུལ…
དུ་སྤྱན་དྲངས་པས་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཏུ་གྲགས། །དེ་ནས་ལི་ཁར་ཤིང་འཕེལ་དང་། པ་ཏ་
ཕེ་ཧར་[14]སོགས་ཡུལ་མང་པོར་སྐྱེ་[15]བོ་མང་པོ་ལ་ཕན་བཏགས། །བྱང་གི་སྒྲ་མི་སྙན་དུ་
ཡང་བྱོན་པ་སོགས་རྫུ་འཕྲུལ་དང་ཆོས་སྟོན་པ་སོགས་ཀྱིས་འགྲོ་བའི་དོན་དཔག་ཏུ་མེད་པ་
མཛད། གཞན་ཡང་མཆོད་རྟེན་དང་ལྷ་ཁང་མང་པོ་བཞེངས་པ་དང་། རྡོ་རྗེ་གདན་ལ་རྡོ་རྗེའི་དྲ་[16]
མིག་གི་ར་བས་བསྐོར་བ་དང་། དཔལ་ལྡན་འབྲས་སྤུངས་ཀྱི་མཆོད་རྟེན་གྱི་བཀོད་པ་ཡང་
བཞེངས་[17]པ་སོགས་མཛད་པ་ཕྲག་རྗེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་བསྟན་པ་ལ་ཕན་པ་བསམ་གྱིས་མི་ཁྱབ་པ…
མཛད། ཁྱད་པར་ཐེག་[18]པ་ཆེན་པོའི་བསྟན་པ་ནུབ་པ་གཞི་ནས་བསོས་[19]ཤིང་རྒྱལ་བའི་
བསྟན་པ་ལ་རྒྱལ་བ་ཉིད་དང་མཚུངས་པར་བཀའ་དྲིན་གྱིས་ཁྱབ་པར་མཛད་དོ། །རྒྱ་
གར་ནས་བསྒྱུར་བའི་རྒྱན་[20]ནག་གི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་འགའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་མདོ་སྡེ་ཕལ་པོ་ཆེ་ཡང་སློབ…

དཔོན་འདིས་ཀླུ་ཡུལ་ནས་སྤྱན་དྲངས་པར་བཤད་ལ། རྒྱ་གར་གྱི་གཞུང་དང་བོད་ཀྱི་བསྟན་བཅོས་སྙིང་པ་རྣམས་སུ་ཡང་ཤེར་ཕྱིན་འབུམ་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཞེས་འབྱུང་བས······སློབ་དཔོན་འདིས་ཀླུ་ཡུལ་ནས་སྤྱན་དྲངས་པའི་ཐེག་ཆེན་གྱི་མདོ་སྡེ་ནི་ཤེར་ཕྱིན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་མདོ་ཁོ་ན་མིན་པར་གསལ་ལོ། །ལེའི་ཡུལ་དུ་ཀླུ་ཆེ་ཇི་ཙམ་བཞུགས་པ་ལ་ཡང་བཤད་ཚུལ་མི་མཐུན་པ་མང་ནའང་ལོ་དྲུག་བརྒྱར་བཞུགས་པ་ནི་ལུང་བསྟན་གྱི་མདོ་དང་···མཐུན་ཞིང་། བུ་སྟོན་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པ་དང་ཇོ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པས་ཀྱང་འདྲ་ཕྱོགས་སུ་མཛད་དོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་འདིས་ཆོས་སྒྲ་ཆེན་པོ་ལན་གསུམ་དུ་བསྒྲགས་པར་བཤད་ཅིང་ཆོས་སྒྲ་ཆེན་པོ་གསུམ་གང་ཡིན་གསལ་བར་བཤད་པ་སྔོན་གྱི་གཞུང་······ལུགས་རྣམས་དང་རྗེ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱི་གསུང་ལས་མི་འབྱུང་ངོ། །ཕྱོགས་གཞན་གྱི་མཁས་པ་ཁ་ཅིག་གིས་ཆོས་སྒྲ་དང་པོ་ནི་དགེ་སློང་བདེ་བྱེད་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཉན་ཐོས་སྡེ་པ་ཁ······ཅིག་ཚར་བཅད་པ་དང་། ཆོས་སྒྲ་གཉིས་པ་ནི་དབུ་མ་རིགས་ཚོགས་དྲུག་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཟབ་མོ་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་སྟོན་པའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་བརྩམས་པ་དང་། ཆོས་སྒྲ་གསུམ་པ་ནི་ང་བོ་ཆེ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་མདོ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་བདེར་གཤེགས་སྙིང་པོ་ཁམས་ཆོས་དབྱིངས་རྟག་པ་སེམས་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཁྱབ་པར་སྟོན་པའི་ཆོས་དབྱིངས་བསྟོད་པ་སོགས་བརྩམས···པ་ལ་བྱེད་པར་བཤད་ཅིང་དེ་ཡང་སྤྲིན་ཆེན་དང་ང་བོ་ཆེའི་མདོ་འདི་ཚིག་ཟིན་འགའ་ཞིག···ལ་བརྟེན་པར་སྣང་ངོ། །རྗེ་བཙུན་དམ་པ་འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པའི་རྡོ་རྗེས་ཀྱང་ཚུལ་འདི་འཐད་ཕྱོགས་སུ་མཛད་ནས། །ཆོས་སྒྲ་ཕྱི་མ་གཉིས་བརྗོད་བྱ་འཁོར་ལོ་དང་པ་དང་མཐུན་ཀྱང་ཆོས་སྒྲ་གསུམ་པས་སངས་རྒྱས་ལ་རྒྱུན་གྱི་རྟག་པ་དང་ངེས་དོན་ལ་མྱ་ངན་ལས་མི་འདའ་ཚུལ་རྒྱས་པར་སྟོན་པས་ཆོས་སྒྲ་གཉིས་པ་ལས་ཟུར་དུ་ཕྱུང་སོ། །ཞེས་བཤད་དོ། །བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོ་འདིས་རིག་པའི་གནས་ཐུན་མོང་བ་དང་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་

པ་སྟོན་པའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་མང་དུ་མཛད་ཅིང་། གསོ་བ་རིག་པའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་སྦྱོར་བ་
བརྒྱ་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་། ལུགས་ཀྱི་བསྟན་བཅོས་སྐྱེ་བོ[21] གསོ་ཐིགས་དང་ཤེས་རབ་
བརྒྱ་པ། གཞན་ཡང་རྟེན་འབྲེལ་གྱི་རྩིས། སྤོ་ས་སྦྱོར། གསེར་འགྱུར་གྱི་
གདམས་པ་སོགས་བོད་དུ་འགྱུར་སྣང་ངོ་། །ནང་རིག་པ་ལ་ས་ལུ་ལྗང་པའི་མདོ་དང་
རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་པར་འབྱུང་བའི་མདོ་སོགས་མདོ་འི་འགྲེལ་པ་ཡང་དུ་མ་ཞིག་སྣང་ཞིང་།
ཁྱད་པར་དུ་ཟབ་མོ་དབུ་མའི་ལམ་ངེས་པའི་དོན་མཐར་ཐུག་པ་ལུང་གིས་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ལ······
མདོ་ཀུན་ལས་བཏུས་པ་དང་། རིགས་པས་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་རྩ་བ་ཤེས་རབ། སྟོང་
ཉིད་བདུན་ཅུ་པ། རྩོད་པ་བཟློག་པ། རིགས་པ་དྲུག་ཅུ་པ། ཞིབ་མོ་རྣམ་འཐག།
རིན་ཆེན་འཕྲེང་བ་སྟེ་དྲུག་གོ། །རྩ་ཤེ་ལ་རྒྱ་གར་ན་འགྲེལ་པ་བརྒྱད་ཡོད་པར་གྲགས་
ཀྱང་བོད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་ནི་ག་ལས་འཇིགས་མེད། སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་པ།
ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་པ་ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲོན་མེ། ཟླ་བའི་ཞབས་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་པ་ཚིག་
གསལ་བཞི་དང་། ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲོན་མེའི་འགྲེལ་བཤད་སྤྱན་རས་གཟིགས་བརྟུལ་ཞུགས་
ཀྱིས་མཛད་པ་རྣམས་སོ། །ག་ལས་འཇིགས་མེད་རང་འགྲེལ་དུ་འདོད་པ་ནི་མི་འཐད་
པར་རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་བཞེད[22]་དོ། །སྟོང་ཉིད་བདུན་ཅུ་པ་དང་རྩོད་བཟློག་དང་ཞིབ་
མོ་རྣམ་འཐག་གསུམ་ལ་རང་འགྲེལ་ཡོད་ཅིང་། རིགས་པ་དྲུག་ཅུ་པའི་འགྲེལ་པ་
ཟླ་བའི་ཞབས་ཀྱིས་མཛད་པ་དང་། སྟོང་ཉིད་བདུན་ཅུ་པའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ང་ཧྲིད་གཞན་
ལ་ཕན་པ་བཟང་པོས་མཛད་པ་ཡོད་དོ། །གཞན་ཡང་སློབ་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་འདིས་མཛད་
པའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་འགྲེལ་ནི་སྔ་མ་མང་པོས་ཕར་ཕྱིན་གྱི་གདམས་ངག་ཏུ་འདོད་ཀྱང་···
རྗེ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱིས་གསང་བ་འདུས་པའི་གཞུང་གི་ཡི་ལག་ཏུ་བཞེད་དོ། །རིམ་པ་ལྔ་
པ་ལ་སོགས་ལ་གསང་སྔགས་ཀྱི་གཞུང[23] ཡང་མང་མོད་ཀྱི་འདིར་མ་སྤྲོས་སོ། །བདག་

ང

ཉིད་ཆེན་པོ་འདི་དེ་རྗེས་འབྲངས་ལ་སློབ་དཔོན་འཕགས་པ་ཀླུས་ནི་དབུ་མའི་སྐོར་ལ་ཡེ···
ཤེས་སྙིང་པོ་ཀུན་བཏུས། འཁྲུལ་པ་བཟློག་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་སྒྲུབ་པ། དབུ་མ··
ལག་པའི་ཚད་སོགས་ཕོར་བུ་འགའ་ཡང་ཡོད་མོད་ཀྱི་བརྗོད་བྱ་ཡོངས་སུ་རྫོགས་པ་ནི····
རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པ་བཞི་བརྒྱ་པ་ཡིན་ལ། འདི་ལ་ཟླ་བའི་ཞབས་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་པ་ཡང་
ཡོད་དོ། །སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་ཀྱི་ཙ་ཤེ་ཊཱི་འགྲེལ་པ་ནི་བཤད་ཟིན་ལ། བསྟན་
བཅོས་མང་དུ་མཛད་པར་གྲགས་ནའང་གཞན་རྣམས་ནི་བོད་དུ་མ་འགྱུར་སྣང་ངོ་། །ལེགས་
ལྡན་འབྱེད་ཀྱིས་རང་ཁྱང་དུ་བཙམས་པ་ནི་དབུ་མ་སྙིང་པོ་དང་དེའི་རང་འགྲེལ་རྟོག་གེ····
འབར་བ་གཉིས་ཏེ། འདི་ལས་ཕྱི་པ་དང་ནང་པའི་གྲུབ་མཐའི་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་མ་ཞིག་
འབྱུང་ཞིང་དབུ་མ་པའི་ལྟ་སྒོམ་སྤྱོད་པའི་གནད་འགག་རྒྱས་པར་འབྱུང་བས་མཉམ་མེད···
ཇོ་བོ་ཆེན་པོས་ཀྱང་རྒྱ་གར་དང་བོད་དུ་རྟོག་གེ་འབར་བའི་བཤད་པ་ལན་དུ་མར་མཛད··
འདུག་གོ །དབུ་མ་རིན་ཆེན་སྒྲོན་མ་ནི་ལེགས་ལྡན་ཆུང་བར་གྲགས་པས་མཛད་པ་
ཡིན་གྱི་སློབ་དཔོན་འདིས་མཛད་པ་མིན་ནོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་ཟླ་བ་གྲགས་པས་ནི་
རང་ཁྱང་དུ་བཙམས་པ་དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པ་རང་འགྲེལ་དང་བཅས་པ་སྟེ་ལེགས་བཤད····
ཕུལ་དུ་བྱུང་བར་གྲགས་ཆེའོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཡེ་ཤེས་སྙིང་པོས་བདེན་གཉིས་རང་འགྲེལ་
དང་བཅས་པ་མཛད་ཅིང་འདིའི་འགྲེལ་བཤད་ཞི་བ་འཚོས་མཛད་པར་གྲགས་པ་ནི་ཁ····
གཡར་རོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཞི་བ་འཚོས་དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་རང་འགྲེལ་དང་བཅས་པ་མཛད།
འདི་ལ་རང་འགྲེལ་དུ་གྲགས་པ་ནི་ཚིགས་བཅད་ལྷུག[24]་གཉིས་སྤྲེ་ལ་མར་བྱས་པའི་དབུ་མ་
རྒྱན་གྱི་བསྟན་བཅོས་དངོས་ཡིན་ལ། ཙ་བར་གྲགས་པ་ནི་དེའི་ནང་གི་ཚིགས་བཅད་
ལོགས་སུ་བཀོལ་བ་ཡིན་གྱི་ཙ་བ་སྔོན་དུ་མཛད་ནས་འགྲེལ་པས་ཕྱིས་བཀྲལ་བའི་བསྟན··
བཅོས་གཉིས་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་རྗེ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པས་གསུངས་སོ།[25] །འདིའི་

དཀའ་འགྲེལ་ཀ་མ་ལ་ཤཱི་ལས་མཛད་པར་གྲགས་པ་ནི་རྫུན་མ་ཡིན་པར་མཁས་གྲུབ་རྗེས་གསུངས་སོ[26]། །དཀའ་འགྲེལ་འདི་ལ་མི་འཐད་པའི་ཆ་འགའ་ཞིག་ཡོད་ཀྱང་སློབ་དཔོན་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བཤེས་གཉེན་གྱིས་སློབ་དཔོན་ཀ་མ་ལ་ཤཱི་ལའི་ཡུན[27] པར་བཞེད་པས་སློབ་དཔོན་…ཐུགས་མ་རྫོགས་པའི་སྐབས་ཤིག་ཏུ་མཛད་པ་ཡིན་ནམ་བརྟག་པར་བྱའོ་ཞེས་རྗེ་རིན་པོ་ཆེའི་དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་གྱི་ཟིན་བྲིས་ལས་གསུངས་སོ། །དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་གྱི་འགྲེལ་བཤད་སློབ་དཔོན་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བཤེས་གཉེན་གྱིས་མཛད་པ་ཡོད་དོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཀ་མ་ལ་ཤཱི་ལས་དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་མཛད་ཅིང་འདི་ལས་དབུ་སེམས་ཀྱི་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཐུན་མོང་མ[28]…ཡིན་པའི་ལུགས་རྣམས་ཤིན་ཏུ་གསལ་བར་མཛད་ལ། རིགས་པའི་གནད་ཤིན་ཏུ[29] ཟབ་ཞིང་རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་ཀྱང་ཐུགས་གཅིགས[30]་ཆེ་བར་མཛད་དོ། །དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་དང་དབུ་མ་བདེན་གཉིས་དང་དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་གསུམ་ལ་རང་རྒྱུད་ཤར་གསུམ་དུ་གྲགས་སོ[31]། །

གཞན་ཡང་སློབ་དཔོན་འདི་དག་གིས་མཛད་པའི་སྔགས་ཀྱི་བསྟན་བཅོས་རྣམས་སུ་ཡང་…ལྟ་བ་གདན་ལ་འབེབས་པའི་རིགས་པ་ཐོར་བུ་ཐོར་བུ་བཤད་པ་དུ་མ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་འདིར་མ…སྨོས་སོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་ཞི་བ་ལྷའི་བསླབ་བཏུས་དང་སྤྱོད་འཇུག་གཉིས་ཀྱང་དབུ་མ་པའི་གཞུང་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་འཕགས་པའོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་དཔའ་བོ་དང་། ཀླུའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་དང་། འཕགས་པ་གྲོལ་སྡེ་དང་། སེང་གེ་བཟང་པོ་དང་། སངས་རྒྱས་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཞབས་དང་། ཨ་བྷ་ཡ་ཀ་ར་རྣམས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་ལུགས་རྣམས་ཀྱང་དབུ་མ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་སུ་འདུའོ། །གྲུབ་པའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་ལཱུ་ཧི་པ[32]། ཏིལླི་བུ་པ། ནག་པོ་སྤྱོད་པ། ནཱ་རོ་པ། མངའ་བདག་མཻ་ཏྲི་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐྱེ་བོ་ཕལ་མོ་ཆེ་ཡང་སློབ་དཔོན་འཕགས་པ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲངས་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་ནོ། །འདི་དག་ཐལ་རང་གང་ཡིན་པ་ནི་འོག་ཏུ་ཅུང་ཟད་འཆད་དོ། འདི་དག་མདོ་ཙམ་སྟེ་མཐའ་དག་པར་ནི་

གཞན་ལས་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །གཉིས་པ་དེ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་དབུ་མའི་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་
ལ་སྔ་བཤད། དབྱེ་བ། མཚན་ཉིད། འདོད་ཚུལ་བཞི་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི།
སློབ་དཔོན་ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱིས། །མཐའ་གཉིས་རྣམ་པར་སྤངས་པའི་དབུས་དང་འདྲ་བས་ན་
དབུ་མ་སྟེ། དབུས་ཉིད་དབུ་མའོ་ཞེས་རང་གི་དོན་དེ་ལ་པ་ཏ་པ་བརྗོད་པའོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་
པ་ལྟར། ཡོད་པ་དང་མེད་པའི་མཐའ་གཉིས་སྤངས་པའི་དབུས་ཉིད་དབུ་མ་དང་། དེ་
རྗོད་པར་བྱེད་པའི་དོན་གྱིས་ན་དབུ་མའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་དང་། དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་མཛད་དང་།
[33]དབུ་མའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་པོ་ནི་གང་ཟག་རྣམས་ལ་ཡང་དབུ་མ་ཞེས་པའི་མིང་འདོགས་ཏེ།
སློབ་དཔོན་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དབུ་མའི་ལམ་དུ་སྟོན་པར་བྱེད་ཅིང་གྲོགས་པར་བྱེད་པས་ན་ཀ་ཞེས་···
བྱ་སྟེ། སྐད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིངས་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་ལ་བསྟན་བཅོས་ཏྲ་པའམ་[34]དབུ་མ་ཞེས་ཏྲ་བའི་མིང་ཡང་
ལ་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ནི་[35]དབུ་མ་སྟེ། ཡང་ན་ཀ་ཞེས་ཏྲ་བ་ནི་མིང་གིས་བརྗོད་པ་ཡིན་པས་དབུ་
མ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ། དབུ་མའི་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །གཉིས་
པ་དབྱེ་བ་ལ་གཉིས། དངོས་དང་། ཞར་ལ་བྱུང་བའི་རྣམ་གཞག་གོ། དང་པོ་ནི།
ཀླུའི་ཞབས་ཀྱི་སློབ་མ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ནང་ནས། འཕགས་པ་ལྷ་ནི་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་ལ་ ····
སོགས་པ་གཞན་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་སློབ་དཔོན་ཉིད་དང་འདྲ་བར་ཚད་མར་འཛིན་པས་ཡབ···
སྲས་དེ་གཉིས་ལ་གཞུང་ཕྱི་མོའི་དབུ་མ་པ་དང་གཞན་རྣམས་ལ་ཕྱོགས་འཛིན་པའི་དབུ···
མ་པ་ཞེས་སྔོན་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཐ་སྙད་མཛད་དེ། ཇོ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་འཕྲད་པར་
བཞེད་དོ། །དེ་ལ་ཕྱི་མོ་པ་དང་ཕྱོགས་འཛིན་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་བྱེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ནི་ཡབ་
སྲས་གཉིས་ཀྱི་དགོངས་པ་མཐར་ཐུག་དཔལ་འབྱུང་བའི་ལུགས་སུ་གནས། ཀྱང་གཞུང་ནི།···
བསྟན་ཆོད་པ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་དངོས་པོ་ལ་རང་མཚན་གྱིས་བཞེས་མི་བཞེས་དང་། ཕྱི་རོལ་
གྱི་དོན་ཞལ་གྱིས་བཞེས་མི་བཞེས་དང་། གཞན་གྲུབ་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་རྟགས་སྒྲོལ་ལ་མི་

ང

དཔག་བསྐྱེད་དུ་རུང་མི་རུང་སོགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་གསལ་བར་ཕྱེ་བ་མེད་པས་ཐལ་རང…
གི་ཕྱོགས་གཅིག་ཀའི་སྒོ་ལ་བརྟགས་པས་ན་ཕྱི་མོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ། །བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་
འགྲེལ་ལས། སེམས་ཅན་འགོག་ཚུལ་ཆུང་ཟད་བྱུང་མོད་ཀྱང་རང་ལུགས་ལ་ཕྱི་དོན་
ཁས་ལེན་མི་ལེན་ཞིབ་ཏུ་བཤད་པ་མེད་དོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་ཀྱིས་
རྩ་ཤེའི་འགྲེལ་པ་བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏར་ཙ་པར་བཤད་པའི་རིགས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དོན་ཐལ་འགྱུར་
མང་པོ་མཛད་ནས་བཀྲལ་ཞིང་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་མ་བཤད་དོ། །དེའི་རྗེས་སུ་
སློབ་དཔོན་ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱིས་སངས་བསྐྱངས་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་པ་ལ་སྐྱོན་མང་དུ་བརྗོད་ནས་རང…
རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་འགོད་དགོས་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་མང་དུ་བཀོད་དེ། རང་རྒྱུད་དུ་འགྲེལ་
བའི་ཤིང་རྟའི་སྲོལ་འབྱེད་པར་མཛད་དོ། །དེའི་འོག་ཏུ་དཔལ་ལྡན་ཟླ་བ་གྲགས་པས་
ནི་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་ལ་སྐྱོན་དེ་རྣམས་མི་འཇུག་པ་དང་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཁས…
ལེན་པ་ལ་གནོད་བྱེད་དང་ཁས་ལེན་མི་རིགས་པ་ལ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་མང་དུ་བསྟན་ནས་འཕགས་
པའི་དགོངས་པ་དབུ་མ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་དུ་འགྲེལ་བའི་ཤིང་རྟའི་སྲོལ་འབྱེད་པར་མཛད་དོ། །
དེའི་ཕྱིར་འདི་རྣམས་ལ་ཕྱོགས་འཛིན་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་ཞེས་གྲག་གོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་སྟོང་
ཐུན་ཆེན་མོ་ལས་དེའི་རྗེས་སུ་སློབ་དཔོན་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་ཀྱིས་རྩ་ཤེའི་འགྲེལ་པ… …
མཛད་ནས་འཕགས་པ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱི་དགོངས་པ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་དུ་བཀྲལ་ཞིང་ཞེས་གསུངས…
པའི་དོན་དུ་བསམས་ནས་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཤིང་རྟའི་སྲོལ་འབྱེད་དུ…
36 རང་དེའི་མཁས་པ་ཁ་ཅིག་བཞེད་མོད། དེ་ནི་རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོ་འི་དགོངས་པར་
མ་སོན་ཏེ། སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་ཀྱིས་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་མ་བཤད་ཀྱང་ཐལ་
འགྱུར་ཙམ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་གཞུང་དོན་འགྲེལ་བར་མཛད་མོད་ཀྱང་དེ་ཙམ་གྱིས་ཐལ་འགྱུར…
བའི་ཤིང་རྟའི་སྲོལ་འབྱེད་དུ་མི་རུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ཡང་ཡིན་ཏེ། ལུགས་དེ་ 37 དང

དེའི་ཞིང་དག་སྦྱོང་འབྱེད་དུ་འཇོག་པ་ལ་ལུགས་དེ་འཐད་པའི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་དེ་དང་དེ་ལས···
གཞན་དུ་དྲང་དུ་མི་རུང་བའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་གསལ་བར་བཤད་ལ་བབ་པ་ཅིག་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།
སྤྱིར་གྱི་ཞིང་དག་སྦྱོང་འབྱེད་ངོས་འཛིན་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་ལེགས་བཤད[38]་སྙིང་པོ་ལས། དེ་
[39]ཡང་ངེས་དོན་གྱི་གསུང་རབ་ཀྱི་དོན་གཞན་དུ་འདྲེན་པ་ལ་གནོད་བྱེད་དང་། གཞན་དུ་
དྲང་དུ་མི་རུང་བར་དོན་དེར་ངེས་པའི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པས་ལེགས་པར་གཏན་ལ་ཕབ་
པ་ཅིག་གི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲངས་ནས་དགོངས་པ་འགྲེལ་དགོས་པས་ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར···
[40]དྲང་ཚུལ་དེ་འདིར་ཡང་འདྲ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ་རྣམ་བཤད་སྙིང་པོ་དེ་རྒྱན་དང་
སྟོང་ཐུན་ཆེན་མོ་ལས་ཀྱང་ཞིང་དག་སྦྱོང་འབྱེད་ཀྱི་དོན་དེ་ལྟར་བཤད་དེ་མངས་ཀྱིས······
དོགས་ནས་མ་བྲིས་སོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ཞིང་དག་སྦྱོང་འབྱེད་ཀྱི་དོན་ངོས་འཛིན་ན་རྗེ་བཙུན་
བྱམས་པ་དབུ་མ་པའི་ཞིང་དག་སྦྱོང་འབྱེད་དུ་མི་འཇོག་པ་དང་། མགོན་པོ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་
ཀྱིན་དབུ་མ་པའི་ཞིང་དག་སྦྱོང་འབྱེད་ཡིན་པ་ཡང་ཤེས་པར་སླའོ། །གཞན་ཡང་
སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་ཀྱིས་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཞིང་དག་སྦྱོང་ཕྱེ་བ་ཡིན་ན་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་
ཀྱིས་རང་ཉིད་དང་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་གཉིས་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་དང···
བཞེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅི་ཡང་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱིས་དེ་ལྟར་བཞེད་
པར་ཅིས་མངོན་ཞེ་ན། འདི་ནི་རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་གསལ་བར་བཤད་དེ། ལེགས་
བཤད་སྙིང་པོ་ལས་ལེགས་ལྡན་ལ་ཡང་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་དང་རང་ཉིད་རང་རྒྱུད་ཁས···
ལེན་མི་ལེན་མི་མཐུན་སྙམ་པ་མི་འདུག་གི་རང་རྒྱུད་ཁས་ལེན་པ་འོས་མེད་དུ་བྱས་པའི···
ལུགས་སུ་སྣང་ངོ་། །དེའི་གནད་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་རང་ཉིད་དང་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་གཉིས་
ལ་ཆོས་དང་གང་ཟག་ལ་རང་བཞིན་འགོག་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་ཡང་ཁྱད་པར་ཡོད་པར་མི···
བཞེད་དོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་ན་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཞིང་དག་སྦྱོང་

འབྱེད་པ་པོ་དེ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་སློབ་དཔོན་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་ཀྱིས་བཞེད་དོ་ཞེས་སྨྲ་བ་ལས་འབྲེལ་མེད་པ་ཅི་ཞིག་སྨྲ་ཡོད[41] ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་སྲོལ་འབྱེད་ཟླ་བའི་ཞབས་ཡིན་པ་ནི་རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས། ཚིག་གསལ་ལས་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བཞེད་པ་དང་དབུ་མ་པས་རང་རྒྱུད་བྱ་མི་རིགས་པའི་སྐྱོན་ཕྱིན་དང་བཀྲོག…… ཕྱོགས་ལ་གནོད་བྱེད་མང་དུ་བསྟན་ནས་ཤིང་རྟའི་སྲོལ་ཕྱེ་བ་གཉིས་པས་གསལ་བར་…… གསུངས་སོ། །དེ་ལ་ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག་ལུང་དེའི་དོན་གཉེར་ཉིད་སྟོན་མཁན་ཟླ་གྲགས་ཡིན་ལ་སྲོལ་འབྱེད་མཁན་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་ཡིན་པར་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་ཟེར་བ་ནི་ཆེས་འབྲེལ་མེད་པར་བློ་གྲོས་དང་ལྡན་ན་གོ་བར་སླའོ། །དོན་ནི་རྩོད་སྤོང་ལས་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་ཀྱིས་རྩ་ཤེའི་འགྲེལ་པ་མཛད་ནས་འཕགས་པའི་དགོངས་པ་ཐལ…… འགྱུར་དུ་བཀྲལ་བར་གསུངས་པའི་དོན་ཅི་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ནི་སྔར་བཤད་པ་ལྟར་གཞུང་གི་དོན་འཆད་པ་ན་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་མ་བཤད་པར་ཐལ་འགྱུར་ཙམ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས…… གཞུང་དོན་བཀྲལ་བ་ལ་བྱ་ཡི་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཤིང་རྟའི་སྲོལ་འབྱེད་དུ་བཤད་པ་མིན་ནོ། །འཕགས་པ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རྗེས་སུ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་འཛིན་པའི་རྒྱལ་པོ་ཨིནྡྲ་བྷཱུ་ཏི[42] དང་བྲམ…… ཟེ་ཆེན་པོ་ས་ར་ཧ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བྱོན་ཞིང་དེ་དག་གིས་ལྟ་བ་མཐར་ཐུག་སྟོན་པའི་གཞུང…… མཛད་ནའང་དབུ་མ་པའི་ཤིང་རྟའི[43] སྲོལ་འབྱེད་དུ་མི་འཇོག་པ་དང་། ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་ཀྱི་སྔོན་དུ་མདོ་སྡེ་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་ལྟ་བ་འཛིན་པའི་སློབ་དཔོན་དེ་བ་ཤ་མ…… དང་། སློབ་དཔོན་ཞི་བ་འཚོའི་སྔོན་དུ་འཕགས་པ་གྲོལ་སྡེ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་ལྟ་བ་འཛིན་པའི་སློབ་དཔོན་འགའ་ཞིག་ཡོད་ཀྱང་དེ་དག་གིས་གཞུང…… མཛད་ནའང་དེ་དག་ལུགས་དེ་དང་དེའི་ཤིང་རྟའི་སྲོལ་འབྱེད་དུ་[44]མི་འཇོག་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན…… ཅི་ཡིན་ལེགས་པར་སོམས་ཤིག །མཁས་དབང་ཆེན་པོ་འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པས་ཀྱང་

ཕྱི་མ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་གསུང་དང་བསྟུན་པའི་བཤད་པ་ལུགས་གཞན་དུ་མཛད་མོད་ཀྱང་རང་གི···
དགོངས་པ་ནི་ཟླ་བ་གྲགས་པ་ཉིད་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཤིང་རྟའི་སྲོལ་འབྱེད་དུ་བཞེད་པར······
ངེས་ཏེ། །སྒྲུབ་མཐའི་ཚ་བར། ཟླ་བས་ལེགས་དགག་ཐུན་མོང་མིན་པར་བསྒྲུབས།
ཞེས་དང་། འགྲེལ་པས་ཀྱང་། ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ལུགས་
དཔལ་ལྡན་ཟླ་བ་ཁོ་ནས་གསལ་བར་ཕྱེ་བར་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། [45] །དཔལ་ལྡན་དཔའ
བོ་དང་། ཀླུའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་སོགས་ཀྱང་དབུ་མ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བར་གསལ་ཏེ། དཔའ
བོའི་དོན་དམ་བྱང་ཆུབ་ཀྱི་སེམས་[46]བསྒོམ་པ་དང་། ཀླུ་བྱང་གི་རྣམ་གཞག་རིམ་པ་
སོགས་ཀྱིས་ཤེས་སོ། །རྒྱལ་སྲས་ཆེན་པོ་ཞི་བ་ལྷ་ནི་ཟླ་བའི་ཞབས་དང་མཐུན་པར
རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་བཞེད་དོ། །མཉམ་མེད་ཇོ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ཡང་དབུ་མ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་
བ་ཡིན་པར་ལམ་སྒྲོན་རྩ་འགྲེལ། དབུ་མའི་མན་ངག་རྩ་འགྲེལ་སོགས་ཀྱིས་ཤེས་ཤིང་
རྗེ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱིས་ལན་ཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པར་བཤད་དོ། །དེས་ན་དབུ་མ་པའི་དབྱེ་བ་ནི་ཐ་སྙད
འདོད་ཚུལ་གྱི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ན་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་འདོད་པ་དང་མི་འདོད་པ་གཉིས་སུ་ངེས···
ཏེ། དེའི་སྔ་མ་ནི་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་དང་ཟླ་བའི་ཞབས་རྗེས་འབྲངས་དང་བཅས་པའོ། །
ཕྱི་མ་ནི་ཞི་འཚོ་ཡབ་སྲས་སོགས་སོ། །དོན་དམ་པ་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ངེས་པའི་ལྟ་བ་རྒྱུད་ལ་
སྐྱེད་ཚུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་ཕྱེ་ན་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་དང་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བ་གཉིས་སུ་ངེས་སོ། །རང་རྒྱུད་
པ་ལ་མདོ་སྡེ་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་དང་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ···
གཉིས་སུ་ཡོད་དེ། །དེའི་སྔ་མ་ནི་ལེགས་ལྡན་ཡབ་སྲས་དང་ཕྱི་མ་ནི་ཞི་འཚོ་ཡབ་
སྲས་སོ། །ཐལ་རང་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ནི་འོག་ཏུ་འཆད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །བོད་
ཀྱི་མཁས་པ་སྔ་མ་དག་གིས་སྣང་སྟོང་གཉིས་ཚོགས་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པར་འདོད་པ་སྒྱུ་མ···
རིགས་གྲུབ་པ་དང་། [47] སྣང་བ་ལ་སྤྲོས་པ་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་པ་ཙམ་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པར་ [48]

ང

འདོད་པ་རབ་ཏུ་མི་གནས་པར་སྨྲ་བ་སྟེ་དབུ་མ་པ་གཉིས་སོ་ ཞེས་ཐ་སྙད་བྱེད་པ་ལ་རྔོག་
ལོ་ཆེན་པོ་བློ་ལྡན་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་སྤྲིང་ཡིག་བདུད་རྩིའི་ཐིགས་པ་ལས་དོན་དམ་འདོད·····
ཚུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་གཉིས་སུ་བཞག་པ་ནི་རྨོངས་པ་ངོ་མཚར་སྐྱེད་[49]པའི་རྣམ་གཞག་གོ། ཞེས་
དགོག་པར་མཛད་དོ། །རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་ཀྱང་རྔོག་ལོ་ཆེན་པོའི་གསུང་དེ་ཤིན་
ཏུ་ལེགས་ཏེ། རིགས་ཤེས་རྗེས་དཔག་གིས་གཞལ་བའི་དོན་ཙམ་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པར་
འདོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་སུ་ཡང་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །འོན་ཀྱང་
རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་སྒྱུ་མ་རིགས་གྲུབ་པའི་དོན་དེ་ལྟར་འདོད་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་བཤད···
པ་ཡིན་གྱི་སྤྱིར་དབུ་མ་པ་ལ་སྒྱུ་མ་རིགས་གྲུབ་པ་དང་རབ་ཏུ་མི་གནས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་ཙམ···
མི་འཐད་པར་བཞེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་འདྲའི་ཐ་སྙད་ཙམ་ནི་སློབ་དཔོན་དཔའ་བོས་
དོན་དམ་བྱང་ཆུབ་[50]ཀྱི་སེམས་བསྒོམ་པའི་ཡི་གེ་ལས་གསལ་པར་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་
མཁས་གྲུབ་ཆེན་པོ་ནོར་བཟང་རྒྱ་མཚོས་གསུངས་པ་ནི་ལེགས་སམ་སྙམ་སྟེ། འདི་
དག་གི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་བཤད་པར་བྱ་བ་མང་དུ་ཡོད་[51]ཀྱང་རེ་ཞིག་བཞག་གོ། །གཉིས་པ་ཞར་
ལ་བྱུང་བའི་རྣམ་གཞག་བཤད་པ་ནི། འདིར་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། འོ་ན་དབུ་སེམས་ཀྱི་
ཤིང་རྟའི་སྲོལ་ཆེན་པོ་འདི་དག་གངས་ཅན་གྱི་ལྗོངས་སུ་ཡང་དབྱེ་བ་སྔར་བཤད་པ་འདྲ···
ཙམ་དུ་ཟད་དམ་འོན་ཏེ་འདི་དག་ལས་གཞན་དབྱེ་བའི་རྣམ་གཞག་མང་དུ་ཡོད། དང་
པོ་ལྟར་ན་མི་འཐད་དེ། གངས་རིའི་ལྗོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའི་ཐ་སྙད་འདིར་མ་བཤད་
པ་མང་དུ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལྟར་ན་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། འདི་དག་ལས་
ཚུལ་གཞན་དུ་འཆད་ན་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བར་མི་རུང་ལ་ཚུལ་གཞན་མ·····
ཡིན་ན་ནི་གྲུབ་མཐའི་ཐ་སྙད་གཞན་དུ་སྨྲ་བ་དོན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཟེར་ན། འདི་ལ་
ཚང་ཟད་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་སྟེ། དེ་ཡང་བོད་ཀྱི་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ་ཐ་སྙད་མི་འདྲ་བ་མང་དུ་

ཡོད་པ་རྣམས་ནི་བྱེ་བྲག་སྨྲ་བའི་སྡེ་པ་[52]བཅོ་བརྒྱད་ལྟར་ཡུལ་གྱི་མིང་དང་སློབ་དཔོན་གྱི་མིང་ལས་བཏགས་པ་ཡང་སྣང་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་རྒྱ་གར་གྱི་པཎ་གྲུབ་རེ་ལས་གདམས་པ་སྣ་རེ་ཞུས་ཤིང་དེ་ཉིད་གཙོ་བོར་ཉམས་སུ་ལེན་པ་ལ་གདམས་པ་དེའི་མིང་གིས་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ཟུར་པར་བཏགས་པ་ཡང་སྣང་བས་འཕགས་ཡུལ་གྱི་ཐེག་ཆེན་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ལྟར་ལྟ་བ་ཁོ་ནའི་སྒོ་ནས་གྲུབ་མཐའི་མིང་བཏགས་པའི་ངེས་པ་མི་སྣང་ངོ་། །དེ་ཡང་དཔེར་བརྗོད་ན་ཡུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་མིང་བཏགས་པ་ས་སྐྱ་པ་འབྲི་གུང་པ་ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ཤིན་ཏུ་མང་ཞིང་། སློབ་དཔོན་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་མིང་བཏགས་པ་ཀརྨ་པ་[53]ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་དང་། གདམས་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་མིང་བཏགས་པ་རྫོགས་ཆེན་པ་ཕྱག་ཆེན་པ་ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །འོན་ཀྱང་འདིར་ནི་ལྟ་བ་ཁོ་ནའི་ཁྱད་པར་ལ་དཔྱོད་པའི་སྐབས་ཡིན་ཞིང་དེའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ན། བོད་དུ་བསྟན་པ་སྔ་དར་གྱི་དུས་སུ་རྒྱལ་བའི་རིང་ལུགས་ཡོངས་སུ་རྫོགས་པའི་བཤད་སྒྲུབ་ཆེས་ཆེར་དར་བ་ནི་ལྷ་བཙན་པོ་ཁྲི་སྲོང་ལྡེ་བཙན་གྱི་དུས་ཡུན་[54]པར་འདུག་ལ་དེའི་ཆེ་ཡང་སློབ་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་པདྨ་འབྱུང་གནས་དང་། ཐུགས་འཆང་ཧཱུྃ་ཀི་རྡི་དང་། བི་མ་ལ་མི་ཏྲ་དང་། སངས་རྒྱས་གསང་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྒྱ་གར་བའི་པཎ་གྲུབ་དུ་མ་ཞིག་བྱོན་ཀྱང་དམ་པའི་ཆོས་འདུལ་བ་ནས་བཟུང་སྟེ་དབུ་མའི་བར་གྱི་བཤད་པའི་ཁྲིར་བསྒོམས་དེ་འཆད་ཉན་དང་བར་མཛད་པ་པོ་ནི་སློབ་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་ཞི་བ་འཚོ་ཡིན་པར་སྟོན་གྱི་ཡི་གེ་རྙིང་པ་དག་ལས་གསལ་བར་སྣང་ངོ་། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་པདྨ་འབྱུང་གནས་ཀྱིས་བོད་ཀྱི་ལྷ་སྲིན་རྣམས་དམ་ལ་བཏགས་ཤིང་རྒྱལ་པོ་ཡབ་སྲས་སོགས་སློབ་མ་ཉུང་འདུས་ལ་གསང་སྔགས་ཀྱི་དབང་དང་གདམས་པ་གནང་ཞིང་ཧཱུྃ་ཀི་རྡིས་ཀྱང་ཡོ་ག་རྡོ་རྗེ་དབྱིངས་ཀྱི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་དུ་དབང་བསྐུར་བ་སོགས་མཛད་སྣང་ངོ་། །འོན་ཀྱང་དེ་དག་གིས་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་གཞུང་ཆེན་མོའི་བཤད་པ་སོགས་མཛད་པའི་གཏམ་མི་སྣང་ལ་ཐུགས་ཕྱོགས་

ཀྱང་དེ་དུས་བཀའ་ཤིན་དུ་དམ་པར་འདུག་པས་ཁྲབ་གདལ་ཆེ་བར་མ་མཛད་སྣང་ངོ། །
ལྷ་སྲིད་ཀྱང་ལྷ་བཙན་པོ་འདི་བཀའ་ལུང་གིས་ལྷ་བ་དང་སྲིད་པ་ནི་མཁན་པོ་བོ[55]་དྷི་སཏྭའི་...
ལུགས་བཞིན་དུ་གྱིས་ཤིག་ཅེས[56]་ཁྲིགས་བསྐུགས་པར་བཤད་སྣང་ངོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་མཁན་
ཆེན་ཞི་བ་འཚོ་ནི་འཕགས་པ་ཀླུའི་རྗེས་འབྲངས[57]་ཀྱི་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་ཚད་མེད་ཡིན་པས་དེ་...
དུས་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་ནི་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་ལས་མ་འདས་སོ། །མཁན་སློབ་གཉིས.ཀའི་
སློབ་མ་ལོ་ཙ་བ[58]་ཆེན་པོ་ཡེ་ཤེས་སྡེའི་ལྟ་བའི[59]་བརྗོད་བྱང་ལས་ཀྱང་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ལུགས་གཙོ་...
བོར་མཛད་ཅིང་དེ་ལས་ཀྱང་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་ལུགས་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་...
བཞིན་བྱས་སྣང་ངོ། །དེ་རྗེས་སློབ་དཔོན་ཕྱིར་ལོག་ཅིང[60]་མཁན་ཆེན་འདས་པའི་རྗེས་སུ་
རྒྱའི་མཁན་པོ་ཧྭ་ཤང་མ་ཧཱ་ཡ་ན་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་ཅི་ཡང་ཡིད་ལ་མི་བྱེད་པའི་ལྟ་བ་གཙོ་བོར་
སྟོན་པའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་མང་དུ་བརྩམས་ནས་རང་གི་ལུགས་སྤེལ་བས་རྒྱལ་པོ་འདི་བཙུན་མོ་
འབྲོ་བཟང[61]་བྱང་ཆུབ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བོད་ཀྱི་མི་མང་པོ་ཞིག་དེའི་ཆོས་ལུགས་ལ་ཞུགས་པར་
གྱུར་ཏོ། དེ་ནས་ལྷ་བཙན་པོས་ཐབས་ཀྱི་ཆ་ལ་སྐུར་པ་འདེབས་པའི་ལུགས་དེ་སྔར་
གྱི་མཁན་པོ་འདི་ལུགས་དང་མ་མཐུན་ཞིང་བོད་མང་པོ་དགེ་སྦྱོར་ལ་གཡེལ་བའི་རྐྱེན་གྱིས་...
ཆོས་ལུགས་རྣམ་དག་མིན་པར་གཟིགས་ནས་མཁན་པོ་འདི་བཀའ་ཆེམས་ལྟར་སློབ་དཔོན་...
ཆེས[62]་པོ་ཀ་མ་ལ་ཤཱི་ལ་སྤྱན་དྲངས་སོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་དེས་རྒྱའི་མཁན་པོ་ལུང་
དང་རིགས་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་ལེགས་པར་ཚར་བཅད། དབུ་མའི་སྒོམ་རིམ་གསུམ་ལ་སོགས་
པ་སོ་སོར་རྟོག་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་བསྔགས་པའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་མང་དུ་བརྩམས་ཏེ་འཆད་ཉན་
གྱི[63]་ལུགས་དྲི་མ་མེད་པ་དར་བར་མཛད། དེའི་ཚེ་ཡང་རྒྱལ་པོས་ད་ཕྱིན་ཆད་ལྟ་བ་སློབ་
དཔོན་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ལུགས་ལྟར་བྱ་དགོས་ཤིང་ཧྭ་ཤང་གི་ལུགས་ལྟར་བྱེད་པ་ལ་ཆད་པས་...
གཅོད་དོ་ཞེས་ཁྲིམས་བསྒྲགས་པར་སྣང་ངོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་བསྟན་པ་སྔ་དར་ལ་སེམས་ཙམ་

པའི་ལུགས་འཛིན་པའི་པཎྜི་ཏ་འགའ་ཞིག་ཀྱང་བྱོན་མོད་ཀྱང་གཙོ་བོ་ནི་ཞི་བ་འཚོ་དང་
ཀ་མ་ལ་ཤཱི་ལའི་ལུགས་ཡིན་པས་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་ལྟ་བ་ཉིད་དར་སོ་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་བར་
སྣང་ངོ་། །བསྟན་པ་ཕྱི་དར་ལ་ལོ་ཆེན་རིན་ཆེན་བཟང་པོས་པཱཊ་ཀྲུབ་ཏུ་ན་བཊྟེན།
སྔགས་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཆོས་སྐོར་མང་དུ་སྤྱངས། བཀའ་བསྟན་བཅོས་ཀྱི་འགྱུར་མང་
དུ་མཛད་དེ་འཆད་ཉན་གྱིས་གདན་ལ་ཕབ་ཅིང་ལྟ་བ་ནི་རབ་ཏུ་མི་གནས་པའི་དབུ་མ་ཡིན་
པར་བཤད་དོ། །ལོ་ཆེན་འདྲིས་ཀླུ་[64] སྐར་རྒྱལ་བདུལ་སྔགས་ཀྱི་ལོག་སྤྱོད་པ་རྣམས་ཚར་
བཅད་དེ་བསྟན་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པས་ཁ་བ་རི་པ་རྣམས་ལ་སྐུ་དྲིན་གྱིས་ཁྱབ་པར་མཛད་
དོ། །ལྷ་བླ་མ་ཡེ་ཤེས་འོད་དང་བྱང་ཆུབ་འོད་ཀྱིས་བོད་ཀྱི་སྔགས་པ་ཅོང་ཆོས་པ་རྣམས་
ཀྱིས་བསྟན་པ་དྲི་མ་ཅན་དུ་བྱས་པ་ལ་བཟོད་པར་དཔལ་མཉམ་མེད་ཇོ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་དཱི་པཾ་ཀ
ར་ཤྲཱི་ཛྙཱ་ན་སྤྱན་དྲངས། བསྟན་པའི་དག་ཐེར་མཛད་པར་གསོལ་བ་བཏབ་པས་བྱང་
ཆུབ་ལམ་གྱི་སྒྲོན་མ་ལ་སོགས་པ་མཛད་དེ། རྒྱལ་བའི་བསྟན་པ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ལ་རྣལ་
པ་ཉིད་དང་མཚུངས་པའི་བཀའ་དྲིན་གྱིས་ཁྱབ་པར་མཛད་དོ། །མཉམ་མེད་ཇོ་བོ་ཆེན་
པོ་འདི་ནི་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་[65] པའི་ལུགས་ལ་གཙོ་བོར་མཛད་དེ། སྟོང་ཉིད་གང་
གིས་རྟོགས་ཞེ་ན། །དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པས་ལུང་བསྟན་ཅིང་། །ཆོས་ཉིད་བདེན་
པ་གཟིགས་པ་ཡི། །ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་སློབ་མ་ཟླ་གྲགས་ཡིན། །དེ་ལས་བརྒྱུད་པའི་མན་
ངག་གིས། །ཆོས་ཉིད་བདེན་པ་རྟོགས་པར་འགྱུར། །ཞེས་ཟླ་བ་གྲགས་པའི་ལུགས་
གཙོ་བོར་མཛད་དོ། །ཇོ་བོ་རྗེ་བོད་དུ་ཕེབས་ནས་བོད་སྟོན་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་རང་རང་གི་
ལྟ་བའི་རྟོགས་པ་ཕུལ་བ་ལ་ཇོ་བོ་ཐུགས་མ་དགྱེས་ནས་[66] ལྟ་བ་ཇི་ལྟར་རྡུང་ཡང་རྡུང་། །
བྱང་ཆུབ་ཀྱི་སེམས་སྒོམས་ཤིག་བྱ་བ་གསུངས་སྐད། ཕྱིས་སུ་འབྲོམ་སྟོན་པས་སློབ་
དཔོན་ཟླ་གྲགས་ལུགས་ཀྱི་[67] རྟོགས་པ་ཕུལ་བས་ཇོ་བོ་ཐུགས་དགྱེས་ནས་ཕྱག་ཐུགས་ཀར

ང

ཐལ་མོ་སྦྱར། ངོ་མཚར་ཆེ། ད་ལྟ་རྒྱ་གར་ཤར་ཕྱོགས་ན་ལྟ་བ་འདི་ཁོ་ན་འཛིན་ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་ཇོ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལས་བརྒྱུད་པའི་བཀའ་གདམས་པ་ཞེས་རྣམ་ཐར་གཙང་མའི་མཐར་ཐུག་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ནང་ནས་དགེ་བའི་བཤེས་གཉེན་པོ་ཏོ་བ་སོགས་སྐུ་མཆེད་གསུམ་དུ་གྲགས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ལམ་རིམ་དང་གསུང་སྒྲོས་སུ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཟླ་གྲགས་ལུགས་དང་མཐུན་ཤས་ཆེ་བར་འབྱུང་ངོ་། །ཇོག་ལོ་ཆེན་པོ་ཡབ་སྲས་ནི་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་དང་ཟླ་བའི་ཞབས་སོགས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་ཁུངས་སུ་དྲངས་པ་མང་དུ་སྣང་ནའང་ལྟ་བ་སྐྱོང་ཚུལ་ཞི་འཚོ་ཡབ་སྲས་དང་མཐུན་ཤས་ཆེ་བར་སྣང་ངོ་། །གསེར་གླིང་པ་ལས་བརྒྱུད་པའི་བློ་སྦྱོང་འགའ་ཞིག་གི་ལྟ་བའི་འགྲོས་ནི་སེམས་ཙམ་རྣམ་རྫུན་པའི་ལུགས་དང་མཐུན་པར་སྣང་ངོ་། །འོན་ཀྱང་རྗེས་འབྲངས་ཕལ་མོ་ཆེས་རྒྱ་གཞུང་དེ་དག་གི་དོན་མ་འདྲེས་པར་འཆད་ཤེས་པ་དཀོན་པར་བྱུང་འདུག་གོ། །ཇོ་མོ་ནང་པར་གྲགས་པའི་ལྟ་བའི་ཁུངས་གཏུག་ས་ནི་གངས་ཏི་སེའི་འགྲམ་དུ་སྐྱེས་པའི་གྲུབ་ཆེན་ཡུ་མོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེང་ངེ་འཛིན་དང་མངོན་ཤེས་ཐར་ཕྱིར་ཡོད་པ་ཞིག་བྱུང་འདུག་པ་དེ་ཡིན་པར་གྲགས་ཤིང་དེས་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འི་ཡིག་ཆ་འགའ་ཞིག་ཀུང་བྲས་སོ། །ལུགས་དེ་གྲུས་པར་བྱེད་པ་པོ་ནི་ཀུན་མཁྱེན་དོལ་བོ་པ་ཞེས་རབ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་ཡིན་པར་འདུག་ཅིང་ཇོ་ནང་ཀུན་དགའ་གྲོལ་མཆོག་སོགས་ཕྱིས་སུ་ཡང་བརྒྱུད་འཛིན་མང་ཙམ་བྱུང་འདུག་གོ། ཻདེའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་ནི་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་གྲུབ་པ་[68] རང་དབང་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་ཅིང་སེམས་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུད་ལ་ཁམས་[69] བདེར་གཤེགས་སྙིང་པོ་རྟག་བརྟན་ཐེར་ཟུག་མཚན་སུམ་ཅུ་རྩ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་མཚན་པ་རང་ཆས་སུ་ཡོད་པ་ཞིག་ཏུ་འདོད་དོ། །འདི་ནི་དབུ་སེམས་ཀྱི་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་མཐའ་དག་གི་ལུགས་ལས་ཕྱི་རོལ་ཏུ་གྱུར་པ་ཞིག་སྟེ། །ཡར་འབྲོག་པ་རིན་ཆེན་དོག །རྫེ་རེད་མདའ་པ། རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོ

ཡབ་སྲས་སོགས་གངས་ཅན་གྱི་མཁས་པའི་ཡང་རྩེ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ལུང་རིགས་བརྒྱ་སྣག······
གིས་འགོག་པར་མཛད་དོ། །ཇོ་ནང་ཀུན་མཁྱེན་ཆེན་པོ་བྲ་ཕྱོགས་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་
པ་ནི་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ་མཐའ་དག་ལ་སྦྱངས་པའི་མཁས་པ་འགྲན་ཟླ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་འདུག···
ཙིང་རང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བའི་བཤད་པ་ནི་བཀའ་གདམས་པ་དང་མཐུན་ཤས་ཆེ་ཞིང་ཟླ་བའི་··
གཞུང་ལ་གཙོ་བོར་མཛད་དོ། །གཞན་ཡང་སྔོན་གྱི་དུས་སུ་ལོ་ཙཱ་བ་ཆེན་པོ་པ་ཚབ་ཉི་
མ་གྲགས་ཀྱིས་ཀུང་ཁ་ཆེའི་ཡུལ་དུ་ལོ་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙ་གསུམ་སྦྱངས་ཏེ་པཎྜི་ཏ་གསེར་གྱི་གོ་ཆ···
ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྤྱན་དྲངས། དབུ་མའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་མང་དུ་བསྒྱུར་ཞིང་འཆད་ཉན་མཛད།
པ་ཚབ་བུ་བཞིར་གྲགས་པ་སོགས་སློབ་མ་མང་དུ་བྱོན། བོད་དུ་སློབ་དཔོན་ཟླ་པ་གྲགས་
པའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་དབུ་མའི་བཤད་པ་ནི་འདི་ལས་མང་དུ་འཕེལ་སྣང་ངོ་། །འགོས་རིན་
པོ་ཆེ་ཁྲག་པ་ལྷས་བཙས་ནི་རྒྱ་གར་དུ་ལན་བཅུ་གཉིས་བྱོན། པཎ་གྲུབ་བདུན་ཅུ་རྩ་
གཉིས་ལ་གཏུགས། རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བཤད་པ་ཡང་མང་དུ་མཛད་སྣང་ཞིང་ལྟ་བ་ཡང་དབུ་མའི་
ལུགས་ལ་གཙོ་བོར་མཛད་དེ། དེའི་གསུང་རབ་རྣམས་ལས་ཐལ་རང་གང་ཡིན་བརྟག་
དཀའ་བར་སྣང་ངོ་། །ལོ་ཙཱ་བ་ཁེ་གད་འཁོར་ལོ་གྲགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལོ་ཆེན་མང་པོ་
ཞིག་ནི་པཎ་ཆེན་ཨ་བྷ་ཡའི་སློབ་མར་སྣང་བས་ལྟ་བ་ཡང་དེ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནམ་སྙམ་སྟེ་གསལ་
བར་བཤད་པ་མི་སྣང་ངོ་། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ར་འབྲོ་གཉན་གསུམ་སོགས་ལོ་ཆེན་པལ་མོ་
ཆེ་ཡང་རང་ཉིད་དབུ་མ་པར་ཞལ་གྱིས་བཞེས་པ་ཁོ་ནར་སྣང་ཞིང་ཐལ་རང་གང་ཡིན······
སོགས་བརྟག་དཀའ་བར་སྣང་ངོ་། །འབྲོག་མི་ཤཱཀྱ་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་རྒྱ་གར་དུ་བྱོན། སློབ་
དཔོན་པིར་ལྟ་བའི་སློབ་མ་ཊོམ་བི་ཧེ་རུ་ཀའི་བརྒྱུད་[70]འཛིན་སློབ་དཔོན་ཤི་ཐུབ་ཟླ་[71]བ་ཞེས···
བྱ་བའི་དངོས་ཀྱི་སློབ་མ་སློབ་དཔོན་དཔའ་བོ་རྡོ་རྗེ་ལས་ཀྱི་རྡོ་རྗེ་རྒྱུད་གསུམ་ཡན་ལག་··
དང་བཅས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་གསན། རྒྱ་གར་དུ་ལོ་བཅུ་གཉིས་བཞུགས། ཚོད་དུ་

ཞེབས་ནས་ཐུགས་དར་བར་མཛད། ཕྱིས་པ་ཏྲི་དྷ་ག་ཡ་ཛྙ་ར་ལ་གདུགས་ཏེ་མ་རྒྱུད་
སྐོར་ལ་སྤྱངས་པར་སྣང་ཞིང་། ས་སྐྱ་པའི་ཆོས་སྐོར་རྣམས་ཀྱང་འདི་ནས་བརྒྱུད་པ་
མང་བར་སྣང་ངོ་། །ལམ་འབྲས་པ་རང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་དབུ་མ་པ་ཆེན་པོ་
ཡིན་པར་བཤད་འདུག་ལ། ལྟ་བའི་ངོ་སྤྲོད་ཚུལ་ལུགས་གཞན་དང་ཅུང་མི་འདྲ་བར་
སྣང་སྟེ། ཐུགས་ཀྱི་གདམས་ངག་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་ངོ་སྤྲོད་ཚུལ་དུ་སྣང་ཞིང་། །
གསལ་སྟོང་ཟུང་འཇུག་གི་ལྟ་བར་གྲགས་སོ། །འོན་ཀྱང་གྲུབ་ཆེན་བིར་ཝ་པའི་དགོངས་
པ་ཡིན་ཕྱིར་ཐལ་འགྱུར་པ་ལས་མ་འདས་སོ། །རྗེས་འབྲངས་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་བཤད་ཚུལ་
ལ་མཐའ་གཅིག་ཏུ་མ་ངེས་སོ། །གནས་ལྔ་རིག་པའི་པཎྜི་ཏ[72]་ཆེན་པོ་འཇམ་དབྱངས་
ཀུན་དགའ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་པས་ཀྱང་ཐུགས་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་དེ་ཁོ་ནར་སྣང་ཞིང་། མདོ་
ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བའི་བཤད་པ་རྣམས་ནི་རབ་ཏུ་མི་གནས་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་ལ་བསྟུགས་པ་ཆེ···
བར་འདུག་གོ། ཕྱིས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱ་པའི་ལམ་ཚང་པ་མཛད་པའི་རྗེ་བཙུན་ཆེན་པོ་རེད་མདའ་
བ་ནི་ཟླ་བའི་ཞབས་ཀྱི་[73]ལུགས་ལ་ངེས་ཞེས་[74]མཆོག་ཏུ་རྟེན་ཅིང་དབུ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་འགྲེལ་
བ་དང་ལྟ་བའི་སྐོར་གྱི་འཁྲིད་[75]ཡིག་མཛད་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོ་འ་གསུང་···
དང་གནད་ཤིན་ཏུ་མཐུན་པར་ཡོད་དོ། །འགྲོ་བའི་མགོན་པོ་དམ་པ་སངས་རྒྱས་ནས་
བརྒྱུད་པའི་ཞི་བྱེད་ལུགས་སུ་གྲགས་པའི་ལྟ་བ་ལ། ཕྱིར་དམ་པ་སངས་རྒྱས་འདི་
མགོན་པོ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་སློབ་ཏུ་གྲགས་ལ། གདམས་པ་དེ་སྐོར་གྱི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་སུ་དམ་
པས་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་པོ་མོ་བརྒྱད་ཅུ་བསྟེན་ནས་ཆོས་གསན་པར་བཤད་ཅིང་། བླ་མ་དེ་དག་
གི་གྲངས་འདྲེན་པའི་ཚེ་སློབ་དཔོན་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ནས་བཟུང་སྟེ་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་ནཱ་རོ་ཏི་པའི་སློབ་མ····
རྣམས་ཀྱང་འདྲེན་པར་བྱེད་དོ། །ཆོས་འབྱུང་རྩོམ་པའི་མཁས་པ་གྲགས་ཆེ་བ་འགས་
ཀྱང་ལོ་རྒྱུས་སྔ་མ་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་བགྲངས་འདུག་ཀྱང་ངེས་པ་འཐོབ་དཀའ་བར་སྣང་ངོ་། །

ངེ

ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་དམ་པ་དང་ཁ་ཆེ་པཎ་ཆེན་ཤཱཀྱ་ཤྲཱི་གཉིས་གཅིག་པར་ཡང་འཆད་དེ། རྒྱུ་
མཚན་ཡང་དག་མ་མཐོང་ངོ་། །གང་ལྟར་མགོན་པོ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་སློབ་ཡིན་པ་ནི་
རྒྱ་ནག་གི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་འགའ་ཞིག་དང་ཡང་མཐུན་པར་སྣང་བས་བདེན་པ་འདྲའོ། །ཞི་བྱེད་
ལུགས་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བའི་ཁུངས་ནི་ཤེར་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་མདོ་ལ་གཏུགས་པར་འདུག་ཅིང་གདམས་····
ངག་གི་ཡི་གེ་རྣམས་སུ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ལ་ཚད་མར་འཛིན་པ་དང་། མ་ཅིག་ལབ་སྒྲོན་གྱི་གསུང་
རྣམས་ཀྱང་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱོགས་དང་མཐུན་ཚབས་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེའོ། །འོན་ཀྱང་བར་
སྐབས་སུ་གདམས་ངག་འཛིན་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཉ་དང་ཉུང་མ་མང་དུ་བསྲེས་སྣང་ངོ་། །
གངས་རིའི་ཁྲོད་ཀྱི་སྒྲུབ་བརྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བསྟན་འཛིན་ཆེན་པོ་ལྷོ་བྲག་མར་པ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བློ་གྲོས་ནི···
རྒྱ་གར་དུ་ལན་གསུམ་བལ་པོར་ལན་བཞི་བྱོན། པཎ་ཆེན་ནཱ་རོ་པ་དང་། མངའ་
བདག་མཻ་ཏྲི་པ། དཔལ་ཡེ་ཤེས་སྙིང་པོ། གྲུབ་ཆེན་ཞི་བ་བཟང་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པ་
མཁས་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་བླ་མ་བརྒྱ་ཙ་བརྒྱད་ལ་གཏུགས། དཔལ་གསང་བ་འདུས་པ་ལ་སོགས་
པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་པ་མའི་རྒྱུད་ཕལ་མོ་ཆེའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བཤད་པ་གདམས་ངག་ཕྱག་ལེན་དང་ ···
བཅས་པ་ཞིབ་ཏུ་སྦྱངས། བོད་དུ་བྱོན་ཏེ་བཀའ་བབས་ཀྱི་སློབ་མ་བཞི[76]་ལ་སོགས་པའི་
བརྒྱུད[77]་འཛིན་མང་དུ་བྱུང་ཞིང་། གསང་སྔགས་ཀྱི་འཕྲིན་ལས་ཁྱབ་གདལ་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་
བས་ད་ལྟའི་བར་དུའང་གདམས་ངག་གི་བརྒྱུད[78]་པ་མང་དུ་འཕེལ་བར་འདུག་གོ། །རྗེ་
འདི་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་ནི་པཎ་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་བླ་མ་མང་པོ་ལས་གསན་པས་དབུ་སེམས་ཀྱི་གདམས····
པའི་རྒྱུན་དུ་མ་ཞིག་ཡོད་པར་སྣང་མོད་ཀྱང་གཙོ་བོ་ནི་རྗེ་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་གསུང་མགུར་དུ།
ལྟ་བའི་སྤྲོ་འདོགས་ཆོད་པའི་བླ་མ་ནི་མི་ཏྲི་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་གསུངས་ཤིང་། ལྟ་སྒོམ་
སྤྱོད་པ་དང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བཤད་པ་གང་གི་སྐབས་སུ་ཡང་ནཱ་རོ་མི་ཏྲི་གཉིས་ལ་གཙོ་བོར་མཛད་
དོ། །དེ་ལ་མངའ་བདག་མཻ་ཏྲི་པ་ནི་དབུ་མ་པ་ཡིན་པར་མ་ཟད་དཔལ་ལྡན་ཟླ་བའི་

ལུགས་ཁོ་ན་གཙོ་བོར་མཛད་པ་ཞིག་སྟེ། དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་འཚོ་བའི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་བཅུ་པ་
ལས། རྣམ་བཅས་མ་ཡིན་རྣམ་མེད་མིན། བླ་མའི་ངག་གིས་མ་བརྒྱན་པའི། །
དབུ་མ་དང་འབྲིང་མོ་ཙམ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་སེམས་ཙམ་རྣམ་བདེན་རྫུན་གཉིས་ཀས་དེ་
ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དོན་[79]རྟོགས་པ་མིན་པ་དང་། དབུ་མ་པ་ལའང་བླ་མའི་མན་ངག་གིས་མ་
བརྒྱན་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་ནི་དབུ་མ་འབྲིང་པོ་ཡིན་པར་གསུངས་ལ། བླ་མའི་གདམས་
ངག་ནི་དཔལ་ལྡན་བླ་བའི་ཞབས་ཀྱི་གདམས་ངག་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་པར་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་སློབ་
མ་པཎྜི་ཏ་ལྷན་ཅིག་སྐྱེས་པའི་རྡོ་རྗེའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ལས་བཤད་དོ། །པཎ་ཆེན་ནཱ་རོ་པ་
ཡང་དཔལ་ལྡན་བླ་བའི་ལུགས་ཁོ་ན་འཛིན་པ་སྟེ། དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུད་ཕྱི་མའི་འགྲེལ་པར།
ཕྱི་མའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་པ་འདི། །སྔོན་མ་གསལ་བའི་རྗེས་འབྲངས་ནས། །ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་
མན་ངག་བཤད་པ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་དང་སློབ་དཔོན་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་འཕགས་པ་ལྷ། །ཀླུ་ཡི་
བྱང་ཆུབ་ཤཱཀྱའི་བཤེས། །ཟླ་བ་གྲགས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པའི། །མན་ངག་རིམ་པ་ལ་
བརྟེན་ནས། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་ལྟ་བའི་བཤད་པ་ཡང་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ལྟར་སྣང་
བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་སྔོན་དང་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་རྟོག་གེ་པ་ཁ་ཅིག་མི་ཏྲི་པ་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་
ཡིན་ཏེ་ཤཱནྟི་པའི་སློབ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་ཟེར་བ་ནི་འཕྱོངས་[80] ཕྱིས་པའི་ཇོ་[81] དང་
མཚུངས་པས་དོར་བར་བྱ་བ་ཁོ་ནའོ། དེ་ལྟར་ན་གྲུབ་དབང་མར་པའི་ལྟ་བ་ནི་དབུ་མ་
པ་ཆེན་པོ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པར་གདོན་མི་ཟའོ། །འོན་ཀྱང་མར་པ་ནས་
བརྒྱུད་པའི་ལྟ་བའི་གདམས་ངག་རྣམས་སུ་སེམས་ཙམ་ལུགས་དང་མཐུན་པའི་བཤད་སྒྲོད་
ལགས་ཀྱང་མཛད་སོད། དེ་ནི་སྔར་བཤད་པ་ལྟར་རྗེ་མར་པ་ལ་བླ་མ་པཎ་གྲུབ་ཀྱང་མང་
ཞིང་དེ་ནས་བརྒྱུད་པའི་གདམས་པ་ཡང་མང་བར་འདུག་པས་བླ་མ་མར་པ་ནས་བརྒྱུད་......
པའི་ལྟ་བའི་གདམས་པ་ཡིན་ཚད་དབུ་མ་པའི་ལུགས་ཡིན་མི་དགོས་སོ། ;རྗེ་བཙུན་

ང

མི་ལ་རས་པའི་མགུར་འབུམ་དུ་ཡང་ཆོ་རིང་མ་ལ་གདམས་པ་སོགས་ལས་འབྱུང་བའི་
ལྟ་བའི་གསུང་རིགས་ནི་ཐལ་འགྱུར་[82] པའི་ལྟ་བ་དང་མཐུན་པར་འདུག་ཅིང་། ཇེ་བདག་
ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་ཀྱང་མགུར་དེའི་དོན་དབུ་མ་པ་དང་མཐུན་པར་གསུངས་སོ། །ཡང་གསུང་
མགུར་འགའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་རྣལ་འབྱོར་བཞིའི་ངོ་སྤྲོད་མཛད་འདུག་ཚང་[83] དེ་དག་ལ་ཡང་དབུ
སེམས་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བའི་བཤད་ལུགས་ཅི་རིགས་པར་ཡོད་དོ། །དེ་དག་ཀྱང་བསྟན་པ་སྙིའི་
རྣམ་གཞག་གི་བསྟན་བཅོས་རྩོམ་པ་མིན་ཕྱིར་[84] ཐད་ཀ་ཐད་ཀའི་ཞུ་བ་པོ་དེའི་བློ་ངོ་དང་
འཚམ་པའི་ལྟ་སྒོམ་སྤྱོད་པ་རེ་གསུང་[85] བ་མ་གཏོགས་གྲུབ་ཆེན་དེ་དག་གིས་ཤེས་ཚད
མཐའ་དག་མི་དེ་ལ་བཤད་དགོས་དོན་མེད་པ་དབང་པོ་རྣོལ་པོས་ཀྱང་ཤེས་ནུས་སོ། །
རྣལ་འབྱོར་བཞིའི་ཐ་སྙད་ནི་སློབ་དཔོན་ཤཱནྟི་པས་སེམས་ཙམ་རྒྱུད་དུ་བཤད་སོད་བཀའ
བརྒྱུད་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་བཞི་ལ་སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ངེས་པ་མི་སྣང་ངོ༑ །ཕྱག་
རྒྱ་ཆེན་པོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་གདམས་ངག་གི་མིང་འདོགས་གྲགས་ཆེ་བར་མཛད་པ་པོ་ནི
མཉམ་མེད་སྒམ་པོ་པ་ཡིན་ལ། །དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་གསུང་ལས་ལྟ་བའི་ངོ་སྤྲོད་ལ་པར་ཕྱིན
ཐེག་པའི་ལུགས་དང་སྔགས་ཀྱི་ལུགས་གཉིས་འབྱུང་ཞིང་དེ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལའང་ཕྱག་རྒྱ
ཆེན་པོ་འི་གདམས་ངག་གི་མིང་འདོགས་པར་མཛད་དོ། །པར་ཕྱིན་ཐེག་པའི་ལུགས་
ལ་སྟོང་ཉིད་ལ་ཕྱག་རྒྱ་ཆེན་པོར་གསུངས་པ་ཡོད་ཚུལ་སོགས་མདོ་ལུང་མང་དུ་དྲངས་ནས་
བསྒྲུབས་པའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་ཀྱང་མཛད་སྣང་ངོ་། །པག་མོ་གྲུབ་རྗེ་ཇེ་རྒྱལ་པོ་དང་།
འབྲི་གུང་[86] སྐྱུ་ར་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་གཉིས་ཀྱང་དེའི་རྗེས་སུ་འཇུངས་པར་སྣང་ཞིང་འདི་དག་ཀྱང
སྣང་ཕྱོགས་རྟེན་འབྲེལ་ལ་གཙིགས་[87] ཆེ་བར་མཛད་ཅིང་སོ་སོར་རྟོག་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི
དཔྱོད་པ་མི་འདོད་[88] པའི་ལུགས་སུ་སྣང་ངོ་། །འོན་ཀྱང་འདི་དག་གི་བཀའ་འབུམ་རྣམས་
སུ་སློབ་མ་མཁས་པ་དང་མི་མཁས་པ་དུ་མས་ཟིན་བྲིས་ཉག་ཉོག་མང་པོ་བཙུག་འདུག་པ

ལ་ཡིད་བརྟན་མི་སྣང་ངོ༎ ༈ དཀར་པོ་ཆིག་ཐུབ་ཅེས་པའི་མིང་ནི་ཞང་ཚལ་པ་ཡན་ཆད་དུ་དར་རྒྱས་ཆེ་རྒྱུ་མེད་ཅིང་ཞང་ཚལ་པས་དཀར་པོ་ཆིག་ཐུབ་ལ་གཙོ་བོར་བྱས་པའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་ཀྱང་མཛད་དོ། །འཇམ་མགོན་ས་སྐྱ་པཎ་ཆེན་གྱིས་དགག་པ་མཛད་ཡུལ་གྱི་གཙོ་བོ་ཡང་འདི་ཡིན་པར་སྣང་ངོ་། །ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་རང་གཞན་མང་པོས་ཀྱང་འདི་ཕྱོགས་ལ་དགག་པ་མང་དུ་མཛད་པར་འདུག་ལ། ཞང་ཚལ་པ་རང་གི་བཞེད་པ་ལ་ཅི་ཡང་ཡིད་ལ་མི་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱོགས་གནས་པ་ཡིན་ན་དགག་པ་དེ་དག་གནད་དུ་འགྲོ་བར་སྣང་སྟེ་ཞིབ་པར་སྒོམ་འདོད་དོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་བདག་གིས་གོང་དུ་བཤད་པ་འདི་རྣམས་ཀྱང་རང་རང་གི་གྲུབ་མཐའི་ཁུངས་གཏུགས་ས་གང་ཡིན་རྣམས་བརྩད་བཅད་ནས་ཟིན་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། ཕྱིར་བོད་ཀྱི་ལོ་ཙཱ་བ་རྒྱ་གར་གྱི་མཁས་པ་ཚོད་མེད་ལ་[89]གཏུགས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་མཁས་པ་དེ་དང་དེའི་ལྟ་བའི་བཞེད་པ་བརྩད་བཅད་པའི་ངེས་པ་མི་སྣང་ལ། བརྩད་བཅད་ཀྱང་པཎ་གྲུབ་དེ་དག་གིས་དྲི་པ་པོ[90]འི་བློ་ངོར་འཚམས་པའི་ལྟ་སྒོམ་གྱི་གནད་ཅིག[91] སྟོན་པ་མ་གཏོགས་རང་གིས་མཁྱེན་ཚད་དེ་ལ་བཤད་པའི[92]་ངེས་པ་མི་འདུག་སྟེ། ཚུལ་འདི་ནི་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ[93]འི་བཤེས་གཉེན་བཟང་པོ་དག་གི་ངང་ཚུལ་ཡིན་གྱི། ཤ་སྐམ་ཁོག་པ་རེའི་ཡོན་ལ་རང་གིས[94]་ཤེས་ཚད་རྣ་བ་སྲུན་སྲུན་དུ་སྨྲ་བའི་ད་ལྟའི་འཆད་པ་པོ་རྣམས་དང་མི་འདྲའོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཇོ་ནང་ལུགས་དང་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་སྟག་ཚང་ལོ་ཙཱ་བ་ཤེས་རབ་རིན་ཆེན་གྱི་ལྟ་བའི་ལུགས་གཉིས་མ་གཏོགས་སྔོན་གྱི་མཁས་གྲུབ་ཕལ་མོ་ཆེའི་ལྟ་བའི་གདམས་པ་རྣམས་ལ་ཁུངས་གཏུག་ས་རྒྱ་གར་གྱི་པཎ་གྲུབ་རེ་ཡོད་པར་འདུག་གོ། དེ་དག་གི་སློབ་འཛིན་པ་རྣམས་ལས་ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་སྐྱོང་པ་ཐན་ཐུན་ཡོད་ཀྱང་རིགས་པ་མི་ཤེས་པ་དང་། འགའ་ཞིག་ནི་ཚུང་ཟད་སྦྱངས་ཀྱང་གྲུབ་མཐའི་ཁྱད་པར་མ་ཕྱེད་པ་དང་། ལ་ལ་ནི་ཟེར་སློས་སྤྲ་མ་སྐྱོར་འདོད་ཀྱང་ཚིག་རིས་ཙམ་ཡང་སྐྱོར་མ་ཤེས་པ་དང་། ཕལ་

མོ་ཆེ་ནི་གདམས་པ་མཐོང་ཚད་རང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་གདམས་པར་བསྒྲེ་བ་སོགས་བརྗོད་པར་····
བཀའ་བའི་ངང་ཚུལ་མང་དུ་སྣང་ངོ་། །ཇོ་ནང་པའི་ལྟ་བ་ནི་རང་མལ་ནས་བློ་བུར་དུ་
བརྫོལ་བའི་ལྟ་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པར་འདུག་ཅིང་མཁས་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཁུངས་གཏུགས་ཅི་ཡང་[95]མེད་····
དོ། །སྟག་ཚང་པས་མ་དཔྱད་པ་དང་ཅུང་ཟད་དཔྱད་པ་དང་ཤིན་ཏུ་དཔྱད་པའི་གནས་
སྐབས་གསུམ་དུ་ཕྱེ་ནས་གནས་སྐབས་ཕྱི་མ་ཕྱི་མས་སྔ་མ་སྔ་མ་འགོག་པའི་ལྟ་བ་རྙིག་··
བཤད་པ་ནི་ངོ་མཚར་ཏེ། རང་གི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ལ་གྲོལ་བ་གཞན་གྱིས་འགལ་ང་སྤྲོག་[96]
མ་དགོས་པར་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བཞག་པའི་བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བཤིག་
པར་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ངང་ཚུལ་འདི་ལྟར་གྱུར་ཀྱང་ཅོད་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་གཞན་
ལ་འགལ་བ་བསྒྲིག་པའི་ངལ་བ་བསྟེན་པ་ནི་དམ་པ་དག་གིས་མཆོག་ཏུ་སྙིང་བརྩེ་བའི་····
ཡུལ་ཁོ་ནའོ། [97] །གཞན་ཡང་ཞང་ཐང་སག་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྫོང་གྱི་དབུ་མ་པ་[98]མཁས་
འཆེས་པ་དག་གིས་ཀྱང་ལྟ་བའི་གཏད་ལ་ནོར་བ་མང་དུ་ཡོད་པ་རྣམས་ནི་རྗེ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱི་··
གསུང་རབ་རྒྱ་མཚོ་ལྟ་བུ་ལས་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །ཕྱག་རྒྱ་ཆེན་པོ་ཨ་མ་ན་སི་པ་དང་།
སེམས་ཕྱོགས་པར་ཁས་འཆེས་པ་མང་པོ་ཞིག་ནི་ཐབས་ཀྱི་ཆ་ལ་སྐུར་པ་འདེབས་པའི་··
རྒྱའི་མཁན་པོ་ཧྭ་ཤང་གི་རིང་ལུགས་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་ཡང་རྣམ་པ་ཀུན་ཏུ་ཐབས་
ཕྱོགས་ལ་སྐུར་པ་འདེབས་པ་དང་། སྒྲོད་ཕྱོགས་དགོས་ཀྱང་ལྟ་བ་འཚོལ་བའི་ཚེ་སོ་
སོར་རྟོག་པའི་དཔྱོད་པ་འདོར་བ་དང་། ཐོག་མར་འཚོལ་བའི་ཚེ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱིས་དཔྱོད་
དགོས་ཀྱང་དངོས་གཞི་སྒོམ་པའི་ཚེ་དཔྱོད་པ་འདོར་བ་སོགས་མང་དུ་སྣང་སྟེ། དེ་ཐམས་
ཅད་ཧྭ་ཤང་གི་ལུགས་ལས་མ་འདས་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་ནོ། །ལྟ་བ་ལོག་པ་འདི་དག་དང་
ཆེས་པས་སྔར་བཤད་པའི་ལུགས་དེ་དག་གི་ནང་ནའང་འདི་དག་ཅི་རིགས་པར་བསྲེས་བ་
བྱུང་སྣང་ངོ་། ། དེ་ལྟར་བདག་གིས་གངས་རིའི་ལྗོངས་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བའི་ཁྱད་པར་མདོ་ཙམ་

བརྗོད་པ་འདི་ནི་གཞན་ལས་ཁྱད་ཐོན་པར་འདོད་པ་དང༌། ཕྱོགས་ལྷུང་དང་གྲགས་
འདོད་ཀྱིས་ཀུན་ནས་བསླང་བ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། མཁས་པ་དང་མི་མཁས་པ་དུ་མས་སྐྱུར་
བར་བྱ་བའི་གནས་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་སྐྱུར་པ་དང་ལུགས་མི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མའི་ཐ་སྙད་ཐམས་…
ཅད་གཅིག་ཏུ་བསྲེས་པ་དག་གིས་དྲི་མ་མེད་པའི་གཞུང་དྲི་མ་དང་བཅས་པར་བྱེད་པ་རྣམས་
ལ་ཕན་པར་བསམ་པ་དང༌། ཁྱད་པར་དུ་རྗེ་བླ་མ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱིས་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་རྣམས་
ཀྱི་ལུགས་འཁྲུལ་པའི་དྲི་མ་མཐའ་དག་དང་བྲལ་བ་མ་འདྲེས་པར་ཕྱེ་བ་འདི་ལ་རིགས་…
པའི་ལམ་ནས་ངེས་པའི་དད་པ་བཙོས་མ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་ལྡན་པ་རྣམས་ལ་ཡིད་དགའ་བ་…
ཆེས་ཆེར་བསྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པ་དང༌། བག་ཆགས་བཟང་པོ་ཅན་རྣམས་ལ་དྲི་མ་མེད་ 99
པའི་ལམ་མཆོག་ཏུ་གྱུར་པ་ནི་རྗེ་རྒྱལ་བ་གཉིས་པའི་རིང་ལུགས་འདི་ཉིད་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་…
མཚོན་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཕྱིར་དུ་སྨྲས་པ་ལགས་སོ། །གཞན་དུ་ན་ལེགས་པར་བཤད་པའི་
གསེར་གྱི་ཞུན་མ་དང་ལོག་པར་བཤད་པའི་མཆིང་བུའི་གོང་བུ་གཉིས་མཉམ་པ་ཉིད་དུ་…
རྟོགས་པའི་ཆགས་བྲལ་གྱི་གོ་འཕང་མངོན་དུ་བྱས་པའི་འགྲོ་བ་འདི་དག་གི་ན་བར་ལུང་…
དང་རིགས་པའི་གདམས་ཟབ་མོ་རྒྱ་ཆེར་བཀྲིས་པ་ལ་བློ་གྲོས་དང་ལྡན་པའི་མཁས་པ་སུ་…
ཞིག་མཆོག་ཏུ་དགའ་བ་ཡོངས་སུ་འཛིན་ 100 པར་འགྱུར། དེ་ནི་འདི་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་སྟེ་རྩོམ་
ལན་ཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པར་རྒྱལ་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྤྱན་སྔར་རྒྱལ་བའི་དམ་ཆོས་འཛིན་པའི་སྨོན་ལམ་
གྱི་མཐུ་ཡོངས་སུ་གནས་པར་བྱས་པས་བསྟན་པའི་སྙིང་པོ་ཡོད་མེད་ཀྱི་མཐའ་ཐམས་ཅད་
དང་བྲལ་བ་ཟབ་མོ་དབུ་མའི་ལམ་ཉིད་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བ་འབྱུང་བའི་རིགས་ཚུལ་སེང་གེའི་…
ང་རོ་ཆེན་པོ་ཡོངས་སུ་སྒྲོགས་པར་མཛད་པས་དུས་ཀྱི་མཐར་ཡང་རྒྱལ་བའི་བསྟན་པ་…
སྲིན་དང་བྲལ་བས་ནོར་འཛིན་གྱི་ཁྲོན་མ་ལུས་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་འགེང་ 101 བར་བྱེད་ཟླ་བོ་ནི་རང་…
ཅག་རྣམས་ཀྱི་འདྲེན་པ་དམ་པ་མཚན་བརྗོད་པར་དཀའ་བ་རྗེ་བཙུན་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པ་…

བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པའི་དཔལ་ཞེས་སྟོན་པའི་བ་དན་འཛིག་རྟེན་གསུམ་དུ་རྣམ་པར་གཡོ་བ་དེ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ལ། ཇེ་བཙུན་དེ་ཉིད་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་གང་གི་ཇེས་སུ་འབྲངས་པ་ནི་མགོན་པོ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་གསུང་ལས་འདི་ལྟར་འབྱུང་སྟེ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་བླ་མེད་ཐེག་པའི་ཚུལ། །ཡོད་དང་མེད་པའི་མཐའ་སྤངས་ཏེ། །ཇི་བཞིན་འགྲེལ་བར་ལུང་བསྟན་པ། །ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་གཞུང་ལུགས་ཀུནྡའི་ཚལ། །དྲི་མེད་མཁྱེན་པའི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་རྒྱས། །གསུང་རབ་མཁའ་ལ་ཐོགས་མེད་རྒྱུ། །མཐར་འཛིན་སྙིང་གི་མུན་པ་སེལ། །ལོག་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུ་སྐར་ཟིལ་གནོན་པ། །དཔལ་ལྡན་ཟླ་བའི་ལེགས་བཤད་ཀྱི། །འོད་དཀར་འཕྲེང་བས་གསལ་བྱས་པ། །བླ་མའི་དྲིན་གྱིས་མཐོང་པའི་ཚེ། །བདག་གི་ཡིད་ནི་ངལ་གསོ་ཐོབ། །ཅེས་གསུངས་པ་ལྟར་དཔལ་མགོན་འཕགས་པ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་དང་དཔལ་ལྡན་ཟླ་བའི་ལུགས་སྲོལ་ཉིད་མཆོག་ཏུ་གཟིགས་ཤིང་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སྐལ་པ་དང་ལྡན་པ་རྣམས་ལ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་ལམ་གསལ་བར་མཛད་དོ། །དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་ན་རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོ་འདི་ཉིད་ལ་ཐུན་མོང་དང་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྣམ་པར་ཐར་པ་བསམ་གྱིས་མི་ཁྱབ་པ་ཞིག་མཆིས་ཀྱང་། དེ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་ནང་ནས་གཙོ་བོར་གྱུར་པ་ནི་རྒྱལ་བའི་མདོ་སྔགས་ཀྱི་གསུང་རབ་མཐའ་དག་གི་དགོངས་པའི་དོན་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཚུལ་ཇི་ལྟར་ཕྱེ་པ་རྣམས་སོ་སོར་མ་འདྲེས་པར་ལུང་དང་རིགས་པ་དྲི་མ་མེད་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་འཁྲུལ་པའི་ཆ་ཤས་ཕྲ་མོ་ཙམ་ཡང་མེད་པར་རང་གིས་ངེས་ཤིང་གཞན་དག་ལ་འདོམས་པར་མཛད་པས་ཐུབ་པའི་བསྟན་པ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ཡོངས་སུ་རྫོགས་པའི་བཀའ་དྲིན་གྱིས་ནོར་འཛིན་གྱི་ཁྱོན་ཁྱབ་པར་མཛད་པ་འདི་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བློ་གྲོས་དང་ལྡན་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །དེས་ན་རྗེ་བཙུན་འདི་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་འདུལ་བའི་ཞིག་ལེན་སྨྲ་མོ་ཡན་ཆད་ནས་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ་ཆེན་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་བར་དང་། སྔགས་ཀྱི་འང་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་གྱི་ཆོ་ག་དང་

ལག་ལེན་ཐ་མོ་ཡན་ཆད་ནས་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་པ་ཆེན་མོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་བར་མཐའ་དག་གང·····
ལའང་རྩང་སྟེ་བློ་ཆོས་དང་རང་བཟོ་འི་ཉིས་པས་ནམ་ཡང་མ་གོས་པར་རང་རང་གི་སྒྲོལ···
འབྱེད་པ་པོ་འི་[102]པཎ་གྲུབ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དགོངས་པ་ལ་གཏུགས་ཤིང་དེ་ཡང་རྒྱལ་བའི་བཀའ····
དང་ལེགས་པར་གཏུགས་ཏེ་གནད་ཐ་མོ་་རི་ལའང་ཞུང་རིགས་དུ་མས་དཔྱད་དེ་ངེས་པ···
སྟེར་བར་མཛད་པ་དང་། ཚུལ་དེས་བསྟན་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་འགལ་བ་མེད་པར་གཅིག་
གྲོགས་སུ་གཅིག་འགྱུར་བའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་གང་ཟག་གཅིག་འཚང་རྒྱ་བའི་ཆ་རྐྱེན་དུ་བསྒྲིག[103]
པར་མཛད་པས་བཤད་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྟན་པ་གཉིས་ཆར་འཛིན་ཅིང་སྤེལ་བར་མཛད་པའི་རྣམ་
པར་ཐར་པ་འདི་ལྟ་བུ་ནི་སྔོན་བྱོན་པའི་གངས་ཅན་གྱི་མཁས་གྲུབ་སུ་ལའང་མེད་པར་མ···
ཟད་རྒྱ་གར་འཕགས་པའི་ཡུལ་གྱི་འཕགས་པ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ལྷ་ཟླ་ལའང་འདི་བས་ལྷག་པ····
ཡོང་ཐབས་མེད་པར་རིགས་པའི་ཚུལ་དྲི་མ་མེད་པས་འགྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་
ཆེ་གེ་མོ་དང་ཆེ་གེ་མོ་ཞིག་གིས་ལུང་བསྟན་པའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་གཞན་གྱི་ལུང····
བསྟན་ཙམ་ལ་སྐབས་འཆད་པའི་རྣམ་པར་ཐར་པ་དང་འདྲ་བའི་གོ་སྐབས་ག་ལ་ཡོད།
ཡི་དམ་གྱི་ལྷ་དུ་མའི་ཞལ་གཟིགས་པ་དང་། ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན་དང་མངོན་པར་ཤེས་པ་
དུ་མ་བརྙེས་པ་སོགས་ལས་ཀྱང་བཤད་མ་ཐག་པའི་རྣམ་པར་ཐར་པ་ཉིད་གཙོ་བོ་ཡིན་ནོ།།
རྗེ་བླ་མ་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས། དང་པོར་རྒྱ་ཆེན་ཐོས་པ་མང་དུ་བཙལ། །བར་དུ་གཞུང
ལུགས་ཐམས་ཅད་གདམས་པར་ཤར། ཐ་མར་ཉིན་མཚན་ཀུན་དུ་ཉམས་སུ་བླངས། །
ཀུན་ཀྱང་བསྟན་པ་རྒྱས་པའི་ཆེད་དུ་བསྔོས། །ཞེས་ཇོག་མ་ཁོ་ནར་རྒྱལ་བའི་བཀའ་
དང་དེའི་དགོངས་པ་འགྲེལ་པའི་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་རྣམས་[104]ཀྱི་གཞུང་ལུགས་མཐའ་དག་ལ·····
འོལ་སྤྱི་ཙམ་དང་ཕྱོགས་རེ་ཙམ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཞིབ་ཏུ་ཐོས་པ་རྒྱ་ཆེན་པོ་བཙལ་བའི་ཚུལ····
དང་། དེ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་འདུལ་བ་ཀ་རི་ཀ་ནས་དཔལ་ལྡན་འདུས་པའི་བར་གྱི་མདོ་

དང་བསྟན་བཅོས་མཐའ་དག་གང་ཟག་གཅིག་འཚང་རྒྱ་བའི་ལམ་གྱི་གཙོ་བོ་དང་ཡན་ལག་
ཅི་རིགས་པར་འདུ་བའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་གཞུང་ལུགས་ཐམས་ཅད་གདམས་པར་ཤར་བ་དང་།
དེ་ལྟར་ཤར་བའི་ལམ་གྱི་ལུས་ཡོངས་སུ་རྫོགས་པ་ལ་དུས་རྟག་ཏུ་སློབ་པ་སྦྱར་ལེན་པའི་...
ཚུལ་གྱིས་ཐུགས་ཉམས་སུ་བཞེས་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་ལམ་གྱི་གནད་ལ་རིགས་པ་དྲི་མ་མེད་...
པའི་སྒོ་ནས་ཀྱིང་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་ངེས་པ་དྲངས་པས་མི་འཕྲུགས་པའི་གཟེར་ཐེབས་པའི......
105
འབྲས་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་པ་ནི་བསྟན་པ་རྣམས་ཅད་འགལ་མེད་དུ་འཆར་ཞེས་པའི་མཛད་..
པ་སྟེ་དང་། ཁྱད་པར་དུ་ཟབ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མདོ་སྔགས་ཀྱི་གསུང་རབ་འདི་དག་ཡིན་ཏེ།
འདི་དག་ལ་ཅི་ཙམ་བརྟགས་ཀྱང་མ་འཛེམ་པ་དང་རྨོངས་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་ཚད་ཐུབ་ཀྱི་..
གཞུང་ལས་བློ་རོལ་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཀླན་ཀ་འཇུག་པའི་གནས་རྡུལ་ཙམ་ཡང་མེད་པར་མངོན་
སུམ་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར། གཞུང་ལུགས་མང་ཐོས་རིགས་པའི་
106
ལམ་དུའང་། །ངལ་བ་མང་བརྟེན་མངོན་པར་རྟོགས་པ་ཡི། །ཡོན་ཏན་ཚོགས་..
ཀྱིས་མི་དམན་དུ་མས་ཀྱང་། །འབད་ཀྱང་རྟོགས་པར་མ་གྱུར་གནས་དེ་ནི། །འཇམ་
མགོན་བླ་མའི་དྲིན་གྱིས་ལེགས་མཐོང་ནས། །ཤིན་ཏུ་བཅེ་བའི་བསམས་པས་བདག
གིས་བཤད། །ཅེས་གསུངས་པ་ནི་རང་བཞིན་བརྗོད་པ་ཁོ་ནའོ། །གསུམ་པ་མཚན་
ཉིད་ནི། ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་དོན་དམ་པར་གྲུབ་པའི་ཡོད་མཐའ་དང་། ཐ་སྙད་
དུ་ཡང་མེད་པའི་ཆད་མཐའ་ལེགས་པར་འགོག ཅིང་བདེན་མེད་དུ་གྲུབ་པར་ཞལ་གྱིས…
བཞེས་པའི་རང་སྡེ་ནི་དབུ་མ་པའོ། །དེ་ལ་ཡང་མཐའ་ནི། ཙ་ཤེས་ལས། ཡོད་
ཅེས་བྱ་བ་རྟག་པར་འཛིན། །མེད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ཆད་པར་ལྟ། །དེ་ཕྱིར་ཡོད་དང་མེད་
པ་ལ། །མཁས་པས་གནས་པར་མི་བྱའོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ལྟར་ཡོད་མཐའ་དང་
མེད་མཐའ་གཉིས་ཡོད་ལ། ཡོད་མཐའ་དང་རྟག་མཐའ་དང་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་ཀྱི་མཐའ་

ང

དོན་གཅིག་ཅིང་། མེད་མཐའ་དང་ཆད་མཐའ་དང་སྐུར་འདེབས་ཀྱི་མཐའ་རྣམས་དོན་གཅིག་གོ །མཐའ་དང་མཐར་འཛིན་མི་གཅིག་སྟེ། །མཐའ་ལ་མེད་པ་ཞིག་དགོས་ལ་མཐར་འཛིན་ནི་ཡོད་པ་ཞིག་དགོས་སོ། །དེ་ལ་གཞན་སྡེ་རྣམས་གང་ཟག[107]་དང་ཆོས་གང་ལ་ཡང་རྒྱུ་དང་རྐྱེན་ལ་བརྟེན[108]་ནས་འབྱུང་བའི་རྐྱེན་ཉིད་འདི་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་རྟེན་འབྲེལ་ནས་ཡང་ཁས་མི་ལེན་ཅིང་དེ་དག་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་འདོད་པ་ནི་རྟག་ཆད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བའི་གཡང་དུ་ལྷུང་བར་རང་སྡེ་མཐའ་དག་གིས་འདོད་དོ། །རང་སྡེ་ཉན་ཐོས་སྡེ་གཉིས་ནི་རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་ལ་བརྟེན[109]་ནས་འབྱུང་བའི་འདུས་བྱས་ཀྱི་རྟེན་འབྲེལ་ཁས་ལེན་ཅིང་དེས་རྟག་ཆད་ཀྱི་མཐའ་སྤོང་བར་འདོད་དེ། བྱེད་པ་པོ་རང་བཞིན་མི་འགྱུར་བ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རྟག་པའི་མཐའ་འགོག་ཅིང་རྒྱུ་འབྲས་དང་བདེན་བཞི་ལ་སོགས་པ་གདན་མི་འཐད་པར་འདོད་པའི་ཆད་པའི་མཐའ་འགོག་པའོ། །རྣམ་པར་རིག་པ་ཙམ་དུ་སྨྲ་བས་གཟུང་འཛིན་གཉིས་སུ་མེད་པའི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་གདན་ལ་ཕབ་ནས་ཀུན་བརྟགས[110]་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པ་ལ······སོགས་པ་རྟག་པའི་མཐའ་སྤོང་ཞིང་། ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་གཞན་གཉིས་ཡེ་མེད་དུ་འདོད་པའི་ཆད་མཐའ་སྤོང་བར་འདོད་དེ་གོང་དུ་བཤད་ཟིན་ཏོ། །མཁས་པ་དབུ་མ་པ་རྣམས་ནི། རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་པར་འབྱུང་བའི་དོན་ཉིད་བདེན་པས་སྟོང་པའི་དོན་ཅན་དུ་བཞེད་ཅིང་··བདེན་པས་སྟོངས་པའི་དོན་ཡང་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་པར་འབྱུང་བའི་དོན་ཅན་ཉིད་ཡིན་གྱི། དོན་བྱེད་པའི་ནུས་པས་སྟོང་པའི་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པའི་དོན་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བཞེད་པས····མཐའ་གཉིས་འགོག་པ་ལ་རྒྱུ་མཚན་སོ་སོ་བ་གཉིས་མི་དགོས་ཤིང་གང་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི····རང་བཞིན་བཀག་པའི་གཞི་དེ་ཉིད་ལ་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་འཐད་པས་རྟེན་ཅིང····འབྲེལ་པར་འབྱུང[111]་བའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་རྟག་ཆད་ཀྱི་མཐའ་གཉིས་ཀ་འགོག་པར···མཛད་དོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་རང་སྡེ་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་མན་ཆད་ཀྱིས་དངོས་པོ་ལ་བདེན་པའི་

རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་པར་འདོད་པས་ན་དངོས་པོ་དེ་དག་པར་མི་སླ་ཡང་དག་ལྟར་འགྱུར་ལ།
དུས་ཐ་མར་བདེན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ཞིག་དུས་གཉིས་པར་ཞིག་པར་འདོད་ན་དེའི་རྒྱུན་ཆད་པར་
ཁས་མི་ལེན་ཀྱང་ཆད་ལྟར་འགྱུར[112] བས་དངོས་པོ་ལ་བདེན་པའི་རང་བཞིན་འདོད་ཕྱིན་ཆད་
རྟག་ཆད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་ལས་མི་འདའོ། །ཇི་སྲིད་པར་དུ་ནམ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པ་པ་དག་གཞན་དབང་
སེམས་བྱུང་ཙམ་ཞིག་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པས་མེད་ལྟ་སྤོང་ཞིང་། གཞན་དབང་ལ་ཀུན་
[113] བརྟགས་པ་མེད་པས་རྟག་ལྟ་སྤོང་བར་འདོད་པ་ནི་ཕྱི་རོལ་ལ་བཟློས་པའི་གཟུང་འཛིན་····
ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ལ་སྐུར་པ་བཏབ་ཅིང་གཞན་དབང་བདེན་པར་མེད་པ་ལ་སྒྲོ་བཏགས[114]······
བས་རྟག་ཆད་གཉིས་ཀའི་མཐར་ལྟུང་བས་དབུ་མ་པའི་ལྟ་བ་ཁོ་ན་ལ་ཡོད་མེད་ཀྱི་མཐར་··
མ་ལྟུང་བ་དང་རྟག་ཆད་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་དང་བྲལ་བ་ཡོད་ཀྱི་གཞན་ལ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཚུལ་དེ་
ནི་དཔལ་ལྡན་ཟླ་བའི་ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། གང་ཞིག་གཞན་དབང་སེམས་དང་སེམས་
ལས་བྱུང་བ་དངོས་པོ་ཙམ་ཁས་བླངས་ནས་དེ་ལ་ཀུན་དུ་བརྟགས་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་····
པས་ཡོད་པར་ལྟ་བ་ཉིད་སྤོང་ཞིང་། གཞན་གྱི་དབང་གི་དངོས་པོ་ཀུན་ནས་ཉོན་མོངས་
པ་དང་རྣམ་པར་བྱང་བའི་རྒྱུར་གྱུར་པ་ཙམ་ཞིག་ཡོད་པས་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་ཉིད་སྤོང་བར་··
འགྱུར་བ་དེའི་ལྟར་ན་ཀུན་དུ་བརྟགས་པ་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། གཞན་
[115] གྱི་དབང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དང་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ལྟ་བ་གཉིས་ཀར་ཡང་འགྱུར་བས་
མཐའ་གཉིས་སྤོང་བར་གལ་འགྱུར། ཞེས་དང་། དེའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལྟར་དབུ་མ་པའི་
ལྟ་བ་ཁོ[116] ན་ཡོད་པ་དང་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ལྟ་བར་ཐལ་བ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པར་ ···
སྨྲ་བའི་ལྟ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དག་ལ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་
སོ། །མགོན་པོ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱིས། གང་ཟག་ཕུང་པོར་སྨྲ་བ་ཡི། །འཇིག་རྟེན་གྲངས་
ཅན་འུག་ཕྲུག་དང་། གོས་མེད་བཅས་ལ་གལ་དེ་ཞིག །ཡོད་མེད་འདས་པ་སྨྲ་

ང

ན་དྲིས། །དེ་ཕྱིར་སངས་རྒྱས་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ནི། །བསྟན་པ་འཆི་མེད་ཡོད་མེད་ལས། །
འདས་པ་ཟབ་མོ་ཞེས་བསྟན་པ། །ཆོས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པ་ཡིན་ཞེས་གྲིས། །ཞེས་གསུངས་
སོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་རྟག་ཆད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་དང་བྲལ་བར་འདོད་ན་[117] གང་ཟག་དང་ཆོས་རྣམས་བརྟེན་
ནས་འབྱུང་བ་ཙྪ་ཀྵ་བཞིན་དུ་བདེན་པས་སྟོང་པའི་དོན་ཅན་དུ་ཁས་བླངས་པར་བྱའོ་.....
ཞེས་བཞེད་དེ། རིགས་པ་དྲུག་ཅུ་པ་ལས། གང་དག་བརྟེན་ནས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས།།
ཙྪ་ཡི་ཟླ་བ་ལྟ་བུར་ནི[118] །ཡང་དག་མ་ཡིན་ལོག་མིན་པར། །འདོད་པ་དེ་དག་ལྟས་
མི་འཕྲོགས། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །འོ་ན་ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལས། ཡོད་དང་
མེད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་གཉིས་ཀ་མཐའ[119] །གཙང་དང་མི་གཙང་དེ་ཡང་མཐའ་ཡིན་ཏེ། །དེ་
ཕྱིར་གཉིས་ཀའི་མཐའ་ནི་རྣམ་སྤངས་ནས། །མཁས་པས་དབུས་ལའང་གནས་པར་
ཡོངས་མི་བྱེད། ཅེས་དང་། རྫི་བརྩོན་གྲུམས་པས། ཚུ་རོལ་པ་རོལ་མཐའ་ལ་
མིན[120] །དེ་དག་བར་ནའང་མི་གནས་པ། །དུས་རྣམས་མཉམ་པ་ཉིད་ཤེས་ཕྱིར། །
ཤེས་རབ་ཕ་རོལ་ཕྱིན་པར་འདོད། ཅེས་མཐའ་གཉིས་སྤངས་ངའི་དབུས་ལའང་གནས་
པ་བཀག་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནམ་སྙམ་དུ་དོགས་ན། ལོག་པར་རྟོག་པ་འདིའི་དབང་གིས་དབུ་
མ་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་ཁས་ལེན་མེད་པ་སོགས་ནོར་བར་སྨྲ་བ་མང་དུ[121] བྱུང་བ་ཡིན་པས་བརྗོད་
པར་བྱ་སྟེ། ལུང་དེ་དག་གིས་ནི་དངོས་པོར་སྨྲ་བ་རྣམས་ལྟར་མཐའ་ཉི་ཚེ་བ་ཞིག་
བཀག་ནས་དེ་དང་བྲལ་བའི་དབུས་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་ནས་མི་གནས་ཞེས་སྟོན་པ་ཡིན་གྱི།
མཐའ་དང་བྲལ་བའི་དབུས་མེད་པར་སྟོན་པ་ག་ལ་ཡིན། རྣམ་བཤད་རིགས་པ་ལས།
མཐའ་ནི་ཟད་དང་མཇུག་ཆ་དང་། །ཉེ་དང་ཕྱོགས་དང་སྨད་པ་ལའོ[122] །ཞེས་གསུངས་
པ་ལྟར་དོན་མང་པོ་ཞིག་ལ་འཇུག་ཀྱང་སྐབས་འདིར་མཐའ་ནི། སློབ་དཔོན་ཀ་མ་ལ་
ཤཱི་ལས། །གལ་ཏེ་དབུ་མ་ལ་སེམས་ཀྱི་རང་གི་ངོ་བོའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དངོས་པོ་དོན

དམ་པ་པ་ཅི་ཡང་ཚང་བ་ཞིག་ཡོད་པར་གྱུར་ན་ནི་དེའི་ཚེ་དེ་ལ་དེ་ཡོད་པས་རྟག་གོ་ཞེ····
འམ་མི་རྟག་གོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་མངོན་པར་ཞེན་པ་ཡང་ཇི་ལྟར་མཐར་འགྱུར་ཏེ་དངོས་པོ་འདི·· 123
དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་གྱི་རྗེས་སུ་སོང་ཞིང་ཚུལ་བཞིན་ཡིད་ལ་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་ལྟུང······
བའི་གནས་སོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །
དེས་ན་འདིའི་མཐའ་ནི་ལྟུང་བའི་གནས་ཡིན་ཏེ། འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་ཐག་གཡང་ལ་མཐའ་
དང་། དེ་ལ་ལྷུང་བ་ལ་མཐའ་ལ་ལྷུང་ཞེས་སྒྲ་བ་བཞིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལ་ཡང་དག་པར་
ཡོད་པ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡང་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཡང་དག་པར་མེད་པ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡོད་དགོས་ལ།
དེའི་ཕྱིར་དོན་དམ་པར་མེད་ཅེས་པ་མེད་པའི་མཐར་འཛིན་པ་མ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ལྟར་མ་
ཡིན་ཞེས་འགོག་པ་ཡང་མེད་མཐའ་འགོག་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོད། དགག་བྱ་བཀག་པའི་
མེད་པ་ཡང་དག་པར་ཡོད་དོ་ཞེས་འཛིན་ན་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པའི་མཐར་ལྟུང་བས་དེ་འགོག
པ་ཡང་མེད་མཐའ་འགོག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ནི་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་ཀྱི་མེད་མཐའ་ཡིན་
ལ་ལས་འབྲས་སོགས་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་མེད་པ་སྐུར་འདེབས་ཀྱི་མེད་མཐའ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཆོས་
རྣམས་དོན་དམ་པར་འཛིན་པའི་ཡུལ་ཡུལ་ཅན་ནི་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་ཀྱི་མཐའ་དང་དེའི་མཐར···
འཛིན་ཡིན་ནོ། །རང་ཉིད་དབུ་མ་པར་ཁས་འཆེས་པ་ལ་འདི་དག་ཤེས་དགོས་པས་
ཅུང་ཟད་བཤད་ལ་ཞིབ་པར་རྗེ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པའི་གསུང་ལས་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །
དེས་ན་བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་དབུ་མའི་ལམ་ཟབ་མོ་འདི་ཞིག་རྟོགས་པར་མི་ནུས་པའི···
གདུལ་བྱ་རྣམས་དྲང་བར་བྱ་བའི་ཕྱིར་དུ། ལ་ལར་ གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་ཡོད་པར་བསྟན་
པ་དང་། འགའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་ནི་མེད་ཀྱི་གཟུང་འཛིན་གཉིས་ཡོད་པ་
ལས་བརྩམས་ནས་བསྟན་པ་དང་། ཐེག་ཆེན་གྱི་རིགས་ཅན་འགའ་ཞིག་ལ་གཟུང་
འཛིན་གཉིས་མེད་ཀྱི་གཉིས་སྟོང་ཡོད་པར་གསུངས་ལ། དབང་པོ་སྨིན་པའི་བློ་རབ་

དུ་གྱུར་པ་ལ་ནི་མཐའ་གཉིས་སྤངས་པའི་དབུ་མའི་ལམ་སྟོང་ཉིད་སྙིང་རྗེའི་སྙིང་པོ་ཅན་··
སྟོན་པར་མཛད་དེ། རིན་ཆེན་འཕྲེང་བ་ལས། བདའ་སྤྱོད་པ་དག་ཇི་ལྟ་བུར།
ཞེས་སོགས་དང་། འཕགས་པ་ཀླུས། ཡོད་དང་མེད་དང་ཡོད་མེད་དང་། །
གཉིས་ཀ་མིན་ཞེས་ཀྱང་བསྟན་ཏེ། །ནད་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི། །སྨོན་ཞེས་
བྱ་བར་འགྱུར་མིན་ནམ ཞེས་དང་། བསོད་ནམས་མིན་པ་དང་པོར་བཟློག། བར་
དུ་བདག་ནི་བཟློག་པ་དང་། །ཕ་མར་ལྟ་ཞིག་ཀུན་བཟློག་པ། །གང་གིས་ཤེས་
དེ་མཁས་པ་ཡིན། ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེས་ན་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་འདུས་
བྱས་དང་འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་རྡུལ་ཙམ་
ཡང་མེད་པ་དང་། དེ་ཉིད་ལ་བསྐྱེད་བྱ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དང་དགག་སྒྲུབ་སོགས་འཁོར་འདས་
ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཐམས་ཅད་ཁས་བླངས་པས་ཆོག་པ་གཉིས་ཚོགས་ཤིག[124]་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་དེ།
བོད་ཀྱི་ལུགས་མང་པོ་དག་གི་ལྟ་བ་རྣམས་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་མིན་དཔྱོད་པར་འདོད་ན···
འདི་ཉིད་ཁོ་ནའི་སྒོ་ནས་དཔྱད[125]་པར་བྱའོ། །ཚུལ་འདི་ནི་འཕགས་ཡུལ་གྱི་དབུ་མ་ཐལ་
རང་གཉིས་ཀའི་ཀ་ར་ཚུགས་པའི་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འཕགས་པ་ཀླུས། རྟེན་
ཅིང་འབྲེལ་པར་འགྱུར[126]་བ་གང་། །དེ་ནི་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་དུ་བཤད། །དེ་ནི་བརྟེན་ནས་
གདམས[127]་པ་སྟེ། །དེ་ཉིད་དབུ་མའི་ལམ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གང་ཕྱིར་རྟེན་འབྱུང་མ་ཡིན་
པའི། །ཆོས་འགའ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ། །དེ་ཕྱིར་སྟོང་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི། །ཆོས་
འགའ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ན[128]། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །བྲ་སྐད་དུ་རང་མཚན་ཞལ་གྱིས་
བཞེས་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ[129]་པ་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་ཞལ་གྱིས··
མི་བཞེས་པས་སྔར་བཤད་པའི་རྟེན་འབྱུང་དང་སྟོང་ཉིད་དོན་གཅིག་པ་ནི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ལྟར····
འཆད་དེ། ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲོན[130]་མེ་ལས། རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་པར་འབྱུང་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟོང་

པ་ཉིད་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་བདེན་ནས་གདམས་པ་སྟེ། འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་དང་འཇིག་རྟེན་
ལས་འདས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་འདོད་པས་ཏེ་པར་ལེན་པ་དག་ལ་བདེན་ནས་གདམས་[131]་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།།
དེ་ཉིད་དབུ་མའི་ལམ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དབུ་མ་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་ཡོད་པ་དང་མེད་
པའི་མཐའ་གཉིས་སྤངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེ་ལྟར་གཞིའི་ལྟ་བ་
གདན་ལ་འབེབས་ཚུལ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་འདི་ལ་ངེས་པ་རྙེད་ན་ལམ་གྱི་གནས་སྐབས་སུ་
ཐབས་ཤེས་ཡ་མ་བྲལ་བའི་གནད་ནི་འཁྲུགས་[133]་པ་བའི་ཐུག་ཏུ་འོང་ཞིང་། དེས་ན་
འབྲས་བུ་སྐུ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་རྒྱུད་ལ་བསྐྱེད་ནུས་པས་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་འདི་
ནི་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་གཞི་ལམ་འབྲས་བུའི་གནས་སྐབས་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་ཤིན་ཏུ་གལ་ཆེ་བ་
ལ་ངེས་པ་བཙལ་དགོས་སོ། །ད་ནི་འདི་དཔྱད་པར་བྱ་སྟེ། ཅི་དབུ་མ་པར་འཇོག་
པ་ལ་རང་གི་ལྟ་བ་དེ་ཉིད་མཐའ་ཐམས་ཅད་དང་བྲལ་བའི་རྟེན་འབྱུང་ཟབ་མོའི་དོན་རྟོགས་
པ་ཞིག་དགོས་ན་ཉི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་དབུ་མ་པར་མི་རུང་སྟེ། རང་རྒྱུད་པས་ཆོས་
དང་གང་ཟག་གི་བཏགས་དོན་རིགས་པས་བཙལ་ནས་གདམས་གཞི་[134]་ཁྱད་པར་པ་རེ་རེ་དང་
དེར་འཇོག་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་མཐའ་ཕྲ་མོ་མ་ཁེགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཅི་སྟེ་
དངོས་པོ་ལ་མཐའ་ཐམས་ཅད་བཀག་པ་མིན་ཀྱང་རང་ངོར་མཐའ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཁེགས་པའི་
དབུ་མ་པར་འདོད་པས་དབུ་མ་པར་འཇོག་ན་དངོས་སྨྲ་བ་ཡང་དབུ་མ་པར་ཐལ་ལོ།
དེས་མཐའ་གཉིས་བཀག་པའི་བློ་ནས་རང་གི་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལམ་དུ་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།།
ཞེས་ཟེར་ན། བཤད་པར་བྱ་སྟེ། ཕྱིར་ཆོས་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་མི་གནས་ཀྱང་བློ་མཐའི་
དབང་གིས་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་པའི་སྟོང་ཚུལ་ཞིག་ཆོས་དེ་དང་དེའི་གནས་ལུགས་སུ་འཇོག་
པ་ནི་བློས་བཟུང་གི་སྟོང་པ་ཡིན་པས་དབུ་མའི་དོན་མེད་ལ། ཆོས་དེ་དགག་བྱ་དེས་
སྟོང་པར་གདན་ལ་ཕབ་པ་ལྟར་ཆོས་དེ་གནས་ཀྱང་སྟོང་ཚུལ་དེས་ཆོས་ཅན་དངོས་པོ……

ང

མཐའ་དག་ལ་ཁྱབ་པ་མིན་པ་ནི་ཉི་ཚེ་བའི་སྟོང་པ་ཡིན་པས་ཆོས་དབྱིངས་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་དུ་མི་རུང་ངོ་། །དེ་ལ་དངོས་པོར་སྨྲ་བའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་རང་འཛིན་ཞེས་པ་ལས་རྒྱང་ཆད་དུ་གྲུབ་པས་སྟོང་པའམ་རང་འཛིན་པའི་རྟོག་པའི་ཞེན་གཞིར་གནས་ཚོད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པས་སྟོང་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ནི་སྟོང་ཚུལ་དེས་ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་མཐའ་དག་ལ་ཁྱབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་། རྒྱུ་མཚན་དེས་ན། སྟོང་ཚུལ་དེས་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་སྟོང་གི་དོན[135] འབྱུང་དང་། སྟོང་པ་དོན་གཅིག་ཏུ་རྟོགས་པར་མི་ནུས་ཤིང་སྟོང་ཚུལ་དེ་ནི་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཁྱབ་པའི་སྟོང་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་མཐའ་གཉིས་འགོག་ཚུལ་དང་སྣང་སྟོང་གྲོགས་སུ་འགྱུར་ཚུལ་ལེགས་པར་འཛོག་མི་ཤེས་སོ། །དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་རང་མཚན་བཀག་ན་གཞི་དེ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡོད་པར་འཛོག་མ་ནུས་པས་རང་མཚན་ཁས་བླངས་ཀྱང་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་བློ་གནོད་དེ་མེད་ལ་ན[136] ལྟོས་བའི་སྤྱོད་ལུགས་ཀྱི་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་མི་བཞེད་ཅིང་རིགས་པའི་རྣམ་གྲངས་དུ་མས་འགོག་པར་མཛད་དོ། །དེ་ལྟར་བཀག་པའི་སྟོང་ཚུལ་དེ་ནི་དོན་ལ་མི་གནས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པས་བློས་བྱས་ཀྱང་མ་ཡིན[137] ཞིང་། འདུས་བྱས་དང་འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་དངོས་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཁྱབ་པས་ཉི་ཚེ་བའི་སྟོང་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལྟར་བཀག་པའི་སྟོང་ཚུལ་དེ་ཉིད་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་འབྱུང་བ་དང་། དོན་གཅིག་ཏུ་ཡང་རྟོགས་པར་ནུས་པས་[illegible]མས་ཅད་ཀྱི་སྟེང་དུ་མཐའ་གཉིས་སྤོང་ཚུལ་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་ལས་ཆེས་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཕྲའོ། །དེས་ན་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་རྣམས་ལ་དབུ་མ་པ་ཞེས་བརྗོད་དུ་རུང་ཞིང་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་ལ་དབུ་མ་པའི་སྒྲ་འཇུག་ཏུ་མེད་དོ། །རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་མཁས་པ་དེ་དག་ཀྱང་ཆོས་བདེན་པར་ཡོད་པའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་རིགས་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་འགོག་ཅིང་བདེན་མེད་དུ་ལེགས་པར་ཞལ་གྱིས་བཞེས་པས་དབུ་མ་པ་ནི་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་དོན་

ནི་དེ་སྐད་དུ་ཞེས་པར་བྱའོ། །སྤྱན་རས་གཟིགས་བརྟུལ་ཞུགས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་། ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་ནང་གི་རྟེན་འབྲེལ་སྒྱུ་མ་ཙམ་དུ་བྱ་བ་བྱེད་ནུས་སུ་ཡོད་ཅིང་དོན་དམ་པར་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པར་ཞེས་པ་ནི་འཕགས་པ་ཡབ་སྲས་དང་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་དང་སངས་རྒྱས…བསྐྱངས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དབུ་མའི་ལམ་སྨྲ་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རོལ་དུ་ཕྱིན་པའི…ཚུལ་བསྟན་པའོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །འོན་ཀྱང་བརྟེན་ནས་འབྱུང་བའི་དོན་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཕྲ་བ་རྟོགས་པ་ནི་དབུ་མ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་པ་ཁོ་ནའོ། །བཞི་པ་གྲུབ་མཐའི་འདོད་ཚུལ་ལ་གཉིས། ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱིས་མདོ་འདི་དྲང་ངེས་ཕྱེ་ཚུལ་[138] དང་། གྲུབ་མཐའི་འདོད་ཚུལ་བཤད་པ་དངོས་སོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་གཉིས། མདོ་ནས་ཇི་ལྟར་གསུངས་པ་དགོད་པ་དང་། དེའི་དོན་བཤད་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། མགོན་པོ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱིས་མདོ་གང་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་གསུང་རབ་ཀྱི་དྲང་ངེས་ཕྱེ་བའི་[139] མདོ་འི་ཁུངས་དངོས་སུ་སྨོས་པ་འཕགས་པ་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རིགས་ཚོགས་དང་མདོ་བཏུས་སོགས་སུ་མ་བྱུང་ཡང་མདོ་དེ…དོན་བཤད་ཚུལ་ལས་དོན་གྱིས་བཤད་པ་ཡོད་ལ། དཔལ་ལྡན་ཟླ་བས་ཚིག་གསལ་[140] ལས་བློ་གྲོས་མི་ཟད་པས་བསྟན་པའི་མདོ་དྲངས་ནས་བསྒྲུབས་ཤིང་། སྤྱན་རས་གཟིགས་བརྟུལ་[141] ཞུགས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲོན་མེའི་[142] འགྲེལ་བཤད་དུ་དེ་ལྟར་བཤད་ལ། སློབ་དཔོན་ཀ་མ་ལ་ཤཱི་ལས་དབུ་མ་སྣང་བར་ཡང་མདོ་དེ་ཉིད་དྲང་[143] ངེས་འབྱེད་པའི་ཁུངས་སུ་མཛད་དོ། །དེས་ན་བློ་གྲོས་མི་ཟད་པའི་མདོ་ཉིད་དྲང་ངེས་འབྱེད་པའི་ཁུངས་ཡིན་ལ་དེ་ལས་གསུངས་ཚུལ་ནི་མདོ་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། ངེས་པའི་དོན་གྱི་མདོ་སྡེ་ནི་གང་། དྲང་བའི་དོན་གྱི་མདོ་སྡེ་ནི་གང་ཞེ་ན། མདོ་སྡེ་གང་དག་ཀུན་རྫོབ་སྒྲུབ་པ་[144] བསྟན་པ་དེ་དག་ནི་དྲང་བའི་དོན་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །མདོ་སྡེ་གང་དག་དོན་དམ་པ་སྒྲུབ་པ་[145] བསྟན་པ་དེ་དག་ནི་ངེས་པའི་དོན་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །མདོ་སྡེ་གང་དག་ཚིག་དང་ཡི་གེ་སྣ་ཚོགས་པ་

ང

བསྟན་པ་དེ་དག་ནི་དྲང་བའི་དོན་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །མདོ་སྡེ་གང་དག་ཟབ་མོ་བལྟ་དཀའ་བ་རྟོགས་པར་དཀའ་བ་བསྟན་པ་དེ་དག་ནི་ངེས་པའི་དོན་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །མདོ་སྡེ་གང་དག་བདག་དང་སེམས་ཅན་དང་སྲོག་དང་གསོ་བ་དང་སྐྱེས་བུ་དང་གང་ཟག་དང་ཤེད་ལས་སྐྱེས་དང་ཤེད་བུ་དང་བྱེད་པ་པོ་དང་ཚོར་བ་པོ་སྐད་སྣ་ཚོགས་ཀྱིས་བཤད་པར་བྱ་བ······ བདག་པོ་མེད་པ་ལ་བདག་པོ་ལྟ་བུར་བསྟན་པ་དེ་དག་ནི་དྲང་བའི་དོན་ཞེས་བྱའོ། ། །མདོ་སྡེ་གང་དག་དངོས་པོ་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་དང་མཚན་མ་མེད་པ་དང་སྨོན་པ་མེད་པ་དང····· མངོན་པར་འདུ་བྱེད་པ་མེད་པ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་སེམས་ཅན་མེད་པ··· དང་སྲོག་མེད་པ་དང་གང་ཟག་མེད་པ་དང་བདག་པོ་མེད་པ་རྣམ་པར་ཐར་པའི་སྒོ་སྟོན··· པ་དེ་དག་ནི་ངེས་པའི་དོན་ཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ། འདི་ནི་ངེས་པའི་དོན་གྱི་མདོ་སྡེ་ལ་རྟོན་གྱི་དྲང་བའི་དོན་གྱི་མདོ་སྡེ་ལ་མི་རྟོན་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའོ། གཉིས་པ་སློབ་དཔོན་གྱིས་དྲང་ངེས་འབྱེད་པའི་དགོས་པ་ནི། བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པ་དང་མེད་པ་དང་བདེན་པ་དང་རྫུན་པ་སོགས་རྣམ་གྲངས་དུ་མའི་སྒོ་ནས་ཆོས་བསྟན་པ······ ལས་གང་ཞིག་ནི་བདེན་པའི་དོན་ཅན་ཡིན། གང་ཞིག་ནི་རྫུན་པའི་དོན་ཅན་ཡིན་ཞེས་ཐེ་ཚོམ་དུ་གྱུར་པ་རྣམས་དང་། ཡང་གང་དག་རང་ཉིད་བློ་གྲོས་དམན་པས་དྲང་བའི་དོན་ལ་ངེས་པའི་དོན་ཅན་དུ་འཁྲུལ་པ་དང་། དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ངེས་པའི་དོན་ལ་ཡང་ཤེས་སུ་འཁྲུལ་པའི་ལོག་པར་རྟོག་པ་ཅན་རྣམས་ལ་དྲང་ངེས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་གསལ་བར་བྱེ[146]··· ནས་དེ་དག་གི་དོན་མཛད་པར་དགོངས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དཔལ་ལྡན་ཟླ་བས། འདིར་དེ་ཁོ་ནའི་དོན་ཅན་གྱི་བསྟན་པ་ནི་གང་ཞིག་ཡིན། དགོངས་པ་ཅན་ནི་འདིར་གང་ཞིག་ཡིན་སྙམ་དུ་གང་ཞིག་ཐེ་ཚོམ་དུ་གྱུར་པ་དང་ གང་ཞིག་བློ་ཞན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དྲང་བའི་དོན་གྱི་བསྟན་པ་ལ་ངེས་པའི་དོན་དུ་[147]རྟོག་པ་དེ་གཉིས་ཀའི་ཐེ་ཚོམ་དང་། ལོག་པའི·

༡ང

ཤེས་པ་དག་རིགས་པ་དང་ལུང་གཉིས་ཀྱི་སྒོ་ནས་བསལ་བར་བྱ་བའི་ཕྱིར་སློབ་དཔོན་གྱི་འདི་བཅམས་སོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། [148] །དྲང་ངེས་ཇི་ལྟར་ཕྱེ་ཚུལ་ནི། ངེས་པའི་དོན་གྱི་མདོ་སྡེ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དོན་ཇི་ལྟར་གནས་པ་ལས་རྣམ་པ་གཞན་དུ་འདྲེན་པའི་དོགས་པའི་གནས་མཐའ་ཡས་པ་བཀོད་ནས་རིགས་པས་ལེགས་པར་སུན་ཕྱུང་སྟེ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པའི་ལམ་ལ་རིགས་པ་མང་པོའི་སྒོ་ནས་ངེས་པ་བླ་ན་མེད་པ་སྐྱེད་པ་དང་། བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱི་བཀའ་ཉིད་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ཏེ་ལུང་གི་སྒོ་ནས་ཀྱང་དོན་དེ་བསྒྲུབས་པར་མཛད་པའོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ཡང་དཔལ་ལྡན་ཟླ་བས་ལུང་དེའི་མཇུག་ཐོགས་སུ། དེ་ལ་བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པས་ནི་རིགས་པ་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་ཆོས་གང་ཞིག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ནི་ལུང་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། ཞེས་སོ། [149] །བློ་གྲོས་མི་ཟད་པའི་མདོ་ཡི་དོན་དངོས་ནི། མདོ་སྡེ་གང་དག་ཀུན་རྫོབ་སྒྲུབ་པ་བསྟན་པ་ཞེས་སོགས་རྐང་པ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་མདོ་དེ་དྲང་ངེས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ཡུལ་[150] དང་དུས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་མི་འདོག་པར་བརྗོད་བྱའི་སྒོ་ནས་འབྱེད་པ་དང་། དེ་ཡང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་གཙོ་བོར་སྟོན་པའི་མདོ་དྲང་དོན་དང་། དོན་དམ་གཙོ་བོར་སྟོན་པའི་མདོ་ངེས་དོན་དུ་འདོག་ཚུལ་མདོར་བསྟན་པའོ། །དེ་ནས་མདོ་སྡེ་གང་དག་ཚིག་དང་ཡི་གེ་ཞེས་སོགས་རྐང་པ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་སྟོན་པའི་མདོ་དང་དོན་དམ་སྟོན་པའི་མདོ་གཉིས་ངོས་བཟུང་པ་སྟེ། [151] དེ་ཡང་ཚིག་དང་ཡི་གེ་མི་འདྲ་བ་སྣ་ཚོགས་པས་དོན་མི་འདྲ་བ་སྣ་ཚོགས་པ་སྟོན་པ་ནི་སྔ་མ་དང་། རྟོགས་དཀའ་བའི་དོན་སྤྲོས་པ་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་པའི་རོ་གཅིག་པར་སྟོན་པ་ནི་ཕྱི་མར་བཞག་གོ །དེ་ནས་མདོ་སྡེ་གང་དག་བདག་དང་སེམས་ཅན་དང་ཞེས་སོགས་རྐང་པ་ཐ་མ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་ནི་སྟོན་ལུགས་ཇི་འདྲ་བ་ཞིག་གིས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བསྟན་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་སྟོན་ལུགས་དང་། སྟོན་ལུགས་ཇི་འདྲ་

ང༡

བ་ཞིག་གིས་དོན་དམ་བསྟན་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་དོན་དམ་སྟོན་ལུགས་གཉིས་སྟོན་པའོ། །
དེ་ཡང་བདག་དང་ཞེས་པ་ནས་བདག་པོ་ལྟ་བུ་ཞེས་པའི་བར་གྱིས་ནི་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་ལ་གང་…
ཟག་གི་རྣམ་གྲངས་ཁོ་ན་བསྟན་ཡང་དེ་ནི་གང་ཟག་ཁོ་ན་ལ་མི་བྱ་ཡི། བྱེད་པ་པོ་རེ་
དང་འབྲེལ་པའི་ལས་སུ་བྱ་བ་དང་བྱེད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་སྟོན་པ་མཐའ་དག་ལ་བྱ་…
དགོས་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་རྩ་ཤེའི་འགྲོ་འོང་བརྟག་པའི་རབ་བྱེད་དང་ལས་བརྟག་པའི་རབ་
152
བྱེད་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་རོལ་ནས་འདིར་འོང་བ་དང་འདི་ནས་པ་རོལ་ཏུ་འགྲོ་…
བ་པོ་ཡོད་ན་གང་ཟག་བདེན་པ་ཡོད་དགོས་པ་དང་། དགེ་མི་དགེའི་ལས་བྱེད་པ་པོ་
ཡོད་ན་གང་ཟག་བདེན་པ་ཡོད་དགོས་པར་རིགས་པའི་མཐའ་འགོག་པས་བྱེད་པ་པོ་དང་
ལས་གཉིས་ཀ་བསྟན་ཀྱང་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་པ་གཙོ་བོར་གདན་ལ་ཕབ་པའི་རབ་…
བྱེད་དུ་བྱེད་དགོས་པ་ལྟར་ཏེ། དེས་ན་འདས་ཀྱང་ཆོས་དང་གང་ཟག་གཉིས་ཀ་སྟོན་
པའི་ཚ་མོ་མོར་བྱེད་དགོས་སོ། །ཚིག་རྐང་གཉིས་པའི་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་དང་ཞེས་པ་ནས་
མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཞེས་པའི་བར་གྱིས་ནི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་ཚུལ་གཙོ་བོར་བསྟན་ལ། སེམས་
ཅན་མེད་པ་ཞེས་པ་ནས་བདག་པོ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་པའི་བར་གྱིས་ནི་གང་ཟག་ལ་བདག་མེད་
ཚུལ་གཙོ་བོར་སྟོན་པའོ། །ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལས་ཀྱང་། སྟོང་པ་བདེ་བར་
གཤེགས་པས་བཤད་པ་ལྟར། །ངེས་དོན་མདོ་སྡེ་དག་གི་ཁྱད་པར་ཤེས། །གང་
ལས་སེམས་ཅན་གང་ཟག་སྐྱེས་བུ་བསྟན། །ཆོས་དེ་ཐམས་ཅད་དྲང་བའི་དོན་དུ་ཤེས།།
ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེ་ལ་དྲང་དོན་དུ་འགྲོ་ལུགས་ལ་དྲང་པ་ནི་གདུལ་བྱ་ཁ་དྲང་བའི་
ཕྱིར་དུ་བསྟན་པ་ཙམ་ལ་མི་བྱ་ཡི། མདོ་དེའི་དོན་ཇི་ལྟར་བསྟན་པ་ལྟར་གཟུང་དུ་མི་
རུང་བར་ད་དུང་དེའི་དགོངས་པ་བཤད་ནས་དོན་གཞན་དུ་དྲང་དགོས་པའམ་ཡང་ན་སྒྲ་ཇི་
བཞིན་པར་བཟུང་བས་ཚིག་ཀྱང་དེ་ཙམ་ཞིག་དེ་དག་གི་ཡིན་ལུགས་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་…

/ང:

པས་ད་དུང་དེའི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་དེ་ལས་གཞན་དུ་བཙལ་དགོས་པས་ན་དྲང་བའི་དོན་ཏེ། དོན་དྲང་དགོས་པའོ། དེའི་དང་པོ་ནི། ཕ་དང་མ་ནི་གསད་བྱ་ཞིང་། ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་སྟེ། ཕ་མ་གསད་པར་གསུངས་པའི་དངོས་ཟིན་གྱི་དོན་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་དུ་ 153 གཟུང་དུ་མི་རུང་བས་དེ་ལས་གཞན་དུ་ལས་ཀྱི་སྲིད་པ་དང་སྲེད་པ་ལ་དྲང་དགོས་པའོ། །དེ་ལྟར་དྲང་པ་དེ་ཡང་ད་དུང་འཇིག་རྟེན་ཕྱི་མའི་དྲང་དོན་དུ་ཡོད་དོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། སྦྱིན་པ་བཏང་བ་ལས་ལོངས་སྤྱོད་འབྱུང་བར་སྟོན་པ་ལྟ་བུ་སྟེ། དེའི་དོན་སྒྲ་ཇི་བཞིན་པར་བཟུང་བས་ཐོག་མེད་ཀྱང་སྦྱིན་པས་ལོངས་སྤྱོད་རྒྱ་ཆེན་པོ་བསྐྱེད་པ་དེ་དེའི་ཡིན་ལུགས…ཡིན་གྱི་དེ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྦྱིན་པའི་ཡིན་ལུགས་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་སྨྲ་བ་ལ། སྦྱིན་པའི་ཡིན་ལུགས་ནི་དེ་ཙམ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི་དེ་ལས་གཞན་དུ་དེའི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་འཚོལ་དགོས་སོ་ཞེས…འཆད་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །ངེས་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཆོས་དང་གང་ཟག་ལ་བདག་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་སོགས་སྤྲོས་པ་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་སྟོན་པ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ལ་ནི་དངོས་བསྟན་གྱི་དོན་དེ་ཉིད་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པས་དེ་ཕན་ཆད་དུ་དྲང་དུ་མེད་པ་དང་། དེ་ལས་གཞན་དུ་གང་ཟག་གཞན་གྱིས་དྲང་དུ་མི་རུང་བ་དང་། དེ་ལ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཚད་མ་དང་ཡང་ལྡན་པས་ན་ངེས་པའི་དོན་ཏེ། དོན་ངེས་པའོ། ས་བོན་ལས་མྱུ་གུ་སྐྱེ་བར་གསུངས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཚད་མ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་དོན་དམ་པའི་དབང་དུ་མཛད་པ་མིན་པས་དྲང་དོན…ཏེ། ཀ་མ་ལ་ཤཱི་ལས་ངེས་པའི་དོན་ཡང་གང་ལ་བྱ་ཞེ་ན། ཚད་མ་དང་བཅས་པ་དང་དོན་དམ་པའི་དབང་དུ་མཛད་ནས་བཤད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་སྟེ། དེ་ནི་དེ་ལས་ལོགས་ཤིག་ཏུ་གཞན་གྱིས་གང་དུའང་དྲང་བར་མི་ནུས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་ངེས་དོན་ལ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཚད་མ་དང་ལྡན་པ་དང་དོན་དམ་པ་སྟོན་པ་གཉིས་ཚོགས་དགོས་པར་གསུངས་སོ། །ཇི་ལྟར་བསྟན་པ་ལྟར་གྱི་དོན་ཡོད་མེད་ཙམ་ལ་དྲང་ངེས་སུ་བྱེད་ན་ཚད་མ་དང་བཅས་པ…

ང

གཅིག་ཕྱུས་ཚིག་གི་དོན་དམ་པའི་དབང་དུ་མཛད་པ་ཞེས་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་སྦྱར་མི་དགོས་སོ།།
དེས་ན་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་གསུང་གི་ཟུར་རེ་རེ་ལ་ཡང་ནུས་པ་འདོན་ལུགས་ཁྱད་
པར་བ་རེ་ཡོད་པ་ཞིབ་ཏུ་ཕྱེད་དགོས་སོ། །དྲང་ངེས་སུ་འཇོག་པ་ལ་ཡང་རྫོད་ཅིད་ཀྱི[154]
སྒོ་ནས་ཕྱེ་ན་གསུང་རབ་འདིའི་དོན་གཞན་དུ་དྲང་དགོས་མི་དགོས་ལ་འཇོག་དགོས་པའི་
ཕྱིར་གསུང་རབ་ཉིད་དྲང་ངེས་ཀྱི་མཚན་གཞིར་གཟུང་དགོས་ཏེ། དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་ལས།
དེ་ལྟ་བས་ན་དོན་དམ་པ་བརྗོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ངེས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ལ་བཟློག་པ་ནི་དྲང་བའི་དོན་
ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་ཁོང་དུ་ཆུད་པར་བྱའོ། །ཞེས་དང་། །སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ལ་སོགས་
པ་ཡང་འཕགས་པ་བློ་གྲོས་མི་ཟད་པས་བསྟན་པ་ལས་ངེས་པའི་དོན་ནོ་ཞེས་བསྟན་ཏེ།
ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །བརྗོད་བྱའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ནས་དྲང་ངེས་འབྱེད་ན་གཞན་དུ་དྲང་དགོས་
མི་དགོས་ཀྱི་དོན་ཉིད་ལ་དྲང་ངེས་སུ་འཇོག་དགོས་པས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ་ལ་དྲང་དོན་དང་
དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་ལ་ངེས་དོན་དུ་འཇོག་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འཕགས་པ་སངས་རྒྱས་ཐམས་
ཅད་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་ལ་འཇུག་པ་ཡེ་ཤེས་སྣང་བའི[155]་རྒྱན་གྱི་མདོ་ལས། ངེས་པའི་དོན་གང་
ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པའོ། །ཞེས་དང་། སྔར་དྲངས་པའི་ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན་གྱི་རྒྱལ་
པོའི་མདོ་འི་ལུང་གིས་ཀྱང་འགྲུབ་བོ། དེ་ཡང་སྒོམ་རིམ་བར་པ་ལས། བཅོམ་
ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱི་བཀའ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ལེགས་པར་གསུངས་པ་སྟེ། མངོན་སུམ་དུའམ་
བརྒྱུད་པས་དེ་ཁོ་ན་མངོན་དུ་གསལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་དང་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ལ་གཞོལ་བ་ཉིད་དོ། །ཞེས་
གསུངས་པ་ལྟར་རྒྱལ་བས་ཆོས་ཇི་སྙེད་ཅིག་གསུངས་པ་རྣམས་ཐར་པ་འཐོབ་པའི་ཆེད་དུ་
ཡིན་ལ། ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་བདེན་པ་ཙམ་གོམས་པ་ལས་དེ་ཐོབ་མི་ནུས་ཤིང་། དེ་ལས་
གཞན་དུ་དྲངས་ཏེ་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་བཅལ་ནས་སྒོམ་པའི[156]་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་ཐར་པ་འཐོབ་དགོས་པ་
ཉིད་ཤེས་པ་ལ་རག་ལས་སོ། །ཡུམ་གྱི་མདོ་ལས་གཟུགས་མེད། གཟུགས་ཀྱི་

སྐྱེ་བ་མེད། ཅེས་སོགས་གསུངས་པ་ངེས་དོན་གྱི་མདོར་ཡིན་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། སྒྲ་ཇི་བཞིན་དུ་གཟུང་དུ་མི་རུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་སྙམ་ན། དེ་དག་སྒྲ་བཞིན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་དོན་ཡ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཕུལ་རྒྱས་པ་ཉིད་ལས། དེ་ཡང་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡོད[157]་ཀྱི་དོན་དམ་པར་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ[158]། །ཞེས་དགག་བྱའི་ཁྱད་པར་སྦྱར་ནས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་དེ་ལྟར་སྐབས་གཅིག་ཏུ་དགག་བྱའི་ཁྱད་པར[159]་ཞིར་ཕྱིན་གཞུང་དེའི་བར་སྐབས་སུ་དགག་བྱའི་ཁྱད་པར་མ་སྦྱར་བའི་ཚིག་ཟུང་བ་ལའང་དོན་གྱིས་སྦྱར་ཟིན་པ་ཡིན་པས་སྐབས་དེར་དངོས་སུ་མ་སྨོས་ཀྱང་དེ་སྒྲ་ཇི་བཞིན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །འདི་ལ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ལྟར་ན་ཤེར་ཕྱིན་འབུམ་པ་ལྟ་བུ་མདོ་དེའི་ནང་དུ་དགག་བྱ་ལ་དོན་དམ་གྱི་ཁྱད་པར[160]་དངོས་སུ་སྦྱར་བའི་ཚིག་ཟུང་བ་རྣམས་སྒྲ་ཇི་བཞིན་པའང་ངེས་དོན་དང་། ཤེས་རབ་སྙིང་པོ་ལྟ་བུ་མདོ་དེའི་ནང་དུ་དགག་བྱ་བདེན་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་གསལ་བར་སྦྱར་བའི་ཚིག་མེད་པ[161]་རྣམས་ནི་སྒྲ་ཇི་བཞིན་པར་བཟུང་དུ་མི་རུང་བས་གཞན་དུ་དྲང་དགོས་པའི་དྲང་དོན་དུ་བཞེད་པས། མདོ་སྡེ་དགོངས་འགྲེལ་གྱིས་འཁོར་ལོ་བར་པ་དྲང་དོན་དུ་གསུངས་པ་ནི་འཁོར་ལོ་བར་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཟེར་རྒྱུ་མིན་ཞེས་བཞེད་དོ། །ཐལ་འགྱུར་བས་ཤེས་རབ་སྙིང་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དགག་བྱ་ལ་དོན་དམ་གྱི་ཁྱད་པར་དངོས་སུ་མ་སྦྱར[162]་བའི་འཁོར་ལོ་བར་པའི་མདོ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་ཡུམ་འབུམ་པ་ལྟ་བུའི་དོན་དམ་གྱི་ཁྱད་པར་གསལ་བར་སྦྱར་བའི་མདོ་སྡེ་དང་རིགས་མཐུན་པས་དེ་དག་ལའང་དགག་བྱའི་ཁྱད་པར་དོན་གྱིས་སྦྱར་བ་ཡིན་པས་སྒྲ་ཇི་བཞིན་པའི་ངེས་དོན་ཁོ་ནར་བཞེད་དོ། །གཟུགས་མེད། སྒྲ་མེད་ཅེས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་མདོ་ཚིག་གིས་གཟུགས་སྒྲ་སོགས་ཡེ་མེད་དུ་བསྟན་པ་ནི་སྙམ་ཟེར་ལའང་བྱ་མི་རུང་བས། གཟུགས་མེད་ཅེས་པའི་མདོ་ཚིག་དེ་གཟུགས་མེད་པར་བསྟན་པའི་མདོ་ཚིག་མིན་དགོས་སོ། །དེ་ལྟར་བྱས་ན་མགོ་པོ

ང

ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱིས་ཕྱི་ནང་གི་རྒྱུ་འབྲས་རྣམས་ལ་བདེན་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་པ་ལ་རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་ལ···
བལྟོས་པར་འགལ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་གནོད་བྱེད་མང་དུ་བསྟན་ཅིང་། བདེན་པའི་རང་
[163] བཞིན་མེད་པ་ལ་འཆིང་གྲོལ་གྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཐམས་ཅད་འཐད་པར་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་དུ་མས······
བསྒྲུབས་པ་ནི་ཡུམ་གྱི་མདོ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་སྟོན་པའི་མདོ་རྣམས་ངེས་པའི་···
དོན་དུ་བསྒྲུབས་··པ་དང་། དེ་དག་དང་མི་མཐུན་པར་སྟོན་པའི་མདོ་རྣམས་དྲང་པའི་དོན་དུ་
བསྒྲུབས་པ་ཡིན་པས་རྩ་བ་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རིགས་པའི་ཚོགས་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་དྲང་
ངེས་འབྱེད་པའི་ཤིང་རྟའི་སྲོལ་ཕྱེ་བ་དང་། དྲང་ངེས་འབྱེད་ཚུལ་དེ་ཡང་བློ་གྲོས་མི་
ཟད་པའི་མདོ་ལ་བརྟེན་པར་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བཤད་པའི་ཚུལ་ཡང་ངེས་ཤེས་པར···
འགྱུར་རོ། །འོ་ན་མདོ་སྡེ་[164] དགོངས་འགྲེལ་ལས། གཞན་དབང་བདེན་པར་མེད་
པར་མཐོང་ན་མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་ག་ལ་སྐུར་འདེབས་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་སྐྱེ་བར་གསུངས་པ་ཇི་ལྟར་··
དྲང་སྙམ་ན། དེ་ནི་ཐེག་པ་[165] ཆེན་པོའི་རིགས་ཅན་ཡིན་ཀྱང་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་རྟོགས་པའི་
[166] བློ་མཆོག་དང་མི་ལྡན་པའི་གདུལ་བྱའི་བསམ་པའི་དབང་གིས་དེ་ལྟར་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
དེ་ཉིད་རྟོགས་པའི་བློ་མཆོག་དང་ལྡན་པའི་གདུལ་བྱ་ལ་གཞན་དབང་བདེན་མེད་དུ་རྟོགས··
པ་ཉིད་སྐུར་འདེབས་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་འགོག་པའི་ཐབས་སུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་
ན་སྙིང་ཡུམ་གྱི་མདོ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་འཁོར་ལོ་བར་པ་ངེས་དོན་དང་ དགོངས་འགྲེལ་ལ····
སོགས་པའི་འཁོར་ལོ་ཐ་མ་དྲང་དོན་ཡིན་ཀྱང་གདུལ་བྱ་དེ་ལ་བལྟོས་ཏེ་ཐ་མ་ངེས་དོན···
དང་བར་པ་དྲང་དོན་དུ་འགྲོ་བ་མི་འགལ་ཏེ། [167] དཔེར་ན་སྔར་བདག་དང་བདག་མེད་
[168] བསྟན་པ་གཉིས་ལས་ཕྱི་མ་མཆོག་ཡིན་ཀྱང་རེ་ཞིག་བདག་མེད་བསྟན་པའི་སྣོད་དུ་མི་རུང་
བའི་གདུལ་བྱ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ངོར་སྔ་མ་མཆོག་ཡིན་པ་མི་འགལ་བ་བཞིན་ནོ། །དེས་ན་ཇི་
སྲིད་གདུལ་བྱ་དེའི་བློ་ངོར་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པ་རྡུལ་ཙམ་ཡང་མེད་པ་དང་།

༄༅

དེ་ལ་རྣམ་གཞག་ཐམས་ཅད་བཞག་པས་ཆོག་པ་གཉིས་མི་འགལ་བར་ཤེས་མི་ནུས་པ་དེ་
སྲིད་དུ་ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་ཁ་ཅིག་བདེན་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག་མི་བདེན་པའི་རྣམ་དབྱེ་མཛད་ནས་
དེ་ལ་ཆོས་བསྟན་དགོས་ཏེ། དེ་ལ་བདག་མེད་པའི་ཕྱོགས་རེ་བསྟན་ནས་རིམ་གྱིས་
འཁྲིད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། དེ་ལ་བསྟན་པའི་བདག་མེད་དེ་ཡང་གང་ལ་འཇོག
པའི་གཞི་བདེན་པ་པ་མེད་ན་ཁོ་འི་བློ་ངོར་བཞག་ཏུ་མི་རུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་
གང་ཟག་ལ་རང་བཞིན་བཀག་ནས་ཕུང་པོ་ལ་མ་བཀག་པ་དང་། གཟུང་འཛིན་རྫས་
གཞན་བཀག་ནས་གཉིས་སྟོང་ལ་རང་བདེན་མི་འགོག་པའི་ཚུལ་གསུངས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་
མཚན་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འདི་དག་ལས་བརྩམས་ཏེ་ད་དུང་ཞིབ་ཏུ་བཤད་དགོས་པ་མང་
དུ་ཡོད་ཅིང་འདི་དག་ལེགས་པར་ཤེས་པ་ནི་བློ་གྲོས་དང་ལྡན་པ་རྣམས་ལ་རྒྱལ་བའི་
དགའ་དང་དེའི་དགོངས་པ་འགྲེལ་པའི་ཚད་ལྡན་གྱི་བསྟན་བཅོས་རྣམས་ལ་བཅོས་མ་མ་
ཡིན་པའི་དད་པ་བརྟན་པོ་སྐྱེ་བའི་སྒོ་མཆོག་ཏུ་གྱུར་པར་སྣང་ངོ་། །གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་
མཐའི་འདོད་ཚུལ་བཤད་པ་དངོས་ནི། སྤྱིར་འཕགས་པའི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲངས་པའི་དབུ་
མ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་གཞིའི་སྐབས་སུ་གང་ཟག་དང་ཆོས་གང་ལའང་བདེན་པའི་རང་བཞིན་
རྡུལ་ཙམ་ཡང་མེད་པ་དང་། དེ་ལ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་རྣམ་གཞག་ཐམས་ཅད་གྲུ་མ་ཉམས་པར་
བཞག་པས་ཆོག་པའི་བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་བྱེད་ཚུལ་གཅིག་དང་། [169] ལམ་གྱི་
སྐབས་སུ་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་རྟོགས་པའི་བློ་ངོར་མཚན་འཛིན་གྱི་དམིགས་གཏད་རྡུལ་ཙམ་ཡང་
མེད་པའི་ལྟ་བ་མ་ནོར་བའི་ཟབ་མོ་འི་ལམ་གྱི་རིམ་པ་དང་། སྐྱེས་བུ་ཆུང་འབྲིང་གི་
བསལ་བ་སྦྱང་བ་སྔོན་དུ་འགྲོ་བ་ཅན་གྱི་བྱམས་པ་དང་སྙིང་རྗེས་དྲངས་པའི་བཅོས་མ་མ་
[170] ཡིན་པའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་ཀྱི་སེམས་དང་། སྤྱོད་པ་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ་དྲུག་དང་། བསྡུ་
བའི་དངོས་པོ་བཞིས་བསྡུས་པའི་རྒྱ་ཆེ་བའི་ལམ་གྱི་རིམ་པ་རྣམས་པན་ཚུན་ཟུང་དུ་སྦྲེལ [171]

དེ་ཐབས་ཤེས་ཡ་མ་བྲལ་བའི་ལམ་ཡོངས་སུ་རྫོགས་པ་ལ་བསླབས་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས།
172
འབྲས་བུ་སྲིད་ཞི་གཉིས་ཆར་གྱི་མཐའ་ལ་མི་གནས་པའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་མངོན་དུ་བྱས་ཏེ་……
གཟུགས་ཀྱི་སྐུ་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་གདུལ་བྱ་རིགས་ཅན་གསུམ་གྱི་དོན་ཇི་ལྟར་རིགས་……
པར་མཛད་པ་ཞིག་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་གཞི་ལམ་འབྲས་བུའི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཏུ་འདོད་པ་ནི་……
སྤྱིའི་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའོ། །ཉན་ཐོས་དང་རང་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་རིགས་ཅན་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་
གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་པ་ཙམ་ཞིག་ཐབས་ཀྱི་ཆ་དང་འབྲེལ་བར་ཚེ་གསུམ་དང་བསྐལ་པ་
བརྒྱ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བར་གོམས་པར་བྱས་པ་ལས་རང་གི་བྱང་ཆུབ་འཐོབ་པར་དབུ་མ་རང་……
རྒྱུད་པ་རྣམས་བཞེད་ལ། གྲུབ་པ་བརྙེས་པའི་སློབ་དཔོན་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་དང་ཟླ་བའི་
ཞབས་དང་རྗེ་བཙུན་ཞི་བ་ལྷ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ནི་དེ་དག་ལ་ཡང་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་པ་རྟོགས་པ་
ཡོད་པར་བཞེད་དོ། །དེ་ལ་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་རིགས་ཅན་དབང་པོ་རྣོན་པོ་བསྐལ་པ་
གྲངས་མེད་གསུམ་གྱི་ལམ་གྱི་འགྲོ་ཚོམ་པའི་གང་ཟག་ལ་དྲུད་པར་ཇི་ལྟ་བུ་ཞིག་ཚང་……
དགོས་སྙམ་ན། དེ་ལ་ལམ་སྤྱིའི་ཚིངས་ནི། རྗེ་བཙུན་བྱམས་པས། སངས་
རྒྱས་སོགས་དམིགས་དད་པ་དང་། །སྦྱིན་སོགས་སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་བརྩོན་འགྲུས་དང་། །
བསམ་པ་ཕུན་ཚོགས་ཟུན་པ་དང་། །རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་ཏིང་འཛིན་དང་། །ཆོས་
རྣམས་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ། །ཤེས་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་དང་རྣམ་ལྔ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་
པ་ལྟར་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ལ་དད་པ་ནི་དུས་གསུམ་གྱི་སངས་རྒྱས་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རྒྱལ་ཁྲིམས་
སོགས་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་དད་པས་མཚོན་ནས་དཀོན་མཆོག་གསུམ་རྒྱུ་དང་འབྲས་བུས་……
བསྡུས་པ་མ་ལུས་པ་ལ་དད་པའི་དད་པ་ནི་སྐབས་འདིའི་དད་པ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་
དད་པ་དེའི་ཡུས་དུ་ཐེག་ཆེན་རྒྱུ་འབྲས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་མ་ལུས་པ་འདུ་བར་འགྱུར་བས་དེ་ལྟ་……
བུའི་དད་པ་སྐྱེས་ན་དང་པོ་ལ་མཁས་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །དྲན་པ་ནི་བསམ་པ་ཕུན་ཚོགས་

ཀྱི་གཙོ་བོ་བྱང་ཆུབ་ཏུ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དྲན་པ་དེའི་ཡུལ་དུ་ཡང་ཐེག་པ་གསུམ
ཀྱི་ལམ་མཐའ་དག་འགྱུར་བས་ན་[173]དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་དྲན་པ་བྱུང་ན་དྲན་པ་ལ་མཁས་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ།།
བརྩོན་འགྲུས་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ནས་སྤྱོད་པ་ལ་སློབ་པའི་ནན་ཏན་དང་བྲལ་ན་བྱང་
ཆུབ་མི་འགྲུབ་པས་གོ་ཆའི་[174]བརྩོན་འགྲུས་ཀྱི་སྒོ་ནས་སྤྱོད་པ་ཀྱི་ལ་ནན་ཏན་བསྐྱེད་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་བརྩོན་འགྲུས་བྱུང་ན་བརྩོན་འགྲུས་ལ་མཁས་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན་
དང་ཤེས་རབ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་ནི་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་མར་ཕྱིན་ཕ་མ་གཉིས་ལ་སློབ་ཚུལ་སྟོན་ཅིང་།
དེ་ཡང་ཐེག་ཆེན་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཞི་གནས་དང་ལྷག་མཐོང་བསྒོམ་པ་ནི་སྐབས་འདིའི་
ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན་དང་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་མཁས་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་སྐྱེས་བུ་ཆུང་འབྲིང་
གི་བསམ་པ་སྦྱངས་པ་སྔོན་དུ་འགྲོ་བའི་སྒོ་ནས་ཐེག་ཆེན་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྐབས་སུ
འགྲོ་བ་དང་། གཞན་དོན་དང་བྱང་ཆུབ་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བ་ཤུགས་དྲག་པོས་སྤྱོད་པའི་
རྟེན་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ནས་རྒྱལ་སྲས་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་པ་རླབས་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་སློབ་པ་སྟེ། དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་
ལམ་གྱི་སྤྱིའི་ཆིངས་ལ་མཁས་པར་བྱས་ནས། མཚན་མེད་རབ་ཏུ་སྤྱིན་ལ་སོགས།
ཞུས་སོགས་ཀྱིས་བསྟན་པ་ལྟར་ཟག་པ་མེད་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་སྐྱེ་ཚན་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙ་གཅིག། རྒྱས་
[175]པར་ཕྱེ་ན་བརྒྱ་དང་བཞི་བཅུ་ཞེ་བཞི་ཡོད་པའི་མངོན་པར་རྟོགས་པའི་རིགས་མ་ལུས་པ
ལ་ཐོས་བསམ་གྱིས་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་ལེགས་པར་ཆོད་ནས་བསྒོམས་པས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་སྦྱང་
པ་ལེགས་པར་ཐོན་པའི་སྦྱོང་པ་ཐོག་མར་སྐྱེས་པ་ན་གྲངས་[176]མེད་གསུམ་གྱིས་འཚང་རྒྱ་བའི་
ལམ་གྱི་སྔོ་རྫོམ་པའི་ལམ་ལ་ཐོག་མར་ཞུགས་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །སྦྱོང་པ་ཉིད་ལ་བསྒོམས
[177]པ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱིས་སྦྱོང་བ་ཐོབ་པ་ནི་སྦྱོར་བའི་ལམ་གྱི་གནས་སྐབས་སུ[178]
འབྱུང་སྲིད་ཀྱི། དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་སྐབས་འདིར་ཡང་བསམ་པ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཤེས་རབ
ཀྱིས་གོམས་པར་བྱས་པ་སོགས་ནི་གདོན་མི་ཟ་བར་དགོས་སོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ལམ་དུ

ང

ཞུགས་པ་དེ་དག་གིས་ཀྱང་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་མཐོང་ལམ་འཐོབ་ཀྱི་བར་དུ་ནི་མཐོང་ལམ་གྱི་ཚེ་ཞེས་མཐོང་གིས་བལྟས་ནས་འདོད་པར་བྱ་བའི་མངོན་པར་རྟོགས་པའི་རིགས་རྣམས་ཀྱང་གོམས་པ་ལྷུར་ལེན་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་བསྒོམ་པར་བྱ་དགོས་པར་གསུངས་པས་དཔལ་འབྱོར་དོན་ཆེ་རྙེད་དཀའ་ནས་བཟུང་སྟེ་བདེན་པ་བཞིའི་རྣམ་པ་བཅུ་དྲུག་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ལམ་གྱིས་ཟིན་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་བསྒོམ་པ་ལ་འབད་པར་བྱ་དགོས་སོ། །ས་ཐོབ་པའི་གནས་སྐབས་སུ་ཡང་མངོན་པར་རྟོགས་པའི་རིགས་མཐའ་དག་ཞི་ལྷག་ཟུང་དུ་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྒོ་ནས་དཔྱད་འཇོག་གི་སྒོམ་གཅིག་ཀ་བྱ་དགོས་ཞིང་། དེ་ཡང་བྱང་ཆུབ་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་སུམ་ཅུ་སོ་བདུན་སོགས་ཀྱི་[179]སྒོ་ནས་ཉམས་སུ་ལེན་པ་སོགས་མདོར་ན་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ་དྲུག་ཉིད་མཉམ་གཞག་དང་རྗེས་ཐོབ་ཀྱི་གནས་སྐབས་སུ་ཇི་ལྟར་རིགས་པར་སྦྱོང་བ་ལས་ཕ་ཉན་པའི་ཉམས་ལེན་གྱི་རིམ་པ་མ་མཆིས་པས་རྒྱལ་ཚབ་དམ་པས་པར་ཕྱིན་དྲུག་གི་ཉམས་ལེན་གྱི་སྨོན་ཆེན་བོར་གསུངས་པ་ལ་ངེས་པ་རྙེད་པར་བྱའོ། །འདི་དག་ཀྱང་དབུ་མ་པ་ཆེན་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྤྱིའི་ལུགས་ཡིན་ལ་ལམ་དང་པོ་པས་ལམ་གྱི་རིམ་པ་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡིད་ལ་བྱ་བའི་ཚུལ་དང་། ལམ་གྱི་བོགས་འདོན་གེགས་སེལ་སོགས་ཇི་ལྟར་བྱ་བའི་ཚུལ་དང་། ལམ་གྱི་གོལ་ས་ངོ་ཤེས་ནས་འགོག་པར་བྱེད་པའི་ཚུལ་སོགས་རྒྱས་པར་ནི་རྒྱལ་བའི་དགོངས་པ་མཐར་ཐུག། ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་གཉིས་ལས་བརྒྱུད་པའི་མན་ངག། མཉམ་མེད་ཇོ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་དང་རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་ལེགས་པར་གསལ་བར་མཛད་པའི་ལམ་སྒྲོན་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་སྦྱངས་པ་ལས་ཤེས་དགོས་ཤིང་། དེ་ཡང་རྗེ་ཡབ་སྲས་དང་དེའི་བརྒྱུད་འཛིན་གྱི་དམ་པའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་རིམ་པར་བྱོན་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཕྱག་རིས་སུ་མཛད་པའི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པའི་ལམ་གྱི་རིམ་པའི་གདམས་པ་རྣམས་དང་།[180] ཚུལ་དེ་ལ་ནང་བྱན་ཚུད་པའི་བཤེས་གཉེན་མཁས་པ་ཡུན་རིང་མཉེས་[181]

པར་བྱས་པ་ལས་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །ཟབ་མོ་འི་ལམ་གྱི་རིམ་པ་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་རྟོགས་པའི་ལྟ་བ་རྒྱུད་ལ་སྐྱེད་པའི་ཚུལ་བདག་མེད་གཉིས་གཏན་ལ་འབེབས་པའི་རྣམ་གཞག་ལ་འཕགས་པའི་རྗེས[182]་འབྲངས་ཆེན་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་ལས་མི་འདྲ་བ་འབྱུང་ཞིང་། དེའི་གནད་ཀྱིས་ལམ་དང་འབྲས་བུའི་གནས་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་ལ་ཡང་མི་འདྲ་བ་ཚུང་ཟད་ཡོད་པ་རྣམས་ནི་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྒྱས་པར་རྗེ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱི་གསུང་ལས་ཤེས་དགོས་ཤིང་། ཁོ་བོས་ཀྱང་གསུང་དེ་དག་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་ཕྱོགས་གཞན་དུ་འཆད་པར་འདོད་མོད་ཀྱི་འོན་ཀྱང་འདིར་ནི་མདོར་བསྡུས་པ་ཙམ་བརྗོད་པར་བྱའོ། །དེ་ལ་གཉིས། དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་ལུགས་བཤད་པ་དང་། དབུ་མ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ལུགས་བཤད་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ། འདོད་ཚུལ་དང་གསུམ། དང་པོ་ནི། འཇིགས་མེད་མཛོད་ལས། རང་རྒྱུད་རང་དབང་བདག་དབང་དང་། ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ལྟར། རང་རྒྱུད་དང་། རང་དབང་དང་། རང་བཞིན་རྣམས་དོན་གཅིག་པར་ཡོད་ལ། ཙ་ཤེའི་རབ་བྱེད་བཅུ་གསུམ་པའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲོན་མེ་ལས། ད་ནི་སྐྱོན་འབྱིན་པའི་ལན་བཏབ་པ་དང་རང་དབང་དུ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་མཐུས[183]་འདུ་བྱེད་རྣམས་རྣམ་པ་ལས་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ཉིད་བསྟན་པའི་དོན་གྱི་དབང་གིས་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་བཅུ་གསུམ་པ་བརྩམས་སོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེས་ན་ཕྱིར་རྒོལ་གྱི་ཁས་བླངས་ཙམ་ལ་མ་འཁྲིས་པར་གདམས་གཞིའི་ངོས་ནས་དོན་གྱི་སྡོད་ལུགས་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་རྒོལ་གྱི་ཚད་མ་མ་འཁྲུལ[184]་པ་ལ་ཆོས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་གྲུབ་ཅིང་། ཆོས་ཅན་དེའི་སྟེང་[185]དུ་རྟགས་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་རྣམས་འགྲུབ་ཚུལ་ངེས་པར་བྱས་ནས་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་རྟོགས་པའི་རྗེས་དཔག་བསྐྱེད་པ་ཞིག་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་དོན་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ལྟར་དགོས་པ་འཐད་པར་ཁས་ལེན་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་ལ་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ཞེས་ཟེར་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ཡང་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་ལུགས་

ལ་དབང་ཤེས་གཉོད་མེད་རྣམས་ཕྱི་སྐད་དུ་སྣང་ཡུལ་ལ་མ་འཁྲུལ་པ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ལྟར་མི་འཁྲུལ་བའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡང་གནོད་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པ་རྣམས་ལ་གཟུགས་སོགས་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་གྲུབ་པར་སྣང་ཞིང་གཟུགས་སོགས་ཀྱང་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་གྲུབ་པར་ཞལ་གྱིས་བཞེས་པ་ཉིད་ལ་ཐུག་གོ །འདི་ལ་དགོངས་ནས་བྱང་ཆུབ་ལམ་རིམ་ཆེན་མོ་ལས། རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་རང་གི་ལུགས་ལ་ཞལ་གྱིས་བཞེས་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡང་ཕྱི་སྐད་དུ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་གྲུབ་པའི་རང་མཚན་ཡོད་པ་འདི་ཡིན་པས་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་རང་ལུགས་ལ་འདོག་མི་འདོག་ནི་དགག་བྱ་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཕྲ་བ་འདི་ལ་ཐུག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ།།

དེས་ན་བདེན་མེད་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་རང་ངོས་ནས་གྲུབ་པར་ཁས་ལེན་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་དེ་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དུ་བྱའོ།[186] །གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་ལ། །མདོ་སྡེ་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་དང་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་གཉིས་སུ་ཡོད་སོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་མདོ་སྡེ་སྤྱོད་པ་ཞེས་བྱེར་བའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ནི། དབང་པོའི་ཤེས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དམིགས་རྐྱེན་ནི་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་བསགས་པའི་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་དུ་བཞེད་པས་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་མདོ་སྡེ་པ་དང་མཐུན་པའི་དམིགས་རྐྱེན་བཞེད་པས་ན་དེ་ལྟར་བཏགས་སོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པ་ཞེས་བྱེར་བའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ནི། སློབ་དཔོན་ཞི་བ་འཚོ་འི་དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་གྱི་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས། གཞན་དག་སེམས་པ་ནི། རྒྱུ་དང་འབྲས་བུར་གྱུར་པ་ཡང་།། ཤེས་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཁོ་ན་སྟེ། །རང་གིས་གྲུབ་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ། །དེ་ནི་ཤེས་པར་གནས་པ་ཡིན། ཞེས་དང་། དེ་ལྟར་བྱས་ན་ཕྱུག་པོ་བཀོད་པ་དང་དགོངས་པ་ངེས་པར་འགྲེལ་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལས་འབྱུང་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་དང་མཐུན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ལྟར་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་རོལ་དོན་གྱིས་སྟོང་པའི་རྣམ་པར་རིག་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་འདོད་པས་ན་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་

ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པོ་ལས། དེས་ན་དེ་འདྲ་བའི་ལུགས་ཀྱང་རེ་རེ་ཙམ་བྱུང་མོད་ཀྱང་གཞུང་རྒྱས་པར་བརྩམས་ནས་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་རོལ་མེད་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱི་དབུ་མའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ནི་སློབ་དཔོན་ཞི་བ་འཚོས་སྲོལ་ཕྱེ་བར་སློབ་དཔོན་ཡེ་ཤེས་སྡེ་བཞེད་པ་ལྟར་ལེགས་སོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །འདི་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག། མདོ་སྡེ་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་པའི་སྒྲ་དོན་དེ་མི་འཐད་དེ། སྟོང་ཐུན་ཆེན་མོ་ལས། སློབ་དཔོན་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་དང་ཡེ་ཤེས་སྙིང་པོ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡང་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་མདོ་སྡེ་པ་དང་མཐུན་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རང་རིག་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡང་ཁས་མི་ལེན་པ་སོགས་ཆེས་མི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ཕྱོགས་གཅིག་མཐུན་པས་མཐུན་པར་འཇོག་ན་ཐམས་ཅད་ཐམས་ཅད་དང་གྲུབ་འཐའ་...... མཐུན་པར་ཐལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་ཟེར་ན་སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ།། དེ་ནི་བོད་སྔ་མ་དག་གིས་མདོ་སྡེ་པས་དོན་དམ་དུ་གང་འདོད་དབུ་མ་པ་འདི་དག་གིས་... ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་འདོད་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་སྒྲ་བཤད་པ་ལ་གནོད་པ་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒོ་བསྟན་པ་ཙམ་ཡིན་གྱི། སྤྱིར་མདོ་སྡེ་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་པའི་སྒྲ་བཤད་ཚུལ་ལ་མདོ་སྡེ་པ་དང་ཕྱོགས་གཅིག་མཐུན་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་སྒྲ་བཤད་དུ་མི་རུང་བར་བསྟན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། སྒྲ་བཤད་པ་དང་འཇུག་པ་ཙམ་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཐམས་ཅད་ཚང་མི་དགོས་པ་དུ་མ་ཡོད་པའི་.... ཕྱིར་དང་། ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱིས་མདོ་སྡེ་པ་དང་མཐུན་པའི་དབང་པོ་དང་ཡུལ་གྱི་འཇོག་ཚུལ་མཛད་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་དཔལ་ལྡན་ཟླ་བས་བཞི་བརྒྱ་པའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ལས་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་ཀྱིས་དེ་ལྟར་བཞེད་ཚུལ་དབུ་མ་སྙིང་པོའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ལས་གསལ་བར་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ལམ་རིམ་ཆེན་མོ་དང་སྟོང་ཐུན་ཆེན་མོ་གཉིས་
ཀྱི་ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱི་བཞེད་པ་འཆད་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་ཡང་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ལྟར་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། 187

གསུམ་པ་འདོད་ཚུལ་ལ་གཉིས། མདོ་སྡེ་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་འདོད་ཚུལ

ང

ཏང་། རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་འདོད་ཚུལ་ལོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་
དངོས་པོར་སྨྲ་བའི་ལུགས་འགོག་པའི་ཚུལ་དང་། རང་གི་ལུགས་བཞག་པ་གཉིས།
དང་པོ་ལ་ཡང་གཉིས། དངོས་སྨྲ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་གྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་བཤད་པ་མི་
འཐད་པར་བསྟན་པ་དང་། ཕྱི་དོན་མེད་པར་བཤད་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་བསྟན་པའོ། །
དང་པོ་ནི། དབུ་མ་སྙིང་པོ་ལས། འདིར་བཤད་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་བཀའ་ཀུན། །
ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་གི་ཚད་མ་ཡིན། ཚད་མ་ཡིད་ཆེས་ལུང་ཡིན་ཕྱིར། །བཟང་པོ་དག་
ནི་སྒྲུབ་བར་བཞེད། །ལུང་གཞན་དག་གི་ཐེ་ཚོམ་[188] དང་། ལོག་པའི་བློ་ཅན་གཞན་
མི་བྱེད། །དེ་ཕྱིར་དེ་དག་སྒྲུབ་གཞུག་ཕྱིར། །རིགས་པ་ལྡན་པའི་ཚུལ་བཅལ་བྱ།།
ཞེས་རྣམ་རིག་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་དབུ་མ་པ་ལ་སྨྲས་པའི་ཉེས་པ་རྣམས་ཚད་མ་དང་བྲལ་བ་····
དང་། རང་གི་ལུགས་ནི་ཚད་མ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་ཕྱིར་སེམས་ཙམ་པས་དབུ་མ་པ་ལ་རྒོལ་
པར་བྱས་པ་མཐའ་དག་སུན་དབྱུང་བར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པར་བཤད་ཅིང་། སུན་དབྱུང་ཚུལ་
ཡང་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། གཉིས་མེད་པ་ཡི་དངོས་པོ་ནི། ཞེས་སོགས་གཉིས་སྟོང་གི་
ཤེས་པ་བདེན་གྲུབ་འགོག་པ་དང་། ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་བཀག་པ་མི་འཐད་པ་དང་།
ཀུན་བརྟགས་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱིས་མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་གྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་
དགག་པར་མཛད་དོ། །དེ་ལ་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་ཁྲོད་ཀྱིས། །ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་ངོ་བོ་
ཉིད་ཆོས་ཅན། །མཚན་ཉིད་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། །ཀུན་ནས་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་པའི་
ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་ཐག་པ་ལ་སྦྲུལ་དུ་བཏགས་པ་བཞིན། ཞེས་
ཟེར་བ་མི་འཐད་དེ། ཀུན་ནས་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱིས་
ཐག་པ་ལ་བཏགས་པའི་སྦྲུལ་བཞིན་དུ་ཀུན་བརྟགས་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད····
གདན་ནས་མེད་ན་ཞིག་གམ། འོན་ཏེ་སྒྲ་དང་རྟོག་པས་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

ཐག་པའི་ང་བོ་བཞིན་དུ་ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་ང་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་པ་་
མ་ངེས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཡིན། གལ་ཏེ་ཐག་པ་ཡང་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མེད་དོ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་
ལ་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྲགས་པས་གནོད་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་ཆུ་དང་། ཐག་པ་
དང་། མིའི་ལག་པའི་རྩོལ་བས་བཀལ་པའི་ཐག་པའི་ང་བོ་ཉིད་ཡོད་པར་གྲགས་
པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་འཆད་པར་དབུ་མ་སྙིང་པོ་ལས། ཀུན་བརྟགས་ཡོད་པ་མ་
ཡིན་ཏེ། །བརྟགས་ཕྱིར་སྦྲུལ་དང་འདྲར་མི་འདོད། །ཐག་པའི་དངོས་པོར་མ་ངེས་
ཕྱིར། །ཡང་ན་གྲགས་པས་གནོད་པར་འགྱུར། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །གཞན་
ཡང་དཔེའི་སྐབས་སུ་ལོག་པར་བརྟགས་པའི་ཆ་སྦྲུལ་དང་། འདོགས་པའི་གཞི་རང་
གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཐག་པ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པ་བཞིན་དུ་དོན་གྱི་གནས་སྐབས་སུ་ཡང་
འདོགས་བྱེད་འཁྲུལ་པའི་ཆ་དང་། འདོགས་པའི་གཞི་ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་ང་བོ་ཉིད་
མ་འཁྲུལ་བའི་ཆ་གཉིས་ཡོད་དགོས་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་ཐག་པ་ལ་སྦྲུལ་དུ་
བརྟགས་པ་བཞིན་ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་དཔེ་དེ་ལ་འདོགས་པའི་གཞི་དང་བརྟགས་པ་ལ་འཁྲུལ་
མ་འཁྲུལ་གྱི་ཆ་ཤས་གཉིས་ཡོད་པས་དཔེ་དོན་མཚུངས་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ནི་
189
འདོད་མི་ནུས་ཏེ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་ང་བོ་ཉིད་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་
མེད་པར་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་ང་བོ་ཉིད་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་
མེད་ན་མེད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །སྐྱོན་དེ་འཇུག་པ་ཡང་ང་བོ་དང་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་བརྟགས་
པའི་དོན་དེ་མཚན་ཉིད་ང་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ཡིན་པ་མི་འཐད་དེ། ང་བོ་དང་ཁྱད་པར་
དུ་བརྟགས་པའི་ཡུལ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་མཚན་ཉིད་ང་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་
དགོངས་པ་སྟེ་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། དེ་ནི་འཁྲུལ་མིན་གང་གི་ཕྱིར། །དུ་མའི་ཆ་དེ་མཐོང་
ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །གཞན་ཡང་ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་ང་བོ

ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་འཁྲུལ་པར་བཤད་པ་མི་འཐད་དེ། དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ལ་སྐུར་པ་འདེབས་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ཀུན་རྫོབ་མེད་ན་སོ་སོ་རང་གིས་རིག་པར་བྱ་བ་དོན་དམ་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཡང་རྟོགས་པར་མི་ནུས་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ཉིད་ལས། ཁྱོད་ནི་དངོས་ལ་སྐུར་འདེབས་འགྱུར། །རྣམ་པ་ཀུན་དུ་ཡུལ་འགོག་ཕྱིར། །ཞེས་དང་རྟོག་གེ་འབར་བ་ལས། གལ་ཏེ་སྒྲ་ཇི་བཞིན་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་སོ་སོ་རང་གིས་རིག་པར་བྱ་བ་དེ་ལྟ་བུ་ཞིག་ཡོད་དོ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་བདེན་པ་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ་དང་འགལ་ཏེ། མདོ་སྡེ་ལས། ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་ཆོས་མེད་པར་དོན་དམ་པ་རྟོགས་པར་མི་ནུས་སོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །གཞན་ཡང་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་ན་རེ་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་ཡུལ་མེད་ཀྱང་མིང་དང་བརྡ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་དོན་གྱི་མཚན་མ[190]ར་སྣང་བ་འབྱུང་བར་འགྱུར་ལ། དེ་ལས་ཀུན་ཏུ་རྟོག་པ་མཐའ་དག་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བས་ཀུན་བརྟགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འཐད་དོ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། མིང་དང་ཡི་གེ་དང་ངེས་པའི་ཚིག་དང་བརྡ་མི་ཤེས་པའི་དུད་འགྲོ་བྱ་དང་རི་དྭགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ[191]་ཡང་ཉོན་མོངས་ཆེན་པོ་སྐྱེ་བ་མཐོ[192]ང་བའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་ན་ཉོན་མོངས་དེ་དག་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཡུལ་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི… དོན་ནི་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ནའོ། །ཞེས་འཆད་པར་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། མིང་མེད་པར་ཡང་ཀུན་ཉོན་མོངས། མིང་ལ་དོན་འཛུག་ལས་བྱུང་མིན། །སྨྲ་མི་ཤེས་པའི་དུད་འགྲོ་ཡང་། །ཉོན་མོངས་སྐྱེ་བ་མཐོང་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་དང་ཕྱི་འགྲེལ་ལས། གང་དག་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་ཉོན་མོངས་པ་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་ཡུལ་དག་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ནར་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །གཞན་ཡང་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་གཞན་དབང་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པར་ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་ལ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ནི་དོན་མེད་དེ།

༡༨

ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་སྒྲུབ་ན་གྲུབ་ཟིན་སྒྲུབ་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་གིས་ཀྱང་
གཞན་དབང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པར་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དོན་
དམ་པར་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པར་སྒྲུབ་ན་ནི་དེ་ཐམས་ཀྱང་མི་འཐད་དོ། །གཞན་
193
དབང་དོན་དམ་པར་ཡོད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཆོས་གཉིས་ལྡན་གྱི་དཔེ་མི་རྙེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་
རོ། །ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས། དངོས་རྣམས་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་ནི། མངོན་བརྗོད་བདག་ཉིད་
སྟོང་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་འགལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་ཉིད་དུ་ཡང་འགྱུར་བའི་
ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རྟགས་མངོན་པར་བརྗོད་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་
དངོས་པོ་དོན་དམ་པར་ཡོད་པ་བསལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་འཆད་པ་ལ་དེ་ཉིད་ལས།
གཞན་དབང་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་སྨྲས་པ། ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ནི་གྲུབ་པ་བསྒྲུབས། གལ་ཏེ་དོན་
དམ་དཔེ་མེད་ཅིང་། །གཏན་ཚིགས་འགལ་བ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར། ཞེས་དང་། དེའི་
ཕྱི་འགྲེལ་ལས་ཀྱང་གསལ་བར་བཤད་དེ། མང་གིས་དོགས་ནས་མ་བྲིས་སོ། །
194
ཡང་ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་སྟོངས་པའི་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཡོངས་གྲུབ་དོན་དམ་པར་ཡོད་པར་
འདོད་པ་ནི་མི་འཐད་དེ། ཡོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དོན་དམ་པར་ཡོད་ན་དོན་
དམ་པར་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་པའི་མཐའ་ལས་གྲོལ་བར་མི་ནུས་ལ། གལ་ཏེ་
དོན་དམ་པར་མེད་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དོན་དམ་པར་ཡོད་ན་སྐུར་པ་འདེབས་པའི་མཐའ་ལས་
མི་གྲོལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཞན་ཡང་། ཡོངས་གྲུབ་དོན་དམ་པར་གྲུབ་ན་ཇི་ལྟ་
བ་གཟིགས་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་དམིགས་པ་དང་བཅས་པར་ཐལ་བ་དང་། ཡང་དག་པར་
རྫོགས་པའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་མཉམ་པ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་དུ་འགྱུར་བར་འཆད་པ་ལ་
དེ་ཉིད་ལས། ཡོད་དང་མེད་པའི་དངོས་ཉིད་ཀྱི། །ངོ་བོ་དོན་དམ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ན། །
སྒྲོ་འདོགས་པ་དང་སྐུར་མཐའ་ལས། །ཐ་ལ་བཅོད་ལ་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡོད། །སྤྱོད་པ་

ང

དམིགས་མེད་མི་འགྱུར་དེ། །དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། །བྱང་ཆུབ་མཉམ་ཉིད་མི་འགྱུར་དེ། །དེ་ཉིད་རང་སྣང་ཐ་དད་ཕྱིར། །ཞེས་དང་དེའི་ཕྱི་འགྲེལ་ལས། ཡོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་དམིགས་པ་ལྟ་ཡོད་ན་སྟོན་པ་སངས་རྒྱས་བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་དམིགས་པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་དེ། དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་ལུང་ལས། སངས་རྒྱས་ནམ་མཁའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དེ། ནམ་མཁའ་ལ་ཡང་མཚན་ཉིད་མེད། །མཚན་གཞི་མཚན་ཉིད་ངེས་གྲོལ་བ། །དམིགས་མེད་ཁྱོད་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་འགལ་ལོ། །སྟོན་པ་དེའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་ཀྱང་མཉམ་པ་ཉིད་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་དེ། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། ཡོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བའི་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་གཅིག་དང་། རང་སྣང་བའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་གཉིས་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེ། དེ་ལྟར་གཉིས་ཡོད་ན་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་གཉིས་མངོན་པར་རྟོགས་པ་དེ་ཇི་ལྟར་མཉམ་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར། ཞེས་སོ། །བྱང་ཆུབ་མཉམ་ཉིད་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་བར་ཐལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་འཕེན་ལུགས་དེ་ནི་སེམས་ཙམ་པས་ཡོངས་གྲུབ་བདེན་གྲུབ་ཏུ་འདོད་པར་མ་ཟད། དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་གཉིས་སྣང་ནུབ་པའི་བློ་ནས་མཉམ་པར་གཞག་པའི་གནས་སྐབས་སུ་ཡང་མཉམ་གཞག་ཡེ་ཤེས་དེ་ཉིད་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པའི་ 195 རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་མངོན་གྱུར་དུ་ཡོད་པར་འདོད་པ་ལ་གནོད་པ་སྟོན་པའོ། །གཞན་ཡང་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས། ཡུལ་དབང་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་སྣ་ཚོགས་སུ་སྣང་བ་རྣམས་ནི་ཐོག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་ཀུན་གཞིའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལ་རང་རང་གི་ནུས་པ་བཞག་པ་ཁོ་ནའི་དབང་གིས་གྲུབ་པར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ལྟ་ན་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་བློ་སོ་སོ་སྐྱེ་བོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུད་ལ་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་ནི་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཧཛ་ལ་བ་སྟེ། སོ་སོ་སྐྱེ་བོ་དེ་དག་གི་རྒྱུད་ལ་སྐྱོན་ མ་ཡང་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་ལ་དམིགས 196

པའི་བློ་འི་ནུས་པ་ཀུན་གཞིའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལ་བཞག་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཁལ་
དེ་ནུས་པ་དེ་མེད་བཞིན་དུ་སྐྱེ་ན་ནི་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ལུགས་ལ་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་བློ་ནི་
རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་རོ། ནམ་མཁའི་མེ་ཏོག་སྣང་བའི་བློ་བཞིན་ནོ། །འཆད་
པར་དབུ་མ་སྙིང་པོ་ལས། དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་བློ། །ནུས་པ་མ་བཞག་
པ་ལས་འབྱུང་། །ནམ་མཁའི་མེ་ཏོག་སྣང་བའི་བློ། །ནུས་པ་མ་བཞག་མི་རིགས་
བཞིན། །ཞེས་དང་དེའི་ཕྱི་འགྲེལ་ལས། སྔོན་ནམ་ཡང་ཀུན་གཞིའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་
པ་ལ་ནུས་པ་མ་བཞག་པ་དེས་ཕྱིས་ཀྱང་འཛོག་པར་མི་རིགས་ཏེ། ནམ་མཁའི་མེ་
ཏོག་མཐོང་བའི་བློ་སྐྱེ་བར་མི་རིགས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། རིགས་
པ་འདི་དག་ནི་ཕ་རོལ་པོས་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་མེད་ཀྱང་ནང་གི་ཀུན་གཞིའི་སྟེང་གི་ནུས་
པའི་དབང་ཁོ་ན་ལས་ཡུལ་སྣང་འབྱུང་བར་འདོད་ཅིང་ནུས་པ་ཡང་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པར་
འདོད་པས་ཐ་སྙད་ཙམ་དུ་ཡིན་ན་སྐྱོན་མེད་ཀྱང་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་ནུས་པ་ལན་ཅིག་
མ་བཞག་པ་ཕྱིས་ཀྱང་འཛོག་དུ་མེད་པ་རིགས་པས་འགྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ནམ་སྙམ་སྟེ། རྟོག་
གེ་འབར་བ་ལས། གཞུང་ཚན་འདི་དག་གི་གོང་དུ། དེ་ནི་རྣམ་པ་ཀུན་དུ་བརྗོད་
པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཡིན་ཏེ། ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་སྟོང་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཅི་ལྟ་བུའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་
ནི་ དོན་དམ་པ་ཡིན་པར་སྨྲ་རོ། །ཞེས་དང་། ཙ་བ་ལས་ཀྱང་། ངོ་བོ་
དོན་དམ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ན། ཞེས་པ་ལས་སྤྲོས་[197] པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ལེགས་ལྡན་
འབྱེད་ཀྱིས་སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་གྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་[198] འགོག་པའི་ཚུལ་དབུ་མ་
སྙིང་པོ་རྩ་འགྲེལ་ལས་ཞིབ་ཏུ་རྒྱས་པར་གསུངས་པ་འདི་དག་སྔ་མ་སུས་ཀྱང་གསལ་བར་
བཤད་པ་མི་སྣང་ལ་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་འི་རིགས་[199] པའི་གནད་ཤིན་ཏུ་བླ་བ་ཞིག་ཏུ་འདུག་པས།
བློ་གྲོས་དང་ལྡན་པ་རྣམས་གཞུང་ལུགས་དེ་དག་ལ་གཟིགས་པའི་རྒྱུན་དུ་འགྱུར་རམ་

ང

སྐམ་ནས་བདག་གིས་བློ་གྲོས་ཆུང་ངུས་དགོངས[200]་ཚོད་ཙམ་བྲིས་པ་ཡིན་པས་རྒྱས་པར་… གཞུང་དེ་དག་ཉིད་དུ་གཟིགས་པར་འཚལ་ལོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་འདིས་ཚ་ཤེའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲོན་མེ[201]་ལས་ཀྱང་སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་གྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་འགོག…… ཚུལ་མདོར་བསྡུས་ཤིག་གསུངས་པ་ནི་རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པོར…… བཀའ་དྲིན་དུ་སྩལ[202]་པ་ལྟར་ཡིན་ལ་དེ་ནི་ཕྱོགས་གཞན་དུ་འཆད་པར་འདོད་དོ། །གཉིས་པ་ཕྱི་དོན་མེད་པར་བཤད་པ་ནི་འཐད་པར་བསྟན་པ་ལ། དབུ་མ་སྙིང་པོ་ལས། གལ་ཏེ་གཟུང་པར་སྣང་འདོད་པས། གཟུགས་བློ་ཡང་དག་མ་ཡིན་ན། །དེས་ན་གཏན་ཚིགས་འགྲེལ་འགྱུར་ཞིང་། །དམ་བཅས་པ་ཡང་ཉམས་པར་འགྱུར། ཞེས་དང་། དེའི་སྟོ་འགྲེལ་ལས། གཟུང་བ་དང་འཛིན་པའི་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་དང་བྲལ་བའི་བློ་གང་ཡིན་པ་ནི་ཡང་དག་པར་ན་དོན་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་ཀྱི། གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་བློ་ནི་རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་པ་ཡིན་དུ་ཟིན་ཀྱང་ཡང་དག་པ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གཟུང་བར་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཟླ་བ་གཉིས་སྣང་བ་མཐོང་བའི་བློ་བཞིན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན། ཞེས་གསུངས་ཏེ། འདིའི་དོན་ལ། སེམས་ཙམ་པས་བཀོད་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ནི། སྔོན་པོ་རང་ལས་བདག་ཉིད་ཐ་དད་པར་སྣང་བའི་སྔོ་འཛིན་མངོན་སུམ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་ལ་མ་འཁྲུལ་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཡུལ་གཞན་དུ་སྣང་བའི་རྣམ་པར་རིག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་ཟླ་བ་གཉིས་སྣང་གི་དབང་ཤེས་བཞིན་ཞེས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་པ་ཡིན་དུ་ཟིན་ཀྱང་ཞེས་པས་ཆོས་ཅན་མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་པར་གྲུབ་… ཅིང་། ཡང་དག་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་ཞེས་པས་སྣང་བ་ལ་འཁྲུལ་པ་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་དང་། གཟུང་བར་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པས་གཏན་ཚིགས་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལ་སྒྲོན་བརྗོད་པ་ནི། དེ་ནི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡང་དག་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཆོས་ཅན་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་

ༀ་དང་། གདན་ཚིགས་གཟུང་བར་སྣང་བ་གཉིས་ཐ་དད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་དོན་གྲུབ་པ་ན་ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་ལོག་པ་ཉིད་དུ་གྲུབ་ཟིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
ཞེས་པ་སྟེ། ཕྱི་འགྲེལ་ལས། འདི་ལྟར་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་ༀ་ནི་གཟུང་བར་སྣང་བ་
ཉིད་མ་གཏོགས་པར་ལོགས་ཤིག་ན་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པས་གཟུང་བར་སྣང་བ་ཉིད་དུ་ཟིས····
སྨྲ་དཔག་པ་ཡང་དག་པ་བསམ་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ལོག་པར་གྲུབ་པས་
འགལ་ལོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །གཞན་ཡང་ཕྱི་རོལ་མེད་པར་སེམས་ཙམ་དུ་
འདོད་པ་མི་འཐད་དེ། ཁས་བླངས་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་གྲགས་པས་གནོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་འཆད་པར་དབུ་མ་སྙིང་པོ་ལས། སེམས་ཙམ་དུ་ནི་དམིགས་པ་
དང་། གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་མི་འཛིན་ན། །ཁས་བླངས་པ་དང་གྲགས་པ་ཡིས།།
དམ་བཅས་པ་ལ་གནོད་པར་འགྱུར། ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །ཁས་བླངས་པ་དང་འགལ་
ཚུལ་ནི་མིག་དང་གཟུགས་རྣམས་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་མིག་གི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་འབྱུང་ངོ་། །
ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ལུང་ཁས་བླངས་པ་དང་འགལ་བའོ། །གྲགས་པས་གནོད་པ་ནི།
འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་དོན་མེད་པར་དེ་འཛིན་པའི་མིག་ལ་སོགས་པའི·····
ཤེས་པ་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་གྲགས་པས་གནོད་པའོ། །ཡང་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་ན་རེ། དོན་
མེད་ཀྱང་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་དེ། དཔེར་ན་རྨི་ལམ་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་བཞིན། ཞེས་
ཟེར་ན་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། རྨི་ལམ་ན་ཡང་ཐོག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་གཟུང་བ་དང་འཛིན་པའི་
བག་ཆགས་ཀྱིས་བསྒོས་པའི་ཤེས་པ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་མིག་གིས་གཟུགས་མཐོང་བ་ཡིན·····
པས་ན། རྨི་ལམ་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་དེ་ཡང་དམིགས་པ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། སྒོན་མཐོང་
བའི་སྔོན་པོ་སྣང་ཟླ་པའི་ཤེས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་དཔེ་ལ་འདུ་བ་ཡོད་པ་མ་
ཡིན་ནོ། །དེར་མ་ཟད་གཟུགས་སོགས་དོན་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་སྤྱངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཡུལ་ལ་སྐྲུར་

པ་བདབ་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་འཆད་པ་ལ་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། དེ་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་སྐྱེས་
པའི་ཕྱིར། མི་ལམ་གཟུགས་སོགས་བློ་བཞིན་དུ། །གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དོན་
མེད་པར། །རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་ཞེས་བྱར་མི་རུང་། །གང་ཕྱིར་མི་ལམ་ལ་སོགས་པའི།།
རྣམ་ཤེས་ཆོས་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་དཔེ་ཡང་མེད་པ་དང་། །ཕྱུལ་
ལ་སྐྱུར་པ་འདེབས་པར་འགྱུར། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེའི་མི་ལམ་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་
ཉིས་ཚ་གསུངས་པར་འགྲེལ་པ་ལས་ཤེས་པ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་མིག་གིས་ཞེས་གསུངས་པས་
མི་ལམ་དུ་དབང་ཤེས་ཡོད་པར་བཞེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། ཕྱིར་མི་ལམ་གྱི་གཟུགས་མཐོང་
བའི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་དམིགས་པ་ཡོད་པར་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཡང་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་ན་རེ།
ཕྱི་དོན་ཡོད་པ་མི་འཐད་དེ། རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་གཅིག་པུ་ཡུལ་དུ་འདོད་ན་ཡང་མི་འཐད།
རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་དུ་མ་འདུས་པ་ཡུལ་དུ་འདོད་ནའང་མི་འཐད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ།
རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་གཅིག་པུ་ནི་དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་གྱི་
དངོས་པོར་མི་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར།[203] དཔེར་ན་དབང་པོ་གཟུགས་ཅན་དང་བ་བཞིན། གཉིས་
པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་དུ་མ་འདུས་པ་ནི་[204] དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྫས་
སུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་ཟླ་བ་གཉིས་སུ་སྣང་བ་བཞིན་ནོ་ ཞེས་ཟེར། དེ་
ལྟར་ཡང་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། དེ་ལ་གཟུགས་རྡུལ་གཅིག་དུ་ནི། །གཟུགས་བློ་འི་སྤྱོད་
ཡུལ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། །དེར་སྣང་ཉིད་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་ཕྱིར།[205] །དབང་གཟུགས་སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་
མ་ཡིན་བཞིན། །ཕྲ་རབ་གཟུགས་ནི་དུ་མ་སྟེ། །སེམས་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་ཡིན་མི་
འདོད། །རྫས་སུ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཕྱིར། །དཔེར་ན་ཟླ་བ་གཉིས་བཞིན་ནོ། །
ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེའི་ལན་ནི། ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་འབའ་ཞིག་པ་སྟེ་རིགས་
མཐུན་འདུས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་ཡན་གར་བ་དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་མ་ཡིན་པར…

སླབ་ན་ནི་གྲུབ་ཟིན་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་གིས་ཀྱང་དེ་དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་ཡིན་པར་མི་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་འཆད་པར་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། དེ་ལ་གལ་ཏེ་ཕ་རོལ་པོ།། བསགས་པ་མིན་པའི་གཟུགས་སེམས་ཀྱི། །སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་མིན་པར་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ན། །དེ་ནི་གྲུབ་པ་ཉིད་བསྒྲུབ་འགྱུར། ཞེས་སོ། །གལ་ཏེ་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་རིགས་མཐུན་བསགས་པའི་གཟུགས་དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སླབ་ན་ནི་རྫས་སུ་མ་གྲུབ་···པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་ཏེ། རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་རིགས་མཐུན་གཞན་དང་གཞན་པན་ཚུན་སྤྲུར་ཞིང་བསགས་པ་ནི་ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་གིས་····206 རྫས་ཡོད་ཀྱི་དངོས་པོར་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལྟར་བསགས་པའི་ཡུལ་དེ་ནི་དབང་པོའི་ཤེས་པའི་དམིགས་པ་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་དོ། །རང་འཛིན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་རང་གི་རྣམ་ལྡན་དུ་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་འཆད་པ་ལ་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། 207 གཟུགས་གཞན་དག་གི་བསགས་པ་ནི། རེར་སྣང་བློ་ནི་སྐྱེ་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ནི་དམིགས་ཉིད་ཡིན་འདོད་དེ། །རེར་སྣང་བློ་ཡི་རྒྱུར་འགྱུར་ཕྱིར། །འདོད་ཆགས་བཞིན་ནོ་དེ་ཡི་ཕྱིར། །ཁྱོད་དམ་བཅས་ལ་རྗེས་དཔག་གནོད། ཅེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ནི་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས། རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་རིགས་མཐུན་པ་བསགས་པའི་གཟུགས་དེ་ནི་དམིགས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་དེ། ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། འདི་ལྟར་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་བསགས་པ་དེ་ནི་བསགས་པའི་གཟུགས་རེར་སྣང་བའི་བློའི་རྒྱུའི་དངོས་པོ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གང་དང་གང་རེར་སྣང་བའི་བློའི་རྒྱུར་གྱུར་པ་དེ་དང་དེ་ནི་བསགས་པ་ལ་དམིགས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་འདོད་ཆགས་ཡུལ་ལ་ཆགས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི་བུད་མེད་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་བསགས་པ་ཉིད་ལ་དམིགས་པར་འདོད་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །རང་ཕྱིར་ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་བསགས་པའི་གཟུགས་ནི་དམིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་དམ་བཅས་

ང

པ་དེ་ལ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་འདིས་གནོད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །ལུང་
དང་འགལ་བ་ནི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པའི་ཚོགས་ལྔའི་གནས་དང་དམིགས་པ་ནི་བསགས་པ་
ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ལུང་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གལ་ཏེ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་
རབ་འདུས་པ་དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྨྲ་བ་ན་ནི་ཁ་བོ་ཅག་ལ་སྐྱོན་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་
ཏེ། ཁ་བོ་ཅག་གིས་ཀྱང་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་འདུས་པ་དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་དམིགས་པ་ཡིན་པར་
མི་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་འཆད་པར་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། འདུས་པ་དག་ནི་མ་
བཙམ་པས། །དེ་འགོག་པ་ནི་གནོད་པ་མེད། ཅེས་གསུངས་སོ། །འོ་ན་
བསགས་པ་དང་འདུས་པ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ཅི་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་རིགས་མཐུན་
ཞིང་རྟེན་གཅིག པའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པའི་ཚོགས་པ་ལ་བསགས་པ་ཞེས་ཟེར་ཏེ། དཔེར་
ན་བུམ་པ་ལྟ་བུ་རང་གི་ཚོམ་གཞིར་གྱུར་པའི་རིགས་མཐུན་གི་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་དུ་མ་འདབ····
འབྱར་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་བསགས་པའོ། །དམག་དང་ནགས ཚལ་དང་འཕྲེང་བ་ལྟ་བུ
རྫས་རིགས་མི་མཐུན་པའི་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་རྟེན་གཞི་ཐ་དད་པ་དུ་མ་ཕྱོགས་གཅིག་ཏུ་ཚོགས
པ་ལ་འདུས་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །གཞན་ཡང་དམིགས་བརྟག་ལས་བཤད་པའི་དམིགས་
རྐྱེན་འགོག་པ་དང་། སེམས་སེམས་བྱུང་རྫས་གཅིག་དང་ཐ་དད་བརྟག་ཚུལ་སོགས་
མང་དུ་གསུངས་ཏེ་འདིར་མ་སྤྲོས་སོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་འདིས་རང་རིག་འགོག་པའི་རིགས་
པ་ནི། སེམས་ཙམ་པ་ན་རེ། རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཡུལ་དང་འཕྲད་པ་ན་ཆ་ཤས་
གཉིས་ཀྱི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་སྐྱེ་སྟེ། ཡུལ་གཟུང་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་དུ་སྣང་བ་དང་ཡུལ་ཅན
འཛིན་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་དུ་སྣང་བའོ། །ཤེས་ཟེར་བ་མི་འཐད་དེ། ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ
208
པར་སྣང་བ་ལས་གཞན་དུ་ཡུལ་ཅན་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་སྣང་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
ཞེས་འཆད་པར་དེ་ཉིདལས། ཡུལ་དུ་སྣང་བ་མ་གཏོགས་པར། སེམས་ཀྱི་བདག་

༡༢༦

ཉིད་གཞན་ཅི་ཡོད། ཅེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། གཞན་མེད་པ་མ་
གྲུབ་སྟེ། ཤེས་པ་རང་ཉིད་རང་གི་ངོ་བོར་གནས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་ཡུལ་གཞན་གྱི་རྣམ་
པ་ཅན་དུ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། དཔེར་ན་ཤེལ་གྱི་ནོར་བུ་བཞིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ།།
དེའི་དོན་ནི་ཤེལ་གྱི་གོང་བུ་སྔོན་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཡུལ་དང་ཉེ་བར་བཞག་པ་ན་ཤེལ་གྱི་
རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ནི་གསལ་བ་ཡིན་ལ་ཡུལ་དང་ཉེ་བའི་དབང་གིས་སྔོན་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་
རྣམ་པ་ཅན་དུ་ཡང་ཡོད་དོ། །དཔེ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལ་ཡང་ཡུལ་སྣང་བའི་
ཚེ་ན་ཡུལ་དུ་སྣང་བ་གཟུང་བའི་རྣམ་པ་དང་། རང་དུ་སྣང་བ་འཛིན་པའི་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་
ཡོད་དོ་ཞེས་འདོད་པའོ། །དེ་མི་འཐད་དེ། དཔེ་ནི་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་མི་
མཚུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཤེལ་གྱི་གོང་བུ་སྔོན་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཡུལ་དང་ཉེ་བར་བཞག་
པར་ཡུལ་གྱི་དབང་གིས་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་བསྒྲིབས་པའི་གསལ་བ་ཡོངས་སུ་བཏང་ནས
209
སྔོན་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་དུ་ཀྱུར་པ 210 ཡིན་གྱི་ཤེལ་གསལ་བའི་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་སྔ་མ་
གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ཉིད་སྔོན་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་དུ་ཀྱུར་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ; དེ་ནི་
འགགས་ཟིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་ཤེལ་གསལ་བའི་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་སྔ་མ་དེ་ཡུལ་ཉེ་
བར་བཞག་པའི་དབང་གིས་འགགས་ནས་དེའི་སྐད་ཅིག་ཕྱི་མ་སྔོན་པོ་འི་རྣམ་ལྡན་དུ
སྐྱེས་པ་ལ་སྐད་ཅིག་སྔ་མའི་ཤེལ་དེ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་སེམས་པ་ནི་བློ་འཁྲུལ་པའོ། །ཇེས་
འཆད་པར་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། གཞན་ལྟར་སྐྱེས་ཕྱིར་དེ་གཉིས་སྣང་། ། ཤེལ་དང་འདྲ་
བར་མི་འདོད་དེ། །ཉེ་བར་བཞག་ལས་དེར་སྐྱེ་བ། །ཤེལ་གྱི་སྐད་ཅིག་མན་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
དེ་འགགས་གཞན་ནི་སྐྱེས་པ་ལ། །དེ་ཡི་བློ་ནི་འཁྲུལ་པར་འདོད; །ཅེས་གསུངས་
སོ། །གཞན་ཡང་གཟུང་བ་དང་འཛིན་པའི་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་མེད་དེ། སྔོན་པོ་སོགས་
ཀྱི་ཡུལ་ཉེ་པ་དང་བྲལ་བའི་གནས་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཤེལ་ལྔ་བུའི་ཤེས་པ་རང་སྣང་བའི་བདག

ང

ཉིད་ཅན་གྱི་གསལ་བ་ཡན་གར་བ་ན་ནམ་ཡང་གཟུང་དུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཞན་ཡང་ཤེལ་གྱི་གོང་བུ་སྔོན་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཚོན་དང་ཉེ་བར་བཞག་པ་ན་སྔོན་པོའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་དུ་སྣང་བར་རུང་ཡང་ཤེལ་ཉིད་སྔོན་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཚོན་གྱི་ངོ་བོར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། ཚོན་ཉིད་ཤེལ་གྱི་ངོ་བོར་འགྱུར་བ་གང་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གཞན་དུ་ན་ཤེལ་གྱི་གོང་བུ་ཚོན་ཡིན་པའམ་ཚོན་ཡང་ཤེལ་གྱི་གོང་བུ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཡང་ས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་གཟུགས་དང་ཉེ་བ་ན་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་དུ་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡིན་གྱི། །ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའམ་གཟུགས་ཉིད་ཤེས་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་གཉིས་ཀ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གཞན་དུ་ནས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཡང་སེམས་དང་བཅས་པར་འགྱུར་བའམ་ཡང་ན་
211
སེམས་ཀྱང་ས་ལ་སོགས་པ་བཞིན་དུ་སེམས་མེད་པར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་པ་རྣམས་རྟོག་གེ་འབར་བ་ལས་གསུངས་ཏེ། ཁུངས་རྣམས་མང་གིས་དོགས་ནས་མ་བྲིས་སོ། །དེའི་འོག་ཏུ་ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་ངེས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་འགོག་ཚུལ་དང་། སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་འགོག་ཚུལ་རྣམས་གསུངས་ཏེ། རྒྱས་པར་དེར་བལྟ་བར་བྱའོ། །ཡང་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་ན་རེ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་ཚུལ་འགོག་པ་མི་འཐད་དེ། བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱི་ལུང་ལས་ཁམས་གསུམ་པོ་འདི་ནི་སེམས་ཙམ་མོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། ལུང་དེའི་དོན་ནི་གཞན་མུ་སྟེགས་བྱེད་དག་གིས་བརྟགས་པ་ལྟར་གྱི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལས་གཞན་པའི་བྱེད་པ་པོ་དང་ཟ་བ་པོ་ཡོད་པ་འགོག་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལྟར་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་འགོག་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལྟར་གསུངས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ཡང་ས་བཅུ་པའི་མདོ་ལས། བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའ་ས་དྲུག་པ་ལ་བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའ་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ

པར་འབྱུང་བ་ལུགས་སུ་འབྱུང་བ་དང་ལུགས་སུ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་རྣམ་པར་བརྟ་བ་འདུ……
212
སྐམ་དུ་སེམས་དེ། མ་རིག་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཡན་ལག་བཅུ་གཉིས་ལས་སྡུག་བསྔལ་
གྱི་ཕུང་པོ་འབའ་ཞིག་པ་བྱེད་པ་པོ་དང་ཚོར་བ་པོ་དང་བྲལ་བ་འདི་འབྱུང་ཞིང་སྡུག་བསྔལ་
གྱི་ཤིང་ལྗོན་པ་མངོན་པར་འགྲུབ་པར་འགྱུར་རོ་སྙམ་དུ་དེ་ལྟར་ངེས་པས། ཀྱེ་རྒྱལ་
བའི་སྲས་དག་འདི་ལྟ་སྟེ། ཁམས་གསུམ་པོ་སེམས་ཙམ་སྟེ་སེམས་ཀྱིས་མངོན་པར་
འདུ་བྱས་པ་དང་སེམས་ཀྱིས་བྲིས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། སེམས་ལས་གཞན་པའི་བྱེད་པ་པོ་དང་
ཟ་བ་པོ་ནི་འགའ་ཡང་མེད་དོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེས་ན་ལུང་དེའི་དོན་ཕྱི་རོལ་
གྱི་ཡུལ་འགོག་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཡང་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་ན་རེ། ཕྱི་རོལ་དོན་གྱིས་
སྟོངས་པ་ནི་མདོའི་དགོངས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཤེར་ཕྱིན་བྱམས་ཞུས་ཀྱི་ལེའུ་ལས། དེ་
ལ་ཆོས་ཉིད་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་གང་ཞེ་ན། ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་གཟུགས་དེས་རྣམ་པར་བརྟགས
པའི་གཟུགས་དེ་ལ་རྟག་ཏུ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དང་ཆོས་བདག་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དང་ཡང……
དག་པའི་མཐའ་ལ་སོགས་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་སྟེ། དེ་ལ་རྫས་སུ་ཡོད་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ལ
རྫས་སུ་མེད་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྣམ་པར་བརྟགས་པའི་དོན་གྱིས་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་དང་རྣམ་
པར་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་ན། ལུང་
དེའི་དོན་ནི་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་པ་ལྟར་གྱི་དོན་གྱིས་སྟོངས་པ་སྣང་པའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་བསྒྲུབས་
པ་ཡིན་གྱི་དོན་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་བསྒྲུབས་པ་མིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་བཞིན་
གཤེགས་པའི་སོ་སོ་རང་གིས་རིག་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཆོས་ཉིད་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ཡོད་པའི……
ཕྱིར། དེས་ན་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་དོན་མི་འགོག་པས་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་
རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་རང་ལས་རྫས་ཐ་དད་པའི་དོན་གྱིས་སྟོངས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་འཆད……
པར། དབུ་མ་སྙིང་པོ་ལས། གལ་ཏེ་རྣམ་བརྟགས་དོན་སྟོང་པས། རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་

པ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ན། །བཏགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་དོན་ཡོད་ཕྱིར། །ཡུལ་མེད་པར་ནི་མི་འགྱུར་རོ།།
ཞེག་གསུངས་སོ། །ཞེས་[213]ན་དེའི་དོན་གོང་དུ་བཤད་པ་ལྟར་བྱ་ཡི། །སོ་སོ་རང་གིས་
རིག་པའི་ཆོས་ཉིད་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་དོན་བདེན་པར་ཡོད་ན་སྒྲོ་མ་བཏགས་པའི་དངོས་པོ་འི་
དོན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་འཆད་པ་ནི་གཞུང་གི་དགོངས་པར་མི་སེམས་ཏེ། སློབ་
དཔོན་འདིས་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་བཞེད་ཀྱི་དོན་བདེན་པ་བ་སེ་བཞེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། རང་
འགྲེལ་ལས། ཆོས་ཉིད་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པ་ཡང་། ཤེས་
པ་ལས་རྫས་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཡུམ་[214]ཡོད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཡིན་གྱི། ཆོས་ཉིད་ཕྱི་དོན་
དུ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་དང་། དེ་བདེན་པར་བཞེད་པ་གང་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །རང་
འགྲེལ་ལས། སྒྲ་ཇི་བཞིན་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ཡོད་
པས། ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ཡང་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་པ་ལྟར་གྱི་ངོ་བོས་སྟོང་པའི་ཡུལ་གྱི་དོན་
ཡོད་པ་ལ་བྱ་ཡི། སེམས་ཅན་པས་འདོད་པ་ལྟར་གྱི་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ལ་
མི་གཟུང་ངོ་། །གཉིས་པ་རང་གི་ལུགས་བཞག་པ་ལ་བཞི། །རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་
བྱ་ངོས་བཟུང་བ་དང་། །དེ་འགོག་པའི་རིགས་པ་བཤད་པ་དང་། །གདན་ལ་ཕབ་
པའི་བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་བཤད་[215]པ་དང་། ལམ་དང་འབྲས་བུའི་རྣམ་གཞག་
ཐུང་ཟད་བཤད་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། དབུ་མ་སྙིང་པོ་ལས། འདིར་ནི་ས་ལ་
སོགས་པ་དག །དོན་དམ་པར་ན་འབྱུང་[216]བ་ཡི། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་འགྲེལ་པར།
དོན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དོན་ཏེ། །བརྟག་[217]པར་བྱ་བ་དང་གོ
བར་བྱ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚིག་གོ །དམ་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་མཆོག་ཅེས་བྱ་བའི་ཚིག
ག་སྒྲ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དོན་དམ་པ་ཞེས་བསྡུ་བ་ནི་དེ་དོན་ཡང་ཡིན་ལ་དམ་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་
[218]པས་དོན་དམ་པའོ། །ཡང་ན་དམ་པའི་དོན་ཏེ། རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་

ང

དམ་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་པས་དམ་པའི་དོན་ནོ། །ཡང་ན་དོན་དམ་པ་དང་མཐུན་པ་སྟེ། དོན་
དམ་པ་རྟོགས་པ་དང་རྗེས་སུ་མཐུན་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་དོན་དམ་པ་ནི་ཡོད་པས་དོན་དམ····
པ་དང་མཐུན་པའོ། །ཞེས་གསུང་ཤིང་དེ་ཡང་དོན་དམ་པར་འབྱུང་བའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་
མ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཞེས་པའི་དོན་དམ་པ་ནི་གང་ལ་བྱེད་ཅེས་པའི་ལན་དུ་དོན་དམ་པ་འཇོག་
ཚུལ་གསུམ་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལས་དང་པོ་ནི། དོན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཤེས་པ་
ནས་དམ་པའང་ཡིན་པས་དོན་དམ་པའོ་ཞེས་པའི་བར་དེ། དོན་དང་དམ་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་
ཡུལ་ལ་སྦྱར་ནས་བཤད་པའོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། ཡང་ན་དམ་པའི་དོན་དེ་ཞེས་
སོགས་ཏེ། དམ་པ་ནི་ཟག་མེད་རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་དང་། དོན་ནི་དེའི་
ཡུལ་ལ་བྱས་པ་སྟེ། དོན་དང་དམ་པ་གཉིས[219]ཡུལ་ཡུལ་ཅན་སོ་སོར་སྦྱར་བའོ། །
གསུམ་པ་ནི། ཡང་ན་དོན་དམ་པ་དང་མཐུན་པ་ཞེས་སོགས་ཏེ། །དེ་ཁོ་ན[220]ཉིད་ལ་
ཚུལ་བཞིན་དུ་དཔྱོད་པའི་ཐོས་བསམ་གྱི་ཤེས་རབ་ཡན་ཆད་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་མངོན་སུམ་དུ····
རྟོགས་པ་དང་རྗེས་སུ་མཐུན་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་དོན་དམ་པར་བྱས་པའོ། །འདི་ནི་དོན་
དང་དམ་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡུལ་ཅན་ལ་སྦྱར་བའོ། །འོ་ན་སྐབས་འདིར་འགོག་རྒྱུའི་དོན་
དམ་པ་དེ་གང་ལ་བྱེད་ཅེ[221]ན། དེ་ནི་རྟོག་གེ་འབར་བ་ལས་དོན་དམ་པ་ནི་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་ཏེ།
དེ་ལ་གཅིག་ནི་མངོན་པར་འདུ་བྱེད་པ་མེད་པར་འཇུག་པའི་འཇིག་རྟེན་ལས་འདས་པ······
ཟག་པ་མེད་པ་སྤྲོས་པ་མེད་པའོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི་མངོན་པར་འདུ་བྱེད་པ་དང་བཅས་
པར་འཇུག་པ་བསོད་ནམས་དང་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་རྗེས་སུ་མཐུན་པ་དག་པ་འཇིག་རྟེན་
པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྤྲོས་པ་དང་བཅས་པ་སྟེ། འདིར་དེ་དམ་བཅའ་བའི་ཁྱད་པར་
ཉིད་དུ་བཟུང་བས་ཉེས་པ་མེད་དོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེས་ན་སྐབས་འདིར་སྟོང་
བཤད་པའི་དོན་དམ་པ་གསུམ་པ་མཐུན་པའི་དོན་དམ་རིགས་ཤེས་རྗེས་དཔག་གི་ངོར······

ཡོད་པ་ལ་དོན་དམ་དུ་ཡོད་པ་དང་དེའི་ངོར་མེད་པ་ལ་དོན་དམ་དུ་མེད་པར་བྱའོ། །དེས་ན་སྒྱུ་མ་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་ན་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་དཔྱོད་པའི་རིགས་ཤེས་དེའི་ངོར་གྲུབ་དགོས་ཏེ། སྒྱུ་མ་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་ན་དེ་ཉིད་སྒྱུ་མའི་གནས་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། རིགས་ཤེས་དེ་ཉིད་གནས་ལུགས་འཇལ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་བློ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་སྒྱུ་མའི་ཆོས་ཉིད་དོན་དམ་དུ་གྲུབ་པར་ཐལ་ཏེ། རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ངོ་ན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། སྒྱུ་མའི་གནས་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེ་ན་སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་ན་གནས་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་དགོས་པ་དང་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ངོར་གྲུབ་དགོས་ཀྱང······གནས་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་པ་དང་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ངོར་གྲུབ་ན་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་མི་དགོས་པའི··ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡང་སྒྱུ་མ་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་ན་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་སྒྱུ་མ་བདེན་གྲུབ་ཏུ་རྙེད་དགོས་ཏེ་རིགས་ཤེས་ཉིད་དེ་ཡོད་མེད་དཔྱོད་བྱེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །སྒྱུ་མ་བདེན་པར་མེད་པ་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་རྙེད་ཀྱང་དེ་ལྟར་རྙེད་པ་དེ་སྒྱུ་མ་བདེན་པར་ཡོད··མེད་དཔྱད་ནས་བདེན་པར་མེད་པར་རྙེད་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་སྒྱུ་མའི་བདེན་མེད་བདེན་པར་ཡོད····མེད་དཔྱད་ནས་དེ་ཡོད་པར་རྙེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འདི་ནི་ལུགས་འདིའི་དཀའ་བའི་གནས་ཏེ། འདིའི་ཁྱད་པར་ལེགས་པར་མ་བྱེད་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་སྔོན་དུས་ཀྱི་མཁས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ཇོག་ལོཙྪ་བ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་ཤེས་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་ 222 པར་བཞེད་པ་དང་། རིག་པའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་ཆ་པ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་སེངྒེས་ཀྱང་བདེན་མེད་བདེན་གྲུབ་ཏུ་བཞེད་པ་སོགས་འཁྲུལ་པ་དུ་མ་བྱུང་བར་རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོ་གསུང་ངོ་། །ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པོ་དང་འཇུག་པའི་རྣམ་བཤད་ཆེན་མོར་སྤྱར་བཤད་པ་དེ་ལས་གཞན་ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱི་གཞུང་གི་སྐོར་དང་ཡེ་ཤེས་སྙིང་པོའི་བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་སྐོར་དང་དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་རང་འགྲེལ་དང་བཅས་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་དགག་བྱ་ངོས་འཛིན་གསལ་བར་མ་བཤད་ལ།

དབུས སྣང་བ་ལས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ ཡོད ཚུལ་བཤད་པ།་བཟློག་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཡོད་པ་ནི་བདེན་···
[223]པར་ཡོད་ཚུལ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་ལྟར་བཤད་དགོས་སོ་ཞེས་[224]གསུངས་པ་ལ་གཞན་ཕྱོགས་པ་ལ་
ཅིག ་ །ལེགས་ལྡན་སོགས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་ལས་དོན་དམ་དུ་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་གང་ཡང་མ་བསྟན་པར་[225]
དགོངས་སོ་སྙམ་ནས་རྗེ་བླ་མའི་གསུང་དེ་མི་འཐད་དེ། བདེན་གཉིས ལས། བློ་ལ་
སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁོ་ན། །ཀུན་རྫོབ་གཞན་ནི་ཅིག་[226]ཤོས་སོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པས་ཀུན་
རྫོབ་ཏུ་གྲུབ་ཚད་དང དོན་དམ་དུ གྲུབ་ཚད་གཉིས་ཀ བསྟན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་ཟེར་ལ། རང་
རེའི་མཁས་པ་སྤྱི་ལ་འགའ་ཞིག་གིས་ཀྱང་དེ་བདེན་པར་སྣང ཞེས་ཟེར་པ་ནི་རྗེ་བླ་མའི·····
གསུང་དང་གཞུང་གི་དོན་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་ལེགས་པར་མ་བརྟགས་པའི་ཅ་ཅོར་ཟད་དོ། །དེ་
འགོག་པ་ལ་མཁས་གྲུབ་ཆེན་པོ་འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པའི་རྡོ་རྗེས་བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ལུང་··
དེའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཅེས་པ་ཡན་ཆད་ཀྱིས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་གྲུབ་པ་ནི་བ་ལང་རྫི་ཡན་ཆད་ཀྱི་བློ་ལ·····
[227]སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་ལ་ཞེས་བཤད་ཅིང་། ལྷག་མས་དོན་དམ་དུ་གྲུབ་ཚད་པ་ལང་
རྫི་སོགས་ལ་མི་སྣང་བར་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྫར་སྤྱི་མ་འགྲེལ་པ་འགྲེལ་བཤད་དང་
བཅས་པས་གྲུབ་ལ་དེས་ཅིག་[228]ཤོས་མི་སྣང་བ་ལ་བྱེད་པར་རིགས་པས་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།
དེས་ན་ཁྱེད་ཅག་ལྟར་ན་པ་ལང་རྫི་སོགས་ཀྱིས [229]ཟིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་དག་ལ་ཆོས་གང་
ཡང་བདེན་གྲུབ་ཏུ་མི་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་དག་གིས་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་རྟོགས་ཟིན་པར་ཐལ།
དེ་དག་ལ་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་གྲུབ་པར་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་ན་གཞུང་དེས་ཀུན་
རྫོབ་དང་དོན་དམ་དུ་གྲུབ་ཚད་སྟོན་པ་མིན་གྱི་བདེན་གཉིས་ངོས་འཛིན་གྱི་གཞུང་ཡིན་ནོ··
ཞེས་གསུང་ངོ་། །དེ་ནི་གཞུང་ཆེན་མོ་ལ་ནང་བྱིན་ཚུད་པའི་མཁས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་འི་གསུང་
ཡིན་པས་ཤིན་ཏུ་ལེགས་སོད། ད་དུང་འདི་ལྟར་བཤད་ན་ལེགས་སམ་སྙམ་སྟེ། སྤྱིར་
དགག་བྱ་ལ་དོན དམ་གྱི་ཁྱད་པར་སྦྱར་པའི་དོན་དག་ལ་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། ཐོས་བསམ་

ང

སློམ་གསུམ་གྱི་རིགས་ཤེས་ལ་དོན་དམ་དང་ངེས་སྟོར་བཤད་པ་ལྟར་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་དོན་དམ་
དུ་གྲུབ་བར་བྱས་བ་གཅིག་དང་། བློ་གནོད་མེད་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་མིན་པའི་དོན་
གྱི་སྡོད་ལུགས་སུ་ཡོད་པ་ལ་དོན་དམ་དུ་ཡོད་པར་བཞག་པ་གཉིས་སོ། །དོན་དམ་
དཔྱོད་པའི་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་འགལ་ཟླ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་སུ་གྱུར་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་
འཛིན་གྱིས་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་ཚུལ་ནི་ཕྱི་མ་ལྟར་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་བདེན་མེད་སྒྲུབ་
པའི་ངགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་གཙོ་བོ་ནི་ཕྱི་མའི་བདེན་གྲུབ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པས་ལུགས་འདིའི་ལྟ་
བ་གཏན་ལ་འབེབས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་ཐོག་མར་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ངོས་གཟུང་
པའི་ཚེ་ཕྱི་མའི་བདེན་གྲུབ་ཏུ་འཛིན་ཚུལ་ངོས་འཛིན་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་སྔ་
མའི་དོན་དམ་དུ་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་དབུ་མ་སྣང་པོ་རྩ་འགྲེལ་དང་དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་རྩ་འགྲེལ་སོགས་
ལས་རྒྱས་པར་བཤད་པ་རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོ་རང་གིས་གསལ་བར་བཤད་པས། དོན་
དམ་པར་ཡོད་ཚུལ་དེ་ནི་དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་མ་གཏོགས་པའི་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་གཞུང་ཁུངས་ཐུབ་
གཞན་ལས་གསལ་བར་མ་བཤད་པར་རྗེ་བླམས་བཞེད་པའི་གོ་སྐབས་ག་ལ་ཡོད། འཛོག་
ཚུལ་གཉིས་པའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པའི་དོན་དམ་དུ་ཡོད་ཚུལ་གསལ་བར་བཤད་པ་ནི་གཞུང་
དེ་དག་ཏུ་ཡོད་ན་ཁྱེད་ཅག་གིས་སྟོན་ཅིག་དང་ཁོ་བོས་སྤྱོངས་གདབ་པར་བྱའོ། །གལ་
ཏེ་ཁྱེད་ཅག་གིས་དྲངས་པའི་བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ལུང་དེས་འཛོག་ཚུལ་གཉིས་པའི་དབང་དུ་
བྱས་པའི་དོན་དམ་དུ་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་ན། ཚིག་གང་གིས་བསྟན་
པ་སྟོན་ཅིག། གལ་ཏེ་གཞན་ཞི་ཅིག་ཤེས་སོ། །ཞེས་པས་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་
230
ཟེར་ན། དེ་ལྟར་ན་ཚིག་དེས་བཤད་པའི་དོན་དམ་དུ་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་ལྟར་གྲུབ་པའི་ཆོས་ཅིག་
མི་སྲིད་པར་ཐལ་ཏེ། འཛོག་ཚུལ་གཉིས་པའི་དོན་དམ་ནི་བདེན་གྲུབ་ལ་བྱ་དགོས་
ཤིང་བདེན་གྲུབ་ཡོད་པར་འདོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། དོན་

ང

དམ་བདེན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པར་ཐལ། དེ་གཞན་ནི་ཅིག་ཤོས་སོ་ཞེས་པའི་གཞུང་གི་སྐབས་
ནས་བསྟན་པའི་དོན་དམ་པ་དེར་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །མགུབ་ན། འགྲེལ་བཤད་
ལེགས་གཞན་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་ལས་གཞན་པའོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་འདིས་ནི་
རིགས་པ་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་ཉིད་ནི་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པའོ་ཞེས་སྟོན་ཏོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་
པའི་དོན་ཅི་ཡིན་སྟོན་ཅིག། གལ་ཏེ་བདེན་གྲུབ་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པར་འདོད་ན་ནི་དབུ་
མ་པའི་དྲི་མི་ཟྲོ་བར་ཟད་དོ། །དེས་ན་བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ལུང་གི་དོན་ནི་ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་
འདི་ཁོ་ན། ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཅེས[232] པས་ཐ་སྙད་པའི་ཚད་མ་ལ་ཡུལ་གྱི་གནས་ཚོད་དང་མཐུན་
པར་ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་ཞིང་མཐོང་བ་འདི་ཁོ་ན་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ་ཞེས་ཕྱེད་སྤྱི་མས་མཚན་ཉིད་···
དང་ཕྱེད་ཕྱི[233] ལས་མཚོན་བྱ་སྟོན་པ་ཡིན་ཞིང་། དེ་ཡང་སྣང་བའི་དོན་མཐོང་བ་ལ་བྱས་
ནས་བ་ལང་རྗི་ཡན་ཆད་གྲུབ་མཐས་བློ་བསྒྱུར་མ་བསྒྱུར་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་ཡུལ་སྟེང་དུ་ཇི་ལྟར་
གནས་པ་མཐོང་བ་དེ་ལྟར་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པར་གནས་པར་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་ཡང་དག···
པར་གྲུབ་པའི་དོན་ལ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་བཤད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ལ། ཁོ་ནའི་སྐབས་ཀྱང་རིགས་ཤེས་
ཀྱིས་རྙེད་པ་ཉིད་གཅོད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གཞན་ནི་ཅིག[234] ཤོས་སོ་ཞེས་པས་དེ་ལས་གཞན་
རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་རྙེས་པ་འམ་གྲུབ་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཅིག[235] ཤོས་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་
ཡིན་ཞེས་པ་སྟེ། གཞན་ནི་ཞེས་པས་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་ཅིག[236] ཤོས་སོ་ཞེས་པས་མཚོན་
བྱ་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་དག་ལ་དགོངས་ནས་རྒྱལ་ཚབ་རྗེས་དེའི་ཊཱི་ཀ་འགྲེལ་དུ། དེ་
ཡང་ཐ་སྙད་པའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་པའི་དོན་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པར་འཇོག་པ་བཞིན་དུ་རིགས···
ཤེས་ཀྱིས་རྙེད་པའི་དོན་ཁོ་ན་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་པའོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །
རང་འགྲེལ་འགྲེལ་བཤད་དང་བཅས་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པར་གསལ་བར་བཤད་
པས་གཞུང་འདིས་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་བདེན་ཚད་བསྟན་པར་ཤེས་རིག་དང་ལྡན་པ་སྤྱ···

ཞིག་སྨྲ། དེས་ན་རྗེ་བླ་མའི་གསུང་ལ་སྔོན་གྱི་གོ་སྐབས་ག་ལ་ཡོད། ཚུལ་འདི་ལྟར་བཤད་ན་གཞུང་གི་དགོངས་པར་འགྲོ་ཚབས[237] ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་སྟེ། རྗེ་བླ་མའི་དགོངས་པ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པ་འཛོག་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ལས་ལྟ་བ་གཏན་ལ་འབེབས་པ་ལ་ཕྱི་མ་ངེས་པ་ཤིན་ཏུ་གལ་ཆེ་བ་དང་ཕྱི་མའི་དོན་དམ་དུ་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་ན་གཏོགས་པའི་གཞུང་གཞན་ལས་གསལ་བར་མི་འབྱུང་བ་ལ་དགོངས་ནས་དེ་ལྟར་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཞུང་དོན་ཡང་བཤད་མ་ཐག་པ་ལས་གཞན་དུ་དྲང་དུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འོ་ན་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་གྱིས[238] བདེན་པར་འཛིན་ཚུལ་དང་དེའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པའི་བརྟག་པ་མཐའ་བཟུང་གི་བདེན་ཚད་རྗེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། འདི་ནི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་བཤད་པར་བྱའོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་རིགས་ཤེས་ལ་དོན་དམ་དུ་ཐེས་པའི་དོན་དམ་དང་དེའི་ངོར་གྲུབ་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡོད་ལ། འཛོག་ཚུལ་ཕྱི་མའི་དོན་དམ་དང་དེར་ཡོད་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་མི་སྲིད་དོ། །ཁྱད་པར་དེ་དག་མ་ཕྱེད་ན་སེམས་ཙམ་པས་འགྱུར་མེད་ཡོངས་གྲུབ་དོན་དམ་པ་ཡིན་ཞིང་གང་ཡིན་ན་དེར་དོན་དམ་པར་གྲུབ་པར་འདོད་པ་ལྟར་ལུགས་འདིར་ཡང་བདེན་སྟོང་དོན་དམ་པ་ཡིན་ན་དོན་དམ་པར་གྲུབ་དགོས་ལ་དོན་དམ་པར་མེད་ན་དོན་དམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ལོག་རྟོག་རྣམས་འབྱུང་ལ། འདི་ལེགས་པར་ཤེས་ན་གཤིས་ལུགས་ལ་དང་། དོན་དམ་དུ་མེད་ཟེར་བ་དང་། ཡང་ཆོས་ཉིད་ཡོད་པར་འདོད་ཅིང་དེ་ཉིད་གཤིས་ལུགས་དང་དོན་དམ་ཡིན་པར་སྨྲ་བ་མི་འགལ་བའི་གནད་རྣམས་ཤེས་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །གཉིས་པ་དེ་འགོག་པའི་རིགས་པ་བཤད་པ་ནི། སྤྱིར་འདི་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་ཡང་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཆེན་པོ་ལྔ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བཞེད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྟོག་གེ་འབར་བར་ཡང་ཕལ་ཆེ་བ་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། བདེན་གཉིས་རྩ་འགྲེལ་ལས་ཀྱང་མུ་བཞི་སྐྱེ་འགོག་ཉིད་རྩལ་དུ་གཏོན་

/ང༦

པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འོན་ཀྱང་རྟགས་དང་མཐུན་དཔེ་སྒྲུབ་སླ་བ་ལ་དགོངས་ནས་རྒྱ་མཚོར་
མཚུངས་པ་མགོ་སྙོམས་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་ལ་གཙོ་བོར་མཛད་དོ། དེ་ཡང་དབུ་མ་སྙིང་པོ་
ཙ་འགྲེལ་དུ་གཉི་ཕུང་པོ་ལྔ་དང་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་བཅུ་གཉིས་དང་ཁམས་བཅོ་བརྒྱད་རྣམས་སུ་…
བསྡུས་ནས་དེ་དག་ལས་ཀྱང་རགས་པ་དང་ཕྲ་བའི་རིམ་པས་དང་པོར་གཟུགས་ཕུང་དང་
དེ་ལས་ཀྱང་འབྱུང་བ་རྣམས་ལ་བརྟག་པར་མཛད་དོ། །དེ་ཡང་དབུ་མ་སྙིང་པོ་ལས།
འདིར་ནི་ས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དག [239] །དོན་དམ་པར་ན་འབྱུང་བ་ཡི། །ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ནི་
བྱས་ཕྱིར་དང་། །རྒྱུ་ལྡན་སོགས་ཕྱིར་ཤེས་པ་བཞིན། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །
ས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དག་ཅེས་པས་ནི་ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་ཁྱད་པར་འཛིན་ཅིང་སོགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲས་ཆུ་དང་
མེ་དང་རླུང་རྣམས་[240] ཅོད་གཞིར་འཛིན་ནོ། །དོན་དམ་པར་འབྱུང་[241] བའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མ
ཡིན་ཞེས་པས་ནི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་སྟོན་ཏོ། །དེ་ཡང་དོན་དམ་པར་ཞེས་པས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་
པའི་ངོ་བོ་མི་འགོག་ཅིང་ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་བཞིན་གྱི་བློ་ནི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་ས་ཡིན…
པར་དོན་གྱི་[242] སྡོད་ལུགས་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པ་འགོག་པར་སྟོན་ཏོ། །ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ན་ཡོད་ཞེས་
པས་འདིའི་ཆོས་སུ་དགག་སྒྲུབ་གཉིས་ལས་དགག་པ་དང་དེ་ལས་ཀྱང་མེད་དགག་ཁོ་ན་
འཛིན་པར་སྟོན་ཏོ། འགྲེལ་པ་ལས། འདིར་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཚིག་འདི་
ནི་མེད་པར་དགག་པའི་དོན་དུ་གཟུང་གི་མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པའི་དོན་དུ་ནི་མི་གཟུང་ངོ།།
ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །ཆོས་དང་ཆོས་ཅན་བསྡུས་པ་ནི་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་ནོ། །བྱས་ཕྱིར་
དང་ཞེས་པས་ནི་གཏན་ཚིགས་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལ་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་བསལ་བ་ནི།
གཞན་དག་ན་རེ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་ས་ལ་སོགས་པ་འབྱུང་བའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པར་བསྒྲུབ་
པ་མི་འཐད་དེ། ཁས་བླངས་དང་འགལ་མངོན་སུམ་དང་འགལ། གྲགས་པ་དང་
འགལ་བའི་ཕྱིར། དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། སྟོན་པའི་ལུང་ལས་འདི་སྐད་ཅེས། ཀྱེ་བྲམ་

ཟེ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཕུང་པོ་ལྔ་དང་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་བཅུ་གཉིས་དང་ཁམས་བཅོ་བརྒྱད་པོ་དག་གོ། །ཞེས་དང་། དེ་བཞིན་དུ་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི་གཟུགས་སུ་རུང་བའོ། །ཞེས་སོགས་ཕུང་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་དང་དེ་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་གསུངས་ལ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་ལུང་དེ་ཚད་མར་ཁས་བླངས་བཞིན་དུ་ཆོས་དེ་དག་འགོག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །

གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། ཡུལ་ཀྱི་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ངེས་པ་ལ་འཇུག་པ་ན་དབང་པོ་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་པར་གྲགས་ལ་མཐོང་བ་ལས་ལྷག་པའི་ཚད་མ་གཞན་མེད་པའི་[243]ཕྱིར་དང་། ཁྱོད་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མིག་གིས་ཀྱང་འབྱུང་བའི་དྭངས་བས་དང་གཟུགས་སོགས་མཐོང་ཞིང་འཛིན་པ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་བྱ་བ་ཡང་བྱེད་བཞིན་དུ་དེ་འགོག་པ་ཡང་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་བསྙོན་པར····འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། ས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་དེ་དག་གི་སྲ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ནི་གནོལ་བ་ཡན་ཆད་འཛིག་རྟེན་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་གྲགས་པའི····ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། སྐྱོན་གསུམ་ག་མེད་དེ། ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་གིས་དོན་དམ་པར་ཞེས་པ་དམ་བཅས་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་ལ་སྦྱར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ཡང་སྐྱོན་དང་པོ་མེད་དེ། བཅོམ་
244 ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་ཆོས་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དང་མཚན་ཉིད་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ་མཛད་པ་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡིན་ལ་དོན་དམ་པར་ནི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པར་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཤེར་ཕྱིན་ལས། ཀཽ་ཤི་ཀ་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སྟོང་སྟེ། ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སྟོང་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པའོ། །དངོས་པོ་མེད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པའོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །

སྐྱོན་གཉིས་པ་ཡང་མེད་དེ། དབང་པོའི་ཤེས་པ་ནི་རང་བཞིན་འཆོལ་པ་ལ་བླུན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། མཐོང་བ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཉམས་པ་མེད་བཞིན་དུ་ཡང་རབ་རིབ་ཅན་ལ་སྐྲ་ཤད་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྣང་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །སྐྱོན་གསུམ་པ་ཡང་མེད་དེ།

འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་ནི་སྔོངས་པའི་དབང་དུ་གྱུར་པས་རང་བཞིན་འཚོལ་བའི་ནུས་པ་མེད་ལ།
འདིར་ནི་དོན་དམ་པ་དཔྱོད་པའི་སྐབས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ནུས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་
པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ནུས་པ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་རྒྱུ་དང་རྐྱེན་གྱིས་མངོན་པར་བསྐྱེད་པའོ། །
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བའི་ངག་ནི། གང་དང་གང་ནུས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་དེ་
དང་དེ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་འབྱུང་བའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་བཞིན་
ཞེས་པའོ། །འདིར་ནི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་དཔེ་དང་གཏན་ཚིགས་
ནི་མ་བསྟན་ཏེ། དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ནི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་སུ་གྱུར་པ་དངོས་པོ་གང་ལ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་
ཡོད་པ་ནི་རྡུལ་ཕྲན་ཙམ་ཡང་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྒྱུ་ལྡན་སོགས་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པས་ནི་གཏན་
ཚིགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གྲངས་གཞན་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྒྱུ་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཉིད་དང་དངོས་པོ་ཉིད་
དང་ཤེས་བྱ་ཉིད་དང་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་ཉིད་ལ་སོགས་པའོ། །འདིར་གལ་ཏེ་བ་ནི་དོན་
དམ་པར་ཡོད་ན་ནི་ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་བཞིན་གྱི་བློ་ཡི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་མིན་པར་རང་
ཉིད་ཀྱི་གནས་ལུགས་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་ཡོད་དགོས་ལ། དེ་ལྟར་ན་རང་དབང་དུ་ཡོད་
དགོས་པས་གཞན་ལ་ལྟོས་པ་ཡང་མི་ལྟོས་དགོས་སོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་ནུས་པ་ཡིན་པར་མཚུངས།
བཞིན་དུ་ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་འབྱུང་བ་མ་ཡིན་ལ། ས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ནི་འབྱུང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཁྱད་
པར་དབྱེ་བར་ནུས་པའི་ཚད་མ་མེད་དོ་སྙམ་དུ་དགོངས་ནས་གོང་ལྟར་རྒྱུ་མཚན་མཚུངས་
པ་མགོ་སྙོམས་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་ལེགས་པར་ཤེས་དགོས་སོ། །

གཞན་ཡང་རྟོག་གེ་འབར་བ་ལས། འབྱུང་བ་དེ་དག་གི་བྱེ་བྲག་ལ་བརྟག་པ་དང་།
ཕུང་པོ་གཞན་རྣམས་བརྟག་པ་དང་། སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ལ་བརྟག་པ་དང་། ཁམས་ལ་བརྟག་
པ་དང་། མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། མཚན་གཞི་དང་། སྐྱེ་འཇིག་གི་བྱེད་པ་དང་།
བཅིང་ཐར་བརྟག་པ་སོགས་དུ་མ་གསུངས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་རིགས་པའི་འགྲོས་གཅིག་གོ།
245

ང

ལུང་གི་སྒོ་ནས་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ནི། བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་ནང་གི་སའི་ཁམས་གང་ཡིན་པ་དང་། ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་སའི་ཁམས་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ན་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པས་གཉིས་སུ་མེད་པའི་དོན་དང་གཉིས་སུ་མེད་པ་དང་གཉིས་སུ་བྱར་མེད་པ་སྟེ། འདི་ལྟ་སྟེ། མཚན་ཉིད་མེད་པ་དང་མཚན་ཉིད་གཅིག་པར་མངོན་པར་རྫོགས་པར་སངས་རྒྱས་སོ། །ཞེས་དང་། བློ་ཡིས་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད་པ་ན། གང་ཕྱིར་དངོས་ཉིད་མ་རྙེད་[246]པ། །དེ་ཕྱིར་འབྱུང་བ་མེད་པ་དང་། །དངོས་ཉིད་མེད་པར་ང་སྨྲའོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་རྣམས་སོ། །གཅིག་ཏུ་སྤྲུལ་[247]གྱི་གདན་ཚིགས་ཀྱང་གསུངས་ཏེ། རྟོག་གེ་འབར་བ་ལས། དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་ཡང་དོན་དམ་པར་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྐྱེ་དང་གཅིག་གམ་ཐ་དད་དུ་དམིགས་སུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། བདག་དང་སེམས་ཅན་དང་གང་ཟག་ལ་སོགས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་སོ། །ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་སྐྱེ་བ་ལྟར་ཡོད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ལུང་ནི་མདོ་ལས། དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་ཟག་མེད་དགེ་བ་ཡི། ཆོས་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་བརྙན་ཡིན་ཏེ་འདི་ལ་ནི། །དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་མེད་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་མེད་ཀྱང་། །འཇིག་རྟེན་ཀུན་ལ་གཟུགས་བརྙན་ཀུན་ཏུ་སྣང་། །ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པའོ། །

གསུམ་པ་གདན་ལ་ཕབ་པའི་བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་ལ་གཉིས། དངོས་དང་ངེས་དོན་ནོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་དབྱེ་གཞི་ནི་ཤེས་བྱའོ། །དབྱེ་བ་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་བདེན་པ་དང་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་གཉིས་སོ། །ཁ་ཅིག་ཐ་དད་ནི་མདོ་སྡེ་དགོངས་འགྲེལ་ལས། ངོ་བོ་ཐ་དད་དང་ལྡོག་པ་གཅིག་པ་ལ་རིགས་པའི་གནོད་པ་བཞི་བཞི་གསུངས་པ་ལྟར་འདིར་ཡང་བཞེད་པས ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་ལ་ལྡོག་པ་ཐ་དད་དུ····· བྱའོ། དེ་ལ་ངོ་བོ་ཐ་དད་འགོག་པའི་རིགས་པ་བཞི་ནི། རྒྱུ་གྲུའི་གནས་ལུགས་རྟོགས་པས་རྒྱུ་གྲུ་ལ་བདེན་འཛིན་གྱི་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་མི་ཆོད་པར་ཐལ་བ་དང་། རྒྱུ་གྲུའི་

ཆོས་ཉིད་དེ་མྱུ་གུའི་སྟོང་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ་བ་དང་། མྱུ་གུ་ལ་བདེན་པ་བཀག་ཙམ་མྱུ་གུའི་ཆོས་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ་བ་དང་། སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་རྒྱུད་ལ་ཡང་བདེན་འཛིན་དང་བདེན་མེད་རྟོགས་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་གཉིས་དུས་ཅིག[248]ཅར་དུ་འཇུག་པར་ཐལ་ཏེ། མྱུ་གུ་དང་མྱུ་གུའི་ཆོས་ཉིད་གཉིས་ངོ་བོ་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པ་སྟེ། ཐལ་བ་བཞི་ག་ཡང་ལྡོག་པ་འཕེན་པའི་ཐལ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ལྡོག་པ་གཅིག་པ་འགོག་པའི་རིགས་པ་བཞི[249]་ནི། སོ་སོ་སྐྱེ་བོས་ཀྱང་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པར་ཐལ་བ་དང་། ཆོས་ཉིད་ཀུན་ནས་ཉོན་མོངས་ཀྱི་དམིགས་པར་ཐལ་བ་དང་། འཕགས་པའི་ལམ་བཙལ་མི་དགོས་པར་ཐལ་བ་དང་། ཀུན་རྫོབ་ལ་དབྱེ་བ་མི་འདྲ་བ་རྣམ་ཚོགས་མེད་པར་ཐལ་ཏེ། གཟུགས་དང་དེའི་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་གཉིས་ལྡོག་པ་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པ་སྟེ། བཞི་ག[250]་ཡང་ལྡོག་པ་འཕེན་པའི་ཐལ་བའོ། །བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི། ཐ་སྙད་པའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དོན་དམ་དཔྱོད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་ཤེས་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་པའི་དོན་ནི་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད། འདིར་དོན་དམ་ལ་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་དངོས་དང་མཐུན་པའི་དོན་དམ་གཉིས་བཤད་དེ། བདེན་གཉིས་ལས། སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་བཀག་པ་ཡང་། །ཡང་དག་པ་དང་མཐུན་པའི་ཕྱིར། །དོན་དམ་ཡིན་པར་ཁོ་བོ་འདོད། །ཅེས་དང་། དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་ལས་ཀྱང་། དེ་ལྟར་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་འདི་ཡང་དོན་དམ་པ་དང་མཐུན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དོན་དམ་པ་ཞེས་བྱའི། །དངོས་སུ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དངོས་སུ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པ་སྤྲོས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་འདས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། གཞན་ཡང་བདེན་གཉིས་ལས། བསྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་རིགས་པ་ནི། དོན་དམ་ཡིན་ཏེ་ཞེས་དང་། དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་ལས་ཀྱང་། གང་ཡང་དོན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་སྨྲས་པ་དེ་ལ་ཡང་དོན་[251]

ནི་འདུ་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་དེ། ཡང་དག་པའི་ཐོས་པ་དང་བསམ་པ་དང་བསྒོམས་པ་ལས་
བྱུང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་[252]དོན་དམ་པ་
ཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ། འདིའི་དོན་དམ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པས་ཡུལ་ཆོས་
ཉིད་ལ་དོན་དམ་པར་བཤད་པ་དང་ཡུལ་ཅན་རིགས་ཤེས་ལ་དོན་དམ་པར་བཤད་པ་གཉིས་
ཡོད་ལ་དེ་རེ་རེ་ལ་ཡང་གཉིས་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། ཡུལ་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ནི་མཉམ་གཞག་ཟག་
མེད་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ངོར་གཉིས་སྣང་གི་སྤྲོས་པ་དང་བདེན་པའི་སྤྲོས་པ་གཉིས་ཆར་དང་བྲལ་
བའི་དོན་དམ་དངོས་དང་། རིགས་ཤེས་རྟོག་བཅས་ཀྱི་ངོར་ནི་བདེན་པའི་སྤྲོས་པ་དང་
བྲལ་ཡང་གཉིས་[253]སྣང་གི་སྤྲོས་པ་དང་མ་བྲལ་བས་སྤྲོས་པ་ཕྱོགས་གཅིག་ཙམ་དང་བྲལ་བ་
ཡིན་ལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཡུལ་སྟོང་ཉིད་དེ་སྐུར་དོན་དམ་དངོས་ཡིན་ཀྱང་རིགས་ཤེས་རྟོག་
བཅས་དེའི་ངོར་སྤྲོས་པ་གཉིས་ཆར་དང་བྲལ་བའི་[254]དོན་དམ་མ་ཡིན་པ་སྟེ། ཡུལ་གྱི་
དོན་དམ་ལ་འཇོག་ཚུལ་གཉིས་སོ། །འཕགས་པའི་མཉམ་གཞག་མི་རྟོག་ཡེ་ཤེས་ནི་
དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་འཇུག་པ་ན་སྤྲོས་པ་གཉིས་ཆར་རང་གི་ཡུལ་དུ་གཅོད་ནུས་པས་དོན་དམ་
པ་དངོས་དང་། རྟགས་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་འཇལ་བའི་རིགས་ཤེས་རྟོག་བཅས་
ནི་རང་གི་ཡུལ་དུ་བདེན་པའི་སྤྲོས་པ་གཅོད་ནུས་ཀྱང་གཉིས་སྣང་གི་སྤྲོས་པ་གཅོད་མི་ནུས་
པས་སྔ་མ་དང་རྣམ་པ་རྗེས་སུ་མཐུན་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས་དོན་དམ་དུ་བཞག་པ་མཐུན་པའི་དོན་དམ་
སྟེ་ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་དོན་དམ་འཇོག་ཚུལ་གཉིས་སོ། མདོར་བསྡུ་ན་ཡུལ་ཆོས་ཉིད་དོན་དམ་
བདེན་པ་དངོས་དང་། ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་དངོས་མ་ཡིན་མོད་ཀྱང་
གཞུང་ལས་བཤད་ཚོད་ལ་ནི་ཡང་དོན་དམ་པར་བཤད་པ་དང་། དེ་དག་རེ་རེ་ལ་ཡང་
དངོས་དང་རྗེས་མཐུན་པ་གཉིས་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཡོད་པར་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །དོན་
དམ་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་སོགས་ཕུང་སོགས་ཀྱི་སྟེང་དུ་བཀག་པའི་མ་ཡིན་དགག་གི་སྟོང་པ་ནི་དོན་

དམ་བདགས་པ་བ་དང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་མཚན་ཉིད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྣང་ཚུལ་དེ་ནི་རང་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མཐོང་བའི་བློ་ནི་ངོར་གཉིས་སྣང་དང་བཅས་པ་ཁོ་ནར་འཆར་གྱི་གཉིས་སྣང་དང་བྲལ་བར་གཏན་མི་འཆར་བའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ཡང་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྣང་ཚུལ་དེ་ནི་སྣང་གཞི་དེ་དག་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་སྣང་བའི་བློ་སྐྱེད་པའི་ཚད་མ་མིག་ཤེས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལའང་སྣང་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འདིས་ནི་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ཇི་སྙེད་པ་མཁྱེན་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་དང་འཕགས་པ་སློབ་པའི་རྗེས་ཐོབ་ཀྱི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ན་ཡིན་དགག་སྒྱུ་མ་ལྟ་བུའི་དོན་འཇལ་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་སྣང་སྟོང་གཉིས་ཚོགས་རྣམས་ཀྱང་རྣམ་གྲངས་པའི་དོན་དམ་ཡིན་གྱི་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་དངོས་མིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །གཞན་ཡང་དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་ལས། ཆོས་དང་གང་ཟག་ལ་བདག་མེད་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ནི་རིགས་པ་དང་ལྡན་པས་དམ་པ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དོན་ཀྱང་དེ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སློབ་པ་སྦྱོང་པ་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཆེད་དུ་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ཡེ་ཤེས་དམ་པ་ཉིད་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་དོན་ཏེ། ཡུལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དོན་དམ་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །ཞེས་ཆོས་དང་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་གཉིས་ཀ་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པར་བཤད་ཅིང་། རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཙ་ཤེ་ཊཱིཀ་ཆེན་ལས་ཀྱང་། དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཕྲུང་པོ་ངེ་ཆོས་དང་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་སྤྲོས་པ་བཅད་ཙམ་ནི་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་མཁྱེན་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཟག་པ་མེད་པས་རྟོགས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ལ། དེའི་ངོར་གང་ཟག་དང་ཕྲུང་པོ་འི་གཉིས་སྣང་གི་སྤྲོས་པ་ཡང་ཞི་བ་ཡིན་པས་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པའོ་ཞེས་ལུགས་འདིས་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་ཀྱང་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པར་འདོད་པར་གསུངས་ལ། ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པོ་ལས་ཀྱང་། 255 དབུ་མ་སྣང་བའི་ལུང་དོན་བདག་མེད་གཉིས་ཀ་དོན་དམ་པ་མཚན་ཉིད་པར་བསྟན་པར་བཤད་དོ། །རྒྱལ་ཚབ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པའི་བཞེད་

གཉིས་དར་ཊཱི་ཀ་ལས་ཀྱང་། དེ་དག་དང་མཐུན་པར་བདག་མེད་གཉིས་ཀ་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པར་བཤད་དོ། །གཞན་ཡང་ལུགས་འདིར་རང་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་ཚད་མས་གཉིས་སྣང་ནུབ་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། རང་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པའི་བློས་གཉིས་སྣང་དང་བཅས་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དུ་བྱ་བ་ནི་གྲགས་ཆེ་ཞིང་། དེ་ལྟར་ན་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པའི་འཕགས་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བར་ཆད་མེད་ལམ་གྱིས་ཀྱང་རང་ཡུལ་ལ་ཆུ་ལ་ཆུ་བཞག་ལྟར་གཉིས་སྣང་ནུབ་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་མཉམ་པར་བཞག་པ་ལས་མ་འདས་པས་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པར་ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེ་ལ་ཡང་གཞན་དག་ན་རེ། གཉིས་སྣང་ལ་རང་ལས་ཐ་དད་པའི་གཉིས་སྣང་དང་བདེན་སྣང་དང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་སྣང་བ་ལ་གཉིས་སྣང་དུ་བཤད་པ་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་དང་པོ་མེད་ཀྱང་ཐ་མ་ཡོད་པས་གཉིས་སྣང་དང་བཅས་པ་མི་འགལ་ལ། ཤེར་ཕྱིན་གྱི་མདོ་ལས། གཟུགས་བ་དག་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་ཉེ་བར་སྟོན་པ་ཡང་ཤེར་ཕྱིན་ལྟར་བཅོས་པ་ཡིན་པར་གསུངས་པ་དང་། ཤེར་ཕྱིན་ནུལ་མར་སྤྱོད་ན་དམིགས་པ་མེད་པའི་སྟོང་ཉིད་ལ་སྤྱོད་དགོས་པར་གསུངས་པས་ཐེག་པ་འོག་མའི་འཕགས་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པའི་མཁྱེན་པ་ཡང་དམིགས་བཅས་ཀྱི་ཤེར་ཕྱིན་ལས་མ་འདས་པའི་ཕྱིར་གཉིས་སྣང་དང་བཅས་པར་འཇོག་གོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་ཤིང་སྤྱོང་ཐུན་ཆེན་མོར་ཡང་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་དང་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་དག་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པར་མི་འདོད་ཅིང་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་འགོག་པའི་རིགས་པ་ཡང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དཔྱོད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པར་འདོད་དོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེ་ལ་ཕྱོགས་སྔ་མ་ལྟར་ན་འཕགས་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བར་ཆད་མེད་ལམ་དེའི་ངོར་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་སྣང་བ་མེད་པ་ནི་ད་དུང་བསྒྲུབ་

པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་གྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་སུ་མི་རུང་ལ། ཕྱུང་གི་དོན་ཡང་རྣམ་པ་གཞན་དུ་འཆད་དུ་རུང་བར་སྣང་ངོ། །རང་རིག་ཁས་ལེན་པའི་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ལྟར་ན་རང་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་ཚད་མས་གཉིས་སྣང་ནུབ་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དུ་འཇོག་པ་ལ་ཡང་དཔྱད་བདག་དགོས་སོ། །གཞན་ཡང་གང་ཟག་རང་རྒྱ་བ་ཐུབ་པོ་དང་གཅིག་དུ་བྲལ་གྱིས་སྟོང་པར་གཏན་ལ་འབེབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་དེ་བློ་གནོད་མེད་ལ་སྣང་བའི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་ས་མ་ཆོས་པར་དོན་གྱི་རྫོད……ལུགས་ལ་དཔྱོད་པའི་རིགས་པ་ཡིན་ནམ་མིན། ཡིན་ན་དེ་ཙམ་གྱིས་དོན་དམ་དཔྱོད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པར་འགྲོ་འམ་མི་འགྲོ། དོན་དམ་དཔྱོད་བྱེད་དུ་སོང་ཡང་རིགས་པ་དེས་དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་གང་ཟག་རང་རྐྱ་བ་དེ་མེད་པར་རྙེད་པ་ལ་དོན། དམ་དཔྱོད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་རྙེད་པས་ཁྱབ་བམ་མ་ཁྱབ། དེ་ལ་ཡང་བློ་ངོ་ལ་ལྟོས་དེ་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་རྙེད་པའི་དོན་དམ་དངོས་སུ་སོང་མ་སོང་གི་ཆ་གཉིས་འཕྱེད་མི་འཕྱེད་སོགས་ཞིབ་པར་བརྟགས་དེ་ཊཱི་ཡབ་སྲས་གསུམ་གྱི་གསུང་རབ་རྣམས་ཀུང་བསྒྲིགས་ནས་ཅིད་པ་སྤྱོང……ལུགས་ཤིག་ཤེས་ན་མཁས་པ་མགུ་བའི་གདམས་དུ་འགྱུར་བར་སྣང་ངོ།། གསུང་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་གཅིག་ཙམ་མཐོང་བས་ཕྱོགས་ཅིག་ཤོས་རས་སུ་འཛིན་པ་དང་། རང་བཟོས་འཁྲུ་སྟོན་གང་ཐུབ་བྱེད་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཆོས་སླ་པར་མི་འོས་སོ། །ཚ་ཤེའི་རབ་དབྱེ་[256]བཅོ་བརྒྱད་པའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲོན་མ་ལས། གལ་ཏེ་ཕུང་པོ་བདག་ཡིན་ན། །
[257]སྐྱེ་དང་འཇིག་པ་ཅན་དུ་འགྱུར། ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱི་སྐབས་སུ། འདིར་སྨྲས་པའི་ཚིག་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་འབྱུང་བ་དང་འབྱུང་བ་འདུས་པ་དང་དབང་པོ་དང་དབང་པོ་འདུས་པ་དང་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་དང་དབང་པོ་དང་བཅས་པའི་ལུས་དང་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་དང་བཅས་པའི་ལུས་ནི་བདག་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྐྱེ་བ་དང་འཇིག་པའི་ཆོས་ཅན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

དཔེར་ན་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་འབྱུང་བ་དག་བཞིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་སོགས་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་
སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་རེ་རེ་བཞིན་ནས་དོན་དམ་པ་ཞེས་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་སྦྱོར་བར་མཛད་ལ།
ནང་དང་ཕྱི་རོལ་ཉིད་དག་ལ། །བདག་དང་བདག་གི་ཟད་གྱུར་ན། །ཉེ་བར་ལེན་
པ་འགག་འགྱུར་ཞིང་། །དེ་ཟད་པས་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་ཟད། ཅེས་པའི་ཐད་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་པ་
ལས་ཀྱང་། །ཐར་པ་ནི་ཡང་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་པ་མཐོང་[258] བའི་ཕྱིར་འཕགས་པ་
ཉན་ཐོས་དང་རང་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ཡིན་ནོ། །སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་[259] རིག་པས་འགྲོ་བ་རྣམས་
ཀྱིས་ནི་ཉོན་མོངས་པའི་སྒྲིབ་པ་དང་ཤེས་བྱའི་སྒྲིབ་པ་སྤངས་པས་ཐོབ་སྟེ། ཉོན་མོངས་
པའི་སྒྲིབ་པ་སྤོང་བའི་[260] ཐབས་ནི་ཇི་སྐད་བསྟན་པ་དེ་དག་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་རབ་ཏུ་དེར་
[261] བཤད་པའི་རིགས་པ་དེ་རྣམས་ཐེག་དམན་གྱི་རིགས་ཅན་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་བསྒོམ་པར་བྱ་
བར་གསུངས་ཤིང་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་གིས་སྟོང་ཚུལ་དེ་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དོན་དུ་ཡང་.........
གསུངས་ཏེ། བཤད་མ་ཐག་པའི་གཞུང་དེའི་ཐད་འགྲེལ་ལས། དེ་ལྟར་ནང་དང་ཕྱི་
[262] རོལ་གྱི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་རྟོགས་པར་བྱེད་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནའི་ཉལ་འབྱོར་པ...
རིམ་དེ་དག་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་དུ་རྟོགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེ་ཀ་གི་འབར་
བའི་ ཉན་ཐོས་ཀྱི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་ལེའུ་ལས་ཀྱང་དེ་དང་[263] འཐུན་པ་མང་
དུ་གསུངས་ཏེ་འདིར་མ་སྤྲོས་སོ། །ཚུལ་འདིས་མདོ་སྡེ་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་
[264] ལ་དགོས་པ་མེད་ཀྱང་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པས་གཟུང་འཛིན་གཉིས་སྟོང་
གི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་བདེན་གཉིས་གང་དུ་འདོད་པའང་བརྟག་པར་བྱའོ། །རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་
ལུགས་ལ་འགོག་བདེན་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པར་འདོད་པའི་ཐོགས་ལྡང་སྟོང་ཐུན་ཆེན་མོ...
ནས་གསོད་བྱེད་གསུངས་པ་རྣམས་འཇུག་ཚབས་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་བར་སྣང་ལ་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་ཆ་ཐོང་
ལམ་ནས་གྲོལ་ལམ་གྱིས་མཐོང་སྤང་[265] སྤངས་པའི་འགོག་པ་མངོན་དུ་བྱས་པར་ནི་ཕ་རོལ་གྱི་

ཟབ་བར་ཁམས་ལེན་དགོས་ལ། དེ་ལྟར་ན་རྣམ་གྲོལ་ལམ་གྱིས་འགོག་ང་དེ་མངོན་སུམ་
དུ་བྱས་པའི་དོན་ཡང་དེ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པ་ལས་གཞན་དུ་འོས་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་།
ལམ་ངེས་མངོན་སུམ་[266]དུ་རྟོགས་པའི་ཡུལ་ནི་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པར་འདོད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།།
དེར་མ་ཟད་ཞེས་བཟོད་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་བཅུ་དྲུག་གི་བཟོད་པ་བརྒྱད་བར་ཆད་མེད་ལམ་དང་…
ཤེས་པ་བརྒྱད་རྣམ་གྲོལ་ལམ་དུ་འཇོག་པའི་ཚེ་བར་ཆད་མེད་ལམ་གྱི་མཇུག་ཐོགས་ཁོ་…
ནར་ཤེས་པ་གཞན་གྱིས་བར་མ་ཆོད་པར་བློ་བུར་དྲི་བྲལ་གྱི་འགོག་བདེན་ཐོབ་པའི་རྣམ་…
གྲོལ་ལམ་གྱི་ངོ་བོར་གྱུར་པའི་ཤེས་པ་བརྒྱད་[267]ཀྱིས་པ་དེས་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་སྤངས་པའི་…
ཁྱད་པར་མངོན་དུ་མ་བྱས་ན་བཟོད་པ་བརྒྱད་དང་ཁྱད་པར་ཅི་ཡང་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་ལ།
དེ་ལས་ལངས་པའི་རྗེས་ཐོབ་ཀྱི་གནས་སྐབས་སུ་འགོག་བདེན་མངོན་དུ་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་མེད་པས་
མཐོང་སྤང་སྤངས་པའི་འགོག་པ་ནམ་ཡང་མངོན་དུ་མི་བྱེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །རིགས་
བ་འདྲེས་[268]ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་རྒྱ་ལ་ཡང་དཔྱད་བར་བྱ་བའི་གནས་དུ་མ་ཞིག་འདུག་པས་བློ་གྲོས་
དང་ལྡན་ཞིང་སྒོམ་ཁམས་ཆེ་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ད་དུང་ལེགས་པར་བརྟུད་བཅད་པར་བྱའོ། །
ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པའི་དབྱེ་བ་ལ། བདེན་གཉིས་ལས། [269]བརྟགས་པའི་དོན་གྱིས་
དབེན་གྱུར་པ། །དངོས་ཙམ་བརྟེན་ནས་གང་སྐྱེས་དེ། །ཡང་དག་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཤེས་
པར་བྱ། ཞེས་དང་། ཡང་དག་མིན་ན་ཀུན་བརྟགས་ཡིན། ཞེས་ཡང་དག་
ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ་དང་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ་གཉིས་སུ་བཤད་དོ། །མཚན་ཉིད་ནི།
སྣང་དུ་འདྲ་ཡང་དོན་བྱེད་དག །ནུས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་མི་ནུས་ཕྱིར། །ཡང་དག་ཡང་
དག་མ་ཡིན་པའི། །ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་ནི་དབྱེ་བ་བྱས། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པས་བསྟན་ཏོ།།
དེ་ལ་སྤྱིར་ཟླ་གཉིས་སོགས་དང་གཞན་སྡེས་བརྟགས་པའི་གཙོ་བོ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་
ཡང་ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ་རྣམས་ནི་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཙམ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། གཉིས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ [270]

ང

·ཕྱིར་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཞུང་ཚན་སྔ་མས་དོན་དམ་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པར་བསྟན་པ་མིན་ནོ། །སྣང་ཚུལ་ལྟར་དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པ་དང་མི་ནུས་པ་ཙམ་ཡང་དག་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ་དང་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དུ་འདོད་པ་ནི་མི་འཐད་དེ། གཞི་དེ་སྣང་ཚུལ་ལྟར་དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པར་ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་ཀྱང་ཡང་དག་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་དོན་ཚད་མས་མ་གྲུབ་པ་དུ་མ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཞན་དུ་ན་གྲུབ་མཐས་བློ་མ་བསྒྱུར་བའི་སོ་སོ་སྐྱེ་བོས་ཀྱང་ས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ་བདེན་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་དོན་ཚད་མས་ཁེགས་པར་ཐལ་ཏེ། དེས་དེ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཡིན་པར་ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་ཅིང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་དོན་རྫུན་པ་ལ་བྱེད་པར་འདོད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་ཐ་སྙད་པའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་པའི་དོན་གང་ཞིག །རང་སྣང་བའི་བློ་ལ་སྣང་བ་ལྟར་དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡང་དག་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ་དང་། དེ་གང་ཞིག །རང་སྣང་བའི་བློ་ལ་སྣང་བ་ལྟར་དོན་བྱེད་མི་ནུས་པའི་ཆོས་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དུ་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །ཡང་དག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་དབྱེ་བ་ནི་རྟོགས་པར་སླ་ལ་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ནི་རྟོག་མེད་ཤེས་པའི་སྣང་བ་མེ་ལོང་ནང་གི་བྱད་བཞིན་གྱི་གཟུགས་བརྙན་དང་། རྟོག་པའི་གཟུང་ཡུལ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱང་ཡིན་ལ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་ནོ། །གྲུབ་མཐས་བཏགས་པའི་གང་ཟག་དང་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་ལ་སོགས་པ་ནི་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པར་མི་གཟུང་སྟེ། ཚད་མས་ཁེགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གལ་ཏེ་དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་ལས། བསྟན་བཅོས་བྱེད་པ་ཁ་ཅིག་གིས་གྲགས་པ་ལས་འདས་ཏེ་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བརྟགས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་དངོས་པོར་ཏེ་བར་བཏགས་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡོད་ཅེས་བྱ་སྟེ། དེ་ན་གྲགས་པར་ཡང་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གང་ཡང་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་འབྱུང་བ་དང་རྗེས་སུ་

མཐུན་པར་རབ་ཏུ་བརྟགས་པ་དཔེར་ན། འདི་ན་བདག་གམ་སེམས་ཅན་མེད། ཆོས་འདི་
རྒྱུ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཡིན། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལྟ་བུ་དེ་ནི་ཡང་དག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡོད་ཅེས་བྱའོ།།
ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་འདིས་བདག་གཉིས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཡང་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པར་…
བསྟན་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནམ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ལྟར་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེས་གྲུབ་མཐའི་དབང་ཁོ་ནས་
བརྟགས་པའི་དོན་རྣམས་ནི་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡོད་པར་བསྟན་གྱི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པར་…
བསྟན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཞན་དུ་ན་དེ་ནི་གྲགས་པར་ཡང་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་
གསུངས་པ་དང་འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ལུགས་འདིས་ཡུལ་མ་གཏོགས་
ཡུལ་ཅན་ལ་ཡང་ལོག་གི་ཁྱད་པར་མི་འབྱེད་ཅིང་དེ་ཡང་རང་མཚན་ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པར་…
བཞེད་པ་ལ་ཐུག་གོ། རང་མཚན་ཁས་མི་ལེན་ན་དབང་ཤེས་ལ་གཟུང་ཡུལ་གསལ་
བར་སྣང་བར་འདྲ་བ་ལ། ཆུ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྣང་བ་ལྟར་དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པའི་ཡང་
དག་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དང་། ཟླ་གཉིས་དང་ཟླ་བ་གཉིས་སྣང་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྣང་བ་ལྟར་དོན་
བྱེད་མི་ནུས་པའི་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་བཞེད་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། དེ་ལྟར་ན་ཆུ་
འཛིན་དབང་ཤེས་ལ་ཆུ་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པར་སྣང་ན་སྣང་བ་ལྟར་དོན་བྱེད་…
མི་ནུས་པའི་ལོག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཐལ་བ་བཟློག་ཏུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཞན་ཡང་
གཟུགས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་བདེན་མེད་ཀྱི་འགལ་ཟླ་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ…
འདོད་པར་ཐལ། རང་མཚན་མཐར་ཐུག་དཔྱོད་པའི་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར་རོ། །འདོད་ན། དགག་བྱ་བདེན་པ་དབང་ཤེས་ལ་སྣང་བར་ཐལ་ཏེ། དབང་ཤེས་
ཀྱི་གཟུང་ཡུལ་དུ་རང་མཚན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འདོད་མི་ནུས་ཏེ་བདེན་གཉིས་ལས།
བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དབང་ཤེས་ལ་མི་སྣང་བར་བཤད་ཅིང་དབང་ཤེས་
ཀྱི་སྣང་བ་ནི་ནམ་ཡང་མི་འགོག་པར་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཁ་ཅིག་བདེན་གཉིས་ལས་

ང

དགག་བྱ་བདེན་པ་དབང་ཤེས་ལ་མི་སྣང་བར་བཤད་པ་ནི་དོན་དམ་དཔྱོད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་ཤེས་ལ་དོན་དམ་དང་དེའི་ངོར་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་དོན་དམ་དུ་གྲུབ་པར་བཤད་པ་དེ་དབང་ཤེས་ལ་མི་སྣང་བར་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་མི་བྱེད་དོ། །ཞེས་ཟེར་བ་ཡང་ལེགས་པར་བཤད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བདེན་གཉིས་འགྲེལ་པ་དང་བཅས་པ་ལས། ཡང་དག་པར་གྲུབ་པོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པར་གཞན་གྱིས[271]ཡོངས་སུ་བརྟགས་པ་རྣམས་འགོག་པར་རིགས་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་དུ་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་། གྲངས་ཅན་གྱིས་བརྟགས་པའི་གཙོ་བོ་དང་། རྒྱང་འཕེན་གྱིས་བརྟགས་པའི་འབྱུང་བ་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། ཤེས་པ་སྐད་ཅིག་ཆ་མེད་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྣམས་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་སྣང་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་དགོད་པར་མཛད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། གཞན་ཡང་སྣང་བ་དགག་པར་མི་རིགས་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་དུ། བདེན་པར་བརྟགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་དབང་ཤེས་ལ་སོགས་ཀྱི་སྣང་བ་འགོག་པ་ནི་བདག་ལ་གནོད་པར་འགྱུར་བ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་བསྟན་ཅིང་། དེའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡང་རྟོག་མེད་དབང་ཤེས་ཚད་མའི་ཡུལ་ནི་ཡང་དག་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་ལ་བདེན་གྲུབ་ཏུ་སྣང་ན་བདེན་གྲུབ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པར་ཐལ་བ་ལ་ཐུག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཞན་ཡང་དངོས་པོར་སྨྲ་བ་གཞན་གྱིས་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་དངོས་པོ་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་དོན་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་དུ་ཐ་སྙད་ཙམ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བཤད་ནས་བདེན་གྲུབ་ལ་ཐ་སྙད་དོན་མཐུན་མི་རིགས་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་དུ་དབང་པོའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལ་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པ་རྡུལ་ཙམ་ཡང་མི་སྣང་བ་བཀོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་རྒྱལ་ཚབ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པས་ཀྱང་ལུགས་འདིས་དགག་བྱ་བདེན་གྲུབ་དབང་ཤེས་ལ་མི་སྣང་བར་བཞེད་པར་གསུངས་ཤིང་། དེ་ནི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ལ་ཡང་འདྲ་སྟེ། རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་འཇུག་པའི་རྣམ་བཤད་ཆེན་མོ་ལས། བདེན་འཛིན་

ང

རིས་བདེན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ལྟར་ཏེ་བར་བསྟན་པ་མཐོང་བ་ནི་རྟོག་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་དབང་ཤེས་མིན་ཏེ། བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་པར་དགག་བྱ་བདེན་པ་དབང་ཤེས་ལ་མི་སྣང་བར་བཤད་པ་འདིར་ཡང་འདྲ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་ཞི་འཚོ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱི་བཞེད་པ་འཆད་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལྟར་མ་ཡིན་པར་རིགས་ངོ་ནི་དོན་དམ་ལ་བྱེད་ན་བདེན་འཛིན་རིས་བདེན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ལྟར་ཏེ་བར་བསྟན་པ་ཞེས་པའི་དོན་འཆད་དཀའ་བར་འགྱུར་རོ། །སྐྱ་མ་དཔེར་བྱེད་ཚུལ་སོགས་ལ་བཤད་རྒྱུ་མང་མོད་ཀྱང་རེ་ཞིག་བཞག་གོ། །གཉིས་པ་འགྲོས་དོན་ལ་མདོ་སྡེ་སྤྱོད་པའི་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་འདར་པས་བདེན་གཉིས་ངེས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཚད་མ་ནི་མངོན་སུམ་དང་རྗེས་དཔག་ཚད་མ་གཉིས་སུ་འདོད་པ་ནི་འདྲ་ལ། རྗེས་དཔག་གི་རྟེན་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དབྱེ་བ་སོགས་ཀྱང་ཕལ་ཆེར་སྔ་མ་རྣམས་དང་འདྲའོ། །མངོན་སུམ་ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་མི་བཞེད་ཚུལ་གོང་དུ་བཤད་ཟིན་པས་དབང་ཡིད་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་གསུམ་དུ་གྲངས་ངེས་སོ། །ཚད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཀྱང་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་དང་མི་མཐུན་ལ་རིགས་པའི་རྗེས་འབྲང་གི་མདོ་སྡེ་པ་དང་ཡང་མི་མཐུན་ཏེ། རང་རིག་མི་བཞེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་གསུམ་གྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཀྱང་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་དང་མི་མཐུན་ཏེ། འདི་པས་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་བསགས་པའི་རེ་རེ་ནས་དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུར་བཞེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་དེ་ཡང་ཟུར་ཡོད་དུ་བཞེད་དེ། རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་དེ་ཡུལ་སྟེང་ནས་གྲུབ་ཅིང་བདགས་དོན་བཙལ་བའི་མཐར་རྙེད་པའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ནས་འཇོག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །བདེན་མེད་ཞལ་གྱིས་བཞེས་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཆ་མེད་ཀྱི་དངོས་པོ་ནམ་ཡང་ཁས་མི་ལེན་པར་མཁས་གྲུབ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཐུན་པས་སྟོང་ཐུན་ཆེན་མོ་དང་ཊཱིཀ་ཆེན་དེ་ཉིད་སྣང་བ་སོགས་ལས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་ལམ་རིམ་ཆེན་མོ་ལས། རྡུལ་ཕྲ་བའི་ཡང་མཐར་ཐུག་པར་ཡང་བཞེད་པར་སྣང་བས་རྡུལ་ཆ་

ང

མེད་དམིགས་རྐྱེན་དུ་བཞེད་དོ། །ཞེས་ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱི་འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་
གསུངས་པའི་དོན་རིགས་པས་ཅི་ཙམ་བརྟགས་ཀྱང་གདན་ནས་ཆ་འབྱེད་རྒྱུ་མེད་པའི་ཆ་
མེད་ལ་མི་བྱའི། རིགས་ཤེས་ལ་མ་ལྟོས་པའི་དབང་པོའི་ཤེས་པས་དེ་ལས་ལྷ་བའི་
ཆ་མཐོང་རྒྱུ་མེད་པའི་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་ལ་དགོངས་པར་བྱས་ན་འགྲིག་གམ་སྙམ་སྟེ་ད་དུང་
བརྟགས་པར་བྱའོ། །དཔལ་ལྡན་ཟླ་བའི་འཇུག་འགྲེལ་ལས། ཁ་ཅིག་གིས་མདོ་སྡེ་
པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ལུགས་གང་ཞིག་དོན་དམ་པར་སྨྲས་པ་དེ་ཉིད་དབུ་མ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་
ཏུ་འདོད་དོ་ཞེས་སྨྲས་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་དབུ་མའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་ཀྱི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་མངོན་
པར་མི་ཤེས་པ་ཁོ་ནས་སྨྲས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་
པ་དང་། བཞི་བརྒྱ་པའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་། བྱེ་བྲག་པ་ལྟར་རང་གི་སྡེ་པ་རྣམས་
ཀྱིས་རྫས་ཀྱི་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་ཁས་བླངས་པར་མི་རིགས་སོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་
273
འདི་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་ཧུར་ཐ་བར་སྣང་ངོ་། །ཐལ་འགྱུར་བས་ཕྱི་དོན་ཁས་ལེན་མོད་
ཀྱང་འདི་པ་དང་འདོག་ཚུལ་མི་མཚུངས་ཏེ། ཚུང་ཟད་འཆད་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང་རྒྱས་པར་
གཞན་དུ་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །ཡིད་ཀྱི་མངོན་སུམ་ཡང་ཚད་མ་པ་དང་མཐུན་མི་མཐུན་
བརྟག་པར་བྱ་ཞིང་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་དང་ཡང་ཚུང་ཟད་མི་འདྲ་འམ་
སྙམ་མོ། །ཀུན་གཞི་དང་ཉོན་ཡིད་ཀྱང་མི་བཞེད་པ་ཤེས་པར་སླའོ། །འདི་པས་
ཕྱི་དོན་མེད་པ་མདོ་གང་གི་ཡང་དགོངས་པ་མིན་པར་བཞེད་པས་གཉིས་སྟོང་གི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་
ཉིད་རྟོགས་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་ཡང་མི་བཞེད་དོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་སློབ་དཔོན་
འདི་པའི་ལུགས་ཀྱིས་རྒྱན་གྱི་དགོངས་པ་འགྲེལ་ཚུལ་ཡང་ཕྱོགས་གཞན་དང་མི་འདྲ་བར་
བྱེད་དགོས་པར་སྣང་ངོ་། །བཞི་པ་ནི། འདི་པས་ཉན་རང་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ལམ་གྱི་ངོ་
274
བོ་ལ་ཁྱད་པར་གནས་སྐ་འདོད་ཅིང་བསྒོམས་པའི་དུས་དང་འདས་བུའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པའི་

ཁྱད་པར་འབྱེད་པར་འདོད་དོ། །རང་རྒྱལ་ལ་ཚོགས་སྤྱོད་ཆེ་ཆུང་དང་བསེ་རུ་ལྟ་བུའི་
རྣམ་གཞག་ཀྱང་མཛད་དོ། །ཐེག་དམན་དུ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་མ་བསྟན་པར་བཞེད་
པས་ཉན་རང་རང་ལམ་དུ་རིགས་ངེས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་རྟོགས་པ་མེད་
པར་བཞེད་དོ། །གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་དང་པོར་ཐེག་ཆེན་དུ་ཞུགས་ནས་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་
མེད་ལེགས་པར་གཏན་ལ་ཕབ་པ་ཞིག[275]་དང་བྱིས་ཉན་རང་དུ་སྨྲ་བ་གཉིས་གཞི་མཐུན……
སྲིད་པ་ནི་འདོད་དགོས་ལ། དེ་ལྟ་ན་དེ་འདྲ་དེས་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་བསྒོམས[276]་པས་
མངོན་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་དང་མཐོང་ཟིན་གོམས་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡང་ཡོད་དགོས་སོ། །དེ་ཡང་
འདོད་ན་དེས་བདེན་འཛིན་ཀུན་བརྟགས་མཐོང་ལམ་ནས་སྤོང་བ་དང་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་བསྒོམ……
ལམ་ནས་ཀྱང་སྤོང་བར་འདོད་དགོས་པས་བདེན་འཛིན་ཤེས་སྒྲིབ་ཏུ་འདོད་པ་དང་།
དེ་ཉན་རང་གི་ལམ་གྱིས་སྤོང་བ་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་གཞག་རྣམས་མི་འཐད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་
ན། སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་གང་ཟག་དེས་དེ་ལྟར་བསྒོམས་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་
བདེན་འཛིན་མངོན་གྱུར་རེ་ཞིག་མགོ་གནོན་པ་ཙམ་འོང་ཡང་བདེན་འཛིན་ཀུན་བརྟགས་
དང་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་གང་གི་ཡང་ས་བོན[277]་སྤངས་པ་མི་འོང་བས་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་མངོན་སུམ་
དུ་མཐོང་བ་དང་མཐོང་ཟིན་གོམས་པར་བྱེད་པ་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་སྤྲོ་སོ་རྟོགས་པའི……
མཐོང་ལམ་དང་བསྒོམ་ལམ་དུ་མི་འཇོག་གོ། །དེའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡང་བདེན་འཛིན་གྱི་ས་
བོན་སྤོང་བ་ལ་བདག་མེད་བསྒོམ་པ་གཅིག་པུས་མི་ཆོག[278]་གི་ཚོགས་མཐའ་ཡས་པའི……
གྲོགས་ཀྱིས་ཟིན་པ་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་བདེན་མེད་རྟོགས་པའི་ཤེས་
རབ[279]་སྣང་བ་སྤོང་བའི་གཉེན་པོ་བར་ཆད་མེད་ལམ་གྱི་ངོ་བོར་སྐྱེ་བ་ནི་ཐབས་ཁྱད་པར……
ཅན་གྱི་རྒྱས[280]་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ཞིང་། བར་ཆད་མེད་ལམ་གྱི་རང་དུས་ན་ཡང་ཐབས་ཀྱི་
རིགས་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རྒྱས་པ་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲེལ་བར་ཡོད་དགོས་སོ། །རིགས་

པ་འདྲིས་རྒྱུན་མཐའི་བར་ཆད་མེད་ལམ་གྱི་རང་དུས་ན་རྒྱལ་བའི་ཟག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཡོན་ཏན་ཀུན་རྫོབ་པ་དང་དོན་དམ་པ་མཐའ་དག་སྐད་ཅིག་གཉིས་པར་མངོན་དུ་འགྱུར་ངེས་ཀྱི་ནུས་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་རྫོགས་པ་མཉམ་གཞག་ཡེ་ཤེས་དེའི་སྟེང་ན་ཡོད་དགོས་ཤིང་། དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་མཉམ་གཞག་ཡེ་ཤེས་དེ་ལ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་པའི་རྣམ་པ་མངོན་དུ་འགྱུར་མི་དགོས་སོ། །འདི་དག་ནི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པའི་ཐེག་པའི་དཀའ་བའི་གནས་ཡིན་པར་འདུག་ཅིང་འཚང་རྒྱ་བ་ལ་ངེས་པར་ཕར་ཕྱིན་ཐེག་པའི་ལམ་གྱི་མཐར་ཐུགས་ལམ་གྱི་སྐྱོན་པ་འདེབས་དགོས་པའི་གནད་གཅིག་ནི་འདི་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཅོད་སྤྲོང་བྱ་ཚུལ་འདི་ནི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ལ་ཡང་འདྲ་ཞིང་རིགས་པའི་འགྲོས་ནི་ཐལ་འགྱུར་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་ཡང་ཤིན་ཏུ་མཁོ་འོ། །འདི་དག་ཀུང་ཟེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོ་འདི་ལེགས་པར་བཤད་པའི་ཁྱད་ཆོས་ཆེན་པོ་འགྲན་ཟླ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ཅིང་བདག་གིས་ཀུང་ཟེ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་གསུང་རབ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་སྨྲས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་དཀར་བའི་གནས་འདི་དག་བདག་ལྟ་བུས་རང་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་བཤད་པར་ག་ལ་ནུས། ཡང་གལ་ཏེ་སློབ་དཔོན་ལེགས་ལྡན་ཞབས་ཀྱིས་ཉན་ཐོས་ཀྱི་སྡེ་སྣོད་ལས་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་བསྟན་ན་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་བསྟན་པ་དོན་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ལས་ན་ཐེག་དམན་འཕགས་པ་ལ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་རྟོགས་པ་མི་སྲིད་དགོས་ཏེ། གཞན་དུ་ན་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་བསྟན་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཐེག་ཆེན་གྱི་ཁྱད་ཆོས་སུ་མི་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཐ་མ་རྟོགས་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་ནི་ཆོས་བདེན་པར་འཛིན་པའི་གཉེན་པོ་ཡིན་ཅིང་བདེན་འཛིན་ཤེས་སྒྲིབ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་སྟོན་པ་ནི་ཤེས་སྒྲིབ་སྤོང་བའི་ཆེད་དུ་སྟོན་པ་ཡིན་པས་ཉན་ཐོས་ཀྱི་སྡེ་སྣོད་ལས་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་བསྟན་ན་ཐེག་དམན་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཤེས་སྒྲིབ་སྤོང་དགོས་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང་། དེ་ལྟར་ན་ཤེས་སྒྲིབ་སྤོང་

པའི་གཉེན་པོ་སྒོ་སྟོད་དེ་ལས་རྫོགས་བར་སྟོན། དགོས་པར་འགྱུར་བས་ཐེག་ཆེན་གྱི་སྒོ་
སྟོད་དོན་མེད་དུ་ཐལ་བར་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་ལས་གཞན་པའི་ཐེག་
ཆེན་གྱི་ཁྱད་ཆོས་མེད་པར་བཞེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །སྤང་བྱ་སྒྲིབ་པ་ལ་ཉོན་
སྒྲིབ་དང་ཤེས་སྒྲིབ་གཉིས་སུ་འདོད་པ་ནི་འདྲ་ལ་ཐེག་ཆེན་རིགས་ངེས་ཀྱིས་ས་བརྒྱད་པ་
ཐོབ་པའི་ཚེ་ཉོན་མོངས་པའི་སྒྲིབ་པ་ཟད་པར་སྤངས་པར་རྟོག་གེ་འབར་བ་ལས་བཤད་
281
པས་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་གཞན་གྱི་ལུགས་ལྟར་རོ། ཇི་ལྟ་བུའི་དཔེ་དེ་འཛིན་གྱིས་སྒྲིབ་གཉིས
ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་སྤོང་བར་མི་བཞེད་མོད། འོན་ཀྱང་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བ་ལྟར་ཉོན་སྒྲིབ་མ་ཟད་
282
བར་དུ་ཤེས་སྒྲིབ་སྤོང་བའི་མགོ་མི་ཙོམ་པར་བཞེད་པའང་མིན་ནོ། །མཐོང་ལམ་
བར་ཆད་མེད་ལམ་གྱི་ཆོས་བཟོད་བཞི་བདེན་བཞིའི་ཆོས་ཉིད་དཔལ་པའི་ཕྱོག་པའི་སྒོ་
ནས་དབྱེ་བ་དང་རྗེས་བཟོད་བཞི་ཡུལ་ཅན་བཞི་རྟོགས་པའི་ལྡོག་པས་ཕྱེ་ནས་འཇོག་པ་
དང་། ཞེས་པ་བརྒྱད་ལ་ཡང་དེ་འདྲའི་ཁྱད་པར་བྱེད་ཚུལ་གྱི་མཐོང་པ་གོང་མའི་
རིགས་པའི་འགྲོས་ནི་དབུ་མ་ཐལ་རང་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་འདྲ་བར་རྒྱལ་ཚབ་རྗེས་བཞེད་དོ། །
བདེན་མེད་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པའི་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་བདེན་མེད་ཡོད་པ་ནི་འགྲུབ་པ་
ནི་ཐལ་རང་ཀུན་འདྲ་ཡང་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པས་བདེན་མེད་རྟོགས
པའི་རིགས་ཤེས་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བའི་རང་རིག་གིས་རིགས་ཤེས་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི
ཕྱུགས་ལ་བདེན་མེད་ཡོད་པ་འགྲུབ་པར་བཞེད་ཅིང་། དབུ་མ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་པས
283
རིགས་ཤེས་རྟོག་མེད་ཀྱིས་སྣང་བའི་བཅད་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་བདེན་མེད་ཡོད་པ་འགྲུབ་པར
284
བཞེད་ཅིང་རྟོག་པ་བཅད་ཤེས་དང་མངོན་སུམ་ཚད་མ་ཡང་མི་འགལ་བར་བཞེད་དོ། །
རང་རྒྱུད་པ་འདི་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་དེ་གཉིས་གང་གང་གཞག་ཏུ་མི་རུང་ཞིང་རིགས་ཤེས
ཀྱིས་བདེན་མེད་ཡོད་པ་ཤུགས་ལ་རྟོགས་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་དངོས་
285

ཡུམ་ཤེར་དཀའ་འགྲེལ་པའི་ཕྲེང་སྐོར། །དེ་སྐབས་ན་ནི་ཇི་ལྟར་འཇོག་པའི་ཚུལ་རྣམས་པར་
བྱ་བ་སྤྲོ་ནར་འདུག ཅིང་དེ་དག་ལས་བརྩམས་ཏེ་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་མང་དུ་འདུག་ཀྱང་དེ་
ཞིག་འཆར་ཉུང་ངོ། །འབྲས་བུའི་གནས་སྐབས་ཀྱི་སྐུ་གསུམ་གྱི་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ་སོགས་
ནི་རྣ་བ་མ་པ་གཞན་དང་ཐལ་ཆེར་མཐུན་ཞིང་མི་འདྲ་བའི་ཁྱད་པར་སྣ་མོ་རེ་གཉིས་ཡོད་
ཀྱང་འདིར་ངས་རྒྱང་ལ་གཞུང་གི་བཤད་ཚུལ་སོ་འདྲ་བ་ཙམ་ནི་མང་དུ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་རྣམ་
286
གྲངས་ཙམ་གྱི་ཕྱིར་མང་དུ་ཉན་གྱི་ཡུགས་མི་མཐུན་པ་ར་ཡིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་རྣལ་
འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ལ་ཡ་དཀྲ་ཚུལ་སྤྱིར་བཤད་པ་དང་། བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་
བཤད་པ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ལ། དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་ལས། སེམས་ཙམ་ལ་ནི་བརྟེན་
ནས་སུ། །ཕྱི་རོལ་དངོས་མེད་ཤེས་པར་བྱ། །ཚུལ་འདིར་བརྟེན་ནས་དེ་ལ་ཡང་། །
ཤིན་ཏུ་བདག་མེད་ཤེས་པར་བྱ། ཞེས་དང་། དེའི་འགྲེལ་ལས། སེམས་
ཅན་གྱི་ཚུལ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་མཚུངས་པར་ལྡན་པ་དང་བཅས་པའི་སེམས་ལས་ཕྱི་རོལ་དུ་
འགོད་པ་བདག་གི་རྒྱང་ཆུང་བ་དང་འཛིན་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་ཚིགས་
287
མེད་པ་ཁོ་ན་རྟོགས་སོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་མདོ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་གདན་ལ་འབེབས་
པ་དང་། དོན་དམ་གཉིས་སྟོང་གི་གོ་ན་ཉིད་གདན་ལ་འབེབས་པའི་རྣམ་གཞག་གཉིས་
དང་། ཡང་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། ཚུལ་འདི་ནི་རང་འབྱུང་བ་མེད་པས་སེམས་དེ་རང་
བཞིན་མེད་པར་རྟོགས་སུ་ཟིན་ཀྱང་མཐའ་ཐམས་ཅད་སྤངས་པའི་དབུ་མའི་ལམ་དུ་རྟོགས་
ན་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་དང་རང་བཞིན་དང་བྲལ་བས་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་རྟོགས་སོ། །
ཞེས་རིམ་པ་སྟེ་མ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྗེས་ལ་བློ་དང་བརྩོན་པ་ལྷག་པར་ཆེ་བས་སེམས་དེ་ལ་
གཅིག་དང་དུ་མའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་བརྟགས་པ་ན་དོན་དམ་པར་གྲུབ་པ་རྡུལ་ཙམ་ཡང་
མེད་པར་མཐོང་བས་མཐའ་ཐམས་ཅད་སྤངས་པ་དབུ་མའི་ལམ་རྟོགས་པར་འགྱུར་བ་སྟེ

དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་གཏན་ལ་འབེབས་པའི་རིམ་པ་གསུམ་དུ་བཤད་དོ། །དེ་ཉིད་མདོ་འདི་དགོངས་པར་སྒྲུབ་པ་ནི་མདོ་ལས། ཀྱེ་རྒྱལ་བའི་སྲས་དག་གཞན་ཡང་ཁམས་གསུམ་པ་ནི་སེམས་ཙམ་དུ་རྟོགས་ཏེ་དུས་གསུམ་ཡང་སེམས་དང་མཚུངས་པར་རྟོགས་སོ། །སེམས་དེ་ཡང་མཐའ་དང་དབུས་མེད་པར་ཁོང་དུ་ཆུད་དོ། །ཞེས་པ་དང་། ཆོས་ཡང་དག་པར་སྡུད་པ་ལས། བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་སྒྲིང་པོ་སྟེ་སེམས་ཙམ་དུ་ཟས་པ་རྫས་མ་མཆིས་པ་སྒྱུ་མ་ལྟར་རྫ་བ་མ་མཆིས་པའོ་ཞེས་དང་། ལང་ཀར་གཤེགས་པ་ལས། སེམས་ཙམ་ལ་ནི་བརྟེན་ནས་སུ། །ཕྱི་རོལ་དོན་ལ་མི་རྟོག་གོ །ཡང་དག་དམིགས་པར་གནས་ནས་སུ། །སེམས་ཙམ་ལས་ཀྱང་ཤིན་ཏུ་འདའ།[288] །སེམས་ཙམ་ལས་ནི་འདས་ནས་ཀྱང་། །སྣང་བ་མེད་ལས་ཤིན་ཏུ་འདའ།[289] །སྣང་མེད་གནས་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་པ། །དེ་ཡིས་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་མཐོང་། །ཞེས་སོགས་གསུངས་པ་འདི་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་གོང་དུ་བ་ཤད་པའི་རིམ་པ་དེ་ལྟར་དུ་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་གཏན་ལ་འབེབས་པའི་རྣམ་གཞག་བསྟན་……པར་བཞེད་དོ། །དེ་ཡང་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་རོལ་དོན་གྱིས་སྟོངས་པའི་རྣམ་པར་རིག་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་ཚུལ་དང་། དོན་དམ་པར་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་སྒོ་ནས་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་འཐོབ་པར་བཞེད་དེ། དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་ལས། ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཤིང་རྟ་ཞོན་ནས་སུ། །རིགས་པའི་སྲབ་སྐྱོགས་འཇུ་བྱེད་པ། །དེ་དག་དེ་ཕྱིར་ཇི་བཞིན[290]་དོན། །ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་པ་ཉིད་འཐོབ། ཅེས[291]་གསུངས་སོ། །དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་འཐོབ་པ་ཡང་རྒྱལ་བའི་དགོངས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ལང་ཀར་གཤེགས་པ་ལས། ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་བསྡུས་པའི་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་མདོར་བསྟན་པ་ནི་འདི་སྐད་དེ། ཆོས་ལྔ་དག་དང་རང་བཞིན་དང་། །རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་བརྒྱད་ཉིད

རུང་། །བདག་མེད་གཉིས་ཀྱི་དངོས་པོར་ནི། །ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་འདུས། ཞེས་འབྱུང་ངོ་ཞེས་འགྲེལ་པ་ལས་བཤད་དོ། །དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་འདོད་པ་ལྟར་གྱི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པ་དང་གཉིས་སྟོང་གི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་བདེན་··· གྲུབ་ནི་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡང་མི་བཞེད་ལ། འཇུག་ཤེས་དྲུག་ལས་ངོ་བོ་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཀུན་གཞི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཡང་ཞལ་གྱིས་མི་བཞེས་ཤིང་རེས་ཉོན་ཡིད་ནི་བཞེད་པ་ཡང་གོ··· བར་ནུས་སོ། །འོ་ན་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་རོལ་མེད་པའི་སེམས་ཙམ་གྱི་ཚུལ་འདི་མགོན་པོ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བཞེད་པ་ཡིན་ནམ་མིན། ཕྱི་མ་ལྟར་ན་ནི་ཙུང་ཞི་བ་འཚོ་ཡབ་སྲས་མགོན་པོ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲངས་པའི་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དང་པོ་ལྟར་ན་ཚུལ་དེ་མགོན་པོ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་གཞུང་གང་གིས་བསྟན་བརྗོད་པར་གྱིས་ཤིག་ཟེར་ན། རིགས་པ་དྲུག་ཅུ་པ་ལས། འབྱུང་བ་ཆེ་ལ་སོགས་བཤད་པ། །རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་སུ་[292] ཡང་དག་འདུ། །དེ་ཤེས་པས་ནི་འབྲལ་འགྱུར་ན། །ལོག་པར་རྣམ་བརྟགས་མ་ཡིན་ནམ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་འདིས་བསྟན་ཏེ། དེའི་ཚིག་དང་པོ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་འབྱུང་བ་དང་འབྱུང་འགྱུར་རྣམས་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལས་དོན་གཞན་སུ་མེད་ཅིང་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ··· ཉིད་དེ་དག་གི་རྣམ་པར་སྣང་བ་ལ་བཞག་པ་ཡིན་པས་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པར་འདུ་བར··· བསྟན་ཏོ། །དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་ལས། ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཤིང་རྟ་ཞོན་ནས་སུ། ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་འགྲེལ་ལས་དངོས་པོའི་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་ཞུགས་པའི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་ལ་འཇུག་པ་རྣམས་ཚུལ··· གཉིས་བརྗོད་པས་བསྡུས་པ། དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་རྣམས་གཤེགས་ཤིང་གཤེགས་པའི་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོས་དངོས་པོ་མཐའ་དག་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ཁོང་དུ་ཆུད་པར་བྱེད་དེ། ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་ཞོན་པ་དག་ཁ་བསྡམས་པའི་སྲབ་སྐྱོགས་ལེགས་པར་བཟུང་བ་བཞིན··· དུ་དོན་དང་ལྡན་པའི་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ཞེས་[293] བྱ་བ་ཡང་དག་པར་བསྒྲུབ་[294] པར་བྱེད་དོ། །ཞེས་

བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་སེམས་ཙམ་གྱི་ཚུལ་དང་དོན་དམ་པར་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པའི་དབུ་མའི་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཤིང་རྟ་ལ་ཞོན་ནས་དྲི་མ་མེད་པའི་རིགས་པའི་སྲབ་སྐྱོགས་འཇུ་བར་བྱས་པ་ལས་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དོན་ཅན་གྱི་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་པ་འཐོབ་པར་གསུངས་སོ། །རང་རྒྱུད་པ་འདི་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་ནང་གསེས་ཀྱི་འདོད་ཚུལ་མི་འདྲ་བའི་དབྱེ་བ་སྣ་ཚོགས་མང་དུ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་གཏན་ལ་འབེབས་པའི་ལུས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་ལ་བཤད་མ་ཐག་པ་ལྟར་འདོད་པར་ནི་ཐམས་ཅད་འདྲའོ། །འཕགས་པ་གྲོལ་སྡེས་ཉི་ཁྲི་སྣང་བ་དང་། སེང་གེ་བཟང་པོས་རྒྱན་སྣང་དང་། ལེ་བརྒྱད་ཁ་དང་། སྡུད་འགྲེལ་རྟོགས་སླ་དང་། སངས་རྒྱས་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཞབས་ཀྱི་པར་ཕྱིན་གྱི་གཞུང་རྣམས་དང་། ཨབྷྱ་ཀ་རའི་གནད་ཀྱི་ཟླ་ཟེར་དང་། ཐུབ་པ་དགོངས་རྒྱན་རྣམས་སུ་ཡང་ལྟ་བ་གཏན་ལ་འབེབ་ས་ཚུལ་འདི་ཁོ་ན་ལྟར་མཛད་དོ། འཕགས་གྲོལ་སོགས་ཞི་འཚོ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱི་སྔོན་དུ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་འདི་པའི་ལུགས་འདོད་མཁན་འགའ་ཞིག་བྱུང་མོད་ཀྱང་ཕྱི་རོལ་མེད་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱི་དབུ་མའི་གཞུང་མཐའི་སྲོལ་འབྱེད་པ་པོ་ནི་སློབ་དཔོན་ཞི་བ་འཚོ་ཡིན་པར་རྗེ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པ་བཞེད་དོ། །གཉིས་པ་བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་བཤད་པ་ལ་བཞི། རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་ངོས་བཟུང་བ་དང་། དེ་འགོག་པའི་རིགས་པ་བཤད་པ། གནད་ལ་ཕབ་པའི་བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་བཤད་པ། ལམ་དང་འབྲས་བུའི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཅུང་ཟད་བཤད་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པའི་འཇོག་ཚུལ་གསུམ་དང་དེ་དག་ཏུ་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་དོན་དམ་དུ་གྲུབ་པར་འཇོག་མི་འཇོག་གི་ཁྱད་པར་ལེགས་པར་ཕྱེད་པ་རྣམས་གལ་ཆེ་བ་ནི་སྔར་བཤད་ཟིན་པས་འདིར་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་བདེན་ཚད་ངོས་འཛིན་ཚུལ་ཅུང་ཟད་བརྗོད་པར་བྱའོ། །དེ་ཡང་དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་

295

ལས། དངོས་པོ་ཡང་དག་པར་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་དག་ལ་ཡང་དེ་ལས་བཟློག་པའི་

ང

རྣམ་པར་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་པའི་འཁྲུལ་བའི་བློ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཅེས་བྱ་སྟེ། འདི་འམ་འདིས་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་སྒྲིབ་པ་ལྟ་བུར་བྱེད། འགེབས་པ་ལྟ་བུར་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། དེ་སྐད་དུ་མདོ་ལས་ཀྱང་། དངོས་རྣམས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ། དམ་པའི་དོན་དུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད། རང་བཞིན་མེད་ལ་འཁྲུལ་པ་གང་། དེ་ནི་ཡང་དག་ཀུན་རྫོབ་འདོད། ཅེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་དེས་ཉེ་བར་བསྟན་པ་མཐོང་བའི་དངོས་པོ་རྫུན་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་ཞེས་བྱའོ། དེ་ཡང་ཐོག་མ་མེད་པའི་འཁྲུལ་པའི་བག་ཆགས་ཡོངས་སུ་སྨིན་པའི་དབང་གིས་བྱུང་ལ། དེས་ཀྱང་སྲོག་ཆགས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཡང་དག་པར་དངོས་པོ་འདི་བདག་ཉིད་ལྟ་བུར་ཉེ་བར་སྟོན་པ····མཐོང་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་དག་གི་བསམ་པའི་དབང་གིས་དངོས་པོ་རྫུན་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་འོ་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །ཞེས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡོད་ཚུལ་གསུངས་པའི་བཟློག་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཡོད་པ་ནི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་བདེན་ཚད་དོ། །དེ་ལ་དངོས་པོ་ཡང་དག་པར་ཞེས་པ་ནས་བློ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་ཞེས་པའི་བར་གྱིས་ནི་དོན་··དམ་པར་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་ལ་དོན་དམ་པར་ཡོད་པར་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་པའི་འཁྲུལ་ལུགས···བསྟན་ཏོ། །ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཅེས་བྱ་སྟེ་ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་སྐད་དོད་ཀྱི་སྒོ་ནས་སྒྲིབ་བྱེད་དུ་བཤད་ཅིང་དེ་ཡང་ཡང་དག་པའི་གནས་ལུགས་མཐོང་བ་ལ་སྒྲིབ་པའོ། །

དེ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ནི་བདེན་འཛིན་དེ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་བདེན····
296
འཛིན་དེས་བདེན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ལྟར་ཉེ་བར་བསྟན་པ་མཐོང་བའི་དངོས་པོ་རྫུན་པ་རྣམས····ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཁོ་ནར་ཡོད་པའོ་ཞེས་སྟོན་པའོ། །འདིའི་སྐབས་ཀྱི་མཐོང་བ་ནི་རྟོག་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་དབང་ཤེས་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། ལུགས་འདིས་དགག་བྱ་བདེན་པ་དབང་ཤེས་ལ་མི་སྣང་བར་འདོད་དོ་ཞེས་རྗེ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པས་གསུངས་ཤིང་། དེ་ཡང་རང་རྒྱུད་

ང

པ་ལུགས་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་འདྲ་བར་གོང་དུ་གསལ་བར་བཤད་ཟིན་ཏོ། །དེ་ཡང་གྲོག་མ་མེད་པའི་ཞེས་སོགས་ནི་དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་བདེན་འཛིན་དེ་ནི་གྲོག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་... བདེན་འཛིན་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཡིན་པར་སྟོན་པའོ། །དེ་དག་གི་བསམ་པའི་དབང་གིས་ཞེས་པའི་བསམ་པ་ལ་རྟོག་བ་དང་རྟོག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡོད་297པར་གསུངས་པས་... ཁ་ཅིག་རྟོག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པ་ཁོ་ནར་འདོད་པ་མི་འཐད་དེ། སོ་སྐྱེའི་རྟོག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་མི་སྣང་བའི་ཆོས་རྟོག་པ་ཁོ་ནས་འཛིན་དགོས་པ་དུ་མ་ཞིག་ཡོད་ཅིང་དེ་ཡང་རང་མཚན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པར་འདི་པ་བཞིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་འཇུག་ཊཱིཀ་ཆེན་མོ་ལས། རྟོག་པ་ཁོ་ན་མིན་གྱི་རྟོག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་ཡང་བྱ་སྟེ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཁོ་ན་དང་ཡང་སྐབས་རྟོག་པ་དང་རྟོག་མེད་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡོད་པ་གསལ་བར་བསྟན་པ་ལ་ལྟུང་དེས་རྟོག་བློ་མེད་པར་བསྟན་ཏོ་ཞེས་མ་འཛིན་ཅིག །ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག། སྐབས་འདིའི་བསམ་པ་ལ་རྟོག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པར་གསུངས་པའི་ཚིག་འདིས་ཀྱང་དགག་བྱ་... བདེན་པ་དབང་ཤེས་ལ་སྣང་བར་བཤད་དམ་སྙམ་དུ་སེམས་པ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། གསུང་འདིས་རྟོག་བཅས་དང་རྟོག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པའི་དབང་གིས་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་འཇོག་... ཚུལ་བསྟན་ལ། དེ་ཡང་དེ་གཉིས་ལ་སྣང་བའི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་ཙམ་གྱི་རང་མཚན་དུ་ཡོད་པར་བསྟན་ཅིང་དེའི་ཤུགས་ཀྱིས་དོན་དམ་དུ་ཡོད་པ་གཅོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། དེ་གཉིས་ལ་སྣང་བའི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་རང་མཚན་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ཡང་འཇུག་པའི་རྣམ་བཤད་ཆེན་མོ་ལས། དེ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་ཡོད་པར་བཞག་གི་དོན་དམ་པར་ཡོད་པ་མིན་298པའི་དངོས་པོ་རྫུན་པ་རྣམས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཁོ་ནར་ཡོད་པ་ནི། དངོས་རྣམས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དུ། ཞེས་པའི་དོན་ཏེ། དེ་ཡང་བདེན་འཛིན་གྱི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡོད་པའི་དོན་མིན་ནོ་ཞེས་

ང

གསལ་བར་གསུངས་པས་ཐ་སྙད་འཇོག་ཚུལ་སྟོན་པའི་གསུང་གིས་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་…
བྱའི་བདེན་ཚད་བསྟན་པར་སླ་བ་ཙམ་ལེགས་པར་སླ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འོ་ན་ལུགས་
འདིས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ལ་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པའི་རང་མཚན་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཁས་ལེན་…
ཅིང་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་ལ་མ་ལྟོས་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་སྡོད་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་…
པ་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་བདེན་ཚད་དུ་བཞེད་ན་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་མ་བཞག་གི་དོན་
ཇི་ལྟར་བྱ་སྙམ་ན། བཤད་པར་བྱ་སྟེ། སྒྱུ་མ་མཁན་གྱིས་རྡེའུ་ཤིང་བུ་སོགས་
རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྤྲུལ་པའི་ཚེ་སྒྱུ་མ་མཁན་ལ་རྡེའུ་ཤིང་བུ་སོགས་རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྣང་བ་ཙམ་ཡོད་…
ཀྱང་རྟ་གླང་དུ་ཞེན་པ་མེད། སྔགས་རྫས་ཀྱིས་མིག་བསླད་པའི་ལྟད་མོ་བ་ལ་ནི་སྤྲུལ་
གཞི་དེ་རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྣང་བ་དང་དེར་ཞེན་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡོད། སྔགས་རྫས་ཀྱིས་མིག་
མ་བསླད་པ་གནས་དེར་ཕྱིས་སླེབ་པའི་གང་ཟག་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་སྤྲུལ་གཞི་དེ་རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྣང་བ…
299
དང་ཞེན་གཉིས་ཀ་མེད་དོ། །དེ་ཡང་སྒྱུ་མ་མཁན་ལྟར་ན་སྒྱུ་མའི་སྤྲུལ་གཞི་དེ་སྔགས་
རྫས་ཀྱིས་བསླད་པའི་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་རྟ་གླང་དུ་བཞག་པ་ཙམ་མ་གཏོགས་དེ་འདྲའི…
བློ་ལ་མ་ལྟོས་པའི་རྡེ་ཤིང་རང་གི་སྡོད་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ངོས་ནས་རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྣང་བ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །
འོན་ཀྱང་སྔགས་རྫས་ཀྱིས་བསླད་པའི་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པའི་རྡེ་ཤིང་ཁོ་རང་གི…
ངོས་ནས་རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྣང་བའི་སྡོད་ལུགས་ཤིག་ནི་ཡོད་དགོས་སོ། །དེ་ལྟ་མ་ཡིན་
པར་ཞེན་པ་འཁྲུལ་པའི་ངོ་ཙམ་དུ་རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྣང་བ་ཙམ་ཡིན་གྱི་སྤྲུལ་གཞི་རྟ་གླང…
དུ་མི་སྣང་ཞེས་ཟེར་ན་སྣང་བ་ལ་འཁྲུལ་པའི་བློ་མི་སྲིད་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། སྤྱིར་རྡེ་ཤིང་
རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྣང་བ་ཙམ་ཡང་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་སྤྲུལ་གཞི་རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྣང་
བར་འཇོག་ནུས་མོད་ཀྱང་བློ་འཁྲུལ་པ་ལ་སྣང་བའི་དབང་གིས་དེ་ལྟར་བཞག་པ་ཡིན…
300
པར་སྤྲུལ་གཞི་རང་གི་སྡོད་ལུགས་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་འཇོག་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དཔེ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ་

དབུ་མ་པ་འདི་ལྟར་ན་དངོས་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་མི་གནོད་པའི་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་འཇོག་པ་དང་། དེའི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པའི་དངོས་པོ་རང་གི་སྡོད་ལུགས་ཞིག་ཀྱང་ཡོད་པ་མི་འགལ་ཏེ། སྔགས་རྫས་ཀྱིས་བསླད་པའི་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་སྒྱུ་མ་གཞི་རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྣང་བར་འཇོག་ནུས་ཤིང་བློ་དེའི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པའི་སྒྱུ་མ་གཞི་དེ་ངོས་ནས་ཀྱང་རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྣང་བའི་སྡོད་ལུགས་ཡོད་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་མྱུ་གུ་ས་བོན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་དང་མྱུ་གུ་[301] རང་གི་ངོས་ནས་ཀྱང་ས་བོན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མི་འགལ་ལོ། །འདི་ནི་ལུགས་འདིས་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡོད་པར་འཇོག་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཞེས་པར་བྱའོ། །སྔགས་རྫས་ཀྱིས་མིག་བསླད་པའི་ལྟད་མོ་བ་ལ་རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྣང་བ་དེ་ནང་གི་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པའི་སྡོད་ལུགས་སུ་མི་འཆར་གྱི་གང་དུ་རྟ་གླང་སྣང་བའི་གཞི་དེར་རང་པོ་ནས་རྟ་གླང་མཚན་ཉིད་པ་གཅིག་ཡུལ་གྱི་གོ་ས་མནན་ནས་བསྡད་ཡོད་པར་འཛིན་ནོ། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ་སེམས་ཅན་ཐ་མལ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ནང་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་ལ་གདན་མ་ལྟོས་པར་ཡུལ་རང་གི་སྡོད་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ངོས་ནས་གྲུབ་གྲུབ་པ་ཞིག་ཏུ་འཛིན་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་ནི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་འཛིན་ཚུལ་ལོ། །འཛིན་ཚུལ་དེས་བཟུང་བ་ལྟར་དུ་གྲུབ་ན་གཅིག་དུ་བྲལ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་གདན་ཚིགས་ཀྱིས་ཁེགས་པར་འགྱུར་གྱི་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པའི་སྡོད་ལུགས་ཙམ་ནི་རིགས་པ་དེ་དག་གིས་མི་ཁེགས་པར་བཞེད་དོ། །དེས་ན་ཚུལ་འདིས་འདི་པའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ཟེ་ཙམ་གྱིས་ན་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་དཔྱོད་པར་སོང་བའི་ས་མཚམས་[302] ཀྱང་ཤེས་པར་ནུས་ཏེ། ཕྱིར་མྱུ་གུ་ས་[303]བོན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ན་ཡིན་[304] ཞེས་པའི་མིང་དང་ཐ་སྙད་ཙམ་གྱིས་མ་ཚིམ་པར་མྱུ་གུ་རང་གི་ངོས་ནས་ས་བོན་ལས་སྐྱེ་མི་སྐྱེ་དཔྱོད་པ་ཙམ་ནི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་དཔྱོད་པར་སོང་བ་མ་ཡིན་ལ། མྱུ་གུའི་སྐྱེ་བ་དེ་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་ལ་མ་ལྟོས་པར་ཡུལ་ཁོ་རང་

ང

གི་སྐོར་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ངོས་ནས་སྐྱེའམ་མི་སྐྱེ་དཔྱོད་པ་ན་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་དཔྱོད་པར་འཇོག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ལུགས་ལ་ནི་དཔྱོད་[305]ཚུལ་སྔ་མ་ལྟར་ནའང་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་དཔྱོད་པར་སོང་བ་ཡིན་ཞིང་ཞེས་བཞག་པ་ལ་མ་ལྟོས་པའི་སྐོར་ལུགས་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པར་…འཛིན་[306]པ་ནི་ཤེས་པའི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། ངེས་པར་སླ་བས་ཚད་[307]མ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་གཞལ་བྱ་རང་སྤྱི་གཉིས་འཇོག་མོད་ཀྱང་དོན་གྱི་སྐོར་ལུགས་སུ་ཡོད་པའི་ཆོས་ཤིག་ཚད་མས་རྟོགས་པར་འདོད་ཀྱི་ཚད་མ་ལ་སྣང་བའི་དབང་གིས་པར་བཞག…པ་ནི་ག་ཡུལ་གྱི་སྐོར་ལུགས་སུ་འདོད་པ་མིན་པས་འདི་པའི་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་[308]དང་དོན་གནད་མི་འདྲའོ། །འབྲུག་ཊཱི་ཀ་ཆེན་མོ་ལས། སྒྱུ་མའི་སྣང་བ་ནི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་ལྟར་ན་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་དང་། ཕྱི་རོལ་ཁས་ལེན་པའི་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ལྟར་ན་ས་[309]ཕྱོགས་སམ་བར་སྣང་ལྟ་བུའི་གཉེ་འཛིན་པའི་དབང་པོ་ནི་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས…གྲུབ་ལ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ནི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་ལྟར་ན་སྒྱུ་མའི་རྟ་གླང་དེ……སེམས་ཀྱི་སྣང་ཆ་ཙམ་ཡིན་པས་སེམས་དེ་འཛིན་པའི་རང་རིག་གིས་ཤུགས་ལ་རྟོགས་པ་དང་། མདོ་སྡེ་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་ལྟར་ན་སྒྱུ་མའི་རྟ་གླང་དེ་ཕྱི་རོལ་དོན་དང་། ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ཡིན་པས་ས་ཕྱོགས་དང་བར་སྣང་ཙམ་རིགས… …འཛིན་པའི་དབང་མངོན་གྱིས་འགྲུབ་པ་ལ་དགོངས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ ཞེས་མཁས་གྲུབ་ཆེན་པོ་…འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པའི་རྡོ་[310]རྗེ་གསུང་ངོ་། མིག་མ་བསླད་པའི་ལྟད་མོ་བ་ལ་རྫིའུ་ཤིང་བུ་རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྣང་བ་དང་དེར་ཞེན་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་མེད་པ་དང་མཚུངས་པ་ནི་ཚུལ……བཞིན་སེམས་པའི་རིགས་པས་ལེགས་པར་དཔྱད་ཅིང་བསྒོམས་པ་ལས་ནམ་ཞིག་རྣམ་…ཐར་མི་རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་སྐྱེས་པ་ན་ཡེ་ཤེས་དེའི་ངོར་གཉིས་སྣང་ཐམས་ཅད་ཉེ་བར་ཞི…བས་བདེན་པར་སྣང་བ་དང་ཞེན་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་མེད་པའོ། །མདོར་བསྡུ་ན་རང་རྒྱུད་

པའི་ལུགས[311]་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པར་ཁས་ལེན་ཅིང[312]་རྟོག་པས……
བཏགས་པར་ཡང་ཁས་ལེན་ཡང་བློས་བཞག་པ་ལ་རྟོག་པ་ཁོ་ནས་བཞག་པས་ཁྱབ་པ…
ཁ་ཡ་མི་ལེན་ཏེ། བློས་བཞག་པ་ལ་རྟོག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པས་བཞག་པ་ཡང་འདོད་པའི…
ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་བློ་གང་ཡིན་གྱིས་བཞག་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡོད་པར་
མི་འདོད་པས་ཚད་མས་མི་གནོད་པའི་བློ་འི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་གཅིག་དགོས་སོ།
དེ་ལྟར་བྱས་ན་གཟུགས་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་རྣམས་སྣང་ཕྱོགས་ནས་བློ་གནོད་མེད་ལ་སྣང…
བའི་དབང་གིས་པར་བཞག་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་སྤྱོད་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་པ་དང་། སྟོང་ཕྱོགས་
ནས་བློས་བཞག་པ་ལ་མ་རྟོས་པའི་དོན་རང་ག་སྤྱོད་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ངོས་ནས་གྲུབ་པས……
སྟོངས་པ་གཉིས་ཚོགས་ཤིག་དགོས་སོ། བློ་ཡི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་ཙམ་དུ་གསུངས་
[313]པའི་ཙམ་སྣྲས་ཀྱང་ཁྱུན[314]་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱོད་ལུགས་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་གཅོད་ཀྱི་སེང་གདངས་
བཞག་ཙམ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱོད[315]་ལུགས་ཡོད་པ་མི་གཅོད་དོ། །འདི་དག་ལེགས་པར་
ཤེས་ན་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་འཇོག་ཚུལ་དངོས་སྨྲ་བ་མན་ཆད་ལས་ལྷ་བ་དང…
དབུ་མ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བ་ལས་རགས་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་རྣམས་ཇི་བཞིན་དུ་ཕྱེད་ནུས་ཤིང་།
དེ་ཡང་རྗེ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱི་གསུང་རབ་རྣམས་ལ་ཞིབ་ཏུ་དཔྱད་ནས་ཆོས་ཀྱི་མདེའུ་ཙེ་ནང……
དུ་བསྐྱུར་བ་ཞིག་ལ་འོང[316]་ཀྱུ་ཡིན་པར་འདུག་གོ །གཉིས་པ་དེ་འགོག་པའི་རིགས་
པ་བཤད་པ་ལ། སློབ་དཔོན་ཞི་བ་འཚོས་དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་ལས་ངོ་བོ་ལ་དཔྱོད་པ་གཅིག་
དུ་བྲལ་གྱི་རིགས་པ་ཉིད་ཙམ་དུ་བཀོན་ནས་འཆད་པར་མཛད་ཅིང་། དེ་ཡང་མདོ་
ལས།[317] བློ་ཡིས་རྣམ་པར་གཞིགས་པ་ན། །ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ནི་གཟུང་དུ་མེད། །དེ་
ཕྱིར་དེ་དག་བརྗོད་མེད་དང་། །ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་མེད་པར་བཤད། །ཅེས་སོགས་
དང་། ཡབ་སྲས[318]་མཇལ་བའི་མདོ་ལས། མི་ལོང་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཡོངས་དག་ལ། །རྗེ་

ང

ལྟར་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་ཡི། །གཟུགས་བརྙན་སྣང་བ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། །ཟློན་པ་ཆོས་
འདི་ཤེས་པར་གྱིས། །ང་ཡིས་རང་བཞིན་སྟོང་པ་ཞེས། །གང་བཤད་སྟོང་པ་ལྟ་
བར་གྱིས། ཞེས་སོགས་དང་། ལང་ཀར་གཤེགས་པའི་མདོ་ལས། གཅིག་
དང་གཞན་ཉིད་སྤངས་པ་ཡིས། །གཟུགས་ནི་ཇི་ལྟར་མེ་ལོང་ལ། །སྣང་ཡང་དེ་
ན་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །དེ་བཞིན་དངོས་པོའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད། །ཅེས་སོགས་ཀྱི་དགོངས་
པར་འཆད་པར་མཛད་དོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་ཀ་མ་ལ་ཤཱི་ལའི་དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་ལས་
ནི་སེམས་ཙམ་པས་དབུ་མ་པ་ལ་རྒོལ་བའི་ཚུལ་མང་པོ་ཞིག་གསུངས་ནས་དེ་དག་གི་
ལན་འཆད་པར་ལུགས་རིགས་མང་དུ་མཛད་པའི་རིགས་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་རྡོ་རྗེ་གཟེགས་
མ་དང་། ཡོད་མེད་སྐྱེ་འགོག་དང་། མུ་བཞིའི་སྐྱེ་འགོག་དང་། གཅིག་དུ་
བྲལ་དང་། རྟེན་འབྲེལ་གྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་རྣམས་ཀུང་རྒྱས་པར་གསུངས་སོ། །འདིར་
གཅིག་དུ་བྲལ་གྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཉིད་ཅུང་ཟད་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་སྟེ། དེ་ཡང་དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་
ལས། བདག་དང་གཞན་སྨྲའི་དངོས་འདི་དག །ཡང་དག་ཏུ་ན་གཅིག་པ་དང་། །
དུ་མའི་རང་བཞིན་བྲལ་བའི་ཕྱིར། །རང་བཞིན་མེད་དེ་གཟུགས་བརྙན་བཞིན། ཞེས་
རྟགས་འགོད་པར་མཛད་ནས། དེའི་ཚུལ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་སྒྲུབ་པ་དང་ཁྱབ་
པ་སྒྲུབ་པ་གཉིས། དེའི་དང་པོ་ལ་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་བྲལ་སྒྲུབ་པ་དང་དུ་བྲལ་སྒྲུབ་
319
པ་གཉིས། དེའི་དང་པོ་ལ་ཕྱི་ནང་གི་སྡེ་པས་བཏགས་པའི་རྟག་དངོས་གཅིག་བདེན་
དགག་པ་དང་། གནས་མ་བུ་པའི་སྡེ་པས་བཏགས་པའི་གང་ཟག་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་
པ་གཉིས་ནི་ཁྱབ་པའི་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པ་དང་། རྡུལ་ཕྲན་ཆ་མེད་ཀྱིས་བརྩམས་
པའི་ཕྱི་དོན་དགག་པ་དང་། དོན་སྣ་གཉིས་དང་ཕྱི་རོལ་པ་དང་རྣམ་རིག་པས་བཏགས་
པའི་རྣམ་ཤེས་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པ་རྣམས་ནི་མ་ཁྱབ་པའི་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པ་དང་།

བདེན་པའི་དུ་བྲལ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་མེད་པ་ཉིད་རྟགས་སུ་འགོད་པར་མཛད་
ལ། ཁྱབ་པ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་ཕན་ཚུན་སྤངས་འགལ་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་དངོས་འགལ་
གྱི་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མཛད་དོ། །ད་ཡང་གཞུང་དང་སྦྱར་ནས་རྒྱས་པར་བཤད་ན་ལེགས་
མོད་ཀྱང་ད་ཅང་མངས་པས་དོན་གྱི་སྙིང་པོ་ཙམ་བརྗོད་ན། འདིར་ཆོས་ཅན་དུ་འཛིན་
རྒྱུ་ནི་གཙོ་བོ་དང་གང་ཟག་རང་རྒྱུ་བ་སོགས་རང་གཞན་གྱི་སྡེ་པས་བཏགས་པའི་དངོས་
པོ་ཉིད་བཟུང་བས་ཆོག་སྟེ། 320 རྟགས་ཆོས་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ཙམ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་གཞི་མ་གྲུབ
ཆོས་ཅན་དུ་བཟུང་ཡང་ཆོག་པར་མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་བཤད་ཟིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་།
321 དོན་དང་བློ་དང་གཞལ་བ་ལ་ལྟོས་པའི་མ་གྲུབ་པ་གསུམ་གྱི་ནང་ནས་དང་པོ་ལ་ཆོས་ཅན་
གྱི་ངོ་བོ་མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ལྟར་བཤད་པ་ཡང་རྟགས་
ཆོས་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་ལ་དགོངས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཆོས་མེད་དགག་ཡིན་པ་ལ་མ་
ངེས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཁྱད་པར་དུ་འདིར་ནི་སློབ་དཔོན་ཀ་མ་ལ་ཤཱི་ལའི་དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་
ལས། གང་ལ་དངོས་པོའི་ཆོས་ཡོད་པའི་ངོ་བོར་སྒྲུབ་པར་མི་འདོད་ཀྱི། །འོན་
ཀྱང་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་པའི་ཆོས་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་པ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཙམ་ཞིག་བརྗོད་པར་འདོད་པ་དེ་
ལ་ནི་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཉིད་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཉེས་པ་བརྗོད་པ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡང་དངོས་པོར་གྲུབ་པའི་
ཆོས་ཅན་ནི་དགོས་ཏེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལ་བལྟོས་ནས་
ཀྱང་དེའི་ཆོས་ཅན་ཉིད་དུ་མི་འཐད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། དེ་ན་གྲུབ་དུ་ཟིན་322 ཀྱང་བསྒྲུབ་པར་
བྱ་བ་མེད་ན་མི་འབྱུང་ངོ། གཏན་ཚིགས་མངོན་པར་འདོད་པའི་དོན་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་གེགས་
བྱེད་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་རྟགས་ཆོས་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ཙམ་ལ་ཆོས་ཅན་དངོས་
པོ་བ་མི་དགོས་པ་གསལ་བར་གསུངས་སོ། །འོན་ཀྱང་རྗེས་དཔག་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཚེ་ཆོས་
ཅན་འབའ་ཞིག་པའི་སྒྲ་དོན་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་བློ་ངོར་ཁྱབ་པ་འགྲུབ་པའི་རྟེན་དུ་དགོས་མི་

ང

དགོས་སྨྲར་དགྲུད་ཟིན་ཏོ། །གལ་ཏེ་གཅིག་ཏུ་བྲལ་གྱི་སྒྲོར་བ་འདི་རྟགས་དང་བསྒྲུབ་ 323
བྱའི་ཆོས་མེད་དགག་ཁོན་ཡིན་ན་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་མི་འཐད་དེ། རྟགས་ཆོས་ཀྱི་
རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་མེད་ལ། དེ་མེད་ན་ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་པ་མི་འཐད་ཅིང་དེ་ལྟར་ན་བདག་…
གཅིག་པའི་འབྲེལ་བ་མེད་པས་གོ་བྱ་གོ་བྱེད་དུ་མི་རུང་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
གལ་ཏེ་རྟགས་ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་ཟེར་ན་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། དེ་ལྟར་ན་གཅིག་
དང་དུ་མའི་རང་བཞིན་དང་བྲལ་བའི་དངོས་པོ་པ་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། དེ་
ནི་དབུ་མ་པས་ཁས་མི་ལེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེ་ན་སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། བདག་གཅིག་
པའི་འབྲེལ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་ཁོ་ན་ལ་མ་ཡིན་པས་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པ་ལའང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་
ཏེ། དེའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་ནི་ངོ་བོ་ཐ་དད་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་གྲངས་ཡིན་ལ། ངོ་བོ་
ཉིད་མེད་པ་དག་ཀྱང་བདག་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་མཚུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་ལས་…
གསུངས་ཏེ། ཡོད་པ་ལ་ངོ་བོ་ཐ་དད་བཀག་ན་ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་ཞིང་སྤྱིར་
324
གཅིག་ཡིན་པ་ཡང་ཁེགས་པས་ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་པའི་ཐ་དད་པའི་བདག་གཅིག་འབྲེལ་པ…
ཡོད་པ་དང་། རྟགས་ཆོས་གཉིས་ཀ་བདག་མེད་པའི་ངོ་བོར་མཚུངས་པས་
མེད་དགག་ཡིན་ཀྱང་གོ་བྱ་གོ་བྱེད་དུ་མི་འགལ་ལོ་སྙམ་དུ་དགོངས་པའོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ཡང་
དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་ལས། དེ་ནི་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ངའི་བདག་ཉིད་ནི་ཐ་དད་པ
མེད་པའི་"རྣམ་གྲངས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ལ། དེ་ནི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་དག་ཀྱང་བདག་
མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་མཚུངས་པས་འགལ་བ་མེད་པ་ཁོ་ནའོ། །ཞེས་དང་། དེ་བཞིན་
དུ་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཡང་དག་པར་ན་གཟུགས་བརྙན་ལ་སོགས་པ་བཞིན་དུ་གཅིག་དང་དུ་
མའི་རང་བཞིན་ལས་ལོག་པ་ན་དོན་དམ་པ་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ལས་ཀྱང་ལོག་པར་ངེས་…
པས་དེའི་ཕྱིར་ལོག་པའི་ཁྱབ་པ་ལ་བརྟོས་པས་བྱས་པའི་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ…
325

བར་བྱ་བ་དང་གོ་བར་བྱེད་པའི་དངོས་པོར་འགྱུར་རོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །འདི་
ལ་སྤྱིར་གྱི་བོད་ཀྱི་མཁས་པ་དག་གཅིག་ཏུ་བྲལ་གྱི་སྣང་བས་འདྲེན་མེད་ཀྱི་སྣང་བ་སྒྲུབ་ཏུ་
མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་། གཅིག་ཏུ་བྲལ་གྱིས་དོན་དམ་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་འི་ཐ་སྙད་ཅུང་ཟང་
བས་སྤོང་བ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ནི་མེད་དགག་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ཞེས་ཟེར་བ་སོགས་ཀྱང་འདི་དག…
གི་གནད་མ་རྟོགས་པ་དང་། བདེན་མེད་སྒྲུབ་པའི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཡ་རྣམ་པར་
བཅད་ཙམ་ཁོ་ན་འཛིན་པ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱི་གང་ཚུགས་པའི་ལྟ་བའི་མཐར་ཐུག
པ་མ་དགོངས་པས་ལན་པའོ། །དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་ལས། བདག་དང་གཞན་སྨྲ་ཡི་
དངོས་འདི་དག །ཅེས་སོགས་ཀྱིས་གསུངས་པའི་རིགས་པ་འདི་སྤྱ་ར་འཇུག་པའི་
ངག་ཐལ་འགྱུར་དང་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ངག་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་སྦྱོར་བ་གང་བྱས་ཀྱང་རྟོག་པར་དབུ་མ་
སྣང་བ་ལས་གསུངས་ཤིང་། དེ་ལ་དོགས་པ་འདི་ཡོད་དེ་གལ་ཏེ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་དུ་
བྱེད་ན། ཡང་དག་ཏུ་གཅིག་པ་དང་། དུ་མ་རང་བཞིན་བྲལ་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་
བརྗོད་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་གང་རུང་དང་བྲལ་བ་གཏན་ཚིགས་སུ་སྨྲས་པ་ན་རུང་བར་
འགྱུར་ཏེ། ཐལ་འགྱུར་ལ་ནི་ཕ་རོལ་པོས་ཁས་བླངས་པ་ཞིག་རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་ནས་
གཞན་གྱི་འདོད་པའི་ཐལ་བ་འཕེན་པ་ཞིག་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ།
ཕ་རོལ་པོས་རྟགས་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་དང་བྲལ་བ་དངོས་སུ་ཁས་མ་བླངས། ཀྱང་
ཤུགས་ཀྱིས་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། དེའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡང་ཕ་རོལ་པོས་རྟགས་
དེའི་ཁྱབ་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ཁྱབ་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་ཁས་བླངས་
ན་ཁྱབ་བྱེད་ཀྱང་ཤུགས་ལ་ཁས་བླངས་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། དེ་སྐད་དུ་ཡང་
དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་ལས། དེ་ལ་འདི་ཐལ་བ་བསྒྲུབ་ན་གཏན་ཚིགས་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཡང་མ་
ཡིན་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་ཅི་སྟེ་ཕ་རོལ་པོ་དག་གིས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་དང་

ང

བྲལ་བར་ཁས་མ་བླངས་སུ་ཟིན་ཀྱང་། འོན་ཀྱང་དེས་ཁྱབ་བའི་ཆོས་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཤུགས་ཀྱིས་ན་དེ་ཡང་ཁས་བླངས་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་ནོ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གལ་ཏེ་ཁྱབ་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་ཁས་བླངས་པས་ཁྱབ་བྱེད་ཤུགས་ལ་ཁས་བླངས་པ···ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། གཞན་དུ་ན་རྒྱང་ཕན་གྱིས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་སྔ་ཕྱི་དང་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པ་ཁས་བླངས་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར། དེའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡང་ཡོད་དེ། རྒྱང་ཕན་གྱིས་ཚེ་འདིའི་རིག་པ་ཁས་བླངས་ལ་དེ་ལ་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་སྔ་མའི་རིག་པ་སྔོན་དུ་འགྲོ་བས·····ཁྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་།[326] ཡང་དེས་འབྱུང་བ་བཞི་ཡོད་པར་ཁས་བླངས་ལ།[327] དེ་ཡོད་པ་ལ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པས་གཟིགས་པས་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གལ་ཏེ་རྒོལ་བ་དེ་དག་གིས་ཁས་བླངས་ཞེས་མི་སྨྲ་ཡི་ཤུགས་ཀྱིས་ཁས་བླངས་པར་སོང་ངོ་ཞེ་ན། །དེ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཆོས་གཅིག་བརྗོད་པ་ན་དེ་ལ་ཁྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་ཡོད་པའི་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་སྒྲ་དེས་ཤུགས་ལ་བརྗོད་པ་དང་སྒྲའི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲང་བའི་བློ་དེས་དེ་དག་ཤུགས·····ལ་ངེས་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་ན་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་སྟེ། འདིར་ཁྱབ་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་ཁས་བླངས་བས་ཁྱབ་བྱེད་ཤུགས་ཀྱིས་ཁས་བླངས་པར་འགྱུར་ཚུལ་སྒྲོར་ཁྱབ་བྱ·····ཁས་བླངས་ན་ཁྱབ་བྱེད་ཤུགས་ཀྱིས་[328]ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་ཞེས་པ་ཙམ་ཡིན་ན་སྐྱོན་དེ་དག···འཇུག་པ་བདེན་མོད་ཀྱང་། གཞུང་གི་དོན་ནི་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་མིན་པ་ཤུགས་ཀྱིས་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ཁྱབ་བྱ་ཁྱད་པར་བ་ཞིག་ཕ་རོལ་པོས་དངོས་སུ་ཁས་བླངས་པ་ལ······དགོངས་ནས་དེ་ལྟར་གསུངས་པས་སྐྱོན་མེད་དོ། །དེ་ཡང་ཕ་རོལ་པོས་ཁས་བླངས་བའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་རྟག་པ་ལྷ་བྱ་ལ་མཚོན་ན་དེས་དེ་རྟག་པར་ཁས་ལེན་ཚུལ་ནི། སྔ་དྲོ་འི་དུས་ན་གང་ཡོད་བའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་དེ་ཉིད་མ་ཞུམ་པ་ཕྱི་དྲོ་འི་དུས་ནའང་ཡོད་པར་འདོད་པས་སྔ་དྲོ་འི་དུས་ན་ཡོད་པའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་གི་ཆ་ཤས་འགའ་ཞིག་ཕྱི་དྲོ་འི་དུས་ན་ཡོད་·

ཀུང་ཆ་གཞན་འགར་ཞིག་ཕྱི་དྲོ་འི་དུས་ན་མེད་པར་འདོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། སྔ་དུས་ན་ཡོད་པའི་ཆ་ཉིལ་པོ་ཕྱི་དུས་ན་ཡོད་ཅིང་། ཕྱི་དུས་ན་ཡོད་པའི་ཆ་སྔ་དུས་ན་མེད་པ་ཡང་མེད་པར་འདོད་དོ། །དེས་ན་དབང་ཕྱུག་ཡིན་པའི་ཆ་ངོ་བོ་པན་ཚུན་ཕ་དད་པ་མི་འདོད་པ་ནི་དབང་ཕྱུག་རྟག་པ་དང་གཅིག་ཏུ་འདོད་པའི་འདོད་ལུགས་སོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་དབང་ཕྱུག་གཅིག་གི་རང་བཞིན་དང་བྲལ་བར་དགོས་སུ་ཁས་མ་བླངས་ཞེས་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་དེའོ། །ཡང་དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་དེས་སྔ་དྲོ་བདེ་བ་སྐྱེད་པ་དང་ཕྱི་དྲོ་སྡུག་བསྔལ་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པ་སོགས་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་སྐྱེད་པའི་རིམ་པ་དུ་མ་ཞིག་ནི་ཁས་ལེན་ནོ། [329] དེ་ལྟར་འབྲས་བུ་རིམ་ཅན་ལ་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱོར་བར་ཁས་བླངས་པ་དེས་ནི་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཞུགས་[330] ཀྱིས་ཁས་བླངས་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། བདེ་སྡུག་སྐྱེད་པའི་དུས་ཐ་དད་པ་དུ་མའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་རྣམས་རིམ་ཅན་དུ་ཡོད་དགོས་པས་དབང་ཕྱུག་ལ་རིམ་པ་དུ་མ་ཡོད་དགོས་པར་འགྱུར་[331] ལ་དབང་ཕྱུག་དེ་དག་ཀུང་ཆ་མེད་ཀྱི་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཚུལ་འདིས་ནི་གཙོ་བོ་དང་དུས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་གཞི་གཞན་ལའང་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་མིན་པའི་ཁྱབ་བྱ་ཁས་བླངས་ཚུལ་ཡང་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །འདི་དག་ནི་རང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་གཅིག་གི་མཚན་གཞིར་འཛོག་པ་དང་སྔ་དྲོ་ཕྱི་དྲོ་གཉིས་ཀའི་དུས་ན་ཡོད་པར་འདོད་ཀུང་སྔ་དྲོ་དེ་ངས་ཀྱི་ནམ་པ་དེ་ཕྱི་དྲོ་འི་དུས་ཀྱི་ནམ་པ་དང་གཅིག་ཏུ་མི་འདོད་ལ་དེ་གཉིས་དུ་མའི་མཚན་གཞིར་ཡང་འཛོག་པ་དང་། ཡང་སྟོན་པོ་གཅིག་ཏུ་ཁས་ལེན་ཞིང་དེས་སྔོ་འཛིན་སྔ་ཕྱི་དུས་རིམ་ཅན་དུ་བསྐྱེད་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་སྟོན་དེ་དག་མི་འཇུག་བའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཤེས་…… དགོས་པ་ཡོད་དོ། །དེ་དག་ཀུང་དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་ལས་དེ་ལ་རེ་ཞིག་གང་གིས་དབང་ཕྱུག་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྟག་པ་དང་གཅིག་བུའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དུ་ཀུན་བརྟགས་པ་དེ་དག་གིས་ནི་དེ…… དག་གི་འབྲས་བུ་རིམ་གྱིས་འབྱུང་བ་ལ་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱོར་བ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཆོས་སུ་ཁས་བླངས་བའི་

ང

ཕྱིར་ཞུགས་ཀྱིས་ན་གཅིག་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དང་བྲལ་བ་ཡང་ཁས་བླངས་པ་ཉིད་དེ། ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་ལ་སྐྱེད་བར་མི་བྱེད་པའི་གནས་སྐབས་དང་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དུས་སྔ་མ་བཞིན་དུ་[332]དུས་ཕྱིས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་མི་རུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། འོན་ཏེ་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ན་ནི་[333]སྔོན་གྱི་གནས་སྐབས་དང་མཚན་ཉིད་མི་མཐུན་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་གཅིག་པ་ཉིད་ཉམས་པར་འགྱུར་བ་མིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ཞིང་གཞུང་དེར་ཕྱིས་བུ་དང་གཙོ་བོ་དང་དུས་དང་ཚངས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་གཞན་སྡེ་རྟག་སྨྲ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་བཏགས་པའི་རྟག་པ་དང་གཅིག་བུ་རྣམས་དང་། རང་སྡེ་བྱེ་སྨྲས་འདུས་མ་བྱས་གསུམ་པོ་རྟག་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཉིད་དུ་སྨྲས་པ་དང་། གནས་མ་བུ་པས་གང་ཟག་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད་པར་སྨྲས་པ་དང་། རྣམ་རིག་པས་ཤེས་པ་བདེན་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དུ་[334]སྨྲ་བཏགས་པ་དག་གིས་ཀྱང་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་བྲལ་བའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་ཁྱབ་བྱ་གཅིག་མིན་པ་ཁས་བླངས་ཚུལ་རེ་རེ་ནས་རྒྱས་པར་གསུངས་ཏེ། །གཞན་སྡེ་དང་རང་སྡེ་ལ་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་བྲལ་ཞུགས་ཀྱིས་ཁས་བླངས་པར་རིགས་པའི་འཕྲུལ་མཚམས་ནི་འདྲ་བ་ཕྲ་མོ་དུ་མ་ཞིག་ཡོད་ཅིང་། རང་སྡེ་ལའང་དོན་སྨྲ་སྡེ་གཉིས་རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ལུགས་རྣམས་ལ་རིགས་པའི་གནོད་པ་སྟོན་ལུགས་པ་རོལ་པོ་འི་ཁས་བླངས་ལ་འགྲོ་ཚུལ་མི་འདྲ་བའི་ཁྱད་པར་ཕྲ་མོ་དུ་མ་ཞིག་ཡོད་པ་ཞིབ་ཏུ་ཤེས་དགོས་སོ། ཇི་སྲིད་རང་གི་བློ་གྲོས་ཀྱི་ཤའི་ཅོ་[335]མོ་ལྷུར་མ་བྱུར་བ་འི་སྲིད་དུ་ཤང་ཏ་ཆེན་པོ་འི་གཞུང་ལ་ཞིབ་ཏུ་དཔྱོད་པས་ངོམས་མེད་བྱ་བ་[336]དང་། བཤེས་གཉེན་མཁས་པ་ཚུལ་བཞིན་དུ་བསྟེན་པ་སོགས་རྒྱ་ཚོགས་དུ་མ་ཞིག་ལ་འབད་པས་བཙལ་ན་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རིགས་ཡང་སྨྲ་མོ་འི་གནད་[337]འགག་རྙེད་པར་འགྱུར་གྱི། བརྗོད་པ་ཁ་ཟང་ཙམ་ལས་རང་ལ་གདོལ་མེད་པའི་ཟེར་སློས་བསྒྲིགས་པ་ཙམ་ལ་ལོ་འཁྱམ་ཟླ་འཁྱམ་ཀྱི་སློབ་གཉེར་ཤ་

ང

ཐུགས་ཟད་ཟད་དུ་བྱས་ཀྱང་རྟོགས་དཀའ་བར་སྣང་ངོ་། །རིགས་པ་འདི་རང་རྒྱུད་
དུ་བྱེད་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་སྒྲུབ་ལུགས་དང་དོན་དང་ཐ་སྙད་སྒྲུབ་གང་ཡིན་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་
ཚུལ་ཚང་ཟད་བཤད་ན། ཚུལ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་གཉིས། ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་སྒྲུབ་པ་
དང་། ཁྱབ་པ་སྒྲུབ་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་གཉིས། བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་
བྲལ་སྒྲུབ་པ་དང་། དུ་བྲལ་སྒྲུབ་པའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། གཙོ་བོ་ལ་སོགས་པ་
དེ་དག་ཆོས་ཅན། བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། འབྲས་བུ་སྔ་ཕྱི་རིམ་ཅན་དུ་མ་
ལ་ཕན་པ་སྔ་ཕྱི་རིམ་ཅན་དུ་མ་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱོར་བའི་ཕྱིར། གལ་ཏེ་འབྲས་བུ་སྔ་ཕྱི་བ་
དད་སྐྱེད་པའི་ནུས་པ་མི་འདྲ་བ་དུ་མ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་སྐྱོན་མེད་དོ་སྙམ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན།
[338] རྟག་པ་གཅིག་བདེན་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འབྲས་བུ་རིམ་ཅན་གྱི་དབང་གིས་སྔ་ཕྱི་
རང་བཞིན་འཛིན་པ་དང་འབྱུང་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་འཆད་པར་དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་
ལས། འབྲས་བུ་རིམ་ཅན་ཉེར་སྦྱོར་བས། །རྟག་རྣམས་གཅིག་པུའི་བདག་ཉིད་
མིན། །འབྲས་བུ་རེ་རེ་ཐ་དད་ན། །དེ་དག་རྟག་ལས་ཉམས་པར་འགྱུར། །
ཞེས་སོ། །རང་སྡེ་གཞན་དག་གིས་བསྒོམ་བྱུང་འཕགས་པའི་མཉམ་གཞག་ཡེ་ཤེས་
ཀྱིས་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བའི་འདུས་མ་བྱས་[339] གསུམ་གཅིག་དུ་བདེན་པར་འདོད་པ་འགོག་པ་
ནི། འདུས་མ་བྱས་གསུམ་ཆོས་ཅན། གཅིག་དུ་བདེན་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བསྒོམ་
བྱུང་གི་ཤེས་པ་སྔ་ཕྱི་རིམ་ཅན་དུ་མ་དང་ཡུལ་དང་ཡུལ་ཅན་དུ་འབྲེལ་བའི་ཕྱིར། [340] ཞེས་
འཆད་པར་རྒྱན་ལས། བསྒོམས་པ་ལས་བྱུང་ཤེས་པ་ཡིས། །ཤེས་བྱ་འདུས་
མ་བྱས་སྨྲ་བའི། [341] །ལུགས་ལའང་གཅིག་མིན་དེ་དག་ནི། །རིམ་ཅན་ཤེས་དང་
འབྲེལ་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་སོ། །གལ་ཏེ་རྣམ་ཤེས་རིམ་ཅན་དང་འབྲེལ་ཡང་ཡུལ་
བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དུ་ཡོད་པ་མི་འགལ་ལོ་ཞེ་ན། ཤེས་པ་སྔ་མའི་ཡུལ་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་

༡༨༦

ཤེས་བྱ་ཤེས་པ་ཕྱི་མའི་དུས་ན་ཡོད་ན་ཤེས་པ་སྔ་མའང་དེའི་ཚེ་ཡོད་དགོས་ཏེ། །ཡུལ་
ཤེས་དུས་མཉམ་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འདོད་ན། བསྒོམ་[342] བྱུང་གི་ཤེས་པ་སྔ་ཕྱི་འཆོལ་
བར་ཐལ་ལོ། །གལ་ཏེ་ཤེས་པ་སྔ་མའི་ཡུལ་ཤེས་པ་ཕྱི་མའི་དུས་ན་མེད་ན་འདུས་
མ་བྱས་དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྐད་ཅིག་མར་ཐལ། སྔོན་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་དེ་ཕྱི་མའི་གནས་
སྐབས་སུ་མི་འབྱུང་། ཕྱི་མའི་རང་བཞིན་དེ་སྔ་མའི་གནས་སྐབས་སུ་མི་འབྱུང་བའི་
དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བསྒོམ་བྱུང་གི་ཤེས་པ་བཞིན། ཡང་ན་འདུས་མ་
བྱས་ཕྱི་མ་རྣམས་ཆོས་ཅན། འདུས་[343]མ་བྱས་སུ་མི་འགྱུར་ཏེ། འདུས་མ་བྱས་
སྔ་མ་སྔ་མའི་མཐུ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་བསྒོམ་བྱུང་གི་སེམས་
སེམས་བྱུང་བཞིན། མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། རང་དབང་དུ་བྱུང་བར་ཐལ།
རྒྱུ་གཞན་ལ་ལྟོས་མེད་དུ་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན་རྟག་ཏུ་ཡོད་པའམ་གཏན་ནས་
མེད་པར་ཐལ། རྒྱུའི་རྗེས་སུ་མི་བྱེད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་འཆད་
པར་རྒྱན་ལས། རྣམ་ཤེས་སྔ་མས་ཤེས་བྱ་བའི། །རང་བཞིན་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲངས་
ན་ནི། །ཤེས་པ་སྔ་མའང་ཕྱི་མར་འགྱུར། །ཕྱི་མའང་དེ་བཞིན་སྔ་མར་འགྱུར།།
སྔོན་དང་ཕྱི་མའི་གནས་སྐབས་སུ། །དེ་ཡི་ངོ་བོ་མི་འབྱུང་ན། འདུས་མ་
བྱས་ཏེ་ཤེས་པ་བཞིན། །སྐད་ཅིག་འབྱུང་བར་ཤེས་པར་བྱ། །སྔ་མ་སྔ་མའི་
སྐད་ཅིག་གི། མཐུ་ཡིས་འབྱུང་བར་གྱུར་པས་ན། །འདུས་མ་བྱས་སུ་འདི་མི་
འགྱུར། །སྐད་ཅིག་པ་རྣམས་དེ་དག་ཏུ། །རང་དབང་འབྱུང་བར་འདོད་ན་ནི། །
གཞན་ལ་ལྟོས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། །རྟག་ཏུ་ཡོད་པའམ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར། །ཞེས་སོ།།
ཇི་ལྟ་བུའི་རང་སྡེ་དང་གཞན་སྡེ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་[344]འདོད་པའི་རྟག་པ་གཅིག་བདེན་རྣམས……
འགོག་པའི་ཚུལ་འདི་དག་ཀྱང་ཕྱོགས་སྔ་མས་གཅིག་ཏུ་ཁས་བླངས་ལུགས་ལེགས་ས……

པར་ཤེས་ནས་དེས་སྐྱོན་ཁྱང་ལུགས་ཤེས་དགོས་པ་གནད་ཡིན་གྱི། དེ་ལྟ་མ་ཡིན་པར་གཅིག་ཙམ་དང་རྟག་པ་ཙམ་རིགས་པ་དེ་དག་གིས་འགོག་པར་བྱས་ན་གཞན་ལ···བཀོད་པའི་སྐྱོན་ཐམས་ཅད་རང་ལ་ཡང་མཚུངས་པར་འཇུག་པ་བཟློག་ཏུ་མེད་པས་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་སྤྱི་ཙ་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པར་འཆད་དཀའ་བར་འགྱུར་རོ། །གནས་མ་བུ་པའི་སྡེ་པས་འདོད་པའི་གང་ཟག་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པ་ནི། གང་ཟག་ཆོས་ཅན། བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་དང་བྲལ་བར་ཐལ། རྟག་མི་རྟག་གང་དུ་ཡང་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ནམ་མཁའི་མེ་ཏོག་བཞིན། ཁྱབ་སྟེ། སྐད་ཅིག་མར་གྱུར་ན་ནི་དུ་མའི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་འགྱུར་ལ། སྐད་ཅིག་མ་མ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་གཅིག་བུའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དུ་རིགས་ཀྱི། གཉིས་ཀ་ལྟར་ཡང་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད་ན་ནི་ཆོགས་མེད་པར་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་འཆད་པར། དེ་ཉིད་ལས། སྐད་ཅིག་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པར། །གང་ཟག་བསྟན་དུ་མི་རུང་བས། །གཅིག་དང་དུ་མའི་རང་བཞིན་དང་། །བྲལ་བར་གསལ་བར་རབ་ཏུ་ཤེས། །ཞེས་སོ། །ཁྱབ་བའི་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པ་ནི། ནམ་མཁའ་དང་དུས་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྣམས་ཆོས་ཅན། གཅིག་ཏུ་བདེན་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཤར་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཆ་ཤས་དང་འདས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་དུས་ཀྱི་ཆ་ཤས་དུ་མ···དང་འབྲད་འདུས་འབྲེལ་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་འཆད་པར་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། ཕྱ་དང་
345 ཕྱོགས་ཅན་དང་འབྲེལ་ཕྱིར། །ཁྱབ་རྣམས་གཅིག་པུར་ག་ལ་འགྱུར། །ཞེས་སོ།། རགས་པ་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པ་ནི། བུམ་པ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རགས་པ་རྣམས་ཆོས་ཅན། གཅིག་ཏུ་བདེན་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྒྲིབ་མ་སྒྲིབ་སོགས་རྣམ་པ་བརྟེན་པའི་འགལ་འདུ། གཡོ་མི་གཡོ་སོགས་བྱ་བ་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་འགལ་འདུ། ཆོན་

གྱིས་བསྒྲུར་མ་བསྒྲུར་སོགས་ཡོན་ཏན་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་འགལ་འདུ་སོགས་དང་ལྡན་པའི་···
ཕྱིར། ཞེས་འཆད་པར་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། སྒྲིབ་དང་མ་སྒྲིབ་དངོས་སོགས་ཕྱིར། །
རགས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་གཅིག་བུ་མིན། །ཞེས་སོ། །རྡུལ་ཕྲན་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་
པ་ནི། ཕྱོགས་བཅུའི་རྡུལ་གྱི་དབུས་ན་གནས་པའི་རྡུལ་ཕྲན་ཆོས་ཅན། ཤར་རྡུལ་
དང་ཕྱོགས་ལྷག་ལ་དགུའི་རྡུལ་གོ་ས་ཐ་དད་མེད་པར་ཐལ། །ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཤར་ལ་བལྟས་
346
པའི་ངོས་དེ་དང་ཕྱོགས་གཞན་དགུ་ལ་བལྟས་པའི་ངོས་རྣམས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
འདོད་ན། སའི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རགས་པ་རྒྱས་པར་འགྱུར་མི་སྲིད་པར་
ཐལ་ལོ། གལ་ཏེ་ཕྱོགས་བཅུར་བལྟས་པའི་ངོས་སོ་སོར་འདོད་ན། རྡུལ་ཕྲ་
རབ་དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཆ་མེད་ཀྱི་གཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཕྱོགས་བཅུའི་རྡུལ་ལ་
བལྟ་བའི་ངོས་དུ་མ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་འཆད་པར་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། འབྱར་
བ་དང་ནི་བསྐོར་བའམ། །བར་མེད་རྣམ་པར་གནས་ཀྱང་རུང་། །དབུས་གནས་རྡུལ་
ཕྲན་རྡུལ་གཅིག་ལ། །བལྟས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་གང་ཡིན་པ། །རྡུལ་ཕྲན་གཞན་ལ་བལྟ་
བའི་ངོས། །གལ་ཏེ་གཞན་དུ་འདོད་ན་ནི། །རབ་ཏུ་ཕྲ་རྡུལ་ཇི་ལྟ་བུར། །གཅིག་
བུ་ཆ་ཤས་མེད་པར་འགྱུར། །ཞེས་སོ། །དེ་ལྟར་རྡུལ་ཕྲན་ཆ་མེད་མ་གྲུབ་པས་
རང་གི་སྡེ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་སྨྲས་པའི་གཟུགས་ཅན་གྱི་ཁམས་བཅུ་པོ་རྣམས་དང་གཞན་·· ··
གྱི་སྡེ་པས་བརྟགས་པའི་རྫས་དང་ཡོན་ཏན་དང་ལས་དང་སྤྱི་དང་བྱེ་བྲག་དང་འདུ་བ་······
སོགས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་བདེན་པར་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཤེས་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང་། ཁྱད་པར་དུ་རང་
སྡེས་སྨྲས་པའི་གཟུགས་ཅན་གྱི་ཁམས་བཅུ་བདེན་པར་མེད་པར་ཤེས་ན་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་
པའི་ཁམས་ལྷ་ཡང་བདེན་པར་མེད་པར་ཤེས་ཏེ། དེ་དག་ནི་གཟུགས་ཅན་གྱི་ཁམས་
ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པའི་ཁམས་ལྔ་བདེན་པར་མེད་ན་

དེ་མ་ཐག་པའི་རྐྱེན་གྱིས་མངོན་པར་བསྒྲུབས་347 པའི་ཡིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཡང་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པ་མི་འཐད་དོ། །རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་དྲུག་གི་ཚོགས་བདེན་པར་མ་གྲུབ་ན་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་དེ་འདས་མ་ཐག་པའི་ཡིད་ཀྱི་ཁམས་ཀྱང་བདེན་པར་མི་རིགས་སོ། །དེ་ལྟར་སེམས་བདེན་པར་མེད་ན་དེ་དང་གྲུབ་པ་དང་བདེ་བ་ཐ་མི་དད་པའི་ཚོར་བ་དང་འདུ་ཤེས་དང་སེམས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སེམས་ལས་བྱུང་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་བདེན་པར་མེད་པ་བདེ་བླག་ཏུ་འགྲུབ་བོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་ལྡན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་འདུ་བྱེད་དང་འབྱུང་བ་ཆེན་པོ་རྣམས་རྒྱུར་བྱས་པས་གྲུབ་པར་སྨྲས་པའི་རྣམ་པར་རིག་བྱེད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཟུགས་ཀྱང་བདེན་པའི་ཅིག་ཏུ་348 མ་གྲུབ་པར་ཤེས་ནུས་ལ། ནམ་མཁའ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་འདུས་མ་བྱས་རྣམས་ཀྱང་སྔར་བཀག་ཟིན་པས་ཁམས་བཅོ་བརྒྱད་ཐམས་ཅད་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་ཏུ་མ་གྲུབ་པར་རྟོགས་པར་སླའོ་ཞེས་དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས་གསུངས་ཤིང་། དེ་ནི་ཡུལ་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་ཏུ་གྲུབ་པ་འགོག་པའི་རིགས་པ་ཡུལ་ཅན་ལའང་སྦྱར་ནས་འགོག་ཚུལ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཤེས་པ་གཅིག་བདེན་འགོག་པའི་རིགས་པ་ཁྱད་པར་བ་ནི། བྱེ་བྲག་སྨྲ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་རྣམ་མེད་དུ་འདོད་པའི་ལུགས་དགག་པ་དང་། མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་སྣ་ཚོགས་གཉིས་མེད་པ། སྒོང་ང་ཕྱེད་ཚལ་པ། རྣམ་ཤེས་གྲངས་མཉམ་པའི་ལུགས་དགག་པ་དང་། ཕྱི་རོལ་པའི་ལུགས་དགག་པ་ལ་བྱེ་བྲག་པ་དང་རིག་པ་ཅན་པའི་ལུགས། ཟད་བྱེད་པའི་ལུགས། རྒྱང་པན་པའི་ལུགས། གྲངས་ཅན་གྱི་ལུགས། རིག་བྱེད་གསང་བའི་མཐར་སྨྲ་བའི་ལུགས་དགག་པ་རྣམས་དང་། རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ལུགས་དགག་པ་ལ་རྣམ་བདེན་དགག་པ། རྣམ་རྫུན་དགག་པ་གཉིས་དང་སྤྱི་མ་ལའང་རྣམ་པ་འདོད་ཚུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་འགོག་ཚུལ་གསུམ་སོགས་ཀྱི་སྒོ་ནས་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དྲལ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་རྒྱས་

ང

པར་དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་ཙ་འགྲེལ་ལས་བཤད་དོ། །དེ་ལ་སྤྱིར་རང་རྒྱུད་ཤར་གསུམ་གྱི་
གཞུང་དེ་དག་གངས་རིའི་ལྗོངས་སུ་བསྟན་པ་སྔ་དར་གྱི་དུས་དང་ཕྱི་དར་ལ་རྔོག་ལོ་ཆེན་
པོ་ཡབ་སྲས་སོགས་ཀྱི་དུས་སུ་ཡང་འཆད་ཉན་གྱི་སྲོལ་ཤིན་ཏུ་དར་བར་སྣང་ཞིང་། དེའི་
ཕྱིས་ཀྱང་རྗེ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱི་དུས་སུ་ཡང་འཆད་ཉན་གྱི་སྲོལ་དར་སོ་ཆེ་བར་ཡོད་པས་
སྔ་མ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་མ་ཐོན་པའི་རིགས་པའི་གནད་འགག་འགའ་ཞིག་མ་གཏོགས་རིགས་
349
པའི་རྣམ་གྲངས་རེ་རེ་ནས་གཞུང་དང་སྦྱར་ནས་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྒྱས་པར་འཆད་པར་མ་མཛད་
པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་པར་རྗེའི་གསུང་གི་ཟུར་དང་མཁས་གྲུབ་སྐུ་ཞེའི་ཉི་མའི་སྤྱོང་
ཐུན་གྱིས་ཤེས་སོ། །ད་ལྟ་ནི་གཞུང་དེ་དག་གི་ཐོག་ནས་འཆད་ཉན་བྱེད་པའི་སྲོལ་
ཉམས་པ་ལྟར་གྱུར་པས་འགྲེལ་པ་དོན་གསལ་གྱིས་མདོར་བསྟན་རྒྱན་གྱི་མཆོད་བརྗོད་འཆད་
པའི་སྐབས་སུ་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དང་བྲལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པའི་ཚིག་ཟུར་ཞིག་
350
ཙམ་བ་དེ་ལ་མཁས་པ་སྔ་མས་གཅིག་དུ་བྲལ་གྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཅུང་ཟད་རེ་འཆད་པར་
351
མཛད་པའི་ཚིག་སྒྲོས་རྣམས་ལས་མགོ་མཇུག་ཚང་མ་ཚང་ཅི་རིགས་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་མ་ཆི་
འབྲིང་བ་ལྟར་རྗེས་བློས་བྱེད་པ་ཁོ་ནས་གཅིག་དུ་བྲལ་གྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལེགས་པར་ཤེས་
པའི་མངོན་པའི་ང་རྒྱལ་བརྟན་པར་བྱས་ཏེ་གནས་པ་ལས་གཞན་དུ་ཙ་བའི་གཞུང་དང་
བསྟུན་ནས་རིགས་པ་རྒྱ་བསྐྱེད་ལུགས་དང་གོ་བ་འཆོལ་ལུགས་སོགས་ལ་བློ་ཁ་ཕྱོགས་
པ་དཀོན་པར་སྣང་ངོ། །རྗེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོས་དྲང་ངེས་རྣམ་འབྱེད་ལས། རང་
གཞན་གྱི་སྡེ་བས་ཅི་འདྲ་ཞིག་ཁས་བླངས་པ་ལ་ཡང་དུས་ཀྱི་རིམ་པས་ཡུལ་གྱི་
ཆ་རྣམ་ཤེས་པའི་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་སོགས་ཆ་དུ་མ་མེད་པའི་ཆ་མེད་མི་སྲིད་པར་བསྟན་
ནས་ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་དུས་ཀྱི་རིམ་པའམ་ཞེས་པས་གཙོ་བོས་དང་། གང་ཟག་
352
དང་། དབང་ཕྱུག་དང་། བདག་རྟག་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་། བྱེ་བྲག་བཏགས་

པའི་འདུས་མ་བྱས་དྲུག་དངོས་གསུམ་དང་། ཡུལ་གྱི་ཆའམ་ཞེས་པ་ས་བྱུས་པལ་སོགས་
པའི་རགས་པ་དང་ཕྲ་ལ་སྣང་ཆ་མེད་དང་། ཤེས་པའི་ཡུལ་[353]གྱི་རྣམ་པ་[354]ཞེས་པས་ཕྱི
རོལ་པ་ལུགས་ལྟ་དང་། དོན་སྣ་སྤྱི་གཉིས་དང་། རྣམ་རིག་པ་ལྟགས་གཉིས་རྣམས་
ཀྱིས་འདོད་པ་ལྟར་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་རྣམས་སོ་ སོར་ཆ་དུ་མ་དང་ལྡན་པར་སྒྲུབ་ལུགས་ཀྱི······
རིགས་པའི་རྣམ་འགྱུར་ཤེས་དགོས་པར་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་ཞིང་། དེའི་རྗེས་སུ་ཡང་
དེ་ཉིད་ལས། ཆ་དུ་མ་དང་ལྡན་པར་སྒྲུབ་པ་ནི་ཆོས་གཅིག་ཆ་དུ་མའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དུ་
ཡོད་པ་ཐ་སྙད་པའི་དོན་ལ་མི་འགལ་མོད་དོན་དམ་པར་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་ནི་ཆ་དང་ཆ་ཅན······
གཉིས་ངོ་བོ་དད་ན་འབྲེལ་མེད་དང་ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་ན་ཆ་རྣམས་གཅིག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བ་དང···
ཆ་ཅན་དུ་མར་འགྱུར་བའི་གནོད་པ་བརྗོད་ནས་ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་དོན་ནོ།[355] རང་གཞན་
གྱི་སྡེ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ཆོས་དེ་དག་ལ་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་འགོག་
པའི་རིགས་པའི་རྣམ་འགྱུར་སོ་ སོའི་ཁས་ལེན་ལ་འགྲོ་ཚུལ་དང་། དེས་བདེན་པ་
འགོག་ཚུལ་རྣམས་ཤེས་དགོས་པར་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། དེ་ཡང་འགོག་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་
པ་རོལ་པོ་འི་བསམ་ངོ་ལ་བལྟོས་ཏེ་བདེན་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་སྦྱོར་དགོས་ཤིང་། སྦྱོར་
བདེན་པ་གཉིས་ཆར་དུ་[356]འགོག་དགོས་པས་བདེན་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་སྦྱོར་མི་དགོས་པ་འགའ་
ཞིག་ཀྱང་ཡོད་མོད།[357] པ་མ་སོ་ཚེར་ནི་བདེན་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་སྦྱོར་དགོས་ཤིང་དེ་ཡང་
ཁོ་རང་གི་ལུགས་ཀྱིས་དྲག་པ་ཆ་མེད་དུ་ཁས་བླངས་པ་དང་དངོས་སུ་ཁས་མ་བླངས་ཀྱང་
རིགས་པས་ཆ་མེད་དུ་འཕྲུལ་ནས་ཁས་མི་ལེན་དཀའ་མེད་དུ་སོང་རྗེས་སྦྱོར་ཆ་མེད་ནི···
སྲིད་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་[358]བསྒྲགས་ནས་རིགས་པའི་[359]གནོད་པ་སྟོན་དགོས་པ་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་
པར་མི་འདྲ་བ་དུ་མ་ཞིག་ཡོད་དོ། དེ་དག་རང་གཞན་གྱི་སྡེ་པས་བརྟགས་པའི་དགག་
བྱ་འགོག་ཚུལ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་བདེན་འཛིན་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་འགོག་པ་ལ་འང་བདེན་འཛིན···

གྱིས་བཟུང་བ་ལྟར་གྲུབ་ན་ཡུལ་གྱི་སྡོད་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་དགོས་པ་དང་དེ་ཡང་བློ་ལ་མ་…
360
ལྟོས་པའི་སྡོད་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་པས་རིགས་པ་དེ་དག་གི་གནོད་པ་འབབ་ཚུལ་ཀྱང་……
ལེགས་པར་ཤེས་དགོས་སོ། །ཀོ་བོས་དེ་དག་གི་ཁྱད་པར་ཞིབ་པར་སླ་བའི་ཇོ་གྲོགས་ 361
མོད་ཀྱི་ད་ཙང་ཡི་གེའི་ཁྲར་གྱིས་འཇིགས་ལས་རེ་ཞིག་དེ་ཙམ་མོ། །གཉིས་པ་བདེན་
པའི་དུ་བྲལ་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ནི། །བདག་དང་གཞན་གྱིས་སྨྲས་པའི་དངོས་པོ་དེ་དག་ཆོས་ཅན།
བདེན་པའི་དུ་མར་མ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་བྲལ་བ་དེའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་སྟེ།
དུ་མ་ནི་གཅིག་བསགས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་འཆད་པར་དབུ་
མ་རྒྱན་ལས། དངོས་པོ་གང་གང་རྣམ་དཔྱད་ན། དེ་དང་དེ་ལ་གཅིག་ཉིད་མེད།
གང་ལ་གཅིག་ཉིད་ཡོད་མིན་པ། དེ་ལ་དུ་མ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་མེད། །ཞེས་ 362 དང་། སྤྱི་འགྲེལ་
ལས། འདི་ལྟར་དུ་མ་ནི་གཅིག་བསགས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དོ། གཅིག་མེད་ན་དེ་
ཡང་མེད་དོ། །ཤིང་ལ་སོགས་པ་མེད་ན་ནགས་ཚལ་ལ་སོགས་པ་མེད་པ་བཞིན་ནོ།
ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། གཉིས་པ་ཁྱབ་པ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ། སྤྱིར་རྟགས་དེ་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་
ཡོད་པར་ངེས་པ་དང་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་མེད་པར་ངེས་པ་ལ་ཚད་མ་གསུམ་དགོས་ཏེ།
རྟགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་གཞི་ངེས་པའི་ཚད་དང་། རྟགས་དང་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་གཞི་མཐུན་
363
འགོག་པའི་ཚད་མ་དང་། བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་དང་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་དངོས་འགལ་དུ་
ངེས་པའི་ཚད་མའོ། །དེ་ལ་དང་པོ་ནི། འདིར་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་བྲལ་
ངེས་པའི་ཚད་མ་སྔར་བཤད་ཟིན་ཏོ། །གཞན་གཉིས་ལ་བདེན་པར་ཡོད་མེད་དངོས་
364
འགལ་དུ་ངེས་པའི་ཚད་མ་ནི། ཡོད་མེད་གཉིས་གཅིག་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ཙམ་གྱིས་
365
ཅིག་ཤོས་ཡོངས་སུ་གཅོད་པའི་དངོས་འགལ་དུ་ངེས་པས་བདེན་པར་ཡོད་མེད་ལ་ཕུང་…
366
གསུམ་སྲིད་པའི་སྒོ་འདོགས་བཅད་ནས་བློ་ཁ་ཕྱོགས་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས་དངོས་འགལ་དུ་ངེས་

པར་བྱེད་ནུས་སོ། །བདེན་ཡོད་དེ་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་བྲལ་ཡིན་པས་རྟགས་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཞུགས་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རམ་སྙམ་ན་དེ་ཙམ་གྱིས་རྟགས་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཞུགས་པར་མི་འགྱུར་ཏེ། རྟགས་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཞུགས་པ་ལ་ནི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་དེ་ཡང་ཡིན་རྟགས་དེ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད་པ་དགོས་ཤིང་། བདེན་ཡོད་ཡང་ཡིན་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་བྲལ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཕྱིར་སྐྱོན་མེད་དོ། དེ་གཉིས་གཞི་མཐུན་མི་སྲིད་པར་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པ་ནི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་གཉིས་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ན་ཅིག་ཤོས་ཡོངས་སུ་གཅོད་པའི་དངོས་འགལ་དུ་ངེས[367]པའི་ཚད་མས་ཡོད་པ་ཙམ་ལ་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མའི་གཉིས་ཡིན་དང་གཉིས་མ་ཡིན་གྱི་ཕུང་གསུམ་གྱི་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་བཅད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བདེན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ལའང་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མའི་གཉིས་ཡིན་དང་གཉིས་མ་ཡིན་གྱི་ཕུང་གསུམ་སྲིད་པའི་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་ཆོད་ནས་བློ་ཁ་ཕྱོགས་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས། བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་བྲལ་དང་བདེན་ཡོད་ལ་གཞི་མཐུན་མི་སྲིད་པར་ངེས་ནུས་སོ། །ཞེས་མཁས་གྲུབ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པས་གསུངས་སོ། །

དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་ལས་ཀྱང་། གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་མ་གཏོགས་པར། །རྣམ་པ་གཞན་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཡི། །དངོས་པོ་མི་རུང་འདི་གཉིས་ནི། །ཕན་ཚུན་སྤངས་ཏེ་གནས་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་དང་། ཕྱི་འགྲེལ་ལས། གཅིག་པུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དང་དུ་མའི་བདག་ཉིད་ནི་ཕན་ཚུན་སྤངས་ཏེ་གནས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པས་ཕུང་པོ་གཞན་སེལ་ཏོ། །ཞེས་གཏན་ཚིགས་འདིའི་ཁྱབ་པ་སྒྲུབ་འདིའི་སྐབས་སུ་གསུངས་སོ། །དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་ལས་ཀྱང་། གང་དག་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཁྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་དེ་དག་ནི་ཕུང་པོ་གཞན་སེལ་བ་དག་ཡིན་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན། ལུས་ཅན་དང་ལུས་ཅན་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་དག་ལྟ་བུའོ། །གཅིག་པ་ཉིད་དང་དུ་[368]མ་ཉིད་དག་ཀྱང་དེ་དང་འདྲ་ལ་ཁྱབ་པར་

བྱེད་བ་ལོག་པས་ཀྱང་ཁྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ལྡོག་པར་ངེས་པས་དེའི་ཕྱིར་གཏན་ཚིགས་མི······
མཐུན་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ལས་ལྡོག་པ་ལ་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཟ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཕུང་པོ་གཞན་མི་སྲིད་
པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེ་ལ་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་གང་རུང་དང་
བྲལ་བའི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་གང་ཟག་བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཁྱབ་པ་ངེས་པའི་ཚད་མ་དེས་···
བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དུ་བྲལ་གྱི་གསལ་བའི་དབྱེ་བ་མཐའ་དག་ལ་བདེན་ཁྱབ་ཀྱིས་སྟོང······[369]
པའི་ཁྱབ་པ་ངེས་སམ་མ་ངེས། ངེས་ན་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་[371]བྱ་འཇལ་བའི་རྗེས་དཔག
[370]གིས་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་གསར་དུ་མི་གཅོད་པར་ཐལ་ལོ། །མ་ངེས་སོ་ཞེ་ན། མི་འཐད་དེ།
སྤྲོས་སྟོང་བར་ངེས་ན་བྱེ་བྲག་གིས་སྟོང་པར་ངེས་པས་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། འདིའི་
ལན་ལ་མཁས་གྲུབ་སྐྱ་བའི་ཉི་མས་ནི་རྟག་པ་བྱས་སྟོང་དུ་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མས་བྱས་པ··
རྟག་པའི་གསལ་བའི་དབྱེ་བ་མཐའ་དག་ལ་འཇུག་པ་མི་སྲིད་པར་མ་ངེས་ཀྱང་འཇུག······
པར་འཛིན་པའི་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་པ་ཅན་[372]ཅིང་། བྱས་རྟག་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་ལ་བློ་ཁ་
ཕྱོགས་པ་ཅན་གྱིས་ཚད་མ་གཞན་ལ་ལྟོས་མེད་དུ་དེ་ཉིད་བྱས་པས་སྟོང་པའི་ངེས་པ······
འདྲེན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འོ་ན་རྗེས་ཁྱབ་ངེས་པའི་ཚད་མས་བྱས་པའི་གསལ་བའི་དབྱེ་བ་
མཐའ་དག་ལ་ནི་རྟག་པས་མ་ཁྱབ་པར་འཛིན་པའི་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་གཅོད་ནུས་པར་འགྱུར་··
ལ། དེ་ལྟ་ན་རྗེས་ཁྱབ་ངེས་ན་བསྒྲུབ་[373]བྱ་ལ་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་ཆོད་པས་ཁྱབ་པར་ཐལ་ལོ་·
ཞེ་ན་མི་མཚུངས་ཏེ། སྤྱིས་ཁྱབ་ཀྱང་དེའི་བྱེ་བྲག་གིས་ཁྱབ་མི་དགོས་ཤིང་སྤྱི་ཁེགས་
ན་དེའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཀྱང་ཁེགས་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་ཤིང་འདིར་ཡང་དེ་
དང་མཚུངས་པར་བཞེད་དོ། །ཡང་རྒྱལ་ཚབ་རིན་པོ་ཆེས་ནི། བྱས་ན་མི་རྟག་
པས་ཁྱབ་པ་ངེས་པའི་ཚད་མ་དེས་བྱས་པའི་སྟེང་དུ་སྒྲའི་རྟག་པས་སྟོང་པ་ངེས་སྤུ་ཚུག··
ཀྱང་སྒྲ་ཁྱད་གཞིར་གཟུང་བའི་སྟེང་དུ་རྟག་པས་སྟོང་བར་མི་ངེས་པས་སྐྱོན་མེད་ལ། བྱས་

ང

པའི་གསལ་བའི་དབྱེ་བ་མཐའ་དག་ལ་མི་རྟག་པས་ཁྱབ་པ་ངེས་པའི་ཚད་མ་ངེས་ཀྱང་
སྒྲའི་བྱས་པ་ལ་མི་རྟག་པས་ཁྱབ་པ་མ་ངེས་ཀྱང་སྒྲའི་བྱས་པ་ལ་བློ་ཁ་ཕྱོགས་ནས་བྱས་
པའི་གསལ་བའི་དབྱེ་བ་མཐའ་དག་ལ་མི་རྟག་པ་དང་ཚོགས་པ་ཚད་མའི་ཡུལ་དུ་སོང་
བ་ན་བསྒྲུབ[374]་བྱ་གྲུབ་དགོས་པས། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་འཛིན་པའི་ཚད་མས་སྒྲུབ་བྱ་གྲུབ་པར་
ཐལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་མེད་དོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །བཤད་པ་ཕྱི་མ་གཉིས་ཀ་པས་ཅེར་
ཕྱོགས་མཐུན་པར་སྣང་ཞིང་ས་བཅད་ཆེན་མོར་ཡང་དེ་དང་མཐུན་པར་འབྱུང་ངོ། །
སྐབས་གཉིས་ཀྱི་བཞེད་པ་རྗེའི་དགོངས་པ་དང་གཞུང་བསྒྲིགས་ན་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་
ཚུལ་གསུམ་ངེས་པའི་ཚད་མས་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་ཤུགས་ལ་རྟོགས་པའང་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་སྒྲ་
ལ་རྟག་འཛིན་གྱི་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་བཅད་པའང་མ་ཡིན་ལ། ཚུལ་གསུམ་ངེས་པའི་ཚད་
མ་དེ་སྐྱེས་པ་ན་བར་དུ་ཚད་མ་གཞན་བརྒྱུད་མི་དགོས་པར་དེའི་མཇུག་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་སྒྲ་
རྟག་འཛིན་གྱི་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་དང་འཛིན་སྟངས་དངོས་སུ་འགལ་བའི་བློ་སྐྱེད་ནུས་པ་ཞིག
ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་པ་ངེས་ན་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐྱོན་ཡང་མེད་ལ། དེའི་བར་དུ་ཟེས་
དཔག་སྐྱེད[375]་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་གཞན་དགོད་དགོས་པའང་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་རྗེ་ཐམས་ཅད་
མཁྱེན་པ་ཡབ་སྲས་གསུམ་གཞི་ཞ་བའི་དགོངས་པར་སྣང་ལ་གཞུང་གི་དགོངས་པ་དང་
ཡང་མཐུན་ཞིང་ཚུལ་དེ་སྐབས་འདིར་ཡང་འདྲ་བར་སེམས་སོ། །དེས་ན་འདི་ལ་ཕྱིས་
ཀྱི་མཁས་པ་ཁ་ཅིག་དངོས་རྟོགས་དང་ཤུགས་རྟོགས་གང་ཡང་མིན[376]་པའི་རིགས་སྟོབས་
ཀྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་ཞེས་པའི[377]་ཐ་སྙད་མཛད་པར་སྣང་བ་ལེགས་མོད་འདོད་ཀྱང་རྟོགས་ཞེས་པ་
ཚད་མ་ངེས་རྟོགས་པ་ལ་བྱར་མི་རུང་ངོ། །ཙ་ཤེ་ཊཱི་ཀ་ཆེན་དང་སྟོང་ཐུན་ཆེན་མོ་དེ་
གསུང་དང་བསྟུན་ན་ཚད་མ་དེའི་སྟོབས་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་རྟོགས་པའི་རྗེས་
དཔག་བློ་གཞན་ཀྱིས་བར་མ་བཅད་པར་སྐྱེད[378]་ནུས་པ་ཙམ་ལ་བཞེད་པར་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར་

སོ། །ད་ནི་གཅིག་ཏུ་བྲལ་གྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་འདི་དོན་དང་ཐ་སྙད་སྒྲུབ་གང་ཡིན་དཔྱད་···
པར་བྱ་སྟེ། དེ་ལ་དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་དང་སྣང་བ་ལས་རྟགས་འདི་ཁྱབ་བྱེད་མ་དམིགས་པའི་
རྟགས་སུ་གསུངས་ཤིང་རྗེ་ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱི་གསུང་འགའ་ཞིག་ལས་རང་བཞིན་མ་དམིགས་··
པར་ཡང་བཤད་ལ། སྟོང་ཐུན་ཆེན་མོ་ལས། ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་
ལ་དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ལ་རང་བཞིན་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་ཁྱབ་པ་
མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ཀྱང་གསུངས་སོ། །རྣམ་འགྲེལ་གྱི་ཡིག་ཆ་མཛད་པ་པོ་འགའ་ཞིག་
གིས་རྒྱུ་དང་ཁྱབ་བྱེད་མ་དམིགས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གང་རུང་ཡིན་ན་དོན་དང་ཐ་སྙད་···
སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་དགོས་ཏེ། པཎ་ཆེན་ཆོས་མཆོག་གིས། འབྲས་བུ་དང་
ཁྱབ་བྱ་ལྡོག་མི་རུང་བ་ལ་ནི་རྒྱུ་དང་ཁྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་དམིགས་པས་དངོས་པོ་མི་མེད་···
པ་དང་དངོས་པོ་མེ་མེད་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་གཉིས་ཀ་གོ་བར་བྱེད་ལ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་···
རོ། །ཞེས་ཟེར་མོད་ཀྱང་ཤུང་དེའི་དོན་དེར་མ་ངེས་སོ། །དེས་ན་འབྲས་རང་ལྟ་
དམིགས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་སྒྲུབ་ཇི་ཙམ་ཡོད་པ་དང་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ཇི་ལྟར་བྱེད་པ·····
སོགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་མང་མོད་ཀྱང་སྐབས་དོན་ལ་སྦྲེལ་བར་འགྱུར་པས་འདིར་ནི······
སྤྲོ་འོ། །འདིར་སྐབས་སུ་བབས་པ་ནི་སྦྱོར་དོན་དང་ཐ་སྙད་སྒྲུབ་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། མཚན་
ཉིད་ལ་དོན་དང་མཚོན་བྱ་ལ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་བྱས་པ་གཅིག་དང་། བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་
379
དོན་ལྡོག་ལ་དོན་དང་། དེའི་ཐ་སྙད་གསུམ་ལ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་བྱས་པའི་འཇོག་ཚུལ་
གཉིས་མཁས་པ་དག་གི་གསུང་ལས་འབྱུང་ངོ་། །ཐ་སྙད་གསུམ་ནི་སྒྲ་བློ་ཤེས་གསུམ་
གྱི་ཐ་སྙད་དོ། །དེ་ལ་གཏན་ཚིགས་འདི་རང་རེའི་མཁས་པ་ཁ་ཅིག་གིས་དོན་སྒྲུབ་
པའི་རྟགས་སུ་ཡང་འདོད་པ་ཡོད་མོད་མཁས་གྲུབ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཐུན་པས་ནི་ཐ་སྙད·····
འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་སུ་བཞེད་ཅིང་། རྒྱལ་ཚབ་རྗེས་བརྗོད་བྱང་ཆེན་མོར་ཡང་

ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ཏུ་གསུངས་པས་རྗེའི་དགོངས་པར་མངོན་ནོ། །དེ་ལ་འཇམ་
དབྱངས་ལེགས་པ་ཆོས་འབྱོར་བ་ན་རེ། འདི་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་སུ་
བཞེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པའི་དོན་ཚང་ན་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་གང་རུང་དུ་བདེན་
དགོས་པས་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་བྲལ་དེ་སྨྱུ་གུ་བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་
ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ནོ། བདེན་མེད་ཀྱི་དོན་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་
བྲལ་གྲུབ་ཟིན་ནས་བདེན་པར་མེད་ཀྱི་ཐ་སྙད་ཙམ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབས[380]་པར་ཟེར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།
སྐབས་དུ་དགོངས་པ་ཡིན་ན་མི་འཐད་དེ། སྔ་ལ་རྟག་པའི་དོན་ཚང་ན་མ་བྱས་པ་ཉིད་
དུ་འགྱུར་དགོས་པས་བྱས་པ་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ཏུ་འགྱུར་
བའི་ཕྱིར། གཞན་ཡང་རྟགས་དེའི་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་འཇལ་བའི་བློ་ཡང་མཐར་ཐུག་དཔྱོད་
པའི་རིགས་ཤེས་སུ་ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་ན་དེ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། གང་ཟག་ཕུང་པོ་དང་
བདེན་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་གཅིག་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་རུང་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཙམ་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་མ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་དགོས་པ་བསླང་བར་མཛད་དོ། །དེ་ལ་གཞན་དག་གིས་ལན་གྱི་རྣམ་
གཞག་མཛད་པ[381]་དུ་མ་ཞིག་སྣང་མོད། འོན་ཀྱང་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ལེགས་པ་ཆོས་འབྱོར་
གྱིས་མཁས་གྲུབ་རིན་པོ་ཆེའི་དགོངས་པ་ལེན་ལུགས་དེ་ཙམ་ཞིག་གིས་ཕྱོགས་སྔ་མའི་
བཞེད་པ་ཡོངས་མ་ཡོངས་གསལ་བར་ཕྱེ་བ་མི་སྣང་ངོ་། །རྟགས་འདི་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག
སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པ་ནི་རྗེ་ཡབ་སྲས་སུ་མ་ཟད་སློབ་དཔོན་ཞི་བ་འཚོ་ཡི་དགོངས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་
[382]ནོ། དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས་གཏན་ཚིགས་འདི་ལ་ནི་དམ་བཅས་པའི་དོན་གྱི་ཕྱོགས་
གཅིག་པ་ཡང་མེད་དེ། སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཡུལ་གྱི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཤེས་པ་དང་སྒྲ་དང་ཐ་སྙད་རྣམས་
སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ་ཞེས་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ཏུ་གསལ་བར་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
ཐ་སྙད་སྒྲུབ་ཏུ་འགྲོ་ཚུལ་ནི་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་དང་བྲལ་བ་གཞི་ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་སྟེང་

དུ་ཚད་མས་ངེས་ཤིང་། བདེན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ལ་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་གང་རུང
གིས་ཁྱབ་པར་ངེས་པའི་གང་ཟག་གིས་གཞི་ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་སྟེང་དུ་བདེན་ཡོད་ཀྱི་དོན་ཞི·····
འདོད་ཀྱིས་བློ་འདོགས་པའི་བློ་འཐད་པས་བསྒྲུབས་ནས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་ཅིང་ཚུལ་དེ་མ་བརྗོད་
པར་ཡོད་བཞིན་[383] དུ་ཕྱུང་པོ་གསུམ་པའི་[384] དོན་གྱི་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་སྐྱེ་ས་མེད་མོད། འོན་ཀྱང་
ཆོས་ཅན་དེའི་སྟེང་དུ་བདེན་པར་མེད་སྨྲ་བའི་བློ་དང་བདེན་པར་མེད་ཅེས་[385] པའི་སྒྲའི·····
ཐ་སྙད་དངོས་སུ་བྱེད་པ་ལ་བློ་བདེ་སིང་ངེ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གནས་སྐབས་སུ་སྤྱར་གྱི་ཚུལ་
གསུམ་ལྡན་པའི་བྱེད་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་དུ་ངེས་པར་བྱུར་པ་སྟེ། དཔེར་
ན་བུམ་པ་ལྟོང་ངུ་ཞེད་མ་བྱེ་བ་ཞིག་གིས་བ་ལང་ལྟོང་ངུ་ཞིག་མཐོང་ནས་དེ་ལ་ནོག་དང་···
[386] སྐོག་ཤལ་འདུས་པ་[387] དང་དེའི་སྟེང་དུ་བ་ལང་གི་ཐ་སྙད་བྱེད་པ་རྣམས་མཐོང་ཡང་བྱིས ···
པ་ལང་ཆེན་པོ་མཐོང་བ་ན་སྔར་མ་འདྲིས་པའི་དབང་གིས་འདི་ནི་བ་ལང་ངོ་སྙམ་པའི·····
བློ་དང་སྒྲའི་ཐ་སྙད་འཇུག་མི་ནུས་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་འདི་ནི་གླང་སྟེ། སྐོག་ཤལ་ལ་སོགས་པ་
འདུས་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུའི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ལྡན་པའི་བྱེད་པ་ལས་བ་
ལང་དུ་ངེས་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང་དེ་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་དུ་འཛོག་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
འདི་ཡང་པཎ་ཆེན་ཞི་བ་འཚོས་གསལ་བར་གསུངས་ཏེ། དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས།
དཔེར་ན་འདི་ནི་གླང་སྟེ་སྐོག་ཤལ་ལ་སོགས་པ་འདུས་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དང་འདྲ་བར་ཇེ་སྐད་སྨྲས་པའི་འཐད་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མའི་རང···
བཞིན་དང་བྲལ་བར་བསྟན་དུ་ཟིན་ཀྱང་། གང་དག་ཐོག་མ་མེད་པའི་འཁོར་བ་ནས་
ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་གཅིག་ནས་གཅིག་ཏུ་བརྒྱུད་དེ། དངོས་པོ་ལ་མངོན་པར་ཞེན་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་
འཕེལ་བ་ཚུལ་བཞིན་ཡིད་ལ་བྱེད་པས་གོམས་པར་མི་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་སྒྲུང་དཀའ་བས·····
ཡང་དག་པར་ན་དངོས་པོ་མཐའ་དག་ལ་ཁྱབ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་[388] ངེས་པར་མི·········

སེམས་མི་བཟོད་ཅིང་གཞན་དག་ལ་ཡང་ངེས་པ་བསྐྱེད་བར་འདོད་པས་ཐ་སྙད་འདོགས་
པར་མི་བྱེད་པ་དེ་དག་ལ་འདི་ལྟར་ཤེས་པ་དང་སྒྲ་དང་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་ཉིད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་སྟེ།
དམིགས་སུ་ཡོད་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་ན་ལས་མི་དམིགས་པས་མེད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ལྟ་
བུའོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དོན་འདི་ལྟར་ཡིན་པར་སློབ་
དཔོན་ཆོས་མཆོག་གིས་ཀྱང་གསལ་བར་གསུངས་ཏེ་འདིར་མ་སྤྲོས་སོ། །དེས་ན་རྗེ་
ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱིས་མཁན་ཆེན་ཞི་བ་འཚོ་འི་བཞེད་པ་འཆད་པར་མཛད་པ་ཉིད་གཞུང་གི
དགོངས་པ་དང་མཐུན་ཞིང་དོན་ཆེན་པོ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །སྟོང་
ཐུན་ཆེན་མོ་ལས། ཆོས་གང་ལའང་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་གང་གིའང་དོན་སྒྲོ་མི་
འདོགས་པར་བདེན་པའི་དོན་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་པ་ཕུང་པོ་གསུམ་པའི་དོན་གྱི་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་སྐྱེ་
ས་མེད་པས་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ཡིན་ལ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་དོན་ཡང་གང་ཟག 389
ངེས་དེའི་ཚེ་གང་ཟག་ཕུང་པོ་དང་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་ཏུ་ཡང་མེད་བདེན་པའི་ཐ་དད་དུ་
ཡང་མེད་ཀྱང་གང་ཟག་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་འདི་འདྲ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པར་འདུག་སྙམ་པའི་
སྒྲོ་འདོགས་སྐྱེ་ས་མེད་ཅིང་། བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་ཕུང་གསུམ་པ་རྟོན་རྒྱུ་མི་རྙེད་ལ།
དེའི་ཚེ་གང་ཟག་ངེས་རྟགས་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་རྣམས་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་བདེན་མེད་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་བློ་དེ་ཐ་སྙད
གང་ཟག་ཁྱད་གཞིར་གཟུང་བའི་སྟེང་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཉིད་རྟགས་དེ་ཐ་སྙད་སྒྲུབ་ཏུ་འགྱུར་ཚུལ་
ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། ཕྱིར་ངེས་གང་ཟག་བདེན་མེད་ཀྱི་དོན་རྟོགས་
ཟིན་པས་རྟགས་དེ་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ཡིན་གསུངས་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ལ། རྟགས་
དེའི་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་འཇལ་བའི་བློ་གང་ཟག་བདེན་མེད་འཇལ་བའི་བློར་བཞེད་པ་ཡང་མ་
ཡིན་ཞིང་། གང་ཟག་ཕུང་པོ་དང་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་། དུ་མ་གང་རུང་དུ་མ་
གྲུབ་པ་ཙམ་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པར་བཞེད་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་སྐད་བཤད་ན་འཇམ་

དབྱངས་ལེགས་པ་ཆོས་འབྱོར་གྱིས་བཀོད་པའི་དོགས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་སེལ་བར་འགྱུར་···
ལ་གཞུང་གི་དོན་ཡང་ལེགས་པར་དྲངས་པར་འགྱུར་ཀྱི། གང་ཟག་ཕུང་པོ་དང་བདེན་
པའི་གཅིག་ཏུ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་གནས་ལུགས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གཅིག་བདེན་པར་
མ་གྲུབ་པ་གཅིག་གི་གནས་ལུགས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་སོགས་སྨྲས་པས་མཁས་
པའི་དབང་པོ་དེའི་དོགས་པ་སེལ་བ་ལ་ཡང་ནི་ཕན་པར་མ་ཟད་འབྲེལ་མེད་པའི་ལན་···
ཁོ་ནར་འགྱུར་རོ། འཕགས་པའི་མཉམ་[390]གཞག་གི་གཟིགས་ངོར་གང་ཟག་བདེན་པའི་
གཅིག་དང་དུ་མར་མ་གྲུབ་པ་སོགས་གང་ཟག་གི་གནས་ལུགས་ཡིན་ཀྱང་ཕྱིར་གང་ཟག་
བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་གང་རུང་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་གནས་ལུགས་ཡིན་མི་···
དགོས་ཏེ། འཕགས་པའི་མཉམ་གཞག་གི་གཟིགས་ངོར་ཕྲུང་སོགས་མེད་པ་ཕྲུང་སོགས་
ཀྱི་གནས་ལུགས་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། །སྐྱིར་ཕྲུང་སོགས་མེད་པ་ཕྲུང་སོགས་ཀྱི་གནས་ལུགས་
ཡིན་མི་དགོས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། དཔྱད་དེ་དག་ལས་བརྩམས་ཏེ་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་མཆོག་ཏུ་
མང་མོད་ཀྱི་རེ་ཞིག་དེ་ཙམ་མོ། །དྲང་ངེས་རྣམ་འབྱེད་ལས། འདི་དག་ཀྱང་མགོན་
པོ་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲངས་པའི་རིགས་པའི་ལམ་ཆེན་པོ་སྤྱི་རིགས་པ་ལ་བློ་གྲོས་པར་
འདོད་པས་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱའོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པས་[391]རིགས་པ་འདི་དག་གི་གནད་ཤེས་
པ་ཤིན་ཏུ་གལ་ཆེ་ཞིང་ལེགས་པར་ཤེས་ན་གཅིག་ཏུ་བྲལ་གྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཁོ་ན་བསྒོམ་···
ཡང་སྒོམ་རྒྱུས་ཕོངས་པ་མི་འདུག་པས་རང་སེམས་ཆོས་སྐུའི་རང་ཞལ་བལྟ་བར་བློ···
པ་[392]རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་རིགས་པ་འདི་ཙམ་རེ་བསླབས་ནས་ལུས་གནད་བསྣུངས་ན་ལེགས···
པར་མངོན་ནོ། གསུམ་པ་བཀའ་ལ་ཕབ་པའི་བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་ལ། བདེན་
གཉིས་ཀྱི་དབྱེ་གཞི་དང་། དབྱེ་བ་དང་། ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཡང་ལོག་གི་ཁྱད་པར་དང་། བདེན་
གཉིས་གཅིག་ཐ་དད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་སོགས་ནི་སྔར་མདོ་སྡེ་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད···

པའི་སྐབས་སུ་བཤད་པ་དང་འདྲའོ། བདེན་གཉིས་ངེས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཚད་མ་ལ་རྣམ་པ་འདོད་ཚུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་གཉིས་ཏེ། འཕགས་པ་གྲོལ་སྡེ་དང་སློབ་དཔོན་ཞི་བ་འཚོ་དང་མཁས་པའི་དབང་པོ་ཀ་མ་ལ་ཤཱི་ལ་སོགས་ནི་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་རྣམ་བདེན་པ་ལྟ་བུར་འདོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་པའོ། །དྲང་ངེས་རྣམ་འབྱེད་ལས། ལུགས་འདིམ་སྤྱོ་སེར་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རྣམ་པ་དངོས་པོར་འདོད་དེ། ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པའི་བཞེད་པ་ཡང་དེ་ལྟར་འགྲེལ་བས་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་རྣམ་བདེན་པ་ལྟར་འདོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་པའོ། ཞེས་གསུངས་ལ། དེ་ཡང་རྣམ་བདེན་སྣ་ཚོགས་གཉིས་མེད་པ་དང་ཚུལ་མཚུངས་པར་བཞེད་དོ། སློབ་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་སེང་གེ་བཟང་པོ་ནི་ཞི་བ་འཚོ་འི་རྗེས་འབྲངས་ཡིན་ཀྱང་རྣམ་རྫུན་པ་དང་ཚུལ་མཚུངས་དེ། འགྲེལ་པ་དོན་གསལ་ལས། གཟུང་བ་མེད་ན་འཛིན་པ་མེད་དོ་སྙམ་དུ་ངེས་པར་སེམས་པས་འཛིན་པའི་རྣམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་རྣམ་པར་རིག་པ་ཙམ་དེ་ཡང་བསམ་པ་དེ་···གཉིས་སུ་མེད་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་འབའ་ཞིག་འདི་ཡང་དག་པར་ཡོད་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཡིན་ནོ་སྙམ་··དུ་ངེས་པར་བྱས་ནས། ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱི་སྐབས་སུ་རྣམ་རྫུན་དུ་འགྲེལ་བར་གསལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་མཁས་གྲུབ་བསྟན་པ་དང་རྒྱས་དང་འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པ་སོགས་ཀྱིས་གསུངས་[393]སོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་བ་བ་ནི་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་རྣམ་རྫུན་པ་ལྟར་འདོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་ཡིན་པར་པཎྜི་ཏ་ལྷན་ཅིག་སྐྱེས་པའི་རྡོ་རྗེམ་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་བཅུ་པའི་འགྲེལ་པ····ལས་བཤད་ཅིང་། སློབ་དཔོན་དགྲ་ལས་རྒྱལ་བའམ་ཛེ་ཏ་རི་ཡང་རྣམ་རྫུན་པ་ཡིན་པར་བདེར་གཤེགས་གཞུང་གི་རང་འགྲེལ་ཀྱིས་ཤེས་སོ། སློབ་དཔོན་འདི་དག་གི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲངས་པའི་པཎ་གྲུབ་མང་ཞིང་རང་རིགས་ལེན་པ་དང་ཚོགས་དྲུག་ལས་ངོ་བོ་ཐ······དད་པའི་ཀུན་གཞི་ཁས་མི་ལེན་པ་སོགས་ཀྱི[394]་རྣམ་གཞག་ཀྱང[395]་མང་ཆེར་འདྲའོ། ཕྱིར་འཕགས་ཡུལ་གྱི་དབུ་མ་པར་ཁས་འཆི[396]་པའི་པ་ཎྜི་ཏ་རེ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་ཀུན་གཞི་དང་རང···

རིག་གཉིས་ཀ་ཁས་ལེན་པ་དང་། འཕགས་པའི་མཉམ་གཞག་རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་པའི་
ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཡུལ་སྣང་སྟོང་གཉིས་ཚོགས་སུ་འདོད་པའི་མཉམ་གཞག་སྣང་བཅས་
སུ་ཁས་ལེན་པ་ཡང་དེ་གཉིས་བྱུང་སོང་ཀྱང་། དེ་ཙམ་གྱིས་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབུ་མ་
རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་འཕགས་པའི་ཟག་མེད་མཉམ་གཞག་ཡེ་ཤེས་ལ་རྒྱུ་མ་ལྟ་བུའི་
སྣང་བ་ཡོད་པར་ཁས་ལེན་པ་སོགས་སུ་མི་འགྱུར་ཏེ། དེ་འདྲའི་འཕགས་ཡུལ་གྱི་
བརྗོད་དུ་དེ་དག་གིས་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོའི་དགོངས་པ་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་མ་ལོན་པའི་རང་གི་བློ་
སྐྱོན་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ལ་ཞུགས་པ་ཙམ་དུ་ཟད་ཀྱི་རང་གི་གྲུབ་མཐའི་ཚུལ་ངེས་ནས་རྣམ་གཞག་
བྱས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་བོད་ཀྱི་དབུ་མ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བར་ཁས་འཆེ་བ་མང་
པོ་ཞིག་གིས་མི་རིགས་པའི་རྣམ་གཞག་དུ་མ་ཞིག་བྱས་པ་རྣམས་དེ་དག་གི་བློ་སྐྱོན་[397] ཡིན་
གྱི་དབུ་མ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ལུགས་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྨྲ་དགོས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་ལམ་
རིམ་ཆེན་མོ་ལས། ཕྱིས་དབུ་མ་པར་ཁས་འཆེ་བའི་རྒྱ་བོད་ཀྱི་སློབ་དཔོན་དཀའ་རེ་དེ་
ལྟར་དུ་འདོད་པ་ཡོད་མོད་ཀྱང་སློབ་དཔོན་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲང་[398] བའི་དབུ་མ་པ་ཆེན་
པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ལུགས་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡིན་གནད་ལ་དབབ་པར་བྱ་[399] ཡི་བླ་མོ་རྣམས་སུ་ཞིག་གིས
བཤད་པར་ནུས། ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ཡང་རྗེ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པས་རྒྱལ་བའི་དགོངས་
པ་འགྲེལ་བ་ལ་ཚད་མར་གྱུར་པའི་ཤིང་རྟ་ཆེན་པོ་རྣོད་མེད་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དགོངས་པ་གནད་
ལ་འབེབས་པ་གཙོ་བོར་མཛད་པར་བཞེད་ཀྱི། བརྗོད་ཡིན་ཟེར་ཚད་དང་གྲུབ་པ་གྲོབ་
ཟེར་ཚད་ཀྱི་ལུགས་སུ་མ་ཕྱོགས་གཅིག་ཏུ་བཟེན་པའི་རྣམ་གྲངས་མང་པོ་གསོག་པ་ཙམ་
ལ་ཐུགས་མ་དགྱེས་པའི་གསུང་དུ་སྣང་ངོ་།[400] ཚིགས་རྡུག་ལས་ངོ་བོ་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཀུན་གཞི་
མི་བཞེད་ཀྱང་རྡུག་པ་ཡིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་ཤེས་ལ་ཆར་ཕྱེ་ནས་བློ་མོ་འི་ཆ་འགའ་ཞིག་ལ་ཀུན་
གཞིའི་སྐབས་བསྟན་པ་ནི་དབུ་མ་པ་ཆེན་པོ་འགའ་ཞིག་གིས་ཀྱང་བཤད་ལ། ཁྱད་པར་དུ

སྤྱགས་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་གཏུང་ན་མང་བར་སྣང་ངོ། ། བདེན་མེད་གདན་ལ་འབེབས། ཚུལ་དང་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་འཇོག་ཚུལ་དེ་དག་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་མདོ་འི་དྲང་ངེས་ཀྱི་དོན། འགྲེལ་ཚུལ་ལ་ཡང་ཞིབ་ཆ་མང་དུ་ཡོད་དེ། མདོ་དགོངས་འགྲེལ་གྱིས་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་རྣམ་པ་གསུམ་གྱི་དགོངས་པ་བསྟན་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡུམ་གྱི་མདོ་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྣམས་ངེས་དོན་གྱི་མདོ་ཁོ་ནར་བསྟན་པར་བཞེད་ཅིང་། སེམས་ཙམ་པས་བཞག་པ་ལྟར་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་གྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་དང་མི་འདྲ་བའི་རང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་གྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་ནི་མདོ་དེའི་གཙོ་བོ་འི་དོན་དུ་བཞེད་དོ། །འོན་ཀྱང་སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་གྱི་འཇོག་ལུགས་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ཞིག་སྟོང་ཉིད་བློ་མོ་རྟོགས་མི་ནུས་པའི་རིམ་གྱིས་བཀྲི་དགོས་པའི་གདུལ་བྱའི་བསམ་ངོ་ལ་བསྟོས་ཏེ་མདོ་འི་དོན་དུ་འཇོག་པར་མཛད་དོ། ། [401] འཁོར་ལོ་བར་པ་ལ་ཡང་དགག་བྱ་ལ་དོན་དམ་གྱི་ཁྱད་པར་དངོས་སུ་སྦྱར་བ་དང་དོན་གྱིས་སྦྱར་བ་རྣམས་ནི་སྒྲ་ཇི་བཞིན་པའི་ངེས་དོན་དང་མདོ་དེའི་ནང་དུ་དོན་དམ་པ་དང་བདེན་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་གསལ་བར་མ་སྦྱར་བར་གཟུགས་མེད་ཅེས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པས་བསྟན་པ་ནི་སྒྲ་ཇི་བཞིན་པར་གཟུང་དུ་མི་རུང་བའི་དྲང་དོན་དུ་བཞེད་དོ། །དེ་དག་གི་ཚུལ་རྒྱས་པར་ནི་ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པོ་ལས་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་ཞིང་ཁོ་བོས་ཀྱང་གཞན་དུ་འཆད་པར་འདོད་དོ། །བཞི་པ་ལམ་དང་འབྲས་བུའི་རྣམ་གཞག་ནི། ཉན་རང་གཉིས་ལ་སྤངས་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ཡོད་པར་བཞེད་ཅིང་དེ་ཡང་ཉན་ཐོས་ཀྱིས་ཉོན་སྒྲིབ་དང་རང་རྒྱལ་གྱིས་ཤེས་སྒྲིབ་རགས་པ་གཟུང་བ་དོན་གཞན་དུ་འཛིན་པའི་རྟོག་པ་སྤོང་བར་བཞེད་དོ། །ལམ་ནི་རིམ་པ་བཞིན་དུ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་ཙམ་དང་དེའི་སྟེང་དུ་གཉིས་སྟོང་གི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་རྟོགས་པའི་ལམ་མོ། །མངོན་རྟོགས་རྒྱན་གྱི་ཚ་སྐོར་གྱི་སྐབས་སུ་རྣལ་འབྱོར་གྱིས་བཞིར་བྱས་ནས་དབང་པོའི་རིམ་པ་བཞི་དང་སྦྱོར་[402] བར་སྤྱི་མ་དག་བཞེད་ཡོད་ཀྱང་ཟེ་[403]……

ང

ཡབ་སྲས་ཀྱི་དགོངས་པ་ནི། སྔོན་པོ་སྔོར་སྣང་ཞེས་པ་ལས་རྫས་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པ་ཁེགས་
ནས་སྔོར་སྣང་ཞེས་པ་སྔོན་པོ་ལས་རྫས་ཐ་དད་པ་མ་ཁེགས་པའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རིམ་པ…
མི་འཐད་པས་དེ་གཉིས་ལ་རིམ་པ་གཉིས་ལྷར་བསྟན་པ་ནི་བཤད་པའི་རིམ་པ་ཙམ་ཡིན་
གྱི་ཐེག་པའི་རིམ་པ་སོ་སོ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་བཞེད་དོ། །དེས་ན་ལུགས་འདིར་ལྟ་བ་
ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་ཐེག་པའི་རིམ་པ་ནི་གསུམ་ཁོ་ན་བསྟན་ཏེ། ཆུང་དུ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་
མེད་ཐུན་མོང་བ་རྟོགས་པ་དང་། འབྲིང་པོ་གཟུང་འཛིན་རྫས་ཐ་དད་ཀྱིས་སྟོང་བར་
404
རྟོགས་པ་དང་། ཆེན་པོ་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་བདེན་མེད་དུ་རྟོགས་པའོ། །ཐེག་པ་
ཆེན་པོའི་རིགས་ཅན་དབང་པོ་རྣོན་པོས་ནི་ཡང་དག་པའི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་འཚོལ་བ་སྔོན…
དུ་བཏང་སྟེ་དེ་ཁོན་ཉིད་ལེགས་པར་ངེས་པ་ན་ལྟ་བ་ངན་པས་རྒྱུད་ཡོངས་སུ་དཀྲུགས…
པའི་འགྲོ་བ་གཞན་རྣམས་ལ་སྙིང་རྗེ་ལྷག་པར་བསྐྱེད་དེ་བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་པུས་འགྲོ་བ…
མཐའ་དག་གི་དོན་བྱེད་པ་ལ་རབ་ཏུ་དཔའ་བའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་ཀྱི་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ནས་ཐབས…
དང་ཤེས་རབ་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་གྱི་སྤྱོད་པ་ལ་སློབ་པར་བྱེད་དེ། དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་ལས།
ཡང་དག་ཤེས་འཚོལ་སྔོན་བཏང་སྟེ། །དོན་དམ་རྣམ་པར་ངེས་གྱུར་ནས། །ལྟ་
ངན་འཐིབས་གནས་འཇིག་རྟེན་ལ། །སྙིང་རྗེ་ཀུན་ཏུ་བསྐྱེད་ནས་སུ། །འགྲོ་དོན་
བྱེད་པར་དཔའ་གྱུར་པ། །བྱང་ཆུབ་བློ་གྲོས་མཁས་པ་ནི། །བློ་དང་སྙིང་རྗེས་བརྒྱན་
པ་ཡི། །ཐུབ་པའི་བརྟུལ་ཞུགས་ཡང་དག་སྤྱོད། །ཅེས་སོ། །ཐེག་ཆེན་གྱི་
རིགས་ཅན་དབང་པོ་རྟུལ་པོས་ནི་མི་རྟག་པ་དང་སྡུག་བསྔལ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བདེན་པ…
405
བཞིའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅང་ད་ ཡང་དུ་བསྒོམས་པས་སྐྱོང་བ་ལེགས་པར་ཤྲོན་པ་ན་སེམས་ཅན…
གཞན་དག་ཀྱང་སྡུག་བསྔལ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་ཅན་གྱི་འཁོར་བར་འཁོར་བ་དང་། དེ་ཡང་
ཆོས་ཙམ་གྱི་རྒྱུ་ལས་ཆོས་ཙམ་གྱི་འབྲས་བུ་འབྱུང་བའི་རྟེན་འབྲེལ་ཏེ་བར་རྟོགས་པ་ལ…
406

བརྟེན་ནས་སྙིང་རྗེ་ཆེན་པོས་བྲངས་པའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་ཏུ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ལ་དེའི་རྗེས་སུ་སྤྱོད་པ་
ལ་སློབ་པའི་དུས་ཉིད་ནས་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཤེས་པ་འཚོལ་བ་ལ་བརྩོན་པར་བྱེད་དོ། །དེ་
407 ལྟར་ཡང་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། ཡང་དག་དད་པའི་རྗེས་འབྲངས་པ། །རྫོགས་པའི་བྱང་
ཆུབ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ནས། །ཐུབ་པའི་བརྟུལ་ཞུགས་བཟུང་བྱས་ཏེ། །དེ་ནས་ཡང་
དག་ཤེས་འཚོལ་བརྩོན། །ཞེས་སོ། །དེ་ལྟར་བྱང་ཆུབ་ཀྱི་སེམས་རིན་ཆེན་
སྤྱོད་པ་ཕྱིན་དྲུག་ལ་སློབ་པའི་ཚུལ་ལ་འབད་པ་ལས་ཕྱིའི་རྒྱུ་དགེ་བའི་བཤེས་གཉེན་
དང་ནང་གི་རྒྱུ་ཚུལ་བཞིན་ཡིད་ལ་བྱེད་པ་སོགས་རྒྱུ་ཚོགས་ཀུན་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་ཆོས་···
ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་བསྒོམ་བྱུང་གི་ཤེས་རབ་སྐྱེས་པ་ན་སྦྱོར་···
བའི་ལམ་འཐོབ་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེ་ནས་རིམ་པར་འབྱེད་པའི་ཆ་དང་མཐུན་པ་བཞི་
ལས་དྲོད་དང་རྩེ་མོ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་སྐབས་སུ་གཟུང་བ་བདེན་འཛིན་སྤོང་བར་ནུས་པ་གོང་ནས
གོང་དུ་ཆེར་ཞུགས་པར་གྱུར་ནས། བཟོད་པ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཚེ་གཟུང་བ་བདེན་འཛིན་ལྷན་
སྐྱེས་མངོན་གྱུར་གྱི་ཡང་དུས་པ་རགས་པ་རྣམས་སྤོང་བ་དང་། ཆོས་མཆོག་
སྐྱེས་པའི་ཚེ་འཛིན་པ་ལ་ཡང་བདེན་ཞེན་མངོན་གྱུར་གྱི་དུས་པ་རྣམས་སྤོང་བར་བྱེད་དོ། །
དེ་ནས་གཉེན་པོའི་ཕྱོགས་ཉམས་པ་འཕེལ་བ་དང་སྤང་བྱའི་ཕྱོགས་ནུས་དམའ་ཚོགས་པས···
རིམ་གྱིས་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་མཐོང་ལམ་སྡུག་བསྔལ་ཆོས་བཟོད་བར་ཆད་408 མེད་ལམ་སྐྱེས་···
པའི་དུས་ན་དངོས་ཀྱི་གཉེན་པོ་མཐོང་སྤང་གི་ས་བོན་དེ་འགགས་ཤིང་གཉིས་པོ་དེ་ལས་···
རྗེས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱེ་མི་རུང་བའི་ཆོས་409 ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་ཚེ་སོ་སོར་བརྟགས་འགོག་ཐོབ་པ་ཡིན···
པས་རྣམ་གྲོལ་ལམ་ཐོབ་པར་འཇོག་གོ། །མཐོང་ལམ་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་གཅིག་ཏུ་བར་ཆད་
པ་ནི་དུས་མཐའི་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ལ་མཉམ་པར་བཞག་པའི་མཉམ་···
གཞག་ཐུན་གཅིག་ཡིན་ལ། དེའི་ཡང་བདེན་པ་མངོན་པར་རྟོགས་པ་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་

ང

གཅིག་ཤེས་བཟོད་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་བཅུ་དྲུག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ནི་མཉམ་གཞག་གི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་ལ་སྦྱོར་ན་ཤེས་སྒྲིབ་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་ས་བོན་དངོས་སུ་གཞོམ་པའི་ཆེད་དུ་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ལ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མཉམ་པར་མི་འཇོག་པ་དེ་སྲིད་ཚུན་ཆད་མཐོང་ལམ་གྱིས་བསྡུས་པར་འཇོག་གོ། །མཐོང་ལམ་གྱི་སྐབས་སུ་ཁམས་གསུམ་གྱི་སེམས་བསྡུས་པའི་ཉོན་སྒྲིབ་ཀུན་བཏགས་བརྒྱ་དང་བཅུ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ས་བོན་དང་ཤེས་སྒྲིབ་ཀུན་བཏགས་བརྒྱ་དང་བརྒྱད་ཀྱི་ས་བོན་འཇོམས་ལ། སྒོམ་ལམ་སྐོར་དགུས་སྒོམ་སྤང་ཉོན་མོངས་བཅུ་དྲུག་གི་ས་བོན་དང་སྒོམ་སྤང་ཤེས་སྒྲིབ་བརྒྱ་དང་བརྒྱད་[410] ཀྱི་ས་བོན་རིམ་ཅན་དུ་སྤོང་པར་གསུངས་སོ། །[411] མཐའི་རྡོ་རྗེ་ལྟ་བུའི་ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན་གྱིས་ཉོན་མོངས་པ་དང་ཤེས་བྱའི་སྒྲིབ་པ་ཕྲ་མོ་ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་སྤངས་ནས་སྐད་ཅིག་གཉིས་པ་ལ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་སྐུ་མངོན་དུ་བྱེད་པར་གསུངས་ཏེ་དེ་དག་ནི་ཐེག་ཆེན་རིགས་[412] ངེས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་གོ། །དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་སྐུ་ནི་མ་རིག་བག་ཆགས་ཀྱི་ས་དང་། མཚན་མའི་སྤྲོས་པ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཟག་མེད་ཀྱི་ལས་དང་། ཡིད་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་ལུས་དང་། བསམ་གྱིས་མི་ཁྱབ་པར་ཡོངས་སུ་འགྱུར་བའི་འཆི་འཕོ་བ་རྣམས་དང་བྲལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རིམ་པ་བཞིན་དུ་གཙང་བ་དང་། བདག་དམ་པ་དང་། བདེ་བ་དང་། རྟག་པའི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལྟ་ནའང་སྟོན་འགྲོ་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་བླ་ན་མེད་པའི་བདེ་བ་ལ་འགོད་པའི་ཐུགས་རྗེ་ཆེན་པོ་ཕྱུལ་དུ་བྱུང་བའི་མཐུ་ཡོངས་སུ་རྫོགས་པས་ཐབས་དང་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཆ་ཤས་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་པའི་མཆོག་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཟག་པ་མེད་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་འདུས་པའི་ལོངས་སྤྱོད་རྫོགས་པའི་སྐུ་ཡིད་བཞིན་གྱི་ནོར་བུ་འཁོར་བ་ཇི་སྲིད་བར་འོག་མིན་གྱི་གནས་སུ་བཞུགས་ནས་སྤྲུལ་པའི་སྐུ་སྣ་ཚོགས་པས་འགྲོ་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་དོན་མཛད་དོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ཡང་དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་ལས། དེས་ན་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་

ཅན་ཀྱི་མཆོག་དང་ལྡན་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་དང་། ཐུགས་རྗེའི་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་འདུས་པའི་སྐུ། ཉོན་མོངས་པ་དང་ཤེས་བྱའི་སྒྲིབ་པའི་ཕུང་པོ་མ་ལུས་པ་དང་བྲལ་བ། ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་མཆོག་འཁོར་བ་ཇི་སྲིད་བར་བཞུགས་སོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །འདིར་མ་བཤད་པའི་ལམ་དང་འབྲས་བུའི་ཁྱད་པར་འགའ་ཞིག་ནི་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་སྤྱི་མའི་སྐབས་སུ་བཤད་པ་དང་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་སྐབས་སུ་ཡང་འཆད་པར་འགྱུར་བ་རྣམས་ལས་ཤེས་···· པར་བྱ་ཞིང་། མངོན་རྟོགས་རྒྱན་གྱི་འགྲེལ་པ་འགྲེལ་བཤད་རྣམས་ལས་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་འདི་པའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ལམ་གྱི་རིམ་པའི་རྣམ་གཞག་ནི་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྒྱས་པར་གསུངས་པ་དང་ལྟ་ཡང་ཐོགས་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་གྲགས་ཆེ་བ་ལྟར་རོ།

GLOSSARY

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
abiding	sthāna	gnas pa
absorption	samāpatti	snyoms 'jug
action	karma	las
Action Tantra	kriyātantra	bya rgyud
adept	siddha	grub pa
adventitious defilements	ākasmika-mala	glo bur gyi dri ma
affirming negative	paryudāsa-pratiṣhedha	ma yin dgag
afflicted mind	kliṣhtamanas	nyon yid
affliction/afflictive emotion	klesha	nyon mongs
afflictive obstruction	kleshāvaraṇa	nyon sgrib
aging	jarā	rga ba
aggregate	skandha	phung po
aggregation	saṃghata	'dus pa
altruism	parahita	gzhan la phan pa
analytical cessation	pratisaṃkhyānirodha	so sor brtags 'gog
antidote	pratipakṣha	gnyen po
appearance	pratibhāsa	snang ba
appearing object	*pratibhāsa-viṣhaya	snang yul
apprehend	grahaṇa	'dzin pa
apprehended	grāhya	bzung ba
apprehended object	grāhya-viṣhaya	bzung yul
apprehender	grāhaka	'dzin pa
arisen from hearing	shrutamayī	thos byung

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
arisen from meditation	bhāvanāmayī	sgom byung
arisen from thinking	chintāmayī	bsam byung
artificial	parikalpita	kun btags
ascertain/ascertainment	nishchaya	nges pa
aspect	ākāra	rnam pa
aspirational mind of enlightenment	bodhipraṇidhichitta	smon sems
attachment	tṛiṣhṇa	sred pa
attribute	visheṣha	khyad par
autonomous inference	svatantra-anumāna	rang rgyud rjes dpag
autonomous sign	svatantra-liṅga	rang rgyud kyi rtags
autonomous syllogism	svatantra-prayoga	rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba
basal subject		rang rten gyi chos can
base/basis	āshraya	rten
basis of affixing		'jug gzhi
basis of all	ālaya	kun gzhi
basis of debate		rtshod gzhi
basis of designation		gdags gzhi
bondage	bandha	'ching ba
Blissful Pure Land	sukhāvati	dbe ba can
Bodhisattva	bodhisattva	byang chub sems dpa'
body consciousness	kāya-vijñāna	lus kyi rnam par shes pa
calm abiding	shamatha	zhi gnas

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
cause	hetu	rgyu
changeable factor	aniyata	gzhan 'gyur
Chittamātra	chittamātra	sems tsam
clairvoyance	abhijñā	mngon par shes pa
clear realization	abhisamaya	mngon rtogs
coarse selflessness		bdag med rags pa
common being	pṛithagjana	so so skye bo
commonly appearing subject		chos can mthun snang
compassion	karuṇā	snying rje
Complete Enjoyment Body	saṃbhogakāya	long spyod rdzogs pa'i sku
composite	saṃchita	bsags pa
compositional factor	saṃskāra	'du byed
compositional factor not associated with either mind or mental factors	chitta-chaitta-viprayukta-saṃskāra	sems sems byung dang ldan par ma yin pa'i 'du byed
conceptual consciousness/ thought/thought consciousness	kalpanā	rtog pa
conceptual subsequent cognizer	*kalpanā-parichchhinna-jñāna	rtog pa brad shes
concentration	dhyāna	bsam gtan

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
conception of self	ātmagraha	bdag tu 'dzin pa
condition	pratyaya	rkyen
conditionality	idaṃpratyayatā	rkyen 'di pa tsam nyid
conditioned phenomenon	saṃskṛita-dharma	'dus byas kyi chos
Conqueror	jina	rgyal ba
consciousness	jñāna/vijñāna	shes pa/rnam shes
consequence	prasaṅga	thal 'gyur
constituent	dhātu	khams
contact	sparsha	reg pa
contaminated	sāsrava	zag bcas
contaminated action	sāsrava-karma	zag bcas kyi las
contamination	āsrava	zag pa
continuum	saṃtāna	rgyun
contradictory	virodha	'gal ba
contradictory consequence		'gal brjod thal 'gyur
contradictory in the sense of mutual exclusion	*anyonya-parihāra-virodha	phan tshun spang 'gal
contradictory in the sense of not abiding together	*saha-anavastā-virodha	lhan cig mi gnas 'gal
contradictory object		'gal zla
contradictory reason	viruddha-hetu	'gal ba'i gtan

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
conventional existence	saṃvṛiti-sat	kun rdzob tu yod pa
conventional mind of enlightenment	saṃvṛiti-bodhichitta	kun rdzob byang chub kyi sems
conventional truth/ truth for a concealer	saṃvṛiti-satya	kun rdzob bden pa
cooperative condition	sahakāri-pratyaya	lhan cig byed rkyen
correct proof	samyak-sadhana	sgrub byed yang dag
correct reason	samyak-nimitta	rgyu mtshan yang dag
correct reasoning	samyak-nyāya	rigs pa yang dag
correct sign	samyak-liṅga	rtags yang dag
correct view	samyak-dṛiṣhṭi	yang dag pa'i lta ba
counterpervasion	vyatireka-vyāpti	ldog khyab
cyclic existence	saṃsāra	'khor ba
definiendum	lakṣhya	mtshon bya
definite discrimination	nirvedhabhāgīya	nges 'byed
definition	lakṣhana	mtshan nyid
definitive	nitārtha	nges don
dependence		ltos pa
dependent-arising	pratītyasamutpāda	rten 'byung
dependent phenomenon	paratantra	gzhan dbang
designation	vyavahāra	tha snyad
desire	rāga	'dod chags
Desire Realm	kāmadhātu	'dod khams

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
determined object	*adhyavasāya-viṣhaya	zhen yul
determining factor	viniyata	yuls nges
direct cognition/ directly cognize		mngon sum du rtogs pa
direct perception/ direct perceiver	pratyakṣha	mngon sum
direct realization/ directly realize		mngon sum du rtogs pa
direct valid cognizer	pratyakṣha-pramāṇa	mngon sum tshad ma
discipline	vinaya	'dul ba
discrimination	samjñā	'du shes
disintegration	vināsha	'jig pa
dissimilar class	vipakṣha	mi mthun phyogs
dissimilar example	vidṛṣhtanta	mi mthun dpe
effect sign	kārya-hetu	'bras rtags
effort	vīrya	brtson 'grus
elaborations	prapañcha	spros pa
element	bhūta	'byung ba
element of [superior] qualities	dharmadhātu	chos dbyings
Emanation Body	nirmāṇakāya	sprul sku
empowering condition	adhipati-pratyaya	bdag rkyen
emptiness	shūnyatā	stong pa nyid
empty	shūnya	stong pa

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
Enjoyment Body	saṃbhogakāya	longs sku
enlightenment	bodhi	byang chub
entity	vastu	ngo bo
entityness	svabhāvatā	ngo bo nyid
entitynessless	niḥsvabhāvatā	ngo bo nyid med pa
established/proven	siddha	grub pa
established base		gzhi grub
etymology		sgra bshad
exalted knower of all aspects/omniscient consciousness	sarvākārajñāna	rnam mkhyen/rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa
exalted knower of the modes	yathavajjñāna	ji lta ba gzigs pa'i ye shes
exalted knower of the varieites	yāvajjñāna	ji snad gzigs pa'i ye shes
exalted wisdom	jñāna	ye shes
exalted wisdom of equipoise	samāhita-jñāna	mnyam bzhag ye shes
example	dṛiṣhṭānta	dpe
existence by way of its own character	svalakṣhaṇa-siddhi	rang gi mtshan nyid
existence by way of its own entityness	*svabhāvatā-siddhi	ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa
existence by way of its own mode of subsistence		rang gi sdod lugs gyi ngos nas grub pa

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
existence from the object's side	*svarūypa-siddhi	rang ngos nas grub pa
existence from the side of the basis of designation		gdags gzhi'i ngos nas grub pa
existence in the manner of coverings its basis of designation		gdags gzhi'i go sa gnon pa'i tshul du yod pa
existence in the object designated	*prajñapti-viṣhaya-siddha	btags yul gyi steng nas grub pa
existence in the basis of designation		gdags gzhi'i steng nas grub pa
existence through its own power	svairī-siddhi	rang dbang du grub pa
existent	sat	yod pa
external object		phyi don
extreme	anta	mtha'
extreme of annihilation	uchchedānta	chad mtha'
extreme of denial/ extreme of deprecia-tion	apavādānta	skur 'debs kyi mtha'
extreme of existence	astyanta	yod mtha'
extreme of non-existence	nāstyanta	med mtha'
extreme of permanence	shashvatānta	rtag mtha'

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
extreme of superimposition	āropānta	sgro 'dogs kyi mtha'
facsimiles of reasons	hetu-ābhāsa	gtan tshigs ltar snang
facsimiles of signs	*liṅga-ābhāsa	rtags ltar snang
faith	shraddhā	dad pa
False Aspectarian	alīkākāravādin	rnam rdzun pa
feeling	vedanā	tshor ba
Foe Destroyer	arhan	dgra bcom pa
Followers of Reasoning	*nyāya-anusārin	rigs pa'i rje su 'brangs pa
Followers of Scripture	*āgama-anusārin	lung gi rje su 'brong pa
forbearance	kṣhānti	bzod pa
form	rūpa	gzugs
Form Body	rūpakāya	gzugs sku
form for the mental consciousness	dharmāyatana-rūpa	chos kyi skye mched pa'i gzugs
Form Realm	rūpadhātu	gzugs khams
form source	rūpāyatana	gzugs kyi skye mched
Formless Realm	arūpadhātu	gzugs med khams
forward pervasion	anvaya-vyāpti	rjes khyab
free from conceptuality	kalpanā-apodha	rtog bral
fruit	phala	'bras bu
generality	sāmānya	spyi

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
generally characterized phenomenon	sāmānya-lakṣhaṇa	spyi mtshan
generic image/meaning generality	arthasāmānya	don spyi
giving	dāna	sbyin pa
great compassion	mahākaruṇā	snying rje chen po
great element	mahābhūta	'byung ba chen po
ground	bhūmi	sa
harmony with enlightenment	bodhi-pakṣha	byang chub kyi phyogs
Hearer	shrāvaka	nyan thos
hearing	shruta	thos pa
heat	uṣhmagata	drod
hidden phenomenon	parokṣha	lkog gyur
Highest Pure Land	akaniṣhṭa	'og min
Highest Yoga Tantra	anuttara-yoga-tantra	bla med gyi rgyud
I	ahaṃ	nga
ignorance	avidyā	ma rig pa
imaginary	parikalpita	kun btags
imaginary phenomenon	parikalpita-dharma	kun btags pa'i chos
immediately preceding condition	samanantara-pratyaya	de ma thag rkyen
impermanent	anitya	mi rtag pa
impermanent thing	bhāva	dngos po

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
imputedly existent	prajñāptisat	btags yod
incontrovertible	avisaṃvadin	mi slu ba
indefinite reason	anaikāntika-hetu	ma nges pa'i gtan tshigs
individual knowledge	pratyātmavedya	so so rang rig
inference/inferential cognizer	anumāna	rjes dpag
inferential valid cognizer	anumāna-pramāṇa	rjes dpag tshad ma
inherent existence	svabhāva-siddhi	rang bzhin gyis grub pa
innate	sahaja	lhan skyes
innate afflictions	sahaja-klesha	nyon mongs lhan skyes
intelligence	buddhi/mati	blo gros
intention	chetanā	sems pa
interpretable	neyārtha	drang don
Īshvara	īshvara	dbang phyug
knower	saṃvedana	rig pa
knowledge	abhidharma	chos mngon pa
Land of Superiors	āryavarsha	'phags yul
latency	vāsanā	bag chags
liberation	vimokṣha/mokṣha	thar pa
lineage	gotra	rigs
love	maitri	byams pa

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
Mādhyamika	mādhyamika	dbu ma pa
manifest phenomenon	abhimukhī	mngon gyur
matter	kanthā	bem po
meaning/object	artha	don
meaning of the term	shabda-artha	sgra don
meditative absorption	samāpatti	snyoms 'jug
meditative equipoise	samāhita	mnyam bzhag
meditative stabilization	samādhi	ting nge 'dzin
mental and physical aggregates	skandha	phung po
mental consciousness	manovijñāna	yid kyi rnam shes
mental direct perceiver	mānasa-pratyakṣha	yid kyi mngon sum
mental engagement	manaskāra	yid la byed pa
mental factor	chaitta	sem byung
mere subject		chos can 'ba' zhig pa
merit	puṇya	bsod nams
method	upāya	thabs
migrator	gati	'gro ba
mind	chitta	sems
mind-basis-of-all	ālaya-vijñāna	kun gzhi rnam shes
mind of enlightenment	bodhichitta	byang chub kyi sems
mindfulness	smṛiti	dran pa
mistaken	bhrānti	'khrul pa
mode	rūpa	mtshul

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
mode of being		gnas lugs
moment	kṣhana	skad cig
mutual exclusion	*anyonya-parihāra	phan tshun spang 'gal
nature	prakṛiti	rang bzhin
Nature Body	svabhāvikakāya	ngo bo nyid sku
negation/negative phenomenon	pratiṣhedha	dgag pa
negative, affirming	paryudāsa-pratiṣhedha	ma yin dgag
negative, non-affirming	prasajya-pratiṣhedha	med dgag
Nihilist	ayata	rgyang 'phen pa
noble/superior	ārya	'phags pa
nominal existence		ming tsam du yod pa
non-affirming negative	prasajya-pratiṣhedha	med dgag
non-analytical cessation	apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha	so sor brtags
non-associated compositional factor	viprayukta-saṃskāra	ldan min 'du byed
non-conceptual	nirvikalpaka	rtog med
non-conceptual wisdom	nirvikalpa-jñāna	rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes
non-entityness	niḥsvabhāvatā	ngo bo nyid med
non-established reason	asiddha-hetu	ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs
non-existent	asat	med pa
non-mistaken	abhrānta	ma 'khrul ba

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
non-observation of a cause	kāraṇa-anupalabdhi	rgyu ma dmigs pa
non-observation of a nature	svabhāva-anupalabdhi	rang bzhin ma dmigs ba
non-observation of a pervader	vyāpaka-anupalabdhi	khyab byed ma dmigs ba
non-observation of an effect	kārya-anupalabdhi	'bras bu ma dmigs pa
non-observation sign	anupalabdhi-liṅga	ma dmigs pa'i rtags
non-revelatory form	avijñāpti-rūpa	rnam par rig byed ma yin pa'i gzengs
non-thing	abhāva	dngos med
non-virtuous	akushala	mi dge ba
object	viṣhaya/artha	yul/don
object of apprehension	grāhya-viṣhaya	bzung yul
object of comprehension	prameya	gzhal bya
object of engagement	*pravṛitti-viṣhaya	'jug yul
object of expression	vākya	brjod bya
object of knowledge	jñeya	shes bya
object of negation	pratiṣhedhya	dgag bya
object of negation by reasoning	*yukti-pratiṣhedhya	rigs pa'i dgag bya
object of negation by the path	*mārga-pratiṣhedhya	lam gyi dgag bya

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
object of observation/ observed object	ālambana	dmigs yul/dmigs pa
object of thought	*kalpanā-viṣhaya	rtog yul
object pervaded	vyāpya	khyab bya
objective existence	*viṣhaya-siddhi	yul gyi steng nas grub pa
observed-object-condition	ālambana-pratyaya	dmigs rkyen
obstructions to liberation/afflictive obstructions	kleshāvaraṇa	nyon mong pa'i sgrib pa
obstructions to omniscience	jñeyāvaraṇa	shes bya'i sgrib pa
omnipresent factor	sarvatraga	kun 'gro
omniscience	sarvākārajñāna	rnam pa tham ced mkhyen pa
only imputed	prajñaptimātra	btags tsam
other-approved reason	paraprasiddha-liṅga	gzhan grags kyi rtags
other-approved syllogism	paraprasiddha-prayoga	gzhan grags kyi sbyor ba
other-powered	paratrantra	gzhan dbang
own character	svalakṣhaṇa	rang mtshan
own continuum/autonomous	svatantra	rang rgyud
own power	svairī	rang dbang
pain/suffering	duḥkha	sdug bsngal
particularity	visheṣha	bye brag
party	pakṣha	rgol ba

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
path	mārga	lam
path of accumulation	saṃbhāva-mārga	tshogs lam
path of meditation	bhāvāna-mārga	sgom lam
path of no more learning	ashaikṣa-mārga	mi slob lam
path of preparation	prayogā-mārga	sbyor lam
path of release	vimukti-mārga	rnam grol lam
path of seeing	darshana-mārga	mthong lam
patience	kṣhānti	bzod pa
peak	mūrdhan	rtse mo
Perfection Vehicle	pāramitāyāna	phar phyin kyi theg pa
perfection	pāramitā	phar phyin
Performance Tantra	charyātantra	spyod rgyud
permanent phenomenon	nitya	rtag pa
person	pudgala	gang zag
personal deity	iṣhṭadevatā	yid dam gyi lha
pervader	vyāpaka	khyab byed
pervasive suffering of conditioning	vyāptisaṃskāraduḥkhatā	khyab pa 'du byed kyi sdug bsngal
pervasion	vyāpti	khyab pa
phenomenon	dharma	chos
phenomenon-source	dharmāyatana	chos kyi skye mched
pleasure	sukhā	bde ba
position	pakṣha	phyogs
potency	vāsanā/bāla	bag chags/nus pa

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
Prāsaṅgika	prāsaṅgika	thal 'gyur pa
predicate of the probandum	sādhyadharma	bsgrub bya'i chos
predisposition	vāsanā	bag chags
principal	pradhāna	gtso bo
produced	utpādya	bskyed bya
producer	utpatti	skyed byed
proof statement	sādhana-vākya	sgrub ngag
property of the subject	pakṣhadharma	phyogs chos
Proponent of No Entityness	niḥsvabhāvavādin	ngo bo nyid med par smra ba
Proponent of True Existence		dngos smra ba
real conventional truth	tathya-saṃvṛiti-satya	yang dag kum rdzob bden pa
real existence	*samyak-siddhi	yang dag par grub pa
reality	dharmatā	chos nyid
realize	adigam	rtogs
reason	hetu	gtan tshigs
reasoning	yukti	rigs pa
referent object	*adhyavasaya-viṣhaya	zhen yul
related object		'brel zla
relationship	saṃbandha	'brel ba

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
renown	prasiddha	grags pa
renowned to oneself	svaprasiddha	rang la grags pa
renowned to others	paraprasiddha	gzhan la grags pa
requiring interpretation	neyārtha	drang don
reverse	vyatireka	ldog pa
root affliction	mūlaklesha	rtsa nyon
same reverse	*eka-vyatireka	ldog pa gcig
Sāṃkhya	sāṃkhya	grangs can pa
Sautrāntika	sautrāntika	mdo sde pa
Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika	sautrāntika-svātantrika-mādhyamika	mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa
scholar-adept	paṇḍita-siddha	mkhas grub
second party	pūrva-pakṣha	phyi rgol
secondary affliction	upaklesha	nye nyon
seed	bīja	sa bon
self	ātman	bdag
self-approved inference	svaprasiddha-anumānu	rang grags rjes dpag
self-approved reason	svaprasiddha-liṅga	rang grags kyi rtags
self knower	svasaṃvedana	rang rig
self knowing direct perceiver	svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣha	rang rig mngon sum
self of persons	pudgalātman	gang zag gi bdag
self of phenomena	dharmātman	chos kyi bdag
self-sufficient		rang rkya ba

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
selflessness	nairātmya	bdag med
selflessness of persons	pudgala-nairātmya	gang sag gi bdag med
selflessness of phenomena	dharma-nairātmya	chos kyi bdag med
sense consciousness	indriya-jñāna	dbang shes
sense direct perceiver	indriya-pratyakṣha	dbang po'i mngon sum
sense power	indriya	dbang po
sentient being	sattva	sems can
sign	liṅga	rtags
sign proving the expression		tha snyad sgrub kyi rtags
sign proving the meaning		don sgrub kyi rtags
sign which is a non-observation of a related object		'brel zla ma dmigs pa'i rtags
sign which is a non-observation of the suitable to appear		snang rung ma dmigs pa'i rtags
sign which is an observation of a contradictory object		'gal zla dmigs pa'i rtags
similar class	sapakṣha	mthun phyogs
similar example	*sadṛiṣhṭānta	mthun dpe
skillful means	upāya-kaushala	thab mkhas

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
Solitary Realizer	pratyekabuddha/svajina	rang sang rgyas/rang rgyal
sound	shabda	sgra
source	āyatana	skye mched
space	ākāsha	nam mkha'
special insight	vipashyanā	lhag mthong
specifically characterized phenomenon	svalakṣhaṇa	rang mtshan
sphere of reality	dharmadhātu	chos kyi dbyings
stabilization	samādhi	ting nge 'dzin
subject	dharmin	chos can
subsequent attainment	pṛiṣhṭhalabdha	rjes thob
subsequent cognizer	*parichchhinna-jñāna	bcad shes
substantial cause	upādāna	nyer len
substantial entity	dravya	rdzas
substantial existence	dravya-sat	rdzas su yod pa
substantially established	dravya-siddha	rdzas su grub pa
substantially existent	dravya-sat	rdzas su yod pa
suchness	tathatā	de bzhin nyid/de kho na nyid
suffering of change	vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā	'gyur ba'i sdug bsngal
suffering of conditioning	saṃskāraduḥkhatā	'du byed kyi sdug bsngal
suffering of pain	duḥkhaduḥkatā	sdug bsngal gyi sdug bsngal

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
Sugata	sugata	bde bar gshegs pa
Sugata essence	sugata-garbha	bde bar gshegs pa'i snying po
Sun Friend	ādityabandhu	nyi ma'i gnyen
superficial cause of error	*pratibhāshikī-bhrānti-hetu	phral gyi 'khrul rgyu
superimpositions	āropa	sgro 'dogs
Superior	ārya	'phags pa
supramundane	lokottara	'jig rten las 'das pa
Supramundane Victor	bhagavan	bcom ldan 'das
supreme mundane qualities	laukikāgraya-dharma	'jig rten pa'i chos kyi mchog
Svātantrika	svātantrika	rang rgyud pa
syllogism	prayoga	sbyor ba
synonym	ekārtha	don gcig
tangible object	sparṣhṭavya	reg bya
Tathāgata	tathāgata	de bzhin gshegs pa
Tathagata essence	tathāgata-garbha	de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po
tenet/system of tenets	siddhānta/siddhyanta	grub mtha'
term	shabda	sgra
thesis	pratijñā	dam bca'
thing/actuality	bhāva	dngos po
thoroughly established	pariniṣhpanna	yongs grub
Three Bodies	trikāya	sku gsum

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
three modes	trirūpa	mtshul gsum
thought/thought consciousness	kalpanā	rtog pa
time	kāla	dus
treatise	shāstra	bstan bcos
True Aspectarian	satyākāravādin	rnam bden pa
true cessation	nirodha-satya	'gog bden
true establishment	satya-siddhi	bden par grub pa
true existence	satya-sat	bden par yod pa
truly established	satya-siddha	bden par grub pa
truly existent	satya-sat	bden par yod pa
truth	satya	bden pa
truth for a concealer	saṃvṛiti-satya	kun rdzob bden pa
Truth Body	dharmakāya	chos sku
two truths	satyadvaya	bden pa gnyis
ultimate	paramārtha	don dam pa
ultimate existence	paramārtha-siddhi	don dam par grub pa
ultimate mind of enlightenment	paramārtha-bodhichitta	don dam byang chub kyi sems
ultimate truth	paramārtha-satya	don dam bden pa
ultimately established	paramārtha-siddha	don dam par grub pa
uncommon empowering condition	asādhārana-adhipati-pratyaya	thun mong ma yin pa'i bdag rkyen
unconditioned phenomena	asaṃskrita-dharma	'dus ma byas kyi chos

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
uncontaminated wisdom	anāsrava-jñāna	zag med ye shes
uninterrupted path	ānantarya-mārga	bar ched med lam
unreal conventional truth	mithyā-saṃvṛiti-satya	log pa'i kun rdzob bden pa
Vaibhāṣhika	vaibhāṣhika	bye brag smra ba
vajra-like meditative stabilization	vajropamasamādhi	rdo rje lta bu'i ting nge 'dzin
valid cognition/valid cognizer	pramāṇa	tshad ma
valid establishment	pramāṇa-siddhi	tshad ma'i grub pa
validly established	pramaṇa-siddha	tshad ma'i grub pa
vehicle	yāna	theg pa
view	driṣhṭi	lta ba
virtuous	kushula	dge ba
visible form	rūpa	gzugs
wisdom	prajñā/jñāna	shes rab/ye shes
wisdom arisen from hearing	shrutamayī-prajñā	thos byung gi shes rab
wisdom arisen from meditation	bhāvanāmayi-prajñā	sgom byung gi shes rab
wisdom arisen from thinking	chintāmayī-prajñā	bsam byung gi shes rab
Wisdom Truth Body	jñānakāya	ye shes chos sku

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
wrong consciousness	viparyaya-jñāna	log shes
wrong view	mithyā-dṛiṣhṭi	log lta
Yoga Tantra	yogatantra	rnal 'byor rgyud
Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika	yogāchāra-svātantrika-mādhyamika	rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa
yogic direct perceiver	yogi-pratyakṣha	rnal 'byor mngon sum

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED

Sutras and tantras are listed alphabetically by English title in the first section, with other works arranged alphabetically by author in the second and third sections. The words *ārya*, *mahāyāna*, and *shrī* have been deleted from the Sanskrit and Tibetan titles, and many of the English titles have been abbreviated. The fact that the titles of Sanskrit and Tibetan texts have been translated into English does not suggest that the works themselves have been translated.

Abbreviations

P: *Tibetan Tripiṭaka* (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Foundation, 1956)

Toh: *A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons*, ed. by Prof. Hakuji Ui, and *A Catalogue of the Tohuku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism*, ed. Prof. Yensho Kanakura (Sendai, Japan, 1934 and 1953)

I. SUTRAS AND TANTRAS

Advice to Kātyāyana Sutra

Kātyāyanāvavādasūtra

Ka tya ya na yi bdams ngag gi mdo

Included in P 1035

Brief Scriptures on Discipline

Vinayakṣhudravastu

'Dul ba phran tshegs kyi gzhi

P 1035

Chapter on the Supramundane

Lokottaraparivarta

'Jig rten las 'das pa'i le'u

[?]

Compendium of Doctrine Sutra

Dharmasaṃgītisūtra

Chos yang dag par sdud pa'i mdo

P 904

Descent into Laṅkā Sutra

Laṅkāvatārasūtra

Lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo

P 775

Diamond Cutter Sutra

Vajrachchhedikā

rDo rje gcod pa

P 739

Garland Sutra

Buddhāvataṃsakanāmamahāvaipulyasūtra

Sangs rgyas phal po che zhes bya ba shin tu rgyas pa chen po'i mdo

P 761

Great Cloud Sutra

Mahāmeghasūtra

sPrin chen po'i mdo

P 898

Great Drum Sutra

Mahābherīhārakaparivartasūtra

rNga bo che chen po'i le'u'i mdo

P 888

Guhyasamāja Tantra

Sarvatathāgatakāyavākchittarahasyaguhyasamājanāmamahākal-parāja

De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi sku gsung thugs kyi gsang chen gsang ba 'dus pa zhes bya ba brtag pa'i rgyal po chen po

P 81

Heart of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra

Bhagavatīprajñāpāramitāhṛidayasūtra

bCom ldan 'das ma shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i snying po'i mdo

P 160

Kāshyapa Chapter Sutra

Kāshyapaparivartasūtra

'Od srung gi le'u'i mdo

P 760.43

Kindred Sayings III

Saṃyutta-nikāya III

London: Pali Text Society, Luzac and Company, 1960

King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra

Samādhirājasūtra/Sarvadharmasvabhāvasamatāvipañchitasamādhirājasūtra

Ting nge 'dzin rgyal po'i mdo/Chos thams cad kyi rang bzhin mnyam pa nyid rnam par spros pa ting nge 'dzin gyi rgyal po'i mdo

P 795

Mañjusrī Root Tantra

Mañjushrīmūlatantra

'Jam dpal gyi rtsa ba'i rgyud

P 162

Meeting of Father and Son Sutra

Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra

Yab dang sras mjal ba'i mdo

P 760.16

Ornament Illuminating the Wisdom Engaging the Sphere of All Buddha Sutra

Sarvabuddhaviṣhayāvatārajñānālokālaṃkārasūtra

Sangs rgyas thams cad kyi yul la 'jug pa'i ye shes snang bai' rgyan gyi mdo

P 768

Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Stanzas Sutra

Shatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra

Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag brgya pa'i mdo

P 730

Perfection of Wisdom in Twenty-Five Thousand Stanzas Sutra

Pañchaviṃshatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra

Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa

P 731

Rice Seedling Sutra

Shalistambasūtra

Sā lu'i ljang pa'i mdo

P 876

Sutra on the Heavily Adorned

Ghanavyūhasūtra

rGyan stug po bkod pa'i mdo

P 778

<u>Sutra on the Ten Grounds</u>

Dashabhūmikasūtra

mDo sde sa bcu pa

P 761.31

<u>Sutra Set Forth by Akṣhayamati</u>

Akṣhayamatinirdeshasūtra

bLo gros mi zad pas bstan pa'i mdo

P 842

<u>Sutra Unravelling the Thought</u>

Saṃdhinirmochanasūtra

dGongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo

P 774

<u>Treasury of Tathāgathas Sutra</u>

Tathāgatakoshasūtra

De bzhin gshegs pa'i mdzon kyi mdo

[?]

<u>Verses of Uplift</u>

Udānavarga

Ched du brjod pa'i tshoms

P 39

II. OTHER SANSKRIT AND TIBETAN SOURCES

Abhayākāragupta

Moonbeams of Essentials

Marmakaumudi

gNad kyi zla 'od

[?]

Akutobhayā (Ga-las-'jigs-med)[1]

Akutobhayā's Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"

Mūlamadhyamakavṛitti-akutobhayā

dbU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa ga las 'jigs med

P 5229

Amarasinha ('Chi-med-seng-ge)

Amarasinha's Treasury

Amarakosha

'Chi med mdzod

P 5787

Āryadeva ('Phags-pa-lha)

Compendium on the Essence of Exalted Wisdom

Jñānasārasamuchchaya

Ye shes snying po kun btus

P 5251

Establishment of the Reasoning and Logic Refuting Error

Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi

'Khrul pa bzlog pa'i rigs pa gtan tshigs grub pa

P 5247

Four Hundred/Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas

Chatuḥshatakashāstrakārikā

bsTan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa

P 5246

Length of a Forearm

Hastavālaprakaraṇakārikā

Rab tu byed pa lag pa'i tshad kyi tshig le'ur byas pa

P 5248

Āryavimuktisena ('Phags-pa-grol-sde)

Illumination of the Perfection of Wisdom in Twenty-Five Thousand Stanzas

Pañchavimshatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitopadeshashāstrābhisamayālaṃkāravṛitti

Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa

P 5185

Asaṅga (Thogs-med)

Compendium of Knowledge

Abhidharmasamuchchaya

mNgon pa kun btus

P 5550

Atīsha

Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment

Bodhipathapradīpa

Byang chub lam gyi sgron ma

P 5343

Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way

Madhyamakopadesha

dbU ma'i man ngag

P 5324; P 5326; P 5381

Avalokitavrata (sPyan-ras-gzigs-brtul-zhugs)

Commentary on (Bhāvaviveka's) "Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) 'Wisdom'"

Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā

Shes rab sgron ma'i rgya cher 'grel pa

P 5259

Ba-so Chö-ḡyi-gyel-tsen (Ba-so Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan). See Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, et al.

B̄el-den Drak-b̄a (dPal-ldan-grags-pa)

Beautiful Ornament of Faith, A Good Explanation

Legs bshad dad pa'i mdzes rgyan

Mundgod, India: Drepung Loseling Printing Press, 1979

Bhāvaviveka (Legs-ldan-'byed)

Blaze of Reasoning, Commentary on the "Heart of the Middle Way"

Madhyamakahṛidayavṛittitarkajvālā

dbU ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba

P 5256

Heart of the Middle Way

Madhyamakahṛidayakārikā

dbU ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa

P 5255

Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom," Commentary on the "Treatise on the Middle Way"

Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛitti

dbU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma

P 5253

Bhāvaviveka the Lesser (Legs-ldan-chung-ba)

Precious Lamp for the Middle Way

Madhyamakaratnapradīpa

dbU ma rin po che'i sgron ma

P 5254

Buddhapālita (Sangs-rgyas-bskyangs)

Buddhapālita's Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"

Buddhapālitamūlamadhyamakavṛitti

dbU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa buddha pā li ta

P 5242

Chandrakīrti (Zla-ba-grags-pa)

Brilliant Lamp Commentary

Pradīpoddyotana

'Grel pa sgron gsal

P 2650

Clear Words, Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"

Mūlamadhyamakavṛittiprasannapadā

dbU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba

P 5260

Sanskrit edition: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*. Publiée par Louis de la Vallée Poussin Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970

Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"

Bodhisattvayogacharyāchatuḥshatakaṭīkā

Byang chub sems dpa'i rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa

P 5266

Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning"

Yuktiṣhaṣhtikāvṛitti

Rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel pa

P 5265

Commentary on the "Supplement to the Middle Way"

Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣhya

dbU ma la 'jug pa'i bshad pa

P 5263

Supplement to the Middle Way

Madhyamakāvatāra

dbU ma la 'jug pa

P 5261; P 5262

Also: Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Publiée par Louis de la Vallée Poussin

Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970

Concerning Tenets and the Buddhist Sciences

Grub mtha' dang nang rig skor

no author given

Dharamsala, India: Council for Tibetan Education, 1970

Da-di-ge-shay Rin-chen-don-drup (Bra-sti-dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub). See Jam-yang-shay-ba, et al.

Dak-tsang (sTag-tshang-lo-tsa-ba Shes-rab-rin-chen)

Ocean of Good Explanations, Explanation of "Freedom from Extremes Through Understanding All Tenets"

Grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho

Thim-phu: Kun-gzang-stobs-rgyal, 1976

De-druk-ken-chen Nga-w̄ang-rap-d̄en (sDe-drug-mkhan-chen Ngag-dbang-rab-brtan). See Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, et al.

D̄en-dar-hla-ram-b̄a (bsTan-dar-lha-ram-pa)

<u>Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many</u>

gCig du bral gyi rnam gzhag legs bshad rgya mtsho las btus pa'i 'khrul spong bdud rtsi'i gzegs ma

Collected gzung 'bum of Bstan-dar Lha-ram of A-lag-sha. Vol. 1.

New Delhi: Lama Guru Deva, 1971

Dharmakīrti (Chos-kyi-grags-pa)

<u>Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium on Valid Cognition"</u>

Pramāṇavarttikakārikā

Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa

P 5709

Dignāga (Phyogs-glang)

<u>Analysis of the Object of Observation</u>

Ālambanaparīkṣha

dMigs pa brtag pa

P 5703

<u>Compendium on Valid Cognition</u>

Pramāṇasamuchchaya

Tshad ma kun las btus pa

P 5700

D̄zong-ka-b̄a (Tsong-kha-pa)

Explanation of the Eight Great Difficult Points in (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"

rTsa ba shes rab kyi dka' gnas chen po brgyad kyi bshad pa

Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1970

Essence of the Good Explanations, Treatise Discriminating the Interpretable and the Definitive

Drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po

P 6142

Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973

Golden Rosary of Eloquence/Extensive Explanation of (Maitreya's) "Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom, Ornament for Clear Realization," As Well As Its Commentaries

Legs bshad gser gyi phreng ba/Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rgya cher bshad pa

P 6150

Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1970

Great Exposition of Special Insight

lHag mthong chen mo

In Dzong-ka-ba's Statements on the Mādhyamika View, Vol. 1

rJe tsong kha pa'i gsung dbu ma'i lta ba'i skor

Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1975

Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path

Lam rim chen mo

P 6001

Also: Dharmsala, India: Shes rig par khang, 1964

Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to the Middle Way"

dbU ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal

P 6143

Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973

Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path

Lam rim 'bring

P 6002

Also: Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, 1968

Notes on (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle Way"

dbU ma rgyan gyi zin bris

P 6141

Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1976

Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"

dbU ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho

P 6153

Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973

Praise of Dependent-Arising/Praise of the Blessed Buddha from the Approach of his Teaching the Profound Dependent-Arising, Essence of the Good Explanations

Sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das la zab mo rten cing 'grel bar 'byung ba gsung ba'i sgo nas bstod pa legs par bshad pa'i snying po

P 6016

Ga-wa-jam-b̄a (dGa'-ba-byams-pa)

Commentary on (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Praise of Dependent Arising," A Garland of White Light

rTen 'brel bstod pa'i ḍikka 'od dkar 'phreng ba

no place, no date

Gen-dun-d̄en-dzin-gya-tso (dGe-'dun-bstan-'dzin-rgya-tsho). See Sha-mar Gen-dun-den-zin-gya-tso.

Gen-dun-drup (dGe-'dun-grub, Dalai Lama I)

Ship Entering the Ocean of Tenets

Grub mtha' rgya mtshor 'jug pa'i gru rdzings

[?]

Gōn-chok-jik-may-wang-bo (dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po)

Precious Garland of Tenets/Presentation of Tenets, A Precious Garland

Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba

Dharmsala, India: Shes rig par khang, 1969

Presentation of the Grounds and Paths, Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles

Sa lam gyi rnam bzhag theg gsum mdzes rgyan

Buxaduor: Gomang College, 1965

Also: The Collected Works of dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, Vol. 7

New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972

Guṇaprabha (Yon-tan-'od)

Discourse on Discipline

Vinayasūtra

'Dul ba'i mdo

P 5619

Gyel-tsap (rGyal-tshab)

Great Purification of Forgetfulness Regarding Valid Cognition

Tshad ma'i brjed byang chen mo

Toh. 5438

Heart Ornament, An Explanation of the Root Text and Commentary of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization"
mNgon rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi rtsa ba 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rnam bshad snying po'i rgyan
Toh. 5433

Illumination of the Meaning of the Essence of (Nāgārjuna's) "Precious Garland"
dbU ma rin chen 'phreng ba'i snying po'i don gsal par byed pa
Toh. 5427

Purification of Forgetfulness of (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle Way"
dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang
Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1976

Haribhadra (Seng-ge-bzang-po)

Clear Meaning Commentary
Abhisamayālaṃkāranāmaprajñāparamitopadeshashāstravṛitti
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan ces bya ba'i grel pa
P 5191

Commentary for Easy Understanding of the Condensed (Perfection of Wisdom) Sutra
Sañchayagāthāpañjikāsubodhinī
sDud pa tshigs su bcad pa dka' 'grel rtogs sla
P 5196

Eight Chapters

[?]

Le brgyad ma

[?]

Illumination of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization," Explanation of the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Stanzas

Aṣhṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāvyākyānābhisamayālaṃkārāloka

Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa'i bshad pa mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi snang ba

P 5192

Jam-bel-sam-pel, Ge-shay ('Jam-dpal-bsam-phel, dGe-gshes)

Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge, Composite of All the Important Points, Opener of the Eye of New Intelligence

Blo rig gi rnam bzhag nyer mkno kun 'dus blo gsar mig 'byed

Modern blockprint, n.p., n.d.

Jam-ȳang-chok-hla-ö-ser ('Jam-dbyangs-phyogs-hla-öd-zer)

Collected Topics of Ra-dö

Rva stod bsdus grva

Dharamsala, India: Damchoe Sangpo, Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (Printed at Jayyed Press, Ballimaran, Delhi), 1980

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a ('Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa)

Analysis of the First Chapter (of Maitreya's "Ornament for Clear Realization")

sKabs dang po'i mtha' dpyod

Sarnath, India: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1965

Analysis of the Third Chapter (of Maitreya's "Ornament for Clear Realization")

sKabs gsum pa'i mtha' dpyod

Sarnath, India: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1965

Great Exposition of Tenets/Explanation of "Tenets," Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound (Emptiness), Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings

Grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong

Musoorie: Dalama, 1962

Great Exposition of the Middle Way/Conclusions about (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to the Middle Way," Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning (of Emptiness), Entrance for the Fortunate

dbU ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs

Buxaduor: Gomang, 1967

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, et al.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, Ba-so Chö-ḡyi-gyel-tsen (Ba-so Chos-kyi rgyal-mtshan), De-druk-ken-chen Nga-w̄ang-rap-d̄en (sDe-drug-mkhan-chen Ngag-dbang-rab-brtan), and Da-d̄i-ge-s̄hay Rin-chen-don-drup (Bra-sti-dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub)

Four Interwoven Annotations to (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path"

Lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma

New Delhi: Chophel Lekden, 1972

J̄ang-ḡya (lCang-skya)

Presentation of Tenets/Clear Exposition of the Presentations of Tenets, Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer's Teaching

Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan

Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1970

Jay-d̄zun-b̄a (rJe-btsun-pa)

Good Explanation of the General Meaning, Clarifying the Difficult Points of (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of the 'Supplement to the Middle Way,'" A Necklace for the Fortunate

bsTan bcos dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi dka' gnad gsal bar byed pa'i spyi don legs bshad skal bzang mgul rgyan

Modern blockprint: no place, no date

Jetāri (dGra-las-rgyal-ba)

Sugata Treatise

Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā

bDer gshegs gzhung gi rab byed

P 5296

Jñānagarbha (Ye-shes-snying-po)

Commentary on the Discrimination of the Two Truths

Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛitti

bDen pa gnyis rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa

[Not in P] Toh. 3882

Discrimination of the Two Truths

Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā

bDen gnyis rnam 'byed

[Not in P] Toh. 3881

Jñānashrībhadra (Ye-shes-dpal-bzang-po)

Commentary on the "Descent into Laṅkā"

Laṅkāvatāravṛitti

Langkar gshegs pa'i 'grel pa

P 5519

Jñānavajra (Ye-shes-rdo-rje)

Commentary on the "Descent into Laṅkā Sutra," Ornament of the Heart of the Tathāgata

Laṅkāvatāranāmamahāyānasūtravṛittitathāgatahṛidayālaṃkāra

Langkar gshegs pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo'i 'grel pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i rgyan

P 5520

Kamalashīla

<u>Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Compendium of Principles"</u>

Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā

De kho na nyid bsdus pa'i dka' 'grel

P 5765

<u>Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle Way"</u>

Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā

dbU ma rgyan gyi dka' 'grel

P 5286

<u>Illumination of the Middle Way</u>

Madhyamakāloka

dbU ma snang ba

P 5287

<u>Stages of Meditation</u>

Bhāvanākrama

sGom pa'i rim pa

P 5310-12

Kay-drup (mKhas-grub)

<u>Thousand Doses/Opening the Eye of the Fortunate, Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness</u>

sTong thun chen mo/Zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed

Toh. 5459

L̄ong-chen-rap-jam (kLong-chen-rab-'byams)

Treasury of Tenets, Illuminating the Meaning of All Vehicles

Theg pa mtha' dag gi don gsal bar byed pa grub pa'i mtha' rin po che'i mdzod

Gangtok: Dodrup Chen Rinpoches, 1969

L̄o-sang-ḡön-chok (bLo-bzang-dkon-mchog)

Word Commentary on the Root Text of (Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's) "Tenets," A Crystal Mirror

Grub mtha' rtsa ba'i tshig ṭik shel dkar me long

In Three Commentaries on the Grub mtha' rtsa ba gdoṅ lṅa'i sgra dbyaṅs of 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pai'-rdo-rje ṅag-dbaṅ-brtson-'grus

Delhi: Chophel Lekden, 1978

Mahāvyutpatti

Bye brag rtogs byed chen po

ed. Ryozaburo Sakaki

Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1962

Maitreya (Byams-pa)

Ornament for the Mahāyāna Sutras

Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārakārikā

Theg pa chen po'i mdo sde'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa

P 5521

Ornament for Clear Realization

Abhisamayālaṃkāra

mNgon par rtogs pa'i rgyan

P 5184

Maitripada

Ten Chapters on Suchness

Tattvadashaka

De kho na nyid bcu pa

P 3080

Mi-pam-gya-tso (Mi-pham-rgya-mtsho)

Explanation of (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle Way," Sacred Word of the Smiling Lama Mañjushrī

dbU ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i zhal lung

In Collected Works of Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham rgya-mtsho, Vol. 12

Gangtok, 1971

Nāgabodhi (kLu-byang-chub)

Ordered Stages of the Means of Achieving Guhyasamāja

Samājasādhanavyavasthāli

'Dus pa'i sgrub pa'i thabs rnam par gzhag pa'i rim pa

P 2764

Nāgārjuna (kLu-sgrub)

Commentary on the "Refutation of Objections"

Vigrahavyavārtinīvṛitti

rTsod pa bzlog pa'i 'grel pa

P 5232

Commentary on "Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness"

Shunyatāsaptativṛitti

sTong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i 'grel pa

P 5231

Commentary on the "Treatise Called 'The Finely Woven'"

Vaidalyasūtranāmavṛitti

Zhib mo rnam par 'thag pa'i 'grel ba

[?]

Compendium of Sutra

Sūtrasamuchchaya

mDo kun las btus pa

P 5330

Drop for Supporting the People

Nītishāstrajanapoṣhaṇabindu

Lugs kyi bstan bcos skye bo gso ba'i thigs

P 5822

Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment

Bodhichittavivaraṇa

Byang chub sems kyi 'grel pa

P 2665; P 2666

Five Stages

Pañchakrama

Rim pa lnga pa

P 2667

<u>Friendly Letter</u>

Suhṛilekha

bShes pa'i spring yig

P 5682

<u>Hundred Applications</u>

Yogashataka

sByor ba bryga

P 5795

<u>Hundred Wisdoms</u>

Prajñāshataka

Shes rab brgya

P 5414

<u>Praise of the Element of Qualities</u>

Dharmadhātustotra

Chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa

P 2010

<u>Praise of the Inconceivable</u>

Achintyastava

bSam gyis mi khyab par bstod pa

P 2019

<u>Praise of the Supramundane</u>

Lokātītastava

'Jig rten las 'das par bstod pa

P 2012

Precious Garland of Advice for the King

Rājaparikathāratnāvalī

rGyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che'i phreng ba

P 5658

Refutation of Objections

Vigrahavyāvartanīkārikā

rTsod pa bzlog pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa

P 5228

Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness

Shūnyatāsaptatikārikā

sTong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa

P 5227

Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning

Yuktiṣhaṣhṭikākārikā

Rigs pa drug cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa

P 5225

Treatise Called "The Finely Woven"

Vaidalyasūtranāma

Zhib mo rnam par 'thag pa zhes bya ba'i mdo

P 5226

Treatise on the Middle Way/Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way Called "Wisdom"

Madhyamakashāstra/Prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakakārikā

dbU ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba

P 5224

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan)

Annotations for (Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's) "Great Exposition of Tenets," Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought

Grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor

Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1964

Explanation of the Conventional and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets

Grub mtha' bzhi'i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i don rnam par bshad pa legs bshad dpyid kyi dpal mo'i glu dbyangs

New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1972

Nga-wang-d̄ra-s̄hi (Ngag-dbang-bkra-shis)

The Collected Topics by a Spiritual Son of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a

Sras bsdus grva

n.p., n.d.

Nyen-d̄on-b̄el-jor-hlun-drup (gNyen-ston-dpal-'byor lhun-grub)

Commentary on the Difficult Points of (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Essence of the Good Explanations," A Lamp for the Teaching

Legs bshad snying po'i bka' 'grel bstan pa'i sgron me

Modern blackprint: no place, no date

Pa-bong-ka (Pha-bong-kha)

Lectures on the Stages of the Path, compiled by Trijang Rinpochay

Lam rim zin bris/rNam grol lag bcangs su gtod pa'i man ngag zab mo tshang la ma nor ba mtshungs med chos kyi rgyal po'i thugs bcud byang chub lam gyi rim pa'i nyams khrid kyi zin bris gsung rab kun gyi bcud bsdus gdams ngag bdud rtsi'i snying po

Mundgod, India: Gan-den Shar-dzay, n.d.

Parahitabhadra (gZhan-la-phan-pa-bzang-po)

Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness"

Shūnyatasaptativivṛittiṭikā

sTong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i 'grel pa

P 5269

Pan-chen Sö-nam-drak-b̄a (Pan-chen bSod-nams-grags-pa)

General Meaning of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization"

Phar phyin spyi don/Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rnam bshad snying po rgyan gyi don legs par bshad pa yum don gsal ba'i sgron me

Buxaduor, India: Nang bstan shes rig 'dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, 1963

Pur-bu-j̄ok (Phur-bu-lcog Byams-pa rgya-mtsho)

Explanation of the Lesser Path of Reasoning

In _Magical Key to the Path of Reasoning, Presentation of the Collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Treatises on Valid Cognition_

Rigs lam chung ngu'i rnam par bshad pa _in_

Tshad ma'i gzhung don 'byed pa'i bsdus grva'i rnam bzhag rigs lam 'phrul gyi sde mig

Buxa, India: n.p., 1965

Explanation of the Presentation of Objects and Object Possessors as well as Awareness and Knowledge

In _Magical Key to the Path of Reasoning, Presentation of the Collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Treatises on Valid Cognition_

Yul yul can dang blo rig gi rnam par bshad pa _in_

Tshad ma'i gzhung don 'byed pa'i bsdus grva'i rnam bzhag rigs lam 'phrul gyi sde mig

Buxa, India: n.p., 1965

The Topic of Signs and Reasonings from the "Great Path of Reasoning"

In _The Magic Key to the Path of Reasoning, Presentation of the Collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Texts on Valid Cognition_

Tshad ma'i gzhung don 'byed ba'i bsdus grva'i rnam gzhag gyi lde mig

Buxa, India: n.d., 1965

Ratnākarashānti (Shanti-pa/Rin-chen-'byung-gnas-zhi-ba)

Ornament of the Chittamātra

Chittamātrālaṃkāra

Sems tsam rgyan

[?]

Sahajavajra (lHan-cig-skyes-pa'i-rdo-rje)

Commentary on (Maitripāda's) "Ten Chapters on Suchness"

Tattvadashakaṭīkā

De kho na nyid bcu pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa

P 3009

Sha-mar Gen-dun-d̄en-zin-gya-tso (Zhwa-dmar dGe-bdun-bstan-'dzin-rgya mtsho)

Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought Set Forth to Purify Forgetfulness of the Difficult Points of (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Great Exposition of Special Insight"

lHag mthong chen mo'i dka' gnad rnams brjed byang du bkod pa dgongs zab snang ba'i sgron me

Delhi: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1972

Shāntarakṣhita (Zhi-ba-'tsho)

Commentary on the "Ornament to the Middle Way"

Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛitti

dbU ma'i rgyan gyi grel pa

P 5285

Compendium of Principles

Tattvasaṃgrahakārikā

De kho na nyid bsdus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa

P 5764

Ornament to the Middle Way

Madhyamakālaṃkāra

dbU may rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa

P 5284

"Shāntarakṣhita"/pseudo-Shāntarakṣhita[2]

Commentary on (Jñānagarbha's) "Differentiation of the Two Truths"

Satyadvayavibhaṅgatīkā

bDen pa gnyis rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel ba

P 5283

Shāntideva (Zhi-ba-lha)

Compendium of Instructions

Shikṣhāsamuchchayakārikā

bsLab pa kun las btus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa

P 5336

Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds

Bodhisattvacharyāvatāra

Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa

P 5272

Shura (dPa'-bo)

<u>Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment/Essay on the Stages of Cultivating the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment</u>

Paramārthabodhichittabhāvanākramavarṇasaṃgraha

Don dam pa byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa'i rim pa yi ger bris pa

P 5431

Vasubandhu (dbYig-gnyen)

<u>Explanation of the "Treasury of Knowledge"</u>

Abhidharmakośhabhāṣhya

Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa

P 5591; Skt. ed. by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri

Varanasi: Baudda Bharati, 1972

<u>Reasonings for Explanation</u>

Vyākhyāyukti

rNam bshad rigs pa

P 5562

<u>Treasury of Knowledge</u>

Abhidharmkośhakārikā

Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi tshig le'ur byas pa

P 5590

Ye-shay-day (Ye-shes-sde)

<u>Differences Between the Views</u>

lTa ba'i khyad par

P 5847

Ye-s̄hay-gyel-tsen (Ye-shes-rgyal-mtshan)

Clear Exposition of the Modes of Minds and Mental Factors, Necklace for Those of Clear Mind

Sems dang sems byung gi tshul gsal bar ston pa blo gsal mgul rgyan

The Collected Works of Tshe-mchog-gliṅ-yoṅs-'dzin ye-śes-rgyal-mtshan, Vol. 16

New Delhi: Tibet House, 1974

III. WORKS IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH

Aronson, Harvey B.

"The Buddhist Path: A Translation of the Sixth Chapter of The First Dalai Lama's Path of Liberation," Part 1

The Tibet Journal, Vol 5, 1980

Chandra, Lokesh

Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature

New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1963

Chimpa, Lama and Chattopadhyaya, Alaka, trans.

Tāranātha's History of Buddhism

Simla, India: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970

Conze, Edward

Buddhist Thought in India

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973

Dasgupta, Surendranath

A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol 1

Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975

de Jong, J. W.

"The Problem of the Absolute in the Madhyamaka School"

Buddhist Studies by J. W. de Jong, ed. Gregory Schopen

Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979

della Santina, Peter

Mādhyamika Schools in India

Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981

Demieville, Paul

Le Concile de Lhasa

Paris: Impr. Nationale de France, 1952

Drake, Durant

Essays in Critical Realism

New York: Peter Smith, 1941

D̄zong-ka-b̄a

"Special Insight: From D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Practiced by Persons of the Three Capacities, trans. Jeffrey Hopkins

unpublished manuscript

Eckel, M. David

"A Question of Nihilism: Bhāvaviveka's Response to the Fundamental Problems of Mādhyamika Philosophy"

Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1980

Encyclopedia of Philosophy

S.v. "Phenomenalism," by R. J. Hirst

S.v. "Realism," by R. J. Hirst

S.v. "Skepticism," by Richard H. Popkin

Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics

S.v. "Mādhyamaka, Mādhyamikas," by Louis de la Vallée Poussin

S.v. "Nihilism (Buddhist)," by Louis de la Vallée Poussin

Guenther, Herbert V.

Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice

Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972

Hattori, Masaaki, trans.

Dignāga, On Perception

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968

Hopkins, Paul Jeffrey

"Meditation on Emptiness"

Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1973

Ichigo, Masamichi

"A Synopsis of the Mādhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita"

Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. 20, 1972

Iida, Shotaro

"The Nature of Saṃvṛiti and the Relationship of Paramārtha to It in Svātantrika-Madhyamika"

The Problem of the Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, ed. Mervyn Sprung

Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing, 1973

Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism
Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1980

Iida, Shotaro and Hirabayashi, Jay
"Another Look at the Mādhyamika vs. Yogāchāra Controversy Concerning Existence and Non-existence"
Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems: Studies in Honor of Edward Conze, ed. Lewis Lancaster
Berkeley: Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, 1977

Jha, Ganganatha, trans.
The Tattvasaṅgraha of Śantarakṣīta with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla
Baroda, India: Oriental Institute, 1937

Kajiyama, Yuichi, trans.
"Bhavaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa (1 Kapitel)"
Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens, Vol. 7, 1965

Kajiyama, Yuichi
"Introduction to the Logic of Svātantrika-Mādhyamika"
Nava-Nalanda Mahavihara Research Publication, Vol. 1, 1957
"Later Madhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation"
Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, ed. Minoru Kiyota
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978

Keith, Arthur Berriedale

Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon

New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1979

Klein, Anne C.

"Mind and Liberation: The Sautrāntika Tenet System in Tibet"

Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1981

Lati Rinbochay

Mind in Tibetan Buddhism, trans. Elizabeth Napper

Valois, New York: Gabriel Press, 1980

Lessing, Ferdinand and Wayman, Alex, trans.

Mkhas grub rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras

The Hague: Mouton, 1968

Lipman, Kennard

"A Study of Śantarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*"

Ph.D. dissertation, University of Saskatchewan, 1979

Murti, T. R. V.

"Saṃvṛiti and Paramārtha in Mādhyamika and Advaita Vedānta"

The Problem of the Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta

ed. Mervyn Sprung

Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing, 1973

The Central Philosophy of Buddhism

London: Allen and Unwin, 1980

Nāgārjuna and the Seventh Dalai Lama

The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses,

trans. Jeffrey Hopkins and Lati Rimpoche

New York: Harper and Row, 1975

Ngawang Dhargyey

The Tibetan Tradition of Mental Development

Dharamsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1978

Obermiller, E.

Bu-ston's History of Buddhism

Heidelberg: Heft, 1932

"The Doctrine of Prajñā-pāramitā as Exposed in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra of Maitreya"

Acta Orientalia, Vol. 11, 1932

Otto, Rudolf

The Idea of the Holy

London: Oxford University Press, 1976

Poussin, Louis de la Vallée, trans.

L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu

Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1971

"Le Joyau dans la main"

Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, Vol. 2, 1932

Ramanan, K. Venkata

Nāgārjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Mahā-Prajñā-pāramitā-Sastra

Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978

Roerich, George N.

The Blue Annals

Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976

Rogers, Katherine

"Tibetan Logic: A Translation with Commentary of Pur-bu-jok's 'The Topic of Signs and Reasonings from the "Great Path of Reasoning"' in the Magic Key to the Path of Reasoning, Explanation of the Collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Texts on Valid Cognition"

M.A., University of Virginia, 1980

Sastri, N. Aiyaswami

"Bhāvaviveka and his Method of Exposition"

Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference, Vol. 10, 1941

"Karatalaratna"

Visva-Bharati Annals, Vol. 2, 1949

Shakabpa, Tsepon W. D.

Tibet: A Political History

New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967

Smith, E. Gene

"The Biography of Lcang-skya Rol-pa'i-rdo rje"

Collected Works of Thu'u-bkwan Blo-bzang-chos-kyi-nyi-ma, Vol. 1

New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1969

Sopa, Geshe Lhundup and Hopkins, Jeffrey

Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism

New York: Grove Press, 1976

Stcherbatsky, Theodore

The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana

Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977

Streng, Frederick J.

Understanding Religious Life

Encino, California: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1976

Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro

The Lankavatara Sutra

London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1932

Thurman, Robert A. F.

"Philosophical nonegocentrism in Wittgenstein and Candrakīrti in their treatment of the private language problem"

Philosophy East and West, Vol. 30, 1980

Tsong-ka-pa

Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, ed. and trans. Jeffrey Hopkins

Valois, New York: Gabriel Press, 1980

Tantra in Tibet: The Great Exposition of Secret Mantra, ed. and trans. Jeffrey Hopkins
London: Allen and Unwin, 1977

Vogel, Claus
Indian Lexicography
Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1979

Warder, A. K.
Indian Buddhism, 2d rev. ed.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980

Woodward, F. L., trans.
The Book of Kindred Sayings III
London: Pali Text Society, Luzac and Company, 1954

Wylie, Turrell
"A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription"
Harvard Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 22, 1959

NOTES

(For the full entries of the Tibetan texts see the Bibliography.)

Annotations: Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's Annotations for (Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's) "Great Exposition of Tenets"

Bel-den: Ge-s̄hay B̄el-den Drak-b̄a's Beautiful Ornament of Faith, A Good Explanation

Four: Four Interwoven Annotations to (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path" by Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, et al.

D̄en-dar: D̄en-dar-hla-ram-b̄a's Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many

Essence: D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Essence of the Good Explanations

Essence Comm: N̄yen-don-b̄el-jor-hlun-drup's Commentary on the Difficult Points of (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Essence of the Good Explanations," A Lamp for the Teaching

Insight: D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Great Exposition of Special Insight

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a: Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's Great Exposition of Tenets

J̄ang-ḡyo: J̄ang-ḡya's Presentation of Tenets

P: Tibetan Tripiṭaka (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Foundation, 1956

Two Truths: Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's Explanation of the Meaning of "Conventional" and "Ultimate" in the Four Tenet Systems

TECHNICAL NOTE

Turrell Wylie, "A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription," Harvard Journal of Asian Studies 22 (1959): 261-7.

INTRODUCTION

1 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

2 *Mkhas grub rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras*, trans. Ferdinand D. Lessing and Alex Wayman (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 86-89.

3 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 288.15-20 translation p. 386.

4 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 37, note 33.

5 See Paul Demieville, *Le Concile de Lhasa* (Paris: Impr. Nationale de France, 1952).

6 Frederick J. Streng, *Understanding Religious Life*, 2d ed. (Encino, California: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1976), p. 7.

7 Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 141.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

9 See translation, chapter 8.

10 J̄ang-ḡya, pp. 340.16-341.8, translation pp. 480-81.

11 *Essence*, p. 115.6-8.

12 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 368.8-10; translation p. 535.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 368.18-369.1; translation p. 536.

14 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, ca 10a.7-10b.3.

15 Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973), pp. 238-9.

16 Ganganatha Jha, trans., *The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣīta*

with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla (Baroda, India: Oriental Institute, 1937).

17 Jang-gya, p. 283.9-11.

18 A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, 2d rev. ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), p. 480.

19 Theodore Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, 2d rev. ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), pp. 91-127.

20 Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* (1 Kapitel)," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens* 7(1963), pp. 37-62; 8 (1964), pp. 100-130. See also by the same author, "Introduction to the Logic of Svātantrika-Mādhyamika Philosophy," *Nava-Nalanda Mahavihara Research Publication*, 1 (1957), pp. 291-331.

21 P. Jeffrey Hopkins, "Meditation on Emptiness" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1973), pp. 86-183.

22 Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Le Joyau dans la main," *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, 2 (1932), pp. 68-138.

23 N. Aiyaswami Sastri, "Karatalaratna," *Visva-Bharati Annals*, 2, (Shantineketan, 1949), pp. 33-99. For a summary of the contents of the *Jewel in the Hand*, see by the same author "Bhāvaviveka and his Method of Exposition," *Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference* 10 (1941), pp. 285-295.

24 N. Aiyaswami Sastri, "Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha of Bhavya," *Journal of Oriental Research, Madras* 5 (1931), pp. 41-9.

25 See Shotaro Iida, Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1980), pp. 12-16.

26 Ibid., pp. 27-48.

27 Herbert V. Guenther, Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 130-6.

28 Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (New York: Grove Press, 1976), pp. 122-32.

29 Shotaro Iida, "The Nature of Saṃvṛiti and the Relationship to Paramārtha to it in Svātantrika-Mādhyamika," in The Problem of the Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, ed. Mervyn Sprung (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing, 1973), pp. 64-77. Chapter Five of the Blaze of Reasoning is discussed in Jay Hirabayashi and Shotaro Iida, "Another Look at the Mādhyamika vs. Yogāchāra Controversy Concerning Existence and Non-existence," in Prajñāparamīta and Related Systems: Studies in Honor of Edward Conze, ed. Lewis Lancaster (Berkeley: Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, 1977), pp. 341-60.

30 Peter della Santina, Mādhyamika Schools in India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981).

31 Kennard Lipman, "A Study of Śāntarakṣīta's Madhyamakālaṃkāra," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Saskatchewan, 1979).

32 Mi-pam-gya-tso (Mi-pham-rgya-mtsho), Explanation of (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle Way," Sacred

Word of the Smiling Lama Mañjushrī (dbU ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i zhal lung) in Collected Works of Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham rgya-mtsho, Vol. 12 (Gangtok, 1971).

33 Malcolm David Eckel, "A Question of Nihilism: Bhāvaviveka's Response to the Fundamental Problems of Mādhyamika Philosophy," (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1980).

CHAPTER ONE: THE MIDDLE WAY

1 Annotations, dbu 53a.7.

2 J̄ang-ḡya, pp. 305.19-306.2; translation p. 413.

3 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 309.5-6; translation p.420.

4 Annotations, dbu 2a.4.

5 Ibid. This statement requires qualification in the context of Svātantrika-Mādhyamika because Bhāvaviveka asserts that one can be liberated from cyclic existence merely by realizing the selflessness of persons (pudgalanairātmya) without abandoning the conception of true existence. The conflicting positions of the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas on this point are discussed at length in Chapter Three.

6 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 306.2-3; translation p. 413.

7 D̄zong-ka-b̄a (Tsong-kha-pa), Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental (Treatise on the Middle Way Called) Wisdom," An Ocean of Reasoning (rTsa she ṭig chen rigs pa'i ryga

mtsho) (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973), p. 15. In future citations, this text will be referred to as Ocean of Reasoning.

8 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

9 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 309.6-7; translation p. 420.

10 Ocean of Reasoning, p. 15.

11 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

12 Ibid.

13 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 306.14-15; translation p. 415.

14 Annotations, dbu 2b.2-3.

15 Ge-shay B̄el-den Drak-b̄a, oral commentary.

16 J̄ang-ḡya, 307.4-6; translation pp. 415-16.

17 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

18 Hopkins, "Meditation on Emptiness," p. 549.

19 P 5224, Vol. 95 2.2.4-3.1-2.

20 P 5225, Vol. 95 11.2.3-4.

21 Essence, p. 101.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 P 2019, Vol. 46 37.4.4-5.

25 Essence, p. 101.

26 P 5682, Vol. 129 237.5.7

27 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 306.6-10; translation p. 415.

28 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary. Also see J̄ang-ḡya, p. 306.10-13; translation p. 415.

29 J̄ang-ḡya, pp. 311.17-312.8; translation pp. 425-26.

30 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

31 Ibid.

32 Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, p. 72.

33 Ibid., p. 93.

34 J̄ang-ḡya, pp. 306.20-307.1; translation p. 415.

35 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 307.2-3; translation p. 415.

36 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

37 Ibid.

38 P 5658, Vol. 129, stanzas 394-97.

39 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

40 Essence, pp. 98-9.

41 Annotations, dbu 1b.2-3.

42 Ibid., 1b.2-5.

43 Essence, p. 99.

44 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

45 Essence, pp. 99-100.

46 P 5228, Vol. 95, stanza 29.

47 P 5225, Vol. 95, stanza 50.

48 P 5246, Vol. 95, chapter XVI, 25.

49 T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980), p. 131.

50 Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 241.

51 Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), p. 140.

52 Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, s.v. "Nihilism (Buddhist)," by Louis de La Vallée Poussin. In fairness to Poussin, it must be noted that later in the same article he qualifies this statement, concluding that the Buddhists are not nihilists.

53 A. Berriedale Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, 2d ed. (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1979), p. 239.

54 Ibid., pp. 240-1.

55 Insight, pp. 135-6.

56 Insight, p. 138 and Four, p. 508.

57 Insight, p. 138 and Four, p. 509.

58 Insight, p. 138.

59 Ibid., p. 137.

60 Ibid., p. 138.

61 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

62 Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 239.

63 P 5228, Vol. 95, stanza 28.

64 P 5225, Vol. 95, stanza 45.

65 P 2012, Vol. 46, stanza 8.

66 Insight, p. 144.

1 Bu-ston's History of Buddhism, trans. E. Obermiller, 2 pts. (Heidelberg: Heft, 1932), Part 2, pp. 108-111.

2 Insight, p. 15.

3 Ibid.

4 In Four, p. 171, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a disputes Ye-s̄hay-day's contention that it is unclear whether Nāgārjuna asserted external objects, citing the passage from the Precious Garland which says:

> To some [he teaches doctrines] based on
> non-duality.
> To some, the profound, frightening to the
> fearful,
> Having an essence of emptiness and compassion
> The means of achieving highest enlightenment.

According to D̄zong-ka-b̄a, the first line identifies the doctrines taught to those of the Mahāyāna lineage who are temporarily incapable of understanding the Mādhyamika view and therefore are taught the emptiness of duality of subject and object (see Essence, p. 99). Since the stanza goes on to describe a more profound view, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a concludes that non-existence of external objects is not the final mode of being.

5 Insight, p. 16.

6 In Four, 172, Nga-w̄ang-rap-den (Sde-drug mKhan-chen

Ngag-dbang-rab-brtan) argues that Ye-shay-day's chronology is not accurate, noting that prior to Bhāvaviveka there was Shūra who was a Mādhyamika who asserted external objects and prior to Shāntarakṣhita there was Āryavimuktisena who was a Mādhyamika who asserted that external objects do not exist.

7 Four, 172.

8 Insight, p. 17.

9 George N. Roerich, trans., The Blue Annals (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976), p. 342.

10 Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti ed. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), p. 655.

11 Essence, p. 139.

12 Jang-gya, 313.1-5; translation p. 427.

13 Essence, p. 139.

14 Ibid., p. 140.

15 According to Warder, Avalokitavrata, Shāntarakṣhita, and Kamalashīla all lived in the eighth century (see his Indian Buddhism, p. 479). According to Tāranātha, Jñānagarbha was a student of Śrīgupta, who was a student of Dharmakīrti. See Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India, trans. Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya, ed. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (Simla, India: Indian Institute

of Advanced Study, 1970), p. 253.

16 *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*, p. 627.

17 *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, s.v. "Madhyamaka, Mādhyamikas," by Louis de La Vallée Poussin.

18 Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, pp. 238-9.

19 K. Venkata Ramanan, *Nāgārjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Mahā-Prajñāpāramitā-Śāstra* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), p. 341.

20 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 325.15-20; translation pp. 450-51.

21 Claus Vogel, *Indian Lexicography* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1979), p. 311.

22 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 325.10; translation p. 450.

23 *Mahāvyutpatti*, 2 Vol. ed. by Ryōzaburō Sakaki, 2d ed. (Tokyo, 1962), Vol. 1, p. 482 and Vol. 2, p. 163.

24 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, ca 61a.5-6.

25 P 5709, Vol. 130 88.3.4.

26 Lati Rinbochay, oral commentary.

27 See Anne C. Klein, "Mind and Liberation: The Sautrāntika Tenet System in Tibet" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1981), pp. 304-23.

28 Lati Rinbochay, oral commentary.

29 Ge-s̄hay Jam-b̄el-s̄am-pel (dGe-gshes 'Jam-dpal-bsam-phel), *Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge, Composite of All the Important Points, Opener of the Eye of New Intelligence*

(Blo rig gi rnam bzhag nyer mkho kun 'dus blo gsar mig 'byed) (Modern blockprint, no place given, no date given), 2a.2-3.

30 Ibid., 4b.2.

31 Lati Rinbochay, Mind in Tibetan Buddhism, trans., ed., with an Introduction by Elizabeth Napper (Valois, New York: Gabriel Press, 1980), p. 76.

32 Pur-bu-jok, The Topic of Signs and Reasonings from the "Great Path of Reasoning" in The Magic Key to the Path of Reasoning, Presentation of the Collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Texts on Valid Cognition (Tshad ma'i gzhung don 'byed ba'i bsdus grva'i rnam par bshad pa rigs lam 'phrul gyi lde mig las rigs lam che ba rtags rigs kyi skor) (Buxa, India: n.p., 1965), 5a.7-5b.1.

33 Ibid., 5b.2.

34 Katherine Rogers, "Tibetan Logic: A Translation, with Commentary, of Pur-bu-jok Jam-ba-gya-tso's The Topic of Signs and Reasonings from the "Great Path of Reasoning" in The Magic Key to the Path of Reasoning, Explanation of the Collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Texts on Valid Cognition (M.A. thesis, University of Virginia, 1980), pp. 53-4, 193 note 2.

35 Pur-bu-jok, The Topic of Signs and Reasonings, 5b.2-3.

36 Pur-bu-jok, Explanation of the Lesser Path of Reasoning

in Magical Key to the Path of Reasoning, Presentation of the Collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Treatises on Valid Cognition (Tshad ma'i gzhung don 'byed pa'i bsdus grva'i rnam bzhag rigs lam 'phrul gyi lde mig ces bya ba las rigs lam chung ngu'i rnam bshad) (Buxa: n.p., 1965), 5b.6.

37 Pur-bu-jok, The Topic of Signs and Reasonings, 5b.3-4.

38 For a discussion of the three modes, see Rogers, pp. 4-7, 62-75.

39 Hopkins, "Meditation on Emptiness," p. 108.

40 Jam-ȳang-chok-hla-ö-ser ('Jam-dbyangs-phyogs-lha-od-zer) Collected Topics of Ra-dö (Rva stod bsdus grva) (Delhi: Jayyed Press, 1980), 154b.5-6.

41 Ibid.

42 Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 131.

43 Anne Klein, "Mind and Liberation: The Sautrāntika Tenet System in Tibet," pp. 206-9.

44 Jam-ȳang-chok-hla-ö-ser, The Collected Topics of Ra-dö, 155a.1-3.

45 Hopkins, "Meditation on Emptiness," p. 109.

46 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 407.

47 Insight, p. 60.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., pp. 60-1.

50 Ibid., p. 62.

51 Lati Rinbochay, Mind in Tibetan Buddhism, p. 52.

52 Insight, p. 62.

53 Den-dar, 428.3-4.

54 Essence, p. 110.

55 Annotations, dbu 55a.8.

56 Jam-yang-shay-ba, ca 63b.4.

57 Insight, p. 64.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Jam-yang-shay-ba, ca 63b.6.

61 Ibid., ca 64b.1-65a.3.

62 Four, 323.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., 323-6.

66 Jang-gya, p. 326.11-13; translation p. 452.

67 Jam-yang-shay-ba, ca 61b.7-62a.1.

68 Insight, p. 68.

69 Jang-gya, p. 364.5-8; translation p. 525-26.

70 Ibid., p. 364.9-10; translation p. 526.

71 Ibid., p. 325.12-15; translation p. 450.

72 Jam-yang-shay-ba, ca 61a.7-8.

73 Ibid., ca 62a.4.

74 Annotations, dbu 27b.3-4.

75 Ibid., dbu 27b.5.

76 Four, 535.

77 Annotations, dbu 27b.5-28a.1.

78 D̄en-dar, 448.4.

79 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, ca 80a.5-6.

80 Ibid.

81 Annotations, dbu 49b.2-4.

82 Ibid., dbu 41b.4.

83 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

84 Four, 537-538.

85 P 5228, Vol. 95, stanza 30.

86 Four, 478.

87 Insight, p. 136.

88 Annotations, dbu 28a.1-2.

89 J̄ang-ḡya, 480.2-8.

90 R. A. F. Thurman, "Philosophical nonegocentrism in Wittgenstein and Candrakīrti in their treatment of the private language problem," Philosophy East and West 30 (July 1980): 321-37.

91 Preceding three paragraphs based on J̄ang-ḡya, pp. 478.5-481.1.

92 Insight, p. 125.

93 Ibid., p. 148.

94 D̄zong-ka-b̄a, Ocean of Reasoning, p. 15.

95 Sha-mar Gen-dun-d̄en-dzin-gya-tso (Zhwa-dmar dGe-bdun-bstan-'dzin-rgya-mtsho), Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought

Set Forth to Purify Forgetfulness of the Difficult Points of (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Great Exposition of Special Insight" (lHag mthong chen mo'i dka' gnad rnams brjed byang du bkod pa dgongs zab snang ba'i sgron me), (New Delhi: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1972), 17a.3-4.

96 D̄en-dar, 428.4-6.

97 J̄ang-ḡya, p.312.8-17; translation pp. 426-27.

98 Ibid., 312.18-20.

99 Annotations, dbu 53a.7-53b.2.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ROOT OF CYCLIC EXISTENCE

1 Arhan is translated as "Foe Destroyer" following the Tibetan dgra bcom pa which is based on the Sanskrit etymology of Arhan as ari han. A Foe Destroyer is a person who has destroyed the foe of ignorance and achieved liberation.

2 Samyutta Nikaya III, ed. by M. Leon Feer (London: Pali Text Society, Luzac and Company, 1960), pp. 141-2. Available in English as The Book of Kindred Sayings III, trans. F. L. Woodward, Pali Text Society 13 (London: Luzac and Company, 1954), pp. 120-1.

3 According to Kensur Ngawang Lekden, as reported by Jeffrey Hopkins, Buddha is called the Sun-Friend (Ādityabandhu) (literally, he who has the sun as his friend) because the

sun nurtured a drop of semen which had fallen from a dying ancestor of the Shākya lineage and caused it to grow into a man, thus allowing the Shākya clan to continue.

4 The following exegesis of the five similes is based on _Annotations_, dbu 31a.2-6 and Ge-shay Bel-den Drak-ba, oral commentary.

5 Sopa and Hopkins, _Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism_, p. 72.

6 _Ibid._

7 See translation pp. 573-74.

8 Lati Rinbochay, _Mind in Tibetan Buddhism_, p. 144.

9 Ye-shay-gyal-tsen (Ye-shes-rgyal-mtshan), _Clear Exposition of the Modes of Minds and Mental Factors, Necklace for Those of Clear Mind_ (_Sems dang sems byung gi tshul gsal bar ston pa blo gsal mgul rgyan_) in _Collected Works of Tshe-mchog-gliṅ yoṅs-'dzin ye-ses-rgyal-mtshan_ 16 (New Delhi: Tibet House, 1974), 14.5.

10 _Ibid._, 16.1-2.

11 _Ibid._, 15.3-6.

12 Sopa and Hopkins, _Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism_, p. 60.

13 Geshey Ngawang Dhargyey, _Tibetan Tradition of Mental Development_, 3d ed. (Dharamasala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1978), p. 71.

14 Sopa and Hopkins, _Practice and Theory of Tibetan_

Buddhism, p. 77.

15 Annotations, dngos 28b.4.

16 Pa-bong-ka (Pha-bong-kha), Lectures on the Stages of the Path (Lam rim zin bris/rNam grol lag bcangs su gtod pa'i man ngag zab mo tshang la ma nor ba mtshungs med cho kyi rgyal po'i thugs bcud byang chub lam gyi rim pa'i nyams khrid kyi zin bris gsung rab kun gyi bcud bsdus gdams ngag bdud rtsi'i snying po) compiled by Trijang Rinbochay (Mundgod, South India: Gan-den Shar-dzay, n.d.), 265b.5-266a.5. See also Harvey B. Aronson, "The Buddhist Path: A Translation of the Sixth Chapter of the First Dalai Lama's Path of Liberation," Tibet Journal 5 (August 1980): 29-51.

17 D̄zong-ka-b̄a (Tsong-kha-pa), Great Exposition of the Stages to Enlightenment Composed by the Peerless Great D̄zong-ka-ba (mNyam med Tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa'i byang chub lam rim che ba) (Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, n.d.), 148b.1-4.

18 Ibid., 148a.4-6.

19 His Holiness the Dalai Lama, oral teaching.

20 Cited in Vasubandhu, Treasury of Knowledge (Abhidharma-kosha), chapter 6. See Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Acharya Vasubandhu with Sphutārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra Part III (Varanasi, India: Bauddha Bharati Series - 7, 1972), p. 877.

21 D̄zong-ka-b̄a, *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*, 147b.5-148a.3.

22 Vasubandhu, *Treasury of Knowledge*, p. 881.

23 P 39 89.5.7.

24 Pa-bong-ka, 285a.5-285b.4.

25 Hopkins, "Meditation on Emptiness," p. 410.

26 Ge-s̄hay B̄el-den Drak-b̄a, oral commentary.

27 Lati Rinbochay, *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*, pp. 144-5.

28 *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, trans. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, 6 vol., (Brussels: Institut Belge Des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1971), 1: 40-1. Also, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, oral teaching.

29 Hopkins, "Meditation on Emptiness," p. 421.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 423.

31 *Samyutta Nikaya*, pp. 141-2. For English translation, see *Book of Kindred Sayings III*, pp. 120-1.

32 Lati Rinbochay, *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*, pp. 66-71.

33 B̄el-den Drak-b̄a, p. 31.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 33.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 48.

36 Tsong-ka-pa, *Tantra in Tibet: The Great Exposition of Secret Mantra*, trans. and ed. Jeffrey Hopkins (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 180.

37 P 5242, Vol. 95 91.3.6-91.4.1.

38 P 5253, Vol. 95 187.4.4-187.5.6.

39 The following discussion of the nine examples from this stanza from the _Diamond Cutter_ is drawn from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, ca 67b.1-8 and _Annotations_, dbu 31a.6-33a.2.

40 Ge-s̄hay B̄el-den Drak-b̄a, oral commentary.

41 Ge-shay Lo-sang W̄ang-du, oral commentary.

42 P 5253, Vol. 95 187.4.4-187.5.6.

43 Ge-s̄hay B̄el-den Drak-b̄a, oral commentary.

44 _Ibid._

45 P 5254, Vol. 95 91.3.7-91.4.1.

46 _Essence_, p. 151.

47 _Ibid._

48 _Concerning Tenets and the Buddhist Sciences_ (_Grub mtha' dang nang rig skor_), no author given (Dharamsala, India: Council for Tibetan Education, 1970), p. 79.

49 B̄el-den Drak-b̄a, pp. 33-4.

50 _Essence Comm._, ga 19a.2-4.

51 B̄el-den Drak-b̄a, p. 48.

52 _Annotations_, dbu 25b.2.

53 P 5626, Vol. 96 34.4.5-6.

54 _Ibid._

55 _Ibid._

56 _Essence_, p. 156.

57 _Annotations_, dbu 26a.1-4.

58 _Ibid._, dbu 25b.8-26a.2.

59 _Ibid._, dbu 26a.4-26b.1.

60 Ibid., dbu 24b.6.

61 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, ca 61b.6.

62 Ibid., ca 61b.8.

63 Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti, ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), pp. 271-280.

64 Annotations, dbu 25a.8.

65 Insight, pp. 173-5.

66 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, ca 62a.3-4.

67 His Holiness the Dalai Lama, oral teaching.

68 Essence Comm., ga 25b.5-26a.2.

69 Preceding paragraphs from Essence Comm. ga 26b.3-27b.6.

70 Tsong-ka-pa, Tantra in Tibet: The Great Exposition of Secret Mantra, pp. 179-86 and His Holiness the Dalai Lama, oral teaching.

71 Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, p. 141.

72 D̄zong-ka-b̄a (Tsong-kha-pa), Explanation of the Eight Great Difficult Points of (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental (Treatise on the Middle Way Called) Wisdom" (rTsa ba shes rab kyi dka' gnas chen po brgyad kyi bshad pa) (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings, 1970), p. 33.

73 Tsong-ka-pa, Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, trans. and ed. Jeffrey Hopkins (Valois, New York: Gabriel Press, 1980), p. 79.

74 Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism,

p. 130 and His Holiness the Dalai Lama, oral teaching.

75 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay-Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

76 Essence, p. 157.

77 Essence Comm., ga 20a.7-20b.7.

78 Essence, p. 157.

79 Essence Comm., 20b.7-21.a.2.

80 Essence, p. 151.

81 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 483.

82 Ibid., p. 484.

83 His Holiness the Dalai Lama, oral teaching.

84 Tsong-ka-pa, Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, p. 169.

85 Nāgārjuna and Kaysang Gyatso, The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses, trans. and ed. Jeffrey Hopkins and Lati Rimpoche (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 75.

86 D̄zong-ka-b̄a, The Eight Great Difficult Points, p. 28.

87 Ibid., pp. 28-9.

88 Ge-s̄hay B̄el-den Drak-b̄a, oral commentary.

89 D̄zong-ka-b̄a, "Special Insight: From D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Practiced by Persons of the Three Capacities" (Lam rim 'bring), trans. Jeffrey Hopkins (unpublished manuscript), p. 18.

90 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, ca 68a.4.

91 Annotations, dbu 33a.2-7.

92 Ibid., dbu 33b.1-2.

93 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, ca 68a.5-6.

94 Essence Comm., ga 17a.3-4.

95 Essence, p. 153.

96 Essence Comm., ga 18b.1-2.

97 Tsong-ka-pa, Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, p. 171.

98 D̄zong-ka-b̄a, Illumination of the Thought of (Chandrakīrti's "Supplement to the) Middle Way" (dbU ma dgongs pa rab gsal) (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973), pp. 65-73. For English translation, see Tsong-ka-pa, Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, pp. 172-81.

99 Jay-d̄zun-b̄a (rJe-btsun-pa), Good Explanation of the General Meaning, Clarifying the Difficult Points of (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of the 'Supplement to the Treatise on the Middle Way,'" A Necklace for the Fortunate (bsTan bcos dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi dka' gnad gsal bar byed pa'i spyi don legs bshad skal bzang mgul rgyan (Modern blockprint: n.p., n.d.), 70a.1-2.

100 Nāgārjuna and Kaysang Gyatso, The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses, pp. 75-6.

101 Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti, p. 23.

102 Essence Comm., ga 17b.3-18a.4.

103 Tsong-ka-pa, Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, p. 174.

104 Ibid.

105 Jay-dzun-ba, 70b.1-3.

106 Ibid., 70b.7-71a.1

107 Ibid., 71a.3.

108 His Holiness the Dalai ama, oral teaching.

CHAPTER FOUR: ULTIMATE EXISTENCE

1 P 5272, Vol. 99, chapter IX.140.

2 P 5255, Vol. 96 4.2.5-6.

3 P 5256, Vol. 96 27.3.1-4.

4 Four, 458.

5 Jam-yang-shay-ba, ca 71b.3-4.

6 P 5256, Vol. 96 27.5.6-7.

7 Four, 460.

8 J. W. de Jong, "The Problem of the Absolute in Madhyamaka," in Buddhist Studies by J. W. de Jong, ed. Gregory Schopen (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979), p. 57.

9 P 5256, Vol. 96 27.5.7-28.1.1.

10 Four, 460-1.

11 Ibid., 461 and Jam-yang-shay-ba, ca 71b.8.

12 Sha-mar-gen-dun-den-dzin-gya-tso, 81a.1-4.

13 Ibid., 80a.1-3 and Annotations, dbu 68b.7-69a.1.

14 Annotations, dbu 69a.1-3.

15 Ibid., dbu 68a.3-4.

16 Sha-mar-gen-dun-d̄en-dzin-gya-tso, 80b.1-3.

17 Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 271.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 238.

19 Tsong-ka-pa, *Tantra in Tibet: The Great Exposition of Secret Mantra*, p. 70.

20 J̄ang-ḡya, 354.11-16; translation pp. 507-8.

21 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

22 Jang-gya, pp. 343.19-344.13; translation pp. 486-88.

23 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

24 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 344.6-9; translation p. 487 and Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

25 Sha-mar-gen-dun-d̄en-dzin-gya-tso, 82a.4-5.

26 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, ca 72a.7-8.

27 *Annotations*, dbu 69a.6.

28 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 344.14-17; translation p. 488 and Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tu-d̄en, oral commentary.

29 B̄en-dar, 430.4-5.

30 J̄ang-ḡya, pp. 371.20-372.10; translation pp. 542-43.

31 Jñānagarbha, *Differentiation of the Two Truths* (*Satyadvaya-vibhaṅgavṛitti*) (bDen pa gnis rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa) Toh. 3882 (Tokyo: sDe gde Tibetan Tripiṭaka preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, 1978), Vol. 12, p. 2.3.3.

32 *Ibid.*, 3.2.7.

33 *Ibid.*, 3.2.6.

34 The exegesis of this passage is based on J̄ang-ḡya, 372.10-373.10; translation pp. 543-45 and Annotations, dbu 37a.4-38a.1.

35 The discussion of the magician's illusion is based on D̄en-dar, 433.5-435.6.

36 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 374.11-15; translation p. 547.

37 Ibid., p. 375.1-5; translation p. 548.

38 D̄en-dar, 433.6-444.1.

39 Annotations, dbu 68a.5-6.

40 Essence Comm., kha 37a.1-3.

41 Insight, p. 119.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Four, 457.

45 Ibid.

46 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

47 D̄zong-ka-b̄a, Eight Great Difficult Points, pp. 6-7.

48 D̄zong-ka-b̄a, Illumination of the Thought, p. 211 ff. and His Holiness the Dalai Lama, oral teaching.

49 Annotations, dbu 70a.5-70b.2.

50 Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, p. 67.

51 Ibid., p. 75.

52 Annotations, stod 25a.3-25b.8.

53 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

54 Anne Klein, "Mind and Liberation: The Sautrāntika Tenet

System in Tibet," pp. 121-5.

55 Ibid., pp. 129-30.

56 Ibid., pp. 123, 127-8.

57 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Realism," by R. J. Hirst.

58 Ibid.

59 Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, pp. 72-3.

60 Anne Klein, "Mind and Liberation: The Sautrāntika Tenet System in Tibet," p. 131.

61 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Realism," by R. J. Hirst.

62 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Phenomenalism," by R. J. Hirst.

63 Anne Klein, "Mind and Liberation: The Sautrāntika Tenet System in Tibet," p. 105.

64 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 370.2-4; translation pp. 538-39.

65 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Realism," by R. J. Hirst. See also Durant Drake, et al., Essays in Critical Realism (New York: Peter Smith, 1941), pp. 3-32.

66 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Skepticism," by Richard H. Popkin.

67 D̄en-dar, 425.3-4.

68 Hopkins, "Meditation on Emptiness," pp. 680-1.

69 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE REASONING CONSCIOUSNESS

1 P 5255, Vol 96 4.2.5-6.

2 P 5256, Vol. 96 27.4.3-5.

3 P 5256, Vol. 96 27.5.1-3.

4 Katherine Rogers, "Tibetan Logic," p. 8.

5 Ibid., p. 9.

6 Ibid., p. 10.

7 Ibid., p. 11.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

10 Ibid., p. 14.

11 Ibid., p. 15.

12 Ibid., p. 11.

13 P 5256, Vol. 96 27.3.5.

14 P 5256, Vol. 96 27.3.5-27.4.2.

15 Katherine Rogers, "Tibetan Logic," p. 13.

16 Annotations, dbu 28.1.6-8.

17 P 5256, Vol. 96 28.1.6-8.

18 Pur-bu-j̄ok, The Lesser Path of Reasoning, 5a.2-3.

19 P 5256, Vol. 96 28.2.5.

20 Essence Comm., kha 22a.4-23b.6.

21 Ibid., kha 23a.7-23b.4.

22 P 5256, Vol. 96 28.1.8-28.2.4.

23 P 5284, Vol. 101 1.1.8.

24 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 381.7-10; translation p. 561.

25 D̄en-dar, 451.5-6.

26 J̄ang-ḡya, pp. 381.19-382.2; translation p. 562.

27 D̄en-dar, 452.4-453.2

28 Katherine Rogers, "Tibetan Logic," p. 22.

29 Ibid., pp. 22-6.

30 Ibid., p. 26.

31 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 379.4-11; translation p. 557.

32 Pur-bu-j̄ok, The Great Path of Reasoning, 31b.1-2.

33 Nga-w̄ang-d̄ra-s̄hi (Ngag-dbang-bkra-shis), Collected Topics by a Spiritual Son of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a (Srus bsdus grva), (no place, no date), p. 463.

34 Pur-bu-j̄ok, The Great Path of Reasoning, 32b.1-3.

35 Lati Rinbochay, Mind in Tibetan Buddhism, p. 80.

36 D̄en-dar, 453.6-454.1.

37 Ibid., 454.4.

38 Ibid., 454.1-6.

39 Ibid., 454.6-455.4.

40 Anne Klein, "Mind and Liberation: The Sautrāntika Tenet System in Tibet," pp. 164-5.

41 D̄zong-ka-b̄a (Tsong-kha-pa), Notes on (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle Way" (dbU ma rgyan gyi zin bris) (Sarnath, India: Gelukpa Students' Welfare Committee, 1976), p. 45.

42 Ibid., p. 46.

43 Lati Rinbochay, Mind in Tibetan Buddhism, p. 75.

44 D̄en-dar, 460.5-6.

45 Ibid., 459.3-6.

46 Anne Klein, "Mind and Liberation: The Sautrāntika Tenet System in Tibet," p. 85.

47 Ibid., p. 86.

48 D̄zong-ka-b̄a, Notes on (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle Way," pp. 46-7.

49 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

50 Annotations, dbu 49b.7-50a.3.

51 Essence Comm., kha 39b.5-40a.2.

52 Ibid., kha 40a.2-4.

53 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a ('Jam-dbyangs-bshad-pa), Analysis of the First Chapter (of Maitreya's "Ornament for Clear Realization) (sKabs dang po'i mtha' dpyod) (Sarnath, India: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1965), p. 83.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., pp. 84-5.

56 D̄en-dar, 462.1.

57 Ibid., 462.1-463.1.

58 Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, p. 136.

59 D̄en-dar, 463.5-6.

60 P 5284, Vol. 101 1.1.8-1.2.1.

61 D̄en-dar, 464.2-5.

62 Ibid., 464.5-465.3.

63 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 388.3-14; translation pp. 573-74.

64 See Masamichi Ichigo, "A Synopsis of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita*," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 20 (March 1972): 38-42. See also Yuichi Kajiyama, "Later Mādhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation," in *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice*, ed. Minoru Kiyota (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978), pp. 114-43.

65 P 5284, Vol. 101 2.1.2-3.

66 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, *Analysis of the First Chapter of (Maitreya's "Ornament for Clear Realization")*, p. 86.

67 P 5285, Vol. 101 7.4.7.

68 According to Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, *Analysis of the First Chapter*, p. 84, the valid cognizer ascertains the entity (*ngo bo*) of the sign. According to J̄ang-ḡya, p. 392.14, it ascertains the instance (*mtshan gzhi*) of the sign.

69 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 392.12-16; translation p. 581.

70 Jam-ȳang-chok-hla-ö-ser, *Collected Topics of Ra-dö*, 46b.6-47a.1.

71 P 5284, Vol. 101 2.1.3.

72 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, *Analysis of the First Chapter*, p. 82.

73 *Ibid.*

74 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 393.1-6; translation p. 582.

75 *Ibid.*, 394.3-8; translation p. 584.

76 *Ibid.*, 394.8-395.15; translation pp. 584-87.

77 Katherine Rogers, "Tibetan Logic," pp. 100-1.

78 _Ibid._, 101-3.

79 D̄en-dar, 468.5-469.3.

80 _Ibid._, 469.5-470.4.

81 Katherine Rogers, "Tibetan Logic," p. 17.

82 D̄zong-ka-b̄a, _Notes on (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle Way,"_ p. 35.

83 Katherine Rogers, "Tibetan Logic," p. 18.

84 P 5285, Vol. 101 8.3.1-2.

85 J̄ang-ḡya, 397.15; pp. 591-96.

CHAPTER SIX: THE TWO TRUTHS

1 P 5224, Vol. 95, XXIV 8-9.

2 _Two Truths_, 48a.7

3 P 5272, Vol. 99, Chapter IX 1-2ab.

4 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 352.15; translation p. 503.

5 D̄en-ma Lo-chö Rin-b̄o-chay, oral commentary.

6 _Two Truths_, 48b.2-7.

7 P̄an-chen S̄ö-nam-drak-b̄a (_Pan-chen bSod nams-grags-pa_), _General Meaning of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization"_ (_Phar phyin spyi don_) (Buxadour: Nang bstan shes rig 'dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, 1963), 66b.2-5.

8 _Two Truths_, 49a.4-6.

9 _Ibid._, 49a.2-4.

10 Ibid., 48b.7-49a.1.

11 Ibid., 60b.3-6.

12 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 353.11-12; translation p. 505.

13 Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, p. 124.

14 Lati Rinbochay, Mind in Tibetan Buddhism, p. 60.

15 Ibid.

16 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 356.9-10; translation p. 510.

17 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

18 Two Truths, 58a.2-3.

19 Annotations, dbu 38a.4-38b.3.

20 Ibid.

21 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 348.15-17; translation p. 495.

22 Hopkins, "Meditation on Emptiness," pp. 363-5.

23 D̄zong-ka-b̄a, "Special Insight," p. 114.

24 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 353.14-15; translation p. 505.

25 Ibid., p. 353.16-18; translation p.

26 Two Truths, 63a.1-5 and Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

27 Two Truths, 63a.5-63b.7.

28 Ibid., 64b.6-65a.1.

29 D̄zong-ka-b̄a explains that the author of the explanatory commentary to Jñānagarbha's Two Truths is either someone with the same name as the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika Shāntarakṣhita or someone who used his name. He argues

that the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika Shāntarakṣhita is not the author of the commentary because Kamalashīla, in his commentary to Shāntarakṣhita's Compendium of Principles (Tattvasaṃgraha), refutes the author of the commentary to the Two Truths' purpose for composing the text, and Kamalashīla would not refute a statement by his own teacher. Furthermore, the author of commentary to the Two Truths states in that text that it is correct to let stand the statement by Jñānagarbha that the proposition that objects and subjects do not exist as they appear is damaged by direct perception and by renown. In other words, the author of the explanatory commentary holds that objects and subjects exist as they appear whereas Shāntarakṣhita, as a Yogāchāra-Svātantrika, asserts that objects falsely appear to be different in entity from the consciousness perceiving them. See Annotations, dbu 42a.1-3.

30 Two Truths, 65a.1.

31 Ibid., 65a.1-2.

32 D̄en-dar, 448.4.

33 Two Truths, 65a.2-66b.2.

34 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 356.16-19; translation p. 511.

35 Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, p. 82.

36 Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o (dKon-mchogs-'jigs-med-dbang-po), Presentation of the Grounds and Paths, Beautiful Ornament

of the Three Vehicles (Sa lam gyi rnam bzhag theg gsum mdzes rgyan) in Collected Works of dkon-mchog-jigs-med-dbang-po 7 (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972), 434.3-4.

37 Ibid., 433.6.

38 Ibid., 435.5.

39 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, Analysis of the First Chapter, p. 268.

40 Ibid., pp. 268-9.

41 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, Analysis of the Third Chapter of (Maitreya's "Ornament for Clear Realization") (sKabs gsum pa'i mtha' dpyod) (Sarnath, India: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1965), p. 21.

42 Ibid., p. 22.

43 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 355.8-12; translation p. 508.

44 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, Analysis of the Third Chapter, p. 41.

45 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 355.14-18; translation p. 509.

46 Lo-sang-ḡön-chok (bLo-bzang-dkon-mchog), Word Commentary on the Root Text of (Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's) "Tenets," A Crystal Mirror (Grub mtha' rtsa ba'i tshig ṭik shel dkar me long) (Delhi: Chopel Lekden, 1978), 100a.5-101a.3.

47 Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o, Presentation of the Grounds and Paths, 446.3-7.

48 Ibid., 446.7-447.1.

49 Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, oral commentary.

50 J̄ang-ḡya, 358.17-359.3; translation p. 515.

51 Ibid., 372.3-5; translation p. 542-43.

52 Ibid.

53 Two Truths, 62a.5.

54 T. R. V. Murti, "Saṃvṛiti and Paramārtha in Mādhyamika and Advaita Vedānta," in The Problem of the Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta ed. Mervyn Sprung (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing, 1973), p. 17.

55 Two Truths, 62b.1-3.

56 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 353.11; translation p. 505.

57 Ibid., 359.17-18; translation p. 517.

58 Ibid., 360.3-9; translation p. 518.

59 Annotations, dbu 41a.1-3.

60 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 359.13-15; translation p. 516-17.

61 Two Truths, 69b.2-4.

62 See Anne Klein, "Mind and Liberation: The Sautrāntika Tenet System in Tibet," pp. 169-75.

63 Two Truths, 69a.5-7.

64 Annotations, dbu 41a.7-41b.2.

65 Two Truths, 70a.2-3.

66 Annotations, dbu 41a.3-4.

67 J̄ang-ḡya, p. 361.9-14; translation p. 520.

68 Annotations, dbu 95b.2-3.

69 Ibid., dbu 95a.7-96b.3.

70 Two Truths, 50a.3-6.

71 Ibid., 50b.1-2.

72 Ibid., 50b.3-4.

73 *Ibid.*, 50b.5-6.

74 *Ibid.*, 51a.1-2.

75 *Ibid.*, 51a.3-4.

76 *Ibid.*, 51a.5-6.

77 *Ibid.*, 51a.7-51b.1.

78 *Ibid.*, 50b.6-7, 51b.1-2.

79 P̄an-chen S̄ö-nam-drak-b̄a, *General Meaning of Maitreya's "Ornament for Clear Realization"*, 68b.6.

CHAPTER SEVEN: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SVĀTANTRIKA SYSTEM

1 The commentary to the Svāntrika chapter is found in *Annotations*, dbu 55a.6-58a.3.

2 The commentary to the Svātantrika chapter is found in L̄o-sang-ḡön-chok, 94b.1-108b.1.

3 L̄o-sang-ḡön-chok, 94b.3-95a.1.

4 *Ibid.*, 95a.2-4.

5 *Annotations*, dbu 55b.1-4, L̄o-sang-ḡön-chok, 95b.1-96b.2.

6 *Annotations*, dbu 55b.6-8.

7 *Ibid.*, 55b.8-56a.3.

8 *Ibid.*, 56a.3.

9 *Ibid.*, 56a.3-5.

10 L̄o-sang-ḡön-chok, 98b.2-3.

11 *Ibid.*, 98b.5-6.

12 *Annotations*, dbu 56a.6-8, L̄o-sang-ḡön-chok, 99a.2-99b.1.

13 Lo-sang-gön-chok, 99b.3-5.

14 *Ibid.*, 99b.5-100a.5, 101b.2-5.

15 *Annotations*, dbu 56b.6-7.

16 Lo-sang-gön-chok, 102a.3-102b.5, *Annotations*, dbu 56b.7-57a.3.

17 Lo-sang-gön-chok, 103a.2-103b.3, Ge-shay Bel-den Drak-ba, oral commentary.

18 Ge-shay Bel-den Drak-ba, oral commentary.

19 *Essence*, p. 3.

20 Ge-shay Bel-den Drak-ba, oral commentary.

21 *Ibid.*

22 *Ibid.*

23 *Ibid.*

24 *Ibid.*

25 *Ibid.*

26 *Annotations*, dbu 57b.3-8; see Hopkins, "Meditation on Emptiness," pp. 487-554.

27 *Annotations*, dbu 57b.8.

28 *Ibid.*, 57b.8-58a.3.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

1 Biographical sketch of J̄ang-ḡya is drawn from E. Gene Smith, "The Biography of Lcang-skya Rol-pa'i-rdo-rje," in the Collected Works of Thu'u-bkwan Blo-bzang-chos-kyi-nyi-ma, Vol. 1 (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1969), pp. 2-12 and Lokesh Chandra, Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature, Vol. 1 (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1963), pp. 38-41.

CHAPTER ONE: THE LIFE AND WORKS OF NĀGĀRJUNA

1 P 775, Vol. 29 74.3.6-7. For another translation, see D. T. Suzuki, trans., The Lankavatara Sutra (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1932), p. 239.

2 P 775, Vol. 29 74.3.7-8. For another translation, see Suzuki, pp. 239-40.

3 According to Tāranātha's History of Buddhism, the text was 12,000 stanzas in length.

4 The biography of Nāgārjuna up to this point is a summary of Bu-dön's History. See Obermiller, Bu-ston's History of Buddhism, pp. 122-5.

5 According to Jeffrey Hopkins, Geshe Gedün Lodrö suggested that this text had been given the name of its author, Akutobhayā, as is the case with Buddhapālita's commentary

on Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way.

6 According to Warder, Parahita was a late Mādhyamika (c. 1000) who composed a subcommentary to Chandrakīrti's Shunyatāsaptitivṛitti. See Warder's Indian Buddhism, p. 510.

CHAPTER TWO: MĀDHYAMIKA SCHOOLS IN INDIA

1 The translation is uncertain.

2 According to L. T. Doboom Tulku, sTong thun should be translated as Thousand Doses because the text delineates many antidotes to ignorance.

3 Essence, p. 3.

4 The title of this text is usually abbreviated to Heart Ornament, an Explanation (rNam bshad snying po'i rgyan).

5 Essence, p. 180.

6 Ibid., pp. 179-80.

7 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, ca 9a.5.

8 In a passage not quoted by J̄ang-ḡya, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a goes on to say:

> Buddhapālita founded Prāsaṅgika but it is not clear whether or not he asserted autonomous [syllogisms]. Chandrakīrti taught that Buddhapālita did not assert autonomous [syllogisms], proved the unsuitability of

the use of autonomous [syllogism] by Mādhyamikas, overturned autonomous syllogisms, and damaged existence by way of own-character.

Thus, it appears, contrary to J̄ang-ḡya's opinion, that Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a considered Buddhapālita to be the founder of Prāsaṅgika. See Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, ca 9a.5-7.

CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY OF MĀDHYAMIKA IN TIBET

1 According to Ken-sur Ye-s̄hay Tup-d̄en, it is the opinion of P̄an-chen Sö-nam-drak-b̄a that Dharmakīrti of Suvarṇadvīpa was a True Aspectarian (Satyākāravādin) Chittamātrin.

2 See Ga-wa-jam-ba (dGa'-ba-byams-pa), Commentary on D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Praise of Dependent Arising," A Garland of White Light (rTen 'brel stod pa'i ḍikka 'od dkar 'phreng ba) (no place, no date) 28a.4.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE MIDDLE WAY

1 This statement forms part of Chandrakīrti's commentary to Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way XV.11. For the Sanskrit see Poussin's Mūlamadhyamakakārikas (Mādhyamika-sūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti, pp. 274-5.

2 Ibid., p. 275.

3 The son of Ulūka, also known as Aulūkya, is better known as Kaṇāda, the author of the Vaisheṣhika Sūtras. See Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 305.

4 See Gyel-tsap's Illumination of the Meaning of the Essence of (Nāgārjuna's) "Precious Garland" (dbU ma rin chen 'phreng ba'i snying po'i don gsal par byed pa) (no place, no date, Modern blockprint in possession of Geshe Gedün Lodrö), 17b.3.

5 Precious Garland (Ratnāvalī), stanzas 61 and 62. Commented on by Gyel-tsap, 17b.1-18a.2.

6 For Chandrakīrti's commentary, see P 5265. Vol. 98 181.3.1-181.5.

7 See Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning (Sarnath edition), pp. 15-16.

8 Precious Garland, stanzas 394-6. For commentary, see Essence, pp. 98-99 and Gyel-tsap, 64a.2-6.

CHAPTER SIX: THE PRACTICE OF THE PATH

1 A being of small capacity is a person who is primarily seeking high status in cyclic existence for himself alone. A being of middling capacity is a person who is primarily seeking liberation from cyclic existence for himself alone through overcoming attachment to the marvels of cyclic existence.

2 The six perfections are giving (dāna), ethics (shīla), patience (kṣhānti), effort (vīrya), concentration (dhyāna), and wisdom (prajñā).

3 The four ways of gathering students are giving gifts, speaking pleasantly, teaching others to fulfill their aims, and acting according to this teaching oneself. See Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, p. 33.

4 From Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayālaṃkāra).

5 For an explanation of leisure and fortune, see Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, p. 33.

6 For an explanation of the sixteen aspects of the four truths, see Anne Klein, "Mind and Liberation: The Sautrāntika Tenet System in Tibet," pp. 551-7.

7 For a list of the thirty-seven harmonies, see Jeffrey Hopkins, "Meditation on Emptiness," pp. 365-7.

CHAPTER SEVEN: SVĀTANTRIKA

1 mDo sde spyod pa is actually Sūtrāntāchārin in Sanskrit, but is translated as "Sautrāntika" in order to indicate more easily this branch of Svātantrika's affinity with Sautrāntika.

2 P 5285, Vol. 101 13.1.4. The translation is based on Gyel-tsap's Purification of Forgetfulness of (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle Way" (dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang) (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1976), pp. 97-98.

3 P 5285, Vol. 101 13.2.1.

CHAPTER EIGHT: REFUTATION OF CHITTĀMATRA

1 P 5255, Vol. 96 11.2.8-11.3.2. Explained at P 5256, Vol. 96 91.3.2-8.

2 P 5255, Vol. 96 12.1.6-7. Explained at P 5256, Vol. 96, 97.3.1-5.

3 P 5255, Vol. 96 12.1.7. Explained at P 5256, Vol. 96 97.3.5-97.4.2.

4 P 5255, Vol. 96 12.1.7.

5 P 5256, Vol. 96 97.4.2-4.

6 P 5255, Vol. 96 12.1.7-8.

7 P 5256, Vol. 96 97.4.7-8.

8 P 5255, Vol. 96 12.3.1.

9 P 5256, Vol. 96 99.3.1-7.

10 P 5255, Vol. 96 12.4.7-8. Explained at P 5256, Vol. 96 102.1.8-102.2.3

11 P 5255, Vol. 96 12.4.8-12.5.1.

12 P 5256, Vol. 96 102.2.6-102.3.2.

13 P 5255, Vol. 96 12.5.1-2.

14 P 5256, Vol. 96 102.3.8.

15 P 5256, Vol. 96 102.1.7.

16 P 5255, Vol. 96 11.3.4-5.

17 P 5256, Vol. 96 92.1.6-7.

18 P 5256, Vol. 96 92.1.8-92.2.1.

19 P 5255, Vol. 96 11.3.6.

20 P 5255, Vol. 96 11.3.6-8.

21 P 5256, Vol. 96 92.3.6.

22 P 5255, Vol. 96 11.4.7-11.5.1.

23 P 5255, Vol. 96 11.5.1-2. Explained at P 5256, Vol. 96 94.4.8-94.5.2.

24 P 5255, Vol. 96 11.5.2-3. Explained at P 5256, Vol. 96 94.5.2-95.1.5.

25 P 5256, Vol. 96 94.5.8-95.1.5.

26 P 5255, Vol. 96 11.5.4. Explained at P 5256, Vol. 96 95.1.7-95.2.5

27 P 5255, Vol. 96 11.3.8. Explained at P 5256, Vol. 96 92.4.5-92.5.2

28 P 5255, Vol. 96 11.3.8-11.4.1. Explained at P 5256, Vol. 96 92.5.2-93.1.7.

29 P 5256, Vol. 96 93.1.1-4.

30 P 5255, Vol. 96 11.4.5-6. Explained at P 5256, Vol. 96 94.2.2-4.

31 P 5256, Vol. 96 94.2.3-4.

CHAPTER NINE: THE MEANING OF ULTIMATE EXISTENCE

1 P 5256, Vol. 96 27.3.1-4.

2 P 5256, Vol. 96 27.5.7-28.1.1.

3 Essence, p. 132.

4 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a identifies the opponent as Je-drung S̄hay-rap-w̄ang-bo/(rJe-drung Shes-rab-dbang-po). See Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, Great Exposition of the Middle Way (dbU ma chen mo) (Buxaduor: Gomang, 1967), 207a.1.

5 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 206b.6-208a.1.

CHAPTER TEN: REFUTATION OF ULTIMATE EXISTENCE

1 The five great reasons are the diamond slivers, the refutation of production of the four extremes, the refutation of production of the four alternatives, the reasoning of dependent arising, and the reasoning of the lack of being one or many. For a discussion see Jeffrey Hopkins, "Meditation on Emptiness," pp. 478-608.

2 P 5255, Vol. 96 4.2.5-6.

3 P 5256, Vol. 96 27.3.6.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: THE INTEGRATION OF MIND-ONLY

1 P 5284, Vol. 101 2.3.4.

2 The phrase mtshungs par ldan pa dang bcas pa'i is omitted from the translation.

3 P 5285, Vol. 101 13.2.4-5.

4 P 5285, Vol. 101 13.2.5-6.

5 Cited by Shāntarakṣhita at P 5285, Vol 101 13.2.6-8.

6 Cited by Shāntarakṣhita at P 5285, Vol. 101 13.2.8-13.3.1.

7 Cited by Shāntarakṣhita at P 5285, Vol. 101 13.3.1-3. The Tibetan translation of the stanzas from the sutra cited by J̄ang-ḡya and Shāntarakṣhita differs from that found in the Peking edition of the sutra (P 775, Vol. 29 75.5.3-4). The Peking edition reads:

sems tsam la ni gnas ni
phyi rol don la mi brtag go
yang dag dmigs la gnas nas ni
sems tsam las ni 'da' bar bya

sems tsam las ni 'das nas ni
snang ba med las 'da' bar bya
rnal 'byor snang pa med gnas na
theg pa chen po mi mthong ngo

Jñānavajra comments on these stanzas in his Commentary to the "Descent into Laṅkā Sutra," Ornament of the Heart of

the Tathāgata (Laṅkāvatāranāmamahāyānasūtravṛittitathāgata-hṛidayalaṃkāra) at P 5520, Vol. 107 315.3.6-315.4.1:

> The meaning of "[Through relying on] mind-only," etc. is that on the occasions of the heat (uṣhmān) and peak (mūrdhan) [levels of the path of preparation], one abides in the conception of mind-only—the non-inherent existence of objects—and one does not imagine external objects. Eventually, on the occasion of the path of seeing, one abides in the correct observation that even apprehending minds do not have entityness ultimately, and one passes beyond the adherence to apprehending minds. Having passed beyond mind-only, one temporarily passes beyond abiding in non-apprehension—the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise (samāhita) on the path of seeing, and so forth—and on the occasion of subsequent attainment (pṛiṣhṭhalabdha) completes the grounds (bhūmi) through training and so forth on the grounds.

8 P 5284, Vol. 101 2.3.5.

9 The five phenomena are signs (mtshan ma), names (ming), conceptions (rnam rtog), suchness (de bzhin nyid), and perfect exalted wisdom (yang dag pa'i ye shes). See P 775, Vol. 29 66.2.6 ff.

10 P 5285, Vol. 101 13.4.2-3. The sutra source is P 775, Vol. 29 66.3.5-6.

11 P 5285, Vol. 101.

12 According to Obermiller, the <u>Eight Chapters</u> is a summary of the <u>Perfection of Wisdom in Twenty-Five Thousand Stanzas</u>. See his "The Doctrine of Prajñā-pāramitā as Exposed in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra of Maitreya," <u>Acta Orientalia</u>, Vol. 11, (1932): p. 9.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THE MEANING OF TRUE EXISTENCE

1 According to Kensur Ngawang Lekden, <u>rdzas</u> refers to a special salve that the magician places on the pebble or stick which, in conjunction with the mantra which is cast on the eyes of the audience, causes pebble or stick to appear as a horse or elephant.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: THE LACK OF BEING ONE OR MANY

1 P 5284, Vol. 101 1.1.8.

2 Translated with commentary in Anne Klein, "Mind and Liberation: The Sautrāntika Tenet System in Tibet," pp. 433-569.

3 <u>Pakṣhadharma</u> is translated as "the property of the subject" because <u>pakṣha</u> refers to the subject in this case, not to

the entire position. The name of the whole is used for a part.

4 P 5284, Vol. 101 1.1.8-1.2.1.

5 *Ibid.*, 1.2.1-1.2.2.

6 *Ibid.*, 1.2.2-1.2.4.

7 *Ibid.*, 1.2.5.

8 *Ibid.*, 1.2.5-6.

9 *Ibid.*, 1.2.6.

10 This stanza is omitted by J̄ang-ḡya and has been added from P 5284, Vol. 101 1.2.7.

11 P 5284, Vol. 101 1.2.6-8.

12 *Ibid.*, 2.1.2-3.

13 *Ibid.*, 7.4.7

14 *Ibid.*, 2.1.3.

15 *Ibid.*, 8.2.8.

16 *Ibid.*, 8.3.1-2.

17 *Ibid.*, 8.3.2-5.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: THE PATHS AND FRUITS

1 P 5285, Vol. 101 15.1.8-15.2.1.

2 *Ibid.*, 15.2.1-2.

3 *Ibid.*, 14.4.4-5.

NOTES TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

1 See "Notes to the Translation," Chapter One, note 5.

2 See "Notes: Chapter Six," note 29.

NOTES TO THE TIBETAN TEXT

Notes indicate all discrepancies between the two editions of the Svātantrika chapter of J̄ang-ḡya's Presentation of Tenets (Grub mtha'i rnam bzhag). The edition reproduced here is that published by the Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press in Sarnath, India, in 1970. "Delhi" refers to the edition edited by Lokesh Chandra and published by Sharada Rani in New Delhi in 1977. Preferences, if any, are indicated and errors which occur in both texts are noted. In the Sarnath edition of the chapter, several pages are misnumbered: page 361 should be page 363, 362 should be 364, 363 should be 361, and 364 should be 362. These pages have been placed in proper sequence and renumbered in the text reproduced here. Thanks to Craig Preston for initially collating the two editions.

1 Changed from su to sus in accordance with the Delhi edition.

2 Delhi edition reads be ta'i.

3 Delhi erroneously reads rtogs.

4 Delhi edition omits pha mas.

5 Delhi edition reads de nas de rim gyis.

6 Delhi omits song.

7 Delhi reads khrid.

8 Delhi erroneously reads na.

9 Changed from dad to dag in accordance with Delhi.

10 Delhi reads zhal lta.

11 Delhi reads gsungs.

12 Changed from yan to yin in accordance with Delhi.

13 Delhi reads zhing.

14 Delhi reads sa.

15 Changed from skye po to skye bo by editor. Delhi reads skyes bu.

16 Delhi erroneously reads gra.

17 Delhi reads bzhengs.

18 Changed from khyad par to khyad par du in accordance with Delhi.

19 Delhi reads gsos.

20 Changed from rgyan to rgya by editor.

21 Changed from skye po to skye bo by editor.

22 Delhi erroneously reads *gsal*.

23 Delhi erroneously reads *kyang*.

24 Delhi reads *lhugs*.

25 Delhi reads *gsung ngo*.

26 *Ibid.*

27 Changed from *yan* to *yin* in accordance with Delhi.

28 Delhi reads *mongs*.

29 Delhi erroneously reads *rig*.

30 Delhi reads *rtsigs*.

31 Changed from *grag go* to *grags so* by editor.

32 Delhi reads *lu*.

33 Changed from *rjad* to *brjod* in accordance with Delhi.

34 Delhi erroneously reads *sgrags*.

35 Delhi erroneously reads *dbyings*.

36 Delhi reads *bsam*.

37 Changed from *te* to *de* in accordance with Delhi.

38 Delhi reads *grig*.

39 Delhi reads *gyis*.

40 Delhi reads *grig*.

41 Changed from *gyis* to *kyis* in accordance with Delhi.

42 Delhi reads *Indra bodhi*.

43 Delhi reads *cing*.

44 *Ibid.*

45 Delhi reads *mongs*.

46 Changed from *dbum* to *dbu ma* by editor.

47 Changed from gas to gis in accordance with Delhi.

48 Changed from bde na to bden in accordance with Delhi.

49 Delhi reads thig.

50 Delhi reads min te.

51 Changed from mchos to mtshos by editor.

52 Changed from pha to pa in accordance with Delhi.

53 Delhi reads khung.

54 Changed from yan to yin in accordance with Delhi.

55 Changed to bo by editor.

56 Delhi erroneously reads zhes.

57 Delhi reads 'brang.

58 Delhi reads lo tsa tsha ba.

59 Changed from pa'i to ba'i by editor.

60 Delhi erroneously reads zhing.

61 Delhi erroneously reads za.

62 Changed from ches to chen by editor.

63 Delhi erroneously reads gyis.

64 Delhi erroneously reads shing.

65 Delhi erroneously reads dri na.

65 Changed from pod to bod by editor.

67 Delhi reads gsung.

68 Delhi reads rgyud.

69 Changed from grub to sgrub by editor.

70 Delhi reads rgyud.

71 Changed from pa to ba by editor.

72 Delhi reads kyi.

73 Changed from kyis skya to kyi sa skya in accordance with Delhi.

74 Delhi reads chen pa.

75 Changed from zhes to shes in accordance with Delhi.

76 Delhi reads lag.

77 Delhi reads rgyud.

78 Ibid.

79 Delhi reads 'bring po.

80 Delhi reads phongs.

81 Changed from rngo to rdo by editor.

82 Delhi reads ris.

83 Changed from cang to cing in accordance with Delhi.

84 Delhi erroneously reads phyin.

85 Delhi reads gsungs pa.

86 Delhi reads khung.

87 Delhi reads rtsigs.

88 Changed from 'dod to 'dor in accordance with Delhi.

89 Delhi reads rtsad.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 Delhi reads 'tshams.

93 Delhi reads rang gi.

94 Ibid.

95 Delhi erroneously reads blo bur.

96 Delhi reads bsgrigs.

97 Ibid.

98 Delhi reads dbu ma par khas.

99 Changed from bzad to bzang by editor.

100 Delhi reads bgyid pa.

101 Delhi reads 'gengs.

102 Changed from bla chos to sla chos in accordance with Delhi.

103 Delhi reads bsgrigs.

104 Delhi reads ces.

105 Delhi reads mi 'chug.

106 Delhi erroneously reads mngon su ma.

107 Delhi reads cig.

108 Ibid.

109 Here and throughout, Delhi reads la rten nas.

110 Here and throughout, Delhi reads kun btags.

111 Changed from bka' pa to bkag pa in accordance with Delhi.

112 Delhi reads cig.

113 Delhi reads sems dang sems byung.

114 Delhi reads ltos.

115 Delhi reads gyur ba.

116 Changed from gal to ga la by editor.

117 Changed from zhes to shes by editor.

118 Delhi erroneously reads rig pa.

119 Delhi reads ces.

120 Delhi reads yong.

121 Delhi erroneously reads _rtogs pa_.

122 Delhi erroneously reads _rig pa_.

123 Delhi reads _zhes_.

124 Delhi reads _zhig_.

125 Delhi reads _dpyod_.

126 Changed from _'gyur_ to _'byung_ by editor.

127 Changed from _gdams_ to _gdags_ by editor.

128 Changed from _na_ to _no_ in accordance with Delhi.

129 Delhi reads _grub par_.

130 Delhi reads _sgron ma_.

131 Changed from _gdams_ to _gdags_ in accordance with Delhi.

132 _Ibid._

133 Delhi reads _'chug pa_.

134 Changed from _gdams_ to _gdags_ by editor.

135 Changed from _stong_ to _steng_ by editor.

136 Changed from _cang_ to _cad_ by editor.

137 Changed from _yan_ to _yin_ by editor.

138 Delhi reads _drangs_.

139 Changed from _dran_ to _drang_ in accordance with Delhi.

140 Changed from _gsas_ to _gsal_ by editor.

141 Delhi reads _rtul_.

142 Delhi reads _sgron ma_.

143 Delhi reads _drangs_.

144 Delhi reads _bsgrub pa_.

145 _Ibid._

146 Delhi reads gcig.

147 Delhi erroneously reads rtogs.

148 Changed from gyi to gyis in accordance with Delhi.

149 Delhi reads zhes.

150 Delhi reads bsgrub pa.

151 Delhi reads tshig rkang.

152 Delhi reads rtsa shes kyi.

153 Delhi reads ces.

154 Delhi erroneously reads brjod.

155 Delhi reads ye shes snying po'i rgyan.

156 Delhi reads bsgom.

157 Change from sgra bzhin pa ma yin pa'i don la yin te to sgra ji bzhin pa ma yin pa'i mdo ma yin te in accordance with Delhi.

158 Delhi erroneously reads 'bom.

159 Delhi erroneously reads sbyar phyin.

160 Delhi erroneously reads shes.

161 Changed from dgag byal to dgag bya la in accordance with Delhi.

162 Changed from dngos sum to dngos su ma in accordance with Delhi.

163 Delhi reads ltos.

164 Delhi reads rang nyid kyis don gyis bshad pa'i tshul.

165 Delhi reads gsum ka.

166 Delhi reads drangs.

167 Delhi reads ltos.

168 Changed from dber to dper in accordance with Delhi.

169 Delhi reads grva.

170 Changed from bsal to bsam in accordance with Delhi.

171 Changed from sprel to 'brel in accordance with Delhi.

172 Delhi reads bslab pa.

173 Delhi reads skyed.

174 Ibid.

175 Changed from zhas to zhes by editor.

176 Delhi reads bsgom.

177 Delhi erroneously reads rtsom pa 'am.

178 Delhi reads bsgom.

179 Changed from gnyig to gnyis in accordance with Delhi.

180 Changed from yig to yi ge in accordance with Delhi.

181 Delhi reads ring du.

182 Delhi reads bskyed.

183 Delhi reads sgron ma.

184 Changed from gdams to gdags by editor.

185 Changed from rgol to rgol phyi rgol by editor.

186 Here and throughout, except where noted, Delhi reads bsgrub or bsgrubs.

187 Delhi erroneously reads nyid.

188 Changed from lang to lung in accordance with Delhi.

189 Changed from dan to don in accordance with Delhi.

190 Changed from seks to sems by editor.

191 Changed from mang to ming in accordance with Delhi.

192 Delhi reads brda'.

193 Changed from do to de by editor.

194 Changed from gsam to gsal in accordance with Delhi.

195 Here and throughout, Delhi reads mnyam par bzhag or mnyam bzhag.

196 Changed from ma to nam in accordance with Delhi.

197 Delhi reads 'phros.

198 Delhi reads rnam bzhag throughout.

199 Delhi erroneously reads rig pa'i.

200 Delhi reads dpog.

201 Delhi reads sgron ma.

202 Delhi reads bstsal.

203 Changed from na to ni in accordance with Delhi.

204 Delhi reads dangs ba.

205 Changed from du to pu in accordance with Delhi.

206 Changed from spyar to sbyar by editor.

207 Delhi reads bskyed.

208 Changed from shes to zhes in accordance with Delhi.

209 Changed from bzhad par to bzhag par na in accordance with Delhi.

210 Delhi reads bsgrib.

211 Changed from nas to na sa by editor.

212 Changed from 'da to 'di in accordance with Delhi.

213 Changed from zhes na to des na in accordance with Delhi.

214 Changed from yum to yul in accordance with Delhi.

215 Changed from bzhad to bshad by editor.

216 Delhi erroneously reads ni 'byung ba min.

217 Here and throughout, Delhi reads brtags.

218 Changed from ga to gi in accordance with Delhi.

219 Changed from me tog to mi stog in accordance with Delhi.

220 Changed from spyar to sbyar by editor.

221 Ibid.

222 Delhi reads phyed.

223 Changed from dbus to dbu ma in accordance with Delhi.

224 Delhi reads zlog.

225 Changed from la to kha in accordance with Delhi.

226 Delhi reads gcig.

227 Delhi reads zhes.

228 Delhi reads gcig.

229 Delhi erroneously reads rig pas.

230 Delhi reads gcig.

231 Ibid.

232 Delhi erroneously reads zhes.

233 Changed from phyi las to phyi mas in accordance with Delhi.

234 Delhi reads gcig.

235 Ibid.

236 Ibid.

237 Delhi reads tshab.

238 Delhi reads *gyis*.

239 Here and throughout, Delhi reads *brtags*.

240 Delhi reads *zhes*.

241 Delhi reads *zhing*.

242 Delhi reads *zhing*.

243 Changed from *na* to *ni* in accordance with Delhi.

244 Changed from *dam bcas* to *dam bca'* in accordance with Delhi.

245 Delhi reads *bcings*.

246 Changed from *gzung ched* to *gzugs med* in accordance with Delhi.

247 Changed from *phral* to *bral* in accordance with Delhi.

248 Delhi reads *gcig*.

249 Delhi reads *bzhi ka*.

250 *Ibid.*

251 Delhi reads *zhes*.

252 Delhi reads *bsgoms*.

253 Changed from *dngas* to *dngos* in accordance with Delhi.

254 Changed from *spyar* to *spyir* in accordance with Delhi.

255 Delhi reads *gsung*.

256 Delhi reads *gnon*.

257 Changed from *dbye* to *byed* in accordance with Delhi.

258 Delhi reads *zhes*.

259 Delhi reads *med pas*.

260 Changed from *zhes* to *shes* in accordance with Delhi.

261 Delhi reads *spangs pa'i*.

262 Delhi reads gsung.

263 Changed from gi to ge by editor.

264 Delhi reads gsung.

265 Delhi reads spangs.

266 Delhi reads kyang.

267 Delhi erroneously reads blo.

268 Delhi reads spangs.

269 Delhi reads rtsad.

270 Changed from grub to ma grub in accordance with Delhi.

271 Delhi erroneously reads 'gral ba.

272 Delhi omits yang.

273 Delhi reads khas len.

274 Changed from byad to byed in accordance with Delhi.

275 Delhi reads cig.

276 Delhi reads bsgom.

277 Delhi reads 'ongs.

278 Changed from chos to chog in accordance with Delhi.

279 Delhi reads spangs.

280 Delhi reads ltos dgos.

281 Delhi reads spang.

282 Delhi reads gcig.

283 Changed from thugs to shugs in accordance with Delhi.

284 Changed from rags to rigs by editor.

285 Delhi erroneously reads kyis.

286 Changed from 'ag ngas to 'gangs by editor.

287 Changed from bdag gi dang to bdag dang bdag gi dang in accordance with Delhi.

288 Delhi reads bzla.

289 Ibid.

290 Changed from zho na to zhon in accordance with Delhi.

291 Delhi erroneously reads zhes.

292 Delhi erroneously reads rig pa.

293 Delhi erroneously reads zhas.

294 Changed from bthob to 'thob in accordance with Delhi.

295 Changed from bjod to brjod by editor.

296 Delhi erroneously reads bdan.

297 Delhi reads bsams.

298 Delhi reads chen po.

299 Changed from slob to sleb in accordance with Delhi.

300 Delhi reads bzhag pa yin gyi de lta ma yin par.

301 Changed from rar to rang by editor.

302 Delhi reads 'tshams.

303 Delhi erroneously reads sa ban.

304 Changed from yino to yin no in accordance with Delhi.

305 Changed from na to ni in accordance with Delhi.

306 Changed from 'jin to 'dzin in accordance with Delhi.

307 Delhi erroneously reads tshad pa.

308 Delhi reads de ka.

309 Changed from na sa to nas in accordance with Delhi.

310 Changed from 'rje to rjes in accordance with Delhi.

311 Changed from lugs to lugs la in accordance with Delhi.

312 Delhi reads zhing.

313 Delhi reads stong pa.

314 Delhi reads thun mongs.

315 Changed from sdo da to sdod in accordance with Delhi.

316 Delhi reads yod rgyu.

317 Delhi reads gyi.

318 Delhi reads dag.

319 Changed from mnyis to gnyis in accordance with Delhi.

320 Changed from rgya to rkya in accordance with Delhi.

321 Delhi reads kyang.

322 Delhi reads ltos.

323 Delhi erroneously reads sgrub.

324 Delhi reads gyur.

325 Delhi reads ltos.

326 Delhi erroneously reads rigs ba.

327 Ibid.

328 Delhi erronecusly reads kyi sa.

329 Delhi reads bskyed.

330 Ibid.

331 Ibid.

332 Ibid.

333 Ibid.

334 Changed from zagb rjed to zag brjed in accordance with Delhi.

335 Changed from tse mo to rtse mo in accordance with Delhi.

336 Changed from med pa pa to med pa in accordance with Delhi.

337 Delhi reads 'gags.

338 Delhi reads bskyed.

339 Delhi reads sgom.

340 Ibid.

341 Delhi reads bsgom.

342 Delhi reads sgom.

343 Ibid.

344 Changed from gyis to kyis in accordance with Delhi.

345 Changed from 'phrad to 'phrod in accordance with Delhi.

346 Changed from la to ma by editor.

347 Delhi reads bsgrub.

348 Delhi reads gcig.

349 Delhi reads 'gags.

350 Delhi reads cig.

351 Delhi erroneously reads 'chad pa.

352 Changed from gtso bos to gtso bo in accordance with Delhi.

353 Changed from pa sa to pas in accordance with Delhi.

354 Changed from pal to pa la by editor.

355 Delhi reads gyur.

356 Delhi reads ltos.

357 Delhi reads char.

358 Delhi reads phul.

359 Delhi reads kha.

360 Delhi reads bzung.

361 Delhi reads thog.

362 Delhi reads zhes.

363 Changed from tshad to tshad ma in accordance with Delhi.

364 Changed from phar to par in accordance with Delhi.

365 Delhi erroneously reads gyi.

366 Delhi reads gcig.

367 Ibid.

368 Delhi erroneously omits dang.

369 Delhi reads stongs.

370 Changed from ba'i to pa'i in accordance with Delhi.

371 Delhi erroneously reads sgrub bya.

372 Changed from pcad to bcad by editor.

373 Delhi erroneously reads sgrub bya.

374 Ibid.

375 Delhi erroneously reads bskyed.

376 Delhi erroneously reads min pas.

377 Delhi reads ces.

378 Delhi reads bskyed.

379 Delhi erroneously reads sgrub bya'i.

380 Delhi reads sgrub.

381 Changed from dgos to dogs in accordance with Delhi.

382 Delhi reads sgrub rather than sgrub pa.

383 Changed from blo to sgro in accordance with Delhi.

384 Delhi erroneously reads 'thad pa'i.

385 Delhi reads snyam pa'i.

386 Changed from byas pa to byis pa in accordance with Delhi.

387 Delhi reads phye ba.

388 Delhi reads spangs.

389 Delhi reads kyang.

390 Delhi reads ci yang.

391 Delhi reads chen mo.

392 Delhi reads bsgom.

393 Delhi reads gsung n[illegible].

394 Changed from rang rigs len pa to rang rig khas len pa in accordance with Delhi.

395 Delhi reads yang.

396 Changed from 'chi pa'i to 'ches pa'i in accordance with Delhi.

397 Delhi reads 'ches.

398 Ibid.

399 Delhi reads 'brangs.

400 Changed from bden ba'i to 'dren pa'i by editor.

401 Delhi reads ltos.

402 Changed from rtsa to rtse by editor.

403 Changed from gyis to gyi sa by editor.

404 Delhi reads thun mongs.

405 Delhi reads brtul pos.

406 Changed from pa'i to ba'i in accordance with Delhi; Delhi reads 'byung ba'i kun byang gi.

407 Delhi reads bslab pa'i.

408 Changed from chogs pas to chags pas by editor.

409 Delhi reads spangs.

410 Delhi reads bsgom spangs.

411 Ibid.

412 Delhi reads skad gcig.